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Abstract 
 
This thesis discusses transparency as a rule and a principle in the World Trade 
Organization. Transparency is used in many contexts within the organization in order to 
describe phenomena ranging from Agreement provisions to soft law or general principle 
and from the obligation of member states to publish national trade laws to civil society 
participation in the WTO. I argue that they all these transparency variations are linked as 
they relate to the organization’s democratization potential.  
 
This thesis has three goals: First, it offers an overview of scholarship discussing 
legitimacy problems in the WTO. Second, it describes, assesses and offers ideas for 
improvement for the four different forms of transparency –internal, external, 
administrative and legal- in the WTO. Third, as a contribution to the debate on 
transparency and legitimacy in the WTO, the thesis proposes a theoretical framework 
combining composite democracy and transparency in the WTO to discuss the link 
between the two concepts. 
 
I argue that the four transparency dimensions help make the WTO a more democratic 
organization. At the international level elections are currently impossible, but other 
governance rules and practices can advance the degree of democratization of 
international institutions. Under the theory of composite democracy, democratization is 
best explored not through the exclusive focus on elections but taking into account other 
factors, such as adherence to the rule of law, adequate representation, minority 
participation avenues and transparency. I will examine if and to what extent the WTO’s 
“transparencies” correspond to the non-electoral composite democracy parameters.  
 
My methodology is based on reviewing legal scholarship and WTO data analysis, 
focusing on treaties, case law, official speeches and website announcements. This thesis 
aims to ultimately explore how the democratizing potential of transparency can expand 
the WTO’s normative space to become more inclusive and effectively address the 
organization’s legitimacy problems. Improving all the different rules and practices that 
WTO scholars and diplomats call “transparency” can help with WTO’s legitimacy issues: 
making the WTO more open and inclusive and trade regulation information easier to 
access and understand can make the WTO a more democratic institution, and therefore 
more legitimate. The normative conclusion of this thesis is that more transparent regimes 
are more democratic.  
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1 
Introduction 
 
 
“Origin of the World Trade organization 
 
They needed a god of trade. From his throne on Olympus, Zeus surveyed 
his family. He did not have to ponder long. Hermes was the god for the 
job. Zeus gave him sandals with little gold wings and put him in charge of 
promoting the exchange of goods, the signing of treaties, and the 
safeguarding of free trade. Hermes, who would become Mercury in Rome, 
was chosen because he was the best liar.” 
 
Eduardo Galeano, Mirrors1 
 
If it were ever to compete for an Oscar, transparency would probably be nominated in 
the ‘best supporting actress’ category. 
Andrea Bianchi2 
 
 
During the forty or so years of the GATT era, trade tariffs were negotiated among 
member states behind closed doors. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade3 was 
not just an Agreement but an intergovernmental organization, whose exclusive mandate 
was the reduction of cross-border trade tariffs (it also extended progressively to a number 
of other trade barriers). Such tariffs were renegotiated every few years in short but 
intense negotiating sessions, collectively grouped as trade rounds, during which countries 
would offer reductions on export tariffs and curbing of other foreign trade-impeding 
measures. In between trade rounds, other negotiations among GATT members would 
offer steps of progress towards the professed ultimate goal of the treaty: the elimination 
of tariffs in trade. The main economic rationale behind the GATT was that collectively its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 EDUARDO GALEANO, MIRRORS: STORIES OF ALMOST EVERYONE 39 (Mark Fried trans., 2009).  
2 Andrea Bianchi, On Power and Illusion: the Concept of Transparency in International Law, in 
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (A. Bianchi & A. Peters, eds. 2013). 
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
GATT] 
 
2 
members could lower the artificial price distorting mechanisms that are tariffs, reduce 
domestic protectionism and thus make trade more prolific and profitable for their 
countries. At least that was the idea behind GATT. 
 
When one looks at the economic practices of GATT members during the GATT years, it 
is easy to identify a plethora of price distorting practices that did the opposite of what 
GATT was promising.4 Practices of protecting domestic industries and subsidizing 
several sectors of production were common, especially among the stronger GATT 
constituents, namely the United States, the European Communities, Canada and Japan.5 
This paradox of commitment towards eliminating tariffs and other barriers while 
maintaining protectionist policies at will demonstrates that, although it was portrayed as 
such, the GATT mantra was never seen as a win-win strategy at least by many powerful 
GATT member states. We could say that the true mandate of the GATT was to eliminate 
tariffs when and where it was to the benefit of those who were better able to get their way 
during GATT negotiations. 
 
The prevalent structure of negotiations during the GATT years, from 1947 to 1995 was 
one of concentric circles of negotiations: in the center were the GATT’s top players: the 
US, the EC, Japan, and Canada.6 Sometimes other strong external trade performers or 
major importers joined them but that circle never looked very different than an old-boy’s 
club. The room where they met in was adjacent to the office of the GATT’s top officer, 
the director general, and was painted “goat vomit green.”7Similar to an “English !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 See among many Nicolas Lockhart & Andrew D. Mitchell, Regional Trade Agreements under GATT 
1994: An Exception and its Limits, in CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE WTO 217 (N. Lockhart & A. 
Mitchell eds. 2005). Frank Schoneveld, The EEC and Free Trade Agreements–Stretching the Limits of 
GATT Exceptions to Non-Discriminatory Trade? 26:5 J. WORLD TRADE 59-78 (1992).  
5 Also known as the Quad. 
6 THEODORE H.COHN, GOVERNING GLOBAL TRADE: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN CONFLICT AND 
CONVERGENCE (2002) Amrita Narlikar, Law and Legitimacy: The World Trade Organization, in 
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (D. Armstrong ed... 2009). Michael Daly & Hiroaki 
Kuwahara, The Impact of the Uruguay Round on Tariff and Non‐Tariff Barriers to Trade in the ‘Quad 21:2 
THE WORLD ECONOMY 207-234 (1998). 
7 Referring to a small conference room adjacent to the Director General’s office in Geneva, see JOHN H. 
JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (2006),  
and Amrita Narlikar & John S. Odell, The Strict Distributive Strategy for a Bargaining Coalition: the Like 
Minded Group in the World Trade Organization in NEGOTIATING TRADE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 132 (J. 
Odell ed..., 2006), referring to officials who, in addition to being unfamiliar with the Green Room process, 
 
3 
gentlemen’s club”, the room smelled of cigars and cigarettes. When those who frequented 
the Green Room came to a decision on concessions, these results were then 
communicated to the lesser players, who would then need to quickly decide how to 
react.8 More often than not, these pre-agreements were negotiated primarily in the Green 
Room, as smaller countries were always reminded of two things: first of all, agreeing on 
common frameworks and new products and lowering tariffs is like Vitamin C, it does 
nothing but good. Second, since the GATT decision-making structure was based on 
consensus, nobody really wanted to be blamed for being the one opposing what everyone 
else seems to be agreeing on. No trade minister or GATT diplomat wanted to be 
remembered as the one who killed the Agreement, or the one who shot down the Round. 
As Richard Baldwin put it, during the GATT, the developing countries’ strategy was 
“don’t obey, don’t object.”9 
 
All of this changed immediately after the Uruguay Round. The Round itself was more 
extensive in what was agreed on than the collective results of the forty years of GATT 
negotiations. New Agreements were signed in various new areas of products. With minor 
exceptions, almost every conceivable area of international trade was put on the 
negotiating table. At the end, not only did the GATT members conclude agreements in 
Services, Intellectual Property and other issues, but they decided to re-launch the 
organization with a new name, that now truly corresponded to what the GATT always 
was: an intergovernmental organization. The godfather of the new beast was John 
Jackson and he named it “the World Trade Organization” or WTO.10 
 
The WTO was not just the renovation of the GATT house. The negotiators of the 
Uruguay Round tore the house to the ground, and rebuilt it from scratch, keeping around !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
did not have the necessary skills in English to participate. See also Debra Steger, The Future of the WTO: 
the case for institutional reform, 12:4 J. INT’L ECON. L.  803 (2009). 
8 For a comparison, see: WTO Website, Map of disputes between WTO Members 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm?country_selected=none&sense=e , PAUL 
BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS 28 (2009). 
9 Richard E. Baldwin, Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to 
Global Free Trade 29:11 THE WORLD ECONOMY 1451-1518 (2006). 
10 PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS 31 (2009), see also id. how the New 
York Times at that time reported the name as MTO, or Multilateral Trade Organization before the decision 
for the name was finalized. 
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the GATT Agreement as amended. Keeping the GATT around was almost as if the only 
thing in an entire house that they kept was the couch, reupholstered. Developing 
countries in the newly built house got a breakthrough agreement signed, the Agreement 
on Agriculture. Not only were agricultural products their main exports, but most of their 
populations depended on better market access for these products as they were 
simultaneously the source of their income and food. The Agriculture Agreement was a 
reason to celebrate11: developing countries, routinely excluded from being taken seriously 
in the GATT, living in the basement, were now given their own room in the new house. 
Or so they thought. Soon enough they realized that the new Agreements still allowed the 
developed countries to control international markets. Using average instead of individual 
tariffs as a benchmark still allowed developed countries to support any agricultural 
products they desired. Moreover, in an increasingly globalized world, when products and 
services travelled a lot faster, the effects of essentially sustaining the pre-Agricultural 
Agreement status-quo were now felt a lot more. Slow trade in key products such as meat, 
crops and textiles became in the nineties even slower. Not only had the developing 
countries not gotten a room in the house. They were still living in a corner at its 
basement. And a crowded basement it was. 
 
The frustration on these take-it-or-leave it Green Room deals did not only come from the 
populous group of the WTO developing member state representatives. It also came from 
their peoples, who now experienced harsher realities and had to downgrade the lifestyle, 
which they could afford through earning 1.5 US dollar per hour.12 Frustration of farmers 
in Asia, Latin America and Africa soon turned into despair. Also crammed in the 
basement were various interest groups such as the consumers of hormone injected beef, 
pharmaceutical conglomerates, epidemics’ patients, labor unions and advocates against 
marine species extinction. A very diverse group was still being left out of the much !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Donna Roberts, Implementation of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures: The First Two Years. NO. 14588. INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE RESEARCH 
CONSORTIUM (1998). See also the critique a few years later from Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing 
Inequality: the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries 27 COLUM. J. 
ENV. L. 433 (2002). Clive Potter & Jonathan Burney, Agricultural Multifunctionality in the WTO—
Legitimate Non-Trade Concern or Disguised Protectionism? 18:1 J. RURAL STUD. 35-47 (2002). 
12 See PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS 236 (2009) for one such 
example. 
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bigger organization, the WTO, as they were during the GATT, and they were not 
happy.13 The new Agreements resulted in a proliferation of industries, consumers, traders 
and producers affected by the WTO. The basement was jam-packed.  
 
It took the basement denizens only four years before they started to shake the entire 
house. The next negotiations’ round about to be launched in Seattle in 1999 went down in 
flames. It was eventually launched in Doha, Qatar, shortly after September 11.14 As this 
round continues, academics and economists have agreed that the reason for its premature 
launch was the September 11th momentum, summarized in a Pink Floyd mentality of 
“united we stand, divided we fall.” The series of failed ministerial conferences that 
followed the launch of the round prompted many commentators to say that the round 
should have already been declared dead. Yet the representatives of coalitions of stronger 
countries together with WTO top officials insist on trying for years now to resuscitate the 
chances of eventually agreeing. To date, this has not happened.  
 
The first question for the legal academics who identify this legitimacy crisis as worthy of 
discussion should be the following: does the answer to the problem, the shaking WTO 
house, lie in finally having a serious discussion about how to move its basement 
inhabitants upstairs and give them better, nicer rooms? In other words, is a fundamental 
rethinking of current policies and negotiating strategies enough to assist the WTO out of 
its legitimacy crisis, help conclude the Doha Round, or at least help launch a new, 
successful round? Or, are the house tremors that we are witnessing not the product of the 
wall banging of the frustrated basement inhabitants, but instead, a problem with the very 
foundations of the house, which, in addition, was there to begin with, even during the 
GATT? Are legitimacy disparities in the WTO due to the growing gap between the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Arvind Subramanian & Shang-Jin Wei, The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly but Unevenly, 72:1 
JOURNAL OF INT’L ECONOMICS 151-175 (2007): 151-175.!WILL MARTIN, THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1996).Sylvia Ostry, The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: 
Implications for Future Negotiations in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 285-
300 (D. Kennedy, J. Southwick eds. 2002). Bernard Hoekman, Operationalizing the Concept of Policy 
Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment 8:2 J. INT’L ECON. L.  405-424 (2005).  
14 See for a more contextual perspective on the trade rounds and Ministerials launched after Uruguay 
Robert Wolfe, Crossing the river by feeling the stones: where the WTO is going after Seattle, Doha and 
Cancun 11:3 REV INT’L POLIT. ECON. 574-596 (2004).  
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Global North and the Global South, or the Agreements and the philosophy of the 
organization itself? This is not an easy question to answer.  
 
Ideas on where the WTO should go from here have come from many directions. Those 
who over the years occupied the post of the Director General of the WTO have insisted 
that negotiating just a bit more, staying around the table just a day longer can and should 
produce the desired results.15 Many trade ministers and other high-ranking officials, 
including former Director General Mike Moore, insisted on results-oriented strategies, 
such as concluding another agreement and launching another round, motivated 
sometimes by an insatiable desire for personal success. 16  The former US Trade 
Representative Bob Zoellick decided that when the WTO does not work as intended and 
consensus is difficult to come by, the best route is for the United States to conclude 
Preferential Trade Agreements, treaties on one-to-one or in groups of countries that are 
willing to move forward with trade liberalization. John Jackson, a legal academic and the 
WTO’s godfather, contends that the solution lies in refocusing on the WTO rules, and its 
dispute settlement process, the crown jewel of the organization in order not to let the old 
school diplomatic processes destroy what was built after years of negotiations.  
 
Martin Wolf, chief economist of the Financial Times, purports that, although there may 
be some distributional and other practical problems with liberal policies of International 
Financial Institutions including the WTO, overall standards of living continue to be 
raised, so we should keep at what we are doing. Because of such institutions life is 
getting better as time goes by. At the same time, he suggested that pursuing trade 
governance without forcing more trade rounds is a better strategy for moving forward.17  
Dani Rodrik, an economist from Harvard, argues that the better performers amongst the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 See Kevin P. Gallagher, Understanding Developing Country Resistance to the Doha Round 15:1 REV. 
INT’L POLIT. ECON. 62-85 (2007), Giovanni Anania & Jean-Christophe Bureau, The Negotiations on 
Agriculture in the Doha Development Agenda Round: Current Status and Future Prospects." 32: 4 EUR. 
REV. AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 539-574 (2005). See also for a more detailed account: KENT A. JONES, 
THE DOHA BLUES: INSTITUTIONAL CRISIS AND REFORM IN THE WTO (2010). 
16 See PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS passim. for examples of such 
desire for success (2009). 
17  See Dani Rodrik, Martin Wolf: Doha is Weakening the WTO, blog entry April 15 2011 
http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2011/04/martin-wolf-doha-is-weakening-the-wto.html.  
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poor nations are the ones who did not adopt the WTO rhetoric wholesale, but rather 
followed an anti-WTO path to their current relative prosperity, for example by adopting 
quotas and subsidizing their infant industries and weaker sectors until they can stand on 
their own feet in the global markets. Rodrik further notes that the ability of trade 
liberalization, as is presented by WTO proponents as a cure for development, has been 
largely exaggerated as it is unequipped to assist least developed and developing countries 
to take the first step out of their state of poverty.18 Finally, he suggests that the world 
trading system has to allow for diversity in national institutions and standards, permit the 
protection of nation-specific social arrangements and not insist on a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach to national trade approaches.19  
 
Representatives of Oxfam, a confederation of NGOs against worldwide poverty and 
injustice, argue that smaller developing countries and least developed countries should 
insist on a hardline approach in order to find space in global markets for their agricultural 
products.20 Developing countries, despite their significantly diverse positions on many 
products and agreements, decided during the Cancun Ministerial Conference to form a 
joint front to deal with developed country coalitions, mostly the EU-US alliance.21 Their 
national constituencies, similarly to those of the developed countries, are usually 
prepared to stand in support of any policies that will make their products more 
competitive in global markets. Usually, for citizens of poorest nations this means that 
they are in opposition to the WTO and its policies. Unions coming from developed 
countries want the WTO to adopt labor standards in order to allow for domestically 
produced goods to compete with manufactured by cheap labor in Latin America, Asia 
(especially China) and Africa to a lesser extent.22 Workers from the last three continents !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF TRADE: AS IF DEVELOPMENT REALLY MATTERED: REPORT 
SUBMITTED TO THE UNDP 3 (2001) “In this vision, the WTO would no longer serve as an instrument for 
the harmonization of economic policies and practices across countries, but as an organization that manages 
the interface between different national practices and institutions.” 
19 Dani Rodrik, A Plan B for Global Finance, THE ECONOMIST, GUEST ECONOMICS FOCUS COLUMN 
(March 12th 2009). 
20 See PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS 145, 198, 206 (2009). 
21 Known as the G-20. See Pedro da Motta Veiga, Brazil and the G-20 Group of Developing Countries 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case7_e.htm. 
22 Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 61 (2001). 
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want the exact opposite: for the WTO to refrain from establishing such labor standards. 
Finally, there are those who express an extreme political message and would like the 
WTO to “just die.” 23  
  
Many of these positions, even if they are not helpful in solving the legitimacy problems 
of the WTO, allow us to at least get a better glimpse at what is at stake when trade rules 
are being negotiated and adopted. This thesis aspires to add to those viewpoints that 
purport that solving common problems in a collective manner and through multilateral 
institutions is always superior than its opposite. As such, having a multilateral trading 
regime is a worthwhile cause, since through negotiations and cooperation trade can help 
raise standards of living when transactions are fair and equitable. The WTO can be a 
strong organization that provides a forum for permanent negotiations, trade monitoring 
and dispute resolution. John Jackson’s favorable attitude towards the WTO legal system 
is a position adopted by this thesis.24  
 
Many of the WTO rules and practices can be revised to work better and help the WTO 
with its extant problems. Revisions through multilateral negotiations may not always be 
feasible, but the interpretation and implementation of the rules can still make a difference 
in improving the WTO legal system. This thesis will focus on one set of such rules, 
which in the WTO appear under the same “name” but have varying content and 
importance: transparency. Upon initial observation, transparency appears to be an 
overarching theme that member states and their representatives as well as the WTO 
Secretariat and its numerous committees and divisions reiterate with considerable 
frequency. Transparency has been used in the WTO by diplomats, lawyers, scholars, 
NGO representatives and judges to describe four different phenomena: participation of 
non-state actors in WTO processes; effective participation of developing countries in 
WTO decision-making; one of the operating principles for the WTO’s small !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Wilkinson, Rorden, and Steve Hughes. "Labor standards and Global Governance: Examining the 
Dimensions of Institutional Engagement." GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 259-277 (2000). 
23 WTO Dying a Slow Death, http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-08-04/wto-dying-slow-death, Forget 
Doha, it’s the WTO that must change or die, http://europesworld.org/commentaries/forget-doha-its-the-
wto-that-must-change-or-die/#.VY1i-6Y77SI 
24 JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2006) introduction. 
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administration, resulting in the frequent publication of GATT and WTO documents; and 
the obligation of WTO member states to publish their trade rules and maintain judicial 
review mechanisms for their implementation.  
 
Transparency and participation have been closely linked in international trade regulation 
ever since the WTO’s creation in 1995.25 In the last three decades, the WTO and, to a 
certain extent, its predecessor, the GATT, has opened up and now provides a vast 
quantity of data to governments, industries and individuals seeking information on the 
administration of international trade. The website of the WTO attracts 1.4 million visits a 
month26, and during the course of 2013 alone, over 2,000 pages on wto.org were created 
or updated. In addition, the organization even has over 100,000 “likes” on Facebook.27 
Concomitant with this increase in information dissemination, the number of disputes 
brought before the Dispute Settlement Body that involve violations of transparency 
obligations in the Agreements has increased significantly over the last twenty years.28 
Especially after the Cancun Ministerial, increased emphasis has also been given to 
rectifying developing country participation problems in WTO negotiations, otherwise 
known as internal transparency. Finally, transparency has been linked to the WTO 
Secretariat in the context of discussions on the so-called “good governance” principles.  
 
The choice of this particular norm (which appears either as a contractual obligation, a 
guiding principle or a desideratum) was due to the stance of WTO member states and 
officials towards transparency. Their attitude towards transparency is saturated with a 
considerable amount of controversy. The obligation of WTO member states to publish 
their laws has been hailed as the “best insurance policy against protectionism” by a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 See Steve Charnovitz, Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization 56 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 927( 2003). 
26 WTO Annual Report 2013 http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep13_e.pdf 123-131. 
27 In fairness, Facebook has yet to create a “dislike” button. It is not clear how many hits the WTO would 
get if such a button existed.  
28 The numbers here are in fact quite striking. 58 cases involve Article X of the GATT 31 cases Article X:1, 
9 cases article X:2, 35 cases Article X:3, 26 cases Article X:3 (a), 3 cases on Article 3 GATS, 6 cases for 
Article 63 of TRIPS, 2 cases on article 63.1 and 2 cases on Article 63.3, Disputes by Agreement 
.http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm  
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former WTO Director General.29 At the same time, requests for direct access (even 
through a controlled closed-circuit video system) to the works of the decision-making 
bodies or the adjudicatory process in the WTO have been met with strong resistance from 
all but very few member states. The WTO frequently publishes an overwhelming amount 
of documents, almost impossible to decipher without proper training in law and 
economics of trade, but the first stage of negotiations of such documents has been for 
years restricted to the representatives of no more than ten member states. The latter is 
extremely troublesome in an organization that has 160 member states and accounts for 
more than 99% of global trade.30 As citizens we are either provided with a huge portion 
of transparency, impossible to metabolize, or none at all.  
 
In this dissertation, transparency is not used in the traditional sense. Section C in Chapter 
I will further explain the analytical categories transparency refers to as a keyword. 
Overall, it is used to discuss a wide spectrum of issues, ranging from secrecy to openness, 
and including power asymmetries and participation. The reason transparency is used in 
this particular manner is first, because the official WTO rhetoric refers to transparency in 
this manner, in the GATT Agreement, in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, in official 
speeches from the WTO Director General and other WTO officials, and finally, in the 
minutes of the General Council, reflecting the WTO member states’ attitude towards the 
term. Such expansive use of the term aspires to contribute to a better understanding on 
the context that affects WTO’s legitimacy, as well as to illuminate different aspects of the 
WTO’s legitimacy problems. 
 
As we will examine, the term “transparency” is used in a number of different contexts 
within the organization in order to describe phenomena of varying normative weight and 
meaning, ranging from Agreement provisions to soft law or general principle and from 
the obligation of member states to publish national trade laws to civil society 
participation in the WTO. These contexts in which transparency appears are rather !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29Lamy hails transparency as the best insurance policy against protectionism at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/trdev_19jul13_e.htm best insurance policy against 
protectionism. 
30 See Trade and Tariff Data at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm .  
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fragmented and do not seem as organically connected to each other. However, I argue 
that they are all linked as they relate to the organization’s democratization potential. In 
that respect, I argue that there is a reason why improving all the different rules and 
practices that WTO scholars and diplomats call “transparency” can help demonstrate 
more aspects of the WTO’s legitimacy issues. Moreover there can be a loose linkage 
between democracy, transparency and legitimacy. In abstract, the three concepts can be 
seen as overlapping circles. My working hypothesis will be that a discussion on various 
transparency forms in the WTO can illuminate various aspects of the organization’s 
legitimacy problems and that attention to the WTO’s transparency processes can clarify 
the relevance of openness and participation in the WTO.  
 
This thesis is partly a critical response to the extant debate on legitimacy in the WTO and 
partly a continuation of the debate in a new direction.  This book has mainly three 
ambitions: First, I would like to offer an overview of scholarship discussing legitimacy 
problems in the WTO, with a particular emphasis on scholarship that discusses 
legitimacy and transparency. Second, I would like to describe, assess and offer ideas for 
improvement for the four different forms of transparency in the WTO. As my research 
will show, the organization’s track record on transparency is not optimal. Despite this 
focus on transparency, there remain deficiencies with respect to full participation in the 
WTO by several integral parties, namely developing countries and citizen-consumers. On 
one hand, the majority of developing countries have yet to fully enjoy the benefits of 
joining in the WTO model because the “Green Room” remains inaccessible for a large 
number of WTO member states due to negotiating asymmetries and resource constraints, 
and their usage of the dispute settlement system is more limited than their developed 
counterparts.31 On the other hand, the desire of the citizen-consumer to participate in the 
business of the WTO has been frustrated by a lack of external transparency. Although 
there have been over one hundred attempts by individuals and associations (representing 
organized consumers, professional unions, environmental groups, industry 
representatives and academics) to affect the outcome of WTO disputes through the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31  For a comparison, see Map of disputes between WTO Members 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm?country_selected=none&sense=e 
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submission of amicus curiae briefs for the Panels’ and Appellate Body’s consideration, 
only very few have been considered. The failure in administrative transparency in the 
form of access to reasoned decision making, with respect to these failed attempts, stains 
the organization and strains its relations with its constituents. 
 
Finally, I would like to contribute to the debate that discusses transparency and 
legitimacy in the WTO and argue for a theoretical framework to discuss the link between 
the two concepts. I argue that the four transparency dimensions mentioned above are not 
unrelated but can be understood under a single overarching theme. All the different 
transparencies can contribute to make the WTO a more democratic organization. At the 
international level elections are currently impossible, but other governance rules and 
practices can advance the degree of democratization of international institutions. Under 
the theory of composite democracy, democratization is best explored not through the 
exclusive focus on elections but taking into account other factors, such as adherence to 
the rule of law, adequate representation, minority participation avenues and transparency. 
I will examine if and to what extent the WTO’s “transparencies” correspond to the non-
electoral composite democracy parameters.  
 
The theoretical approach for the examination of transparency through composite 
democracy sans elections, is based on Montesquie’s and Madison’s governance 
paradigms of separation of powers and checks and balances. My methodology is based on 
reviewing legal scholarship and WTO data analysis, focusing on treaties, case law, 
official speeches and website announcements. Thus, this thesis aims to ultimately explore 
how the democratizing potential of transparency can expand the WTO’s normative space 
to become more inclusive and illuminate more aspects of the organization’s legitimacy 
problems. Making the WTO more democratic can be linked to the improvement of rules 
that fall under WTO’s “transparency” definitions in order to ensure that: developing 
countries will not continue to be systematically excluded during the first step of 
negotiations, the Green Room; civil society participation in the WTO will not be treated 
as a nuisance; the WTO’s administration will function in a better way; and product rules 
will be communicated usefully to traders and consumers who want to make informed 
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decisions. This can make the organization, its administration, diplomats, and the citizens 
of the countries that are members to the WTO be in a more favorable position to 
negotiate, implement and discuss these rules at a national and international level better.  
 
The normative conclusion of this thesis is that more transparent regimes can be more 
democratic. By exploring transparency in all its manifestations, this thesis aspires to 
provide a model of analysis of composite democracy at an international level, and a case 
for comparison with other international organizations, which also lack direct electoral 
legitimacy. Democratization does not directly address the extant problems with trade 
rules, such as the treatment of subsidies or quotas or tariffs on agricultural products, nor 
the fact that the WTO Agreements are laden with references to a commitment towards a 
“liberal” trading system. When better decisions on trade rules are not possible, we can at 
least focus on improving the process of decision-making in hopes that keeping all 
avenues of communication open and political discourse more informed, better rules might 
follow. In a sense, this is a process-oriented argument, arguing that legitimation results 
from process, or emphasizing “through-put” legitimacy32. There is also a derivative 
content-oriented aspect in the democratizing potential of transparency. When concessions 
and rules that are negotiated in a more transparent manner, it may be more difficult to 
reach consensus, but when consensus is achieved, the rule will be more representative of 
the interests of more countries, and that may decrease its violation potential.  
 
Furthermore, promoting transparency as a means of democratization can act as a 
substitute for the lack of direct democratic legitimation at the international level. 
Transnational regimes, or regimes of transnational governance such as the WTO affect a 
very large number of stakeholders, member and non-member governments, multinational 
corporations, other organizations, numerous unions such as trade and labor unions and 
the global civil society, the aggregate of all citizens affected either directly or indirectly 
by trade policies. The WTO, similarly to other transnational regimes, lacks direct 
legitimation through elections at it is the case for national democracies. However, such !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Vivien A. Schmidt, Forgotten Democratic Legitimacy: “Governing by the Rules” and “Ruling by the 
Numbers" in the Euro Crisis in THE FUTURE OF THE EURO” (M. Blyth & M. Matthijs eds. forthcoming, 
2015 Final Draft for Chapter on file with the author). 
 
14 
regimes can exhibit other democratization elements, especially through meaningful 
commitment to principles such as openness and the establishment of platforms for 
transnational actors’ participation. 33 
 
A number of very important issues are linked to the major themes discussed in this 
dissertation. First, the Global South position towards transparency and participation in the 
WTO remains a very crucial dimension on the issue. In particular, legal scholarship, 
political discourse and public opinion in the Global South have expressed their stance 
towards the WTO and its legitimacy problems, often extending this analysis to the 
concept of openness, transparency and participation. The Global South in and of itself is a 
very diverse legal and political terrain and cannot be discussed under a single rubric. The 
position of India and Brazil for example in the WTO is markedly different than that of 
smaller economies, such as for example Colombia, Vietnam or Nepal. As such, the 
discussion of Global South perspectives needs to be tuned to the differences across and 
within states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This analysis is crucial to international 
trade regulation but remains outside the scope of this dissertation.  
 
Another important issue that does not fall within the scope of this thesis is civil society 
empowerment and the legitimacy concerns with respect to organized civil society and 
NGOs in particular. Accountability and representativeness of NGOs have been 
questioned extensively. More specifically, it is not clear who is represented by NGOs, 
that have the potential of becoming elite institutions whose mandates only in theory 
embody noble causes, while in practice they engage in lobbying with tactics similar to 
those of for-profit institutions. Finally, the credibility of organized civil society has been 
put in question due to many scandals, especially economic in nature, that have been 
revealed throughout the last three decades. All these large issues will not be discussed in 
this thesis. Rather, the discussion will only briefly focus on the organizations that have 
submitted amicus curiae briefs and have participated in WTO Ministerial Conferences 
and insofar this is relevant to the WTO’s external transparency.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 In this dissertation I adopt the position expressed by ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND 
OPPOSITION 8 (1973). 
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Finally, this thesis will not discuss the very crucial for international trade regulation issue 
of national performance with respect to Article X transparency. As with the two 
aforementioned issues, national transparency mechanisms at the border as well as within 
domestic markets are essential to the function of cross-border trade. However, a 
comprehensive survey of national Article X mechanisms, while a worthwhile project, can 
also be in and of itself the topic of a dissertation (or an even larger project). It requires, 
first and foremost, a familiarity with domestic legal systems of the 160 WTO member 
states and an analysis of de jure and de facto administrative and judicial practices and 
mechanisms and publication of laws at the national level. Thus, it will not be examined in 
the context of this dissertation. 
Methodology  
 
Transparency as a norm and an administrative principle has been explored both in the 
field of international law, and more specifically within WTO law. The normative 
parameters of transparency have been discussed in an illuminating manner and 
scholarship has produced a number of thought-provoking accounts, both at the level of 
rule formation and at the level of rule compliance.  
 
The following matters are discussed under the term “transparency” in the WTO: less 
effective participation of developing countries in WTO decisionmaking  (“internal 
transparency”), openness, publications and participation of non-state actors, civil society 
and individuals in the WTO (“external transparency”), transparency as an administrative 
principle invoked in the selection and operations of various WTO bodies, such as the 
Secretariat, the Dispute Settlement Body and the General Council (“administrative” or 
“institutional transparency”), and transparency as an obligation to publish national laws 
and maintain judicial remedy mechanisms for traders, assumed by WTO member states 
in Article X of the GATT and its equivalent in other WTO Agreements (“legal 
transparency”). Moreover, transparency in the WTO normatively takes the form of: soft 
law, as part of the organization’s operational dogma and as an administrative principle; 
general principle of international law in the meaning of Article 38 para.1 c) of the ICJ 
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Statute;34 and, treaty obligation, in the meaning of Article 38 para.1 a).35 It remains 
unclear whether transparency at any level has acquired customary law status. Such a 
theory has neither been articulated nor has it been tested during adjudication. 
 
The emergence of normatively relevant transparency with the participation of civil 
society is mostly discussed under the auspices of Global Administrative Law (GAL) and 
its theoretical counterparts, as well as rationalist and realist approaches. Many legal 
scholars have elaborated on both external and administrative transparency in the WTO, 
such as Steve Charnovitz and Panagiotis Delimatsis.36 Some of these accounts integrate a 
socio-legal perspective to explain global governance, institutional evolution and 
preferences and look upon civil society contributions and the emancipation of developing 
countries within the world trading system under a favorable light. However, their analysis 
is restricted to soft law aspects of transparency, as well as a more traditional 
understanding of the principle that directly links transparency to either publication of 
documents or civil society participation.  
 
Scholarly work that discuss internal transparency exclusively in the context of WTO law 
and development37 moves away from positivism and seeks a better understanding of 
development and the needs of developing countries in the WTO context. This internal 
transparency debate and the discussion on the developing countries’ position, which has 
produced a deadlock for the organization’s negotiations, has been explored under the lens 
of “law and development.” Such approach can benefit a lot from becoming more WTO-
specific. Once this discussion is more exclusively focused on the WTO, similar problems 
to those described under “internal transparency” can be found in the analysis of 
Preferential Trade Agreements and Accession Protocols. Some WTO scholars have 
elaborated separately on WTO Plus accession agreements, and more particularly the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1. 
35 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1 (a). 
36 Panagiotis Delimatsis, Transparency in the WTO Decision-Making, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012-
006 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2001919 (2012) and Steve Charnovitz, Transparency and Participation in the 
World Trade Organization” 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 927(2003). 
37 Weak cognitivism discussed in ANDREAS HASENCLEVER ET AL EDS., THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
REGIMES passim, esp. 8-23 and 211 et seq. (1997).  
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Chinese Accession Protocol and transparency issues.38 Preferential and regional trade 
agreements are not generally discussed within the internal transparency paradigm.  
 
Finally, legal transparency, Article X and equivalents and Article X case law is mostly 
discussed from a positivist perspective, often sidestepping sociological elements, which 
are discussed in other contexts (more often in economics’ studies and sometimes in Third 
World Approaches in International Law- or TWAIL scholarship) but not as elaborately.39  
 
Within the WTO, the dominant neoliberal pro-trade ethos on one hand refutes the 
significance of internal and external transparencies. WTO officials and Global North 
diplomats and trade ministers have stubbornly ignored the former for decades, until 
having reached a veritable deadlock in Cancun, a deadlock whose effects are felt until 
today; and reducing the latter to a non-issue during internal meetings. Administrative and 
legal transparencies on the other hand are generally perceived as conducive to the 
acceleration of trade liberalization and are promoted with the proliferation of relevant 
case law and trade monitoring bodies.  
 
The international trade regime dates formally to the 1940’s and has long legal, political 
and economic histories. The legitimacy problems that the organization is facing cannot be 
discussed only from a legal perspective without consideration of the political and 
economic histories. The quest for a structured understanding of the three different 
perspectives has led mostly the GAL scholars to find a sanctuary in familiar territory: 
constitutionalism. The constitution in the national context is the framing document, 
which combines economic programs and political aspirations in a higher-level contract 
among the people (or the people and their government). Thus, although not optimal, the 
constitutionalism turn is understandable.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Julia Ya Qin, “WTO Plus” Obligations and Their Implication for the World Trade Organization Legal 
System: An appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37:3 J. WORLD TRADE 483-522 (2003). 
39 See for example Bhupinder Singh Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in 
the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004), id, Co-Option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global 
Administrative Law 37  NYU J. INT'L. L. & POL. 799 (2004) 799 and Gerhard Loibl, Contribution in  B. S. 
Chimni et al. (2003). Theme III: Global Governance: Institutions 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 897-913 at 900-901 
(2003). 
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My argument is premised on the understanding that transnational regimes, or regimes of 
transnational governance such as the WTO include multiple levels of exercise of 
authority and affect a very large number of stakeholders either directly or indirectly with 
trade rules and policies. They do so with both contractual rules and soft law principles or 
guidelines. As such, the WTO as a transnational regime exhibits two fundamental 
characteristics: it is a polyarchy, a relative but incomplete regime with few democratic 
elements, describing itself as “popularized and liberalized […],inclusive and […]open to 
public contestation”40 and its normative reach can be described as polynormative, ranging 
from guidelines to contractual obligations. The numerous forms of transparency in the 
WTO also display these two characteristics: polyarchy in the sense that transparency 
appears at various levels of governance and involving numerous actors, and 
polynormativity because of the varying legal nature of transparency forms. 
 
Moreover, the different forms of transparency in the WTO appear to have a common 
thread that runs through all of them. Their side-by-side comparison shows certain shared 
properties.  First, the current inconsistencies with respect to each of the transparency 
forms do not become obvious in the debate that discusses each one separately, but when 
examined alongside. For example, Canada’s legal transparency record is one of the best 
in the WTO: Canada provides very detailed access to information on trade tariffs to 
traders and has a user-friendly process in place online for the reporting of trade distorting 
practices. However, before we give Canada a high score for transparency performance, it 
might be relevant to know that Canada has always been a member of the Quad, and has 
taken a very long time to publish the text of CETA, its most recent and very important 
Preferential Trade Agreement with the European Union.41  
 
Second, a direct comparison of how different forms of transparencies has evolved shows 
common histories that coincide with the emancipation of global civil society, the 
refinement of their arguments and the systematic push for accountability of national 
governments and international organizations, the lack of tolerance for exclusionary !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 8 (1973). 
41 Stuart Trew, Is Canada Legally Bound to Release the CETA Text? COUNCIL-OF-CANADIANS'S BLOG 
(Nov.8 2013). 
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tactics and the expansion of democratic discourse space at a global level to match that 
which may exist at the national level in many countries. Not only global civil society 
protested the WTO’s policies during the Seattle Ministerial, but simultaneously NGOs 
and groups of academics were submitting amicus curiae briefs and shortly thereafter, in 
the Cancun Ministerial, developing countries assumed an equally strong stance against 
practices compromising internal transparency.  
 
Third, demonstrating the interconnectedness of different transparency forms and their 
relationship to democratization gives developing countries more terrains to pursue fair 
and meaningful integration of their economic needs at the WTO level. Effective 
strategizing to end the pervasiveness of the Green Room negotiation process can be 
directed both towards more powerful member states, as it happened in Cancun, and 
towards the WTO Secretariat who facilitates such meetings.  
 
Beyond discussing all transparencies in unison in order to get a better picture and find 
more ways of improving the WTO’s and its members’ transparency performance, the 
four transparency dimensions are linked through a single thread, an overarching concept: 
their democratization potential. A sociological approach in law that refocuses the 
transparency analysis in the WTO from constitutionalism to democratization seeks to not 
limit participatory platforms to those allowed by the GATT and other normative forms. 
Instead, an analysis that includes both legal and other transparencies in the context of 
democratization will allow multiple and innovative participatory forms to emerge and be 
proposed by developing country members outside the “rigidness” of an analysis based on 
constitutional consolidation. Instead, the fluid notion of democratization is proposed as 
the main analysis framework.  
 
All the phenomena labeled as transparency in the WTO carry a number of characteristics 
prevalent in democratic regimes, such as participation and meaningful information. 
Whether these amount to constitutional principle is a derivative point: first we have to 
understand the democratizing potential of transparency and how it can expand the WTO’s 
normative space. In other words, if there exist principles that have emerged above the 
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WTO Agreements, first we must understand how these principles add to the existing 
normative framework, and then assess their possible constitutional quality. The 
appropriate framework has to steer clear from nationally embedded public law and 
national notions of the constitution. In the absence of elections at the global level, 
composite or compounded democracy offers a full list of other potential democratic 
functions in governance. It extends beyond voting, for example into the executive 
representation, horizontal mutual control, associative and expert representation, and 
legitimacy based on individual rights. My argument stems from theory of deliberative 
and participatory polyarchy.42 At the supranational level the main case-study for such 
polyarchy is the European Union.  Democratic elements that increase legitimacy of 
decision-making in the European Union are traced across different processes and organs. 
The WTO is a very different case for such elements. In the WTO they are all found under 
the concept of transparency.  
 
By definition, transparency as a concept implies a higher degree of visibility, access and 
openness. This allows for the evaluation, and to some extent the measurability of the 
democratization of the WTO. Transparency is a prominent principle in Madisonian or 
composite democracy analysis, as it enables the flourishing of a system of checks and 
balances. When evaluating a model of governance that is labeled as “democratic”, these 
models of composite democracy look at election processes, representation in government, 
good governance, observance of rule of law principles, good administration and access 
and participation opportunities for citizens. As a result, modern democracies are 
aggregates of numerous elements that extend above and beyond voting. Vertical 
legitimation through national elections is only one of numerous democratic legitimation 
elements. Legitimacy in a compounded, composite, Montesquieian or Madisonian 
democracy needs to extend beyond voting, into the executive representation, horizontal 
mutual control, associative and expert representation, and legitimacy based on individual 
rights. I argue that in the WTO, four out of these five elements of composite democracy 
currently exist under the rubric of transparency in its four different forms, internal, 
external, legal and institutional.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 8 (1973). 
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To each of the four forms of transparency corresponds to a different facet of composite 
democracy. There are very few links between vertical legitimation and external 
transparency as well as intermediate democratic legitimation (or secondary vertical 
legitimation) to the extent that governments of democratic member states represent the 
interests of their citizens periodically legitimized through national elections. Internal 
transparency parallels horizontal control (mutual at a political level and structural at the 
permanent review bodies). The participation of NGOs and experts in the WTO relates to 
both secondary vertical legitimation and associative or expert representation present in 
composite democracy. Finally, Article X, directly assigning informational and 
adjudicatory resources for traders exhibits elements of individual-rights based 
legitimacy.43 
 
Among intergovernmental organizations, the WTO is a model example to discuss 
transparency and composite democracy. It remains outside the United Nations system, 
has a unique structure and a very active dispute settlement system. The WTO manages 
international trade, and issue-specificity allows a better examination of international 
regime consolidation into more democratic forms. Its unique history of transition from 
the GATT to the WTO adds an additional layer in a composite democracy analysis, since 
its evolution has been visible in a legal and institutional level, by the conclusion of new 
agreements and the creation of a new organization. Another similarly unique organization 
is the European Union, with the difference that it is regional and not global and it 
conducts periodic elections, which most, if not all intergovernmental organizations do not 
do. The WTO an intergovernmental organization in the sense of traditional Public 
International Law and according to its constitutive documents, and is distinct from the 
plethora of UN-based organizations. Finally, the WTO Agreements have several 
transparency provisions similar to Article X and a substantial amount of case law 
discussing the transparency obligations, another unique feature of the WTO for the 
examination of transparency. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 See Chapter II parts D and E infra. 
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The working thesis of my dissertation is that large asymmetries (or deficits) exist with 
respect to each of the four transparency forms after evaluating each one in the WTO. The 
WTO as an organization as well as its member states suffer overall by transparency 
shortages, despite the robust institutional discourse that argues the opposite. 
Transparency has strong democratic and transnational capacity through the inclusion of 
non-state stakeholders such as NGOs, corporations, scientists, trade unions and 
individuals in the WTO. Additionally, developing country participation is at the heart of 
the debate for the WTO’s future and resolution of the development issue is essential to 
the survival of the WTO. But the WTO falls short in a meaningful integration of 
transnational aspects and a direct confrontation with the needs of developing countries in 
its normative impetus and largely foregoes the democratization potential that 
transparency offers.  
 
Through this analysis, this thesis aspires to provide a model for application of composite 
democracy at an international level, and a case for comparison with other international 
organizations, which also lack direct electoral legitimacy. At a larger scale, the normative 
conclusion of this dissertation is that global governance as exhibited in international 
organizations can be more democratic even in absence of elections and transparency is a 
key feature of democratization without direct legitimation. More transparent regimes can 
be linked to democracy and legitimacy. This legitimacy can be substantive (resulting in 
better rules- also known as output legitimacy), procedural or “through put”44 legitimacy 
(ensuring at least a proper participatory and deliberative decision-making process), but 
also a substitutive legitimation element, in the absence of input (direct democratic) 
legitimacy.  
 
Such a composite democracy analysis cannot solely rely on a collection of previous 
theoretical accounts on transparency, since none of them has evaluated the aggregate 
democratizing potential of transparency, nor have they provided a full account on the 
transnationalizing effects transparency has had on the WTO as an intergovernmental !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Vivien A. Schmidt, Forgotten Democratic Legitimacy: “Governing by the Rules” and “Ruling by the 
Numbers" in the Euro Crisis in THE FUTURE OF THE EURO” (M. Blyth & M. Matthijs eds. forthcoming, 
2015 Final Draft for Chapter on file with the author). 
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organization (focusing instead at the constitutionalizing effect). Such analysis directly 
picks up from Deborah Cass, and Howse and Nicolaides.45 Cass in her work briefly 
alludes to transparency in the democratization context, while Howse and Nicolaides focus 
on democratization in a more abstract way. 
 
Transparency is analyzed as a norm within the legal, political and economic frameworks 
in the WTO. My analysis extends beyond the traditional sources of international law and 
I argue that normative impetus can potentially be traced in transparency forms that have 
not distilled to any form of law (not even soft law). In an evaluation of democratization 
of transnational regimes, phenomena such as the proliferation of regional agreements that 
de facto exclude non-parties WTO member states, and WTO Plus-Minus Accession 
Protocols are as relevant as amicus curiae briefs, publication of documents and formal 
trade openness monitoring. Each of those WTO transparencies is relevant to an aspect of 
composite legitimization. Thus the WTO as a transnational regime at some levels has the 
potential to become a polyarchy 46 , a relative but incomplete democratic regime, 
“popularized and liberalized […], highly inclusive and extensively open to public 
contestation.” 
Outline 
 
This thesis begins in the introduction with a brief description of the legitimacy challenges 
that the WTO is currently facing, further elaborating on the notion of the WTO as a house 
whose foundations are shaking. Chapter I reviews transparency as a concept in law 
generally before offering an overview of the WTO-specific transparency definitions, 
which depart from traditional understandings of the word. Chapter I continues by 
summarizing the focus of the Sutherland Report on transparency. The Sutherland Report 
has been, to date, the most comprehensive WTO-initiated account on legitimacy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the 
WTO is a Step too Far Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy—The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium 
227-252 at 228 (2001), Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: 
Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity? 16.1 GOVERNANCE 73-94 (2003), Deborah Z. Cass, The 
'Constitutionalization' of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of 
Constitutional Development in International Trade 12.1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 39-75 at 73 (2001). 
46 ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1973). 
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concerns. Transparency is prominently featured in the report, yet, analyzed in a 
fragmented manner. However, the Sutherland Report provides an initial map of the 
different transparency forms in the WTO.  
 
Next, Chapter I examines the relevant to transparency and global governance literature 
from International Law and International Relations, extending the discussion to 
Positivism in international Law, Global Administrative law, International Public Law, 
Constitutionalism in WTO, Critical International Law and Societal Constitutionalism. 
Chapter II introduces composite democracy as a framework of analysis for transparency 
in the WTO. This chapter focuses on the concepts of composite democracy and 
legitimacy in international regimes. It traces each of the elements of composite 
democracy in the various transparency forms in the WTO- both transparency parameters 
discussed in the Sutherland Reports, but also others, appearing in WTO political 
discourse, and WTO legal scholarship.  
 
Chapters III, IV, V and VI offer an in-depth analysis on each of the various forms of 
transparency. These chapters describe the history and current state of each of the four 
transparency forms, and they offer an evaluation of their performance with respect to 
their democratizing potential. Chapter III discusses internal transparency deficits stricto 
and lato sensu. “Internal transparency” originally referred to developing countries’ 
participation problems in the WTO. However, the types of asymmetries that cause the 
systematic exclusion of developing countries appear in other areas of WTO law, and in 
particular the proliferation of preferential trade agreements among WTO member states 
and the varying degrees of commitments that candidate members are asked to assume 
during their accession process. This I will call transparency lato sensu and it will be 
explored in the last two parts of Chapter III.  
 
Chapter IV shifts towards external transparency, information for and participation in the 
WTO of non-state actors, NGOs, corporations, and individuals that constitute civil 
society at-large. Here, I examine participatory platforms, both formal and informal, at the 
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various WTO fora as well as, most importantly, during the dispute settlement process 
through the submission of amicus curiae briefs.  
 
Chapter V explores administrative transparency, namely the different formations of the 
General Council, the highest permanent executive organ of the WTO as well as the 
selection and operations of the Secretariat, the Panelists, the Appellate Body members 
and experts participating in the dispute settlement process.  
 
Finally, Chapter VI focuses on the treaty-based requirement for member states to publish 
their trade-related laws and regulatory measures and to maintain administrative and 
judicial mechanisms to resolve and remedy any trade related issues both at the border and 
in the domestic market. More specifically, this chapter discusses the legal obligations of 
member states to disclose their legislation and other trade affecting measures and 
maintain transparent national trading regimes, the various monitoring mechanisms in the 
WTO that are geared towards supervising market openness and rule compliance of WTO 
member states and the dispute settlement reports that have been issued after claims for 
transparency obligation violations.  
 
The last chapter offers a thorough evaluation of the four different forms of transparency 
and their contribution to democratization. Although a number of innovative and very 
useful steps have been taken within the WTO, they still fall short of addressing the 
pressing problems surrounding international trade regulation, and in particular the lack of 
direct legitimation through elections, that is, democratic legitimacy and the failure to 
provide for a viable normative platform for developing countries in order to benefit from 
international trade. The discussion then returns to the merit of democratization as a more 
useful framework of analysis for global governance principles. Finally, keeping in mind 
current legitimacy problems, this chapter offers a diagram for the way forward for the 
WTO, on how to improve its transparency record and commitment to pluralistic 
governance that will bring the organization closer to a democratic paradigm. 
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A closer look into the WTO’s legitimacy problems, or The WTO at 20, the 
GATT at 68: a teenager or a golden-ager? 
  
The larger context in which this doctoral dissertation is situated relates to the most 
fundamental pillars in international law: the degrees of sovereignty erosion, the ensuing 
legitimacy deficits and the patterns of transnational regime formation. By looking at 
transparency in different forms with varying normative weight within the WTO I hope to 
offer an insight into the origins and sources of modern international law. The question of 
the roots of contemporary international law is closely coupled with that of its legitimacy. 
It is essentially a history of transition from the “Old World” to the “New World.”  
 
In the “Old World” exists the Westphalian-centric understanding that only agreements 
among sovereigns could bind them and all their citizens. International law, the only law 
beyond national law, was reduced to treaty law or, exceptionally, custom understood as 
binding and emerging from state practice.47 The central question in the Old World 
understanding was: why should international law subjects follow rules?48 The answer was 
almost exclusively traced in sovereign will, or a version of the idea of “justice” or 
“humanity” which legitimized norms. In the “New World”, law emerges from layered, 
multidimensional, polycentric normative “hubs”, including but absolutely not limited to 
the nation-state. In this poly-normative world, the focal point of legitimacy shifts. 
Countries no longer form the entire mosaic; they are mere pebbles. The source of 
normativity is fragmented, scattered among actors who utilize formal and informal, 
usually cross-jurisdictional avenues to find solutions to legal questions and to regulate 
themselves and others.  
 
A number of different narratives have been used to describe the transition to the New 
World. Some are positive (sometimes almost naively so), as is for example Fukuyama’s 
End of History and the Last Man, or Friedman’s The Lexus and the Olive Tree. Thomas !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Statute of the International Court of Justice Article 38. 
48 For a discussion on naturalist and positivist discourse in the 19th and 20th century see MARTTI 
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 131-
132 and 164 (2006), WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 503-515 (2000).  
 
27 
Friedman chronicles the success stories of the New World, he marvels on the speed of it 
and its methods, its “golden straightjackets”49, while he identifies that there are some 
“emotions” and “anxieties” that triggered a backlash. However, modern capitalism as he 
describes it has built-in internal mechanisms to deal with the problems that it creates: 
Friedman observed that the South Jersey beefsteak tomatoes were replaced with waxy 
pink ones because they can ship better and last longer, but the solution is for the farmers 
to simply set up a website and buy them online with a credit card. Zambian cotton 
farmers however, whose cotton is of superior quality to that of their US counterparts 
don’t have computers readily available- nor FedEx to deliver it.50 In fact, the absolute 
lack of infrastructure prohibits producers to source their products to the markets of their 
neighboring countries.51 Such problems with capitalism were identified, among many, in 
Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine, Ulrich Beck’s What is Globalization and Eric 
Hobsbawm’s The Age of Extremes. As Hobsbawm posits, the western world in the 
nineties was not only in depression, it was also in denial about it.52 An idea very popular 
in the 1970s and 1980s was that transferring employment to new places (geographically) 
because of industrialization would free up resources and direct labor towards new, 
possibly better sectors. Instead, as both Beck and Hobsbawm observe, the new 
industrialization of the nineties created “rust belts” when industries moved out.53 Such 
rust belts continue to exist both in the developing and the developed world. The new 
paradox (which has now ceased to be a paradox) is that Colombian textile workers and 
auto-industry employees in Detroit are jobless due to the same international disease: 
Globalization. 
 
Globalization is a word that has been used most frequently in all contexts where powerful 
changes have occurred. Globalization is seen as a process and as a state of affairs of a 
world order. For many disciplines in the humanities globalization, or the events that set it 
in motion began roughly during the early eighties. Since then, certain key historical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION 101 et seq. 
(2000). 
50 PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS 49-50 (2009). 
51 Id. page 212, PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 53-64 (2007). 
52 ERIC J. HOBSBAWM, , THE AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1914-1991 408-409 (1996). 
53 Id. at 412-413, ULRICH BECK, WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION, 18-19, 159 (2000). 
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events have been referenced to pinpoint and describe globalization more. As a substantial 
amount of ink has been used to discuss globalization, here we will briefly summarize 
very few events and developments that have been relevant to the evolutionary trends in 
international law and international trade regulation.  
 
The proclaimed triumph of western government structures was initially coupled with a 
theory of the victory of permanent peaceful coexistence. Hobsbawm says, the crisis was 
boiling underneath the euphoric surface: soon came the realization that the end of the 
Cold War did not mean the end of conflict. The UN intervention in Yugoslavia conveyed 
clearly that the post-1989 end-of history narrative was misled. The nature of conflict 
moved from being inter-border to progressively becoming intra-border. As a result, many 
more forms of internal turmoil or dissent, even peaceful protests, became newsworthy. 
International organizations were confronted with many humanitarian catastrophes, in 
Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia and a lack of sufficient legal tools to reach decisions 
on how to address the crises. In a true battle of Old versus New, deadlocks in the UN 
Security Council stemming from the Cold War divide were coupled with new 
understandings of humanitarian intervention.54 
 
In the nineties we also witnessed the emergence of a global civil society steered not from 
affiliation with political camps but a widespread sharing of information. Citizens became 
“netizens”55. Further, the communication boom brought by the expansion of global media 
and the internet called attention to the disproportionate distribution of power and wealth, 
which withstood the fall of the Berlin Wall. The awareness of a worldwide rich/poor 
divide coincided with the transformation of industrial capitalism to a “new capitalism” 
coupled with record-high rates of unemployment. 56   Since the late 80s “money, 
technologies, commodities, information and toxins cross frontiers as if they did not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 See for example the debate between Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects,  
10: 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1-22 (1999): 1-22 and Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: are we moving 
towards international legitimation of forcible humanitarian countermeasures in the world community?  
10:1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23-30 (1999). 
55 The term is from the article The death of an icon, THE ECONOMIST U.S. ed. 91 (24 Oct. 1998). 
56 ULRICH BECK, WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION 6 (2000). 
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exist.”57 Globalization also resulted in the normative and fiscal depletion of the welfare 
state, so that it could no longer cushion employment supply and demand asymmetries. 58 
 
The expansion of the global media and the growth of Internet access did not only inform 
the world of its inequalities.  The Internet is “more than just a cheap and immediate form 
of communication” since it “offers a solidarity in cyberspace that may be hard to achieve 
geographically.” 59 It enables the civil society to network and mobilize using the new 
communication potential.60 As Ulrich Beck rightly notes “things which used to be 
negotiated and decided by managers and academics behind closed doors and with no 
attempt at justification, must now suddenly have their consequences justified in the biting 
wind of public debate.”61 The internet and the global media made this public debate 
possible.62 Social movements and NGOs utilized this potential like “spiders uniting and 
tying down lions.” 63 
 
The two major events that framed this era were the fall of the Berlin Wall (11/9) and the 
terrorist attacks of September 11 (9/11). The world in less than twenty years moved from 
celebration to grief and back to celebration quite a few times. International law was 
challenged in unique ways as a result. However, this was hardly the first stress test for the 
field during the last century. The two World Wars had contributed a fair amount to 
enormous changes in the international law landscape, as did for example environmental 
degradation and satellite technology: the proliferation of international organizations, the 
emergence, establishment and consolidation of human rights’ law, arms control treaties, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Id., 20. 
58 JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW 
AND DEMOCRACY (1998) see in particular, Chapter 9, Paradigms of law and more specifically, pages 430-
436 on the difficulties that extended national administrations face in dealing with “a growing set of tasks 
that are qualitatively new”. See also Jürgen Habermas, The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State 
and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies  (Ph. Jacobs trans.) 11:2 PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM 1-18 
(1986). 
59 Arachnophilia THE ECONOMIST U.S. ed... 28 (10 Aug. 1996). 
60 Elizabeth Smythe & Peter J. Smith, Legitimacy, Transparency, and Information Technology: The World 
Trade Organization in an Era of Contentious Trade Politics, 12:1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 31, 38 (2006). 
61 ULRICH BECK, WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION 42 (2000). 
62 Maria Perez Esteve , Civil Society and WTO Accountability WTO Rules and Practices for Transparency 
and Engagement with Civil Society Organizations, Working Paper Draft Prepared for the IISD- Entwined 
Workshop available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/wto_accountability_rules_transparency.pdf   6 (May 
2011). For example the WTO website visits averaged at one million per month in 2010.  
63 Arachnophilia THE ECONOMIST U.S. ed. 28 (10 Aug. 1996). 
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fields like environmental and space law are all products of major events of the last 
century.  
 
Treaty proliferation, the fragmentation of International Law and more elaborate accounts 
on international institutional law are some of the areas where International Law focused 
in the last twenty years. After having signed a considerable amount of treaties in the 
nineties, now it is time to carefully examine whether extant cross-border problems can be 
better solved through new agreements, or we need to find sophisticated ways of better 
implementing the old ones. In international trade regulation, this question is progressively 
becoming one of the key themes in analyzing how will the international community move 
forward and out of the current crisis. Before describing the problems the WTO is facing 
in more detail, we will explain the title of this chapter: is the international trading system 
a mature and sophisticated treaty regime that dates back to the end of World War II? Or 
was 1995 a rupture moment, and the WTO has started on a clean sleight its own history? 
 
The ad hoc dispute settlement process of the GATT Panels was more diplomatic in 
nature, as was the GATT as an organization as a whole. It focused on products (not 
services, nor intellectual property, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, nor rules of 
origin, or agriculture like the WTO) and the elimination of tariffs on the products covered 
in the GATT was extensive.  
 
In the early 1980s, after the Tokyo Round of negotiations, proposals for the legalization 
of the diplomatic aspects of the GATT were placed at the forefront at the negotiating 
agenda. More specifically, three major pillars were discussed: first, the formalization of 
the dispute settlement process, including an appeals process and the creation of a 
permanent Appellate Body was proposed (and later, adopted). Panel and Appellate Body 
reports would be adopted automatically, unless there was consensus to the opposite 
(unlike the GATT, where any member, including the ones to the dispute, could veto the 
decision). Second, trade monitoring would no longer be conducted in an informal basis, 
but by the Trade Policy Review Body, under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, and in 
periodic fashion, depending on the size of each member’s economy. Finally, a long list of 
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non-covered products were being negotiated, and these negotiations resulted to a series of 
new Agreements, such as the Agreement on Agriculture, the GATS on Trade in Services, 
the TRIPS on Intellectual Property products, and numerous others. 
 
The GATT never ceased to exist, it is still one of the main WTO Agreements and its rules 
are applied as they were since 1947. However, the system has transitioned from being 
based on diplomatic ethos and informal processes to one of formal mechanisms. The 
Agreements of the WTO’s legal architecture create a labyrinth. The “Final Act” of the 
Uruguay Round concluded the trade negotiations and stated the agreement to create the 
WTO. 64 The WTO was then created through the “Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade organization.” Annexed to the WTO Agreement are more than fifty agreements, 
among which is the GATT 1994. The GATT 1947 is incorporated in the 1994 GATT.  
This structure is anything but straightforward and the complex landscape of the WTO 
Agreements have been discussed in the literature.65 
 
Currently, most of the legal aspects of transnational trade fall within the jurisdiction of 
the WTO for its member states. It currently has 160 member states, with another 23 
countries on an accession track. The total membership potential of 183 countries is 
almost global: over 99% percent of world trade, world GDP and world population are 
represented in the WTO. Considering the inescapable nature of cross-border trade, the 
reach of the WTO is impressive. The organization is committed to the growth of 
international trade, while adhering to various trade-related principles such as the 
commitment to sustainable development, inclusion of developing countries in the world 
economy, raising standards of living and allowing for the optimal use of the world’s 
resources. Its scope is “to provide a common institutional framework for the conduct of 
trade relations among its Members in matters related to the agreements and associated !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64  JOHN JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990); Gerald A. Bunting, GATT and the 
Evolution of the Global Trade System, 11:2 ST. JOHN’S J. OF LEGAL COMMENTARY 505-521, esp. 519-521 
(1996); John H. Jackson, Global Economics and International Economic Law, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L.  1-23 
(1998); WTO-SECRETARIAT, FROM GATT TO WTO (2000).  
65 Patrick M. Moore, The Decisions Bridging the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement, 90 AMER. J. OF 
INT’L L. 1996 317-328; David Palmeter & Petros Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law 92 
AMER. J. OF INT’L L. (1998) 398; E. Montaguti & M.Lugard , The GATT 1994 and other Annex 1A 
Agreements: Four Different Relationships? 3 J. INT’L ECON. L.  2000, 473-484 
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legal instruments.”66 The WTO preamble mentions the organization’s direction towards 
“the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.”67 More 
specifically, its mandate is to  
 
“facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, and further 
the objectives, of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements[…], provide the framework for the implementation, 
administration and operation of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements[…], 
provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their 
multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the agreements in 
the Annexes to this Agreement […],provide a forum for further 
negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade 
relations[…], administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, […] administer the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism […]. 68 
 
Considering that the overwhelming majority of countries is either already a member of 
the organization69 or has applied to become one, one can argue that more the majority of 
international trade regulation is performed under the WTO umbrella.  
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was the WTO’s predecessor, began 
in 1947 as a platform for the extension of bilateral agreements on tariffs in trade to all of 
its members.70 The GATT emerged from the failed International Trade organization 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article II Para. 1.  
67 Id., Preamble, 3rd recital.  
68 Id. Article III. 
69  The WTO currently has 160 members: Yemen to become 160th WTO member at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/acc_yem_27may14_e.htm , as well as 26 candidate 
members: WTO members and Accession Candidates (June 2012). 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/members_brief_e.doc. Tajikistan and Laos have almost concluded 
the accession process. Thus, if we take the UN member state list as a foundation (at 
http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml), then out of 193 sovereign countries, 157 are members to the 
WTO, which translates to 81 percent of world countries, and 183 are the total number of countries who 
either are members of the organization or aspire to become members, which percentage-wise is 94 percent 
of world countries.  
70 In fact, the delegations that were negotiating the GATT at the time refused to call it an organization, in 
fears that the US Congress would refuse to sign off part of its foreign trade jurisdiction to an international 
organization. “Congress insisted that the 1945 RTAA did not authorize the creation of any international 
trade-related institution or U,S. participation in any trade-related organization. Hence, the GATT was 
envisioned as an interim arrangement, not an organization, until the ITO charter could be formally 
approved by Congress. The GATT was not a treaty or an organization, but merely a trade agreement put 
into effect by executive order. As a result, participants were not "members" but "contracting parties" and 
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(ITO) negotiations with twenty-three founding members.71 It was originally called an 
agreement and not an organization in order for the US Congress to approve the 
participation of the United States in the Agreement. Progressively, it evolved to include 
institutional structures that made discernable that it was not a simple contract among 
states but the constitutive document of an organization. In the five decades of its 
existence before the founding of the WTO, the GATT was reviewed periodically in seven 
negotiation rounds. In 1995, the Uruguay Round resulted to the emergence of a new 
international organization. The creation of the WTO happened in a rather unique and 
unusual fashion in international law. The organization became the surrogate of the 
GATT, but the original GATT (GATT 1947) remained in force. 
 
Table 2 GATT and WTO Negotiation Rounds 
Duration Name/Location Main area of negotiations 
1947  Geneva  Tariffs  
1949  Annecy  Tariffs  
1951  Torquay  Tariffs  
1956  Geneva  Tariffs  
1960-1961  Dillon Round  Tariffs  
1964-1967  Kennedy Round  Tariffs and anti-dumping   
1973-1979  Tokyo Round  Tariffs, non-tariff barriers to trade  
1986-1994  Uruguay Round  Tariffs, non-tariff barriers to trade, rules, 
services, intellectual property, dispute 
settlement, textiles, agriculture, the 
creation of WTO, WTO Agreements 
2001-current date Doha Development 
Round 
Agriculture, Development, Intellectual 
Property and others 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
State Department officials invented the Protocol of Provisional Application to bring it to effect.”  DOUGLAS 
A. IRWIN ET. AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 96 (2008). 
71 Id. 98-122. 
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The basic GATT legal principles did not change for five decades, with some exceptions 
such as the addition of the section on Development. Moreover, some plurilateral 
agreements (with less than full GATT membership) were signed under the auspices of the 
GATT. Progress in international trade negotiations is usually achieved during extensive 
periods of high-level trade negotiations called “Rounds”. These rounds last for years. 
Negotiations are not done on an issue-by-issue basis but progress is made in packages. 
Thus, the negotiation Rounds introduce an all-or-nothing single undertaking approach to 
negotiations. Agreements are concluded through trade-offs among GATT and WTO 
member states. Both political and economic considerations affect the outcomes of 
negotiation rounds. 
 
The trade negotiation rounds from 1947 until 1995 had as a main goal to reduce tariffs. In 
addition to tariff reduction and/or elimination, the Kennedy Round included discussions 
on the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Tokyo Round discussed non-tariff barriers to trade 
and the Uruguay Round, the longest GATT Round, resulted in the creation of the WTO 
and the adoption of the WTO Agreements. The Uruguay Round in a sense achieved the 
impossible: agreements were procured in a large number of areas, and the emerging 
organization was a structure that the 23 original GATT members could not have 
envisioned. Almost the entire agenda of this negotiation round was concluded 
successfully. The Agreements of the WTO’s legal architecture created a labyrinth. The 
“Final Act” of the Uruguay Round concluded the trade negotiations and stated the 
agreement to create the WTO. 72 The WTO was then created through the “Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade organization.” Annexed to the WTO Agreement are more 
than fifty agreements, among which is the GATT 1994. The GATT 1947 is incorporated 
in the 1994 GATT. This structure is anything but straightforward and has been discussed 
in the literature.73 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72  JOHN JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990); Gerald A. Bunting, GATT and the 
Evolution of the Global Trade System, 11:2 ST. JOHN’S J. OF LEGAL COMMENTARY 505-521, esp. 519-521 
(1996); John H. Jackson, Global Economics and International Economic Law, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1-23 
(1998); WTO-SECRETARIAT, FROM GATT TO WTO (2000).  
73 Patrick M. Moore, The Decisions Bridging the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 
317-328 (1996); David Palmeter & Petros Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law 92 AM. J. 
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The complexity of the new organization, and the proliferation of multilateral (binding to 
all member states) and plurilateral (binding amongst a subset of the member states) 
agreements into a large number of new areas such as trade in services, agriculture, 
investment and technical barriers to trade demonstrates that the WTO is not merely an 
improved version of the GATT. This idiosyncratic legal system exists entirely outside the 
United Nations umbrella, unlike the overwhelming majority of intergovernmental 
organizations. Over the years it has grown, both in the tariff amount reductions, the 
number of concessions, the amount and types of products regulated, the types of 
regulations and practices that it characterizes as trade-distorting and the countries 
involved. In the 1980s it became evident that the 1947 structure was insufficient to deal 
with this growing body of commitments and emerging legal questions. The Uruguay 
Round of negotiations, out of which emerged the successor to the GATT, the WTO, 
became the most visible example of the transition from the Old to the New World: the 
diplomatic ethos and the informal dispute settlement of 1947 was replaced by a system 
priding itself on its dispute settlement process, including a permanent Appellate Body- 
hailed as the crown jewel; numerous trade monitoring bodies became institutionalized; 
the agreements on trade no longer included only commodities but extended to services 
and intellectual property, specialized agreements were concluded on sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, customs, antidumping and more. 
 
Although the size of the WTO secretariat has doubled in size and the WTO delegations 
have proportionately increased, it is still an elite administration of less than six hundred 
employees74 and another six hundred or so liaison officers and representatives to WTO75 
located in the same building since 1977 in Geneva, which manages international trade. 
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74 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
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75 Interestingly enough, it is very difficult to find an approximate number of the liaison officers and 
representatives to the WTO. In any event an accurate number could be found in the internally published 
annual phone directory. In 1999 C. Michalopoulos, based on this directory, reported that the number of 
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The institution of the Director-General was maintained. The Panels became formalized in 
the Dispute Settlement Process, with compulsory jurisdiction and a permanent Appellate 
Body was established. Many elements remained the same, but an even larger number of 
things changed fundamentally.  
 
It became evident very quickly however, that the New World roses were packed with 
thorns: developing countries’ interests were finally taken more seriously into account 
through the conclusion of the Agriculture Agreement. However, tariff reductions were 
agreed on a basis of averages. This gives the opportunity to still protect certain sectors 
with high tariffs and quotas, while completely liberalizing others that are of significantly 
less importance. The textile industries of many developing countries began to suffer as 
soon as Chinese products, in significantly more competitive prices hit the global markets 
when the Textiles Agreement came into force. As the world became more globalized and 
knowledge began to travel with great speed across the globe, it also became evident that 
not only was poverty not eliminated by participation in the world trading system but also 
the gap between the rich and the poor still seemed unbridgeable.76 
 
Dispute Settlement also took time and resulted in retaliatory rights within the winner’s 
domestic market. This meant that the breaching state could continue to disregard WTO 
rules during litigation, and the decision would not have retroactive effect. Violations 
could go on for years at a time. Smaller countries who managed to survive the long 
litigation process and win, as it happened with Antigua and Barbuda, then were given the 
right to retaliate against their opponents, but only in the domestic market. Antigua and 
Barbuda, who won a case regarding gambling services, 77 could only retaliate against US 
products in its domestic market. Such a result hardly made a dent in the US economy. 
Having lost was rendered meaningless. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 See PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND WHAT CAN 
BE DONE ABOUT IT (2007); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: HOW 
TRADE CAN PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT: HOW TRADE CAN PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT (2005); WALLACH LORI 
& PATRICK WOODALL, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION?: THE COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE WTO (2004). 
77 Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services  WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) and Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting 
the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). 
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The political, legal and economic position of developing and least-developed countries in 
the WTO has not improved at all from their participation in the world trading regime. 
Developing countries were promised by joining the GATT and the WTO de minimis to be 
included as equals in the organization’s organs and processes and to be able to better, 
through free trade, their peoples’ living conditions. Developing counties’ treatment was 
originally a direct result of the history of colonialism but also the de facto position of 
developing countries which accessed only limited resources of wealth, comprising mainly 
of primary products.  Later on, with the formation of the G77 group, and the negotiations 
of UNCTAD and the New International Economic Order, the GATT Contracting Parties, 
partly responding to almost two decades of pressures from their developing members, 
partly due to concerns of progressive replacement by UNCTAD, chose to adopt Part IV 
of the GATT, under the title “Trade and Development.” The next major step regarding 
development in the GATT was the adoption of the Generalized System of Preferences, 
which was made permanent through the adoption of the Enabling Clause during the 
Tokyo Round. However, the efforts of developing countries to achieve meaningful to 
their economies trade concessions that would enable them to benefit from participating in 
the international trading system have not produced any significant results to date.  
 
The Green Room negotiations continued to take place after the creation of the WTO and 
developing countries continued to be confronted with prefabricated take-it-or-leave it 
agreements. These legitimacy issues furthered the idea that the organization suffered 
from a significant compositional flaw: a very small number of diplomats and 
international technocrats, working within the legacy of the original architects of the 
WTO, namely a handful major WWII-era neoclassical economists, are now the key actors 
of the international financial system. This “elite administration” has not been elected and 
remains unaccountable for advancing normative changes in the area of international trade 
that affect the lives of a very significant fraction of the world population. Moreover, the 
negotiating asymmetries and diverse needs of member states cannot be synchronized with 
the very rigid consensus rule with respect to decision-making. It was time for developing 
countries to utilize the consensus rule and block further decision making en masse.  
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This happened first in the Seattle and then in the Cancun Ministerial Conference.78 In 
Seattle, the impasse was reached when the US government attempted to put labor 
standards on the table. US President Bill Clinton, during an interview right before he 
arrived to Seattle for the Ministerial said that he was going to push the agenda of labor 
standards in the WTO, which he repeated when he addressed the WTO trade ministers 
the next day. The “trade and labor” scenario alienated almost all developing nations who 
still counted on cheap labor as a means to remain competitive in the global economy. It 
was bad enough that the case of Shrimp-Turtle had put fishing nets under scrutiny. 
Developing countries could not afford more production methods to become an 
impediment to their export trade. The Ministerial was intended as the launching pad for 
the next negotiations round, and it failed. In Cancun, developing country representatives 
took their frustration one step further when they met with Quad ministers and more 
specifically the US Trade Representative as a united front. The Doha Round, officially 
called “the Doha Development Round” was eventually (and- as it appears in retrospect, 
prematurely) launched in 2001 in Doha. Negotiations have reached a stand-still, and until 
today, there is still a rift in at least three important areas (Agriculture, Intellectual 
Property, the framework of Special and Differential Treatment). 79 The Doha Round is 
still ongoing and many commentators have argued that it is de facto terminated, due to 
the continuing inability of WTO member states to reach any agreement. 
 
Another important event of the late nineties was China’s accession. China, which 
withdrew from the GATT in the 1950s, applied to accede to the WTO and its accession 
negotiations became the center of attention for the largest trading countries. 80 Its 
accession protocol was to become the most complex accession document to an 
international organization to date.81 The accession of China, a country with a very strong !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 Many of the facts in this part are from the excellent account by PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE 
MOST FAVORED NATIONS (2009). 
79  See Subjects treated under the Doha Development Agenda 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohasubjects_e.htm. 
80 Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469 
(1999). 
81 See Raj Bhala, id. Julia Ya Qin, “WTO Plus” Obligations and Their Implication for the World Trade 
organization Legal System: An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37:3 J. OF WORLD TRADE 483-
522 (2003), and Ljiljiana Biukovic, Selective Adaptation of WTO Transparency Norms and Local Practices 
in China and Japan, 11:4 J. INT’L ECON. L.  803-825 (2008).  
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trade profile, a large national and cross border economy and population, revealed many 
of the negotiation imbalances that existed within the organization. In addition to China, 
another 23 countries acceded to the organization since 1995. Recently, Russia also 
completed its accession negotiations.82 The accession of China and Russia changed the 
dynamics between developed and developing countries in the WTO.  
 
Brazil, Russia, China and India continue claim developing country status in the WTO. 
Due to large parts of their populations living in poverty, these countries, despite their 
high GDP claim that developing countries’ privileges should extend to them. Giving the 
same treatment to the BRICs group as the Least-Developed Countries (LCDs) hardly 
makes any sense in terms of the dynamics of international trade. The two groups have 
neither comparable trade volumes nor similar critical products. China’s and Russia’s 
accession also shifted the WTO dynamics by re-aligning the negotiating blocs. In the 
WTO, the Quad used to dominate the negotiations for many decades, something that is 
clearly reflected in WTO rules. Most Favored Nation is a great rule for the West, but 
leaves the rest virtually without any tools to protect infant industries and essential 
domestic commodities. With China and Russia acceding, this picture changed: two large 
countries with a strong negotiating presence in the WTO joined Brazil and India, and 
together with the Middle income countries can block agreements that are catering to the 
Quad, and request for treatment of commodities that is more sensitive to less 
industrialized societies and markets not directly following a capitalist model. 
 
A small step was taken when the Quad was replaced by the so-called Five Interested 
Parties. The change was highly symbolic: Japan was ousted from the group and was 
replaced by India and Brazil. Also, India and Brazil decided to put aside their diverging 
trade interests and join forces with other developing countries to oppose their exclusion 
from the Green Room. This larger group was called the G-20.83 Originally, this seems 
like a move towards the right direction. However, India and Brazil are two large 
economies. They are part of the BRICS group (named after the initial letter of each of its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 WTO Members and Accession Candidates  www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/members_brief_e.doc 
83 It has no relation to the other G-20, which consists of the twenty countries with the highest GDP.  
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members), together with Russia, China and South Africa. Their trade needs and 
negotiating priorities are very different than other developing countries.  
 
Exclusion continues to be the WTO’s modus operandi. Bali like previous Ministerial 
conferences was not the setting for meaningful trade negotiations among all member 
states, but rather involved the usual informal meetings among some member states and 
the continuous exclusion of others. Moreover, the Bali Agreements show the persisting 
lack of desire on behalf of the developed world to reach meaningful consensus over 
development needs and more specifically on products essential to developing countries, 
such as cotton, pharmaceuticals and agricultural products. The WTO preambular 
commitments to raise standards of living and share the growth in international trade 
remain an empty letter, as developed countries still enjoy the majority of benefits from 
joining in the international trade regime, while simultaneously being able to afford to 
sidestep- almost without consequence- WTO rules when those are not to their benefit. 
 
Trade ministers from smaller countries were traditionally excluded from talks with the 
“big boys.” However, two things are different in the WTO era. First, the economic 
backlash of liberalization put people in the developing world out of jobs faster, at greater 
amounts without creating opportunities for participation in alternative product markets. 
Modern technology made it possible for states with resources to exploit them, and the 
returns in production were tenfold. This annihilated the contribution of small farming 
units in large parts of Latin America, Asia and Africa to world trade and resulted in sharp 
GDP drops and widespread poverty. Globalization put national markets dependent on 
smaller production units in distress.  
 
Second, the inability of trade representatives from the developing world to do anything 
about this situation was broadcasted on real time across the world. Government ministers 
were sitting idle for hours and days at a time outside the rooms where the select few were 
negotiating.  Journalists who sat with them took pictures and wrote reports, which the 
next day, or the next hour reached local media. The news of exclusion spread like 
wildfire, and dissatisfaction with the WTO, its policies and methods grew. Trade 
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ministers could no longer politically afford to return to their countries empty-handed. 
This landscape remains unchanged to this day. For more than a decade, developed and 
developing countries have not achieved any meaningful consensus on how to move 
forward together in the WTO in a manner that is conducive to developing countries’ 
needs.  
 
The exclusion of less powerful WTO members also occurs through the proliferation of 
regional trade agreements as evidenced by the current ongoing trade negotiations, among 
others, between the US and the EU and the US and Canada. When more powerful WTO 
members with large trade volumes cannot achieve their desired goals of tariff reduction 
through multilateral negotiations, they resort to regional trade agreements. More 
specifically, when countries with larger economies are faced with frustration expressed 
by developing countries during the WTO formal and informal negotiations, instead of 
seeking ways to achieve meaningful consensus on key products for developing countries 
at the multilateral level, they decide to sign bilateral or regional agreements amongst 
themselves in products that interest them. These agreements are allowed by the WTO but 
are traditionally left without any scrutiny from the WTO monitoring bodies, although 
their provisions can sidestep cardinal WTO rules. Thus, in practice their compatibility 
with WTO law is never checked, neither by the General Council nor by the Panels and 
Appellate Body, allowing potential collusions among the members of such agreements. 
Not extending Most-Favored Nation treatment to anyone but the parties of regional and 
preferential agreements can be identified as an obliteration of the fundamental rules of 
WTO law at the expense of all non-parties to these agreements. As a result, developing 
countries (together with any other country excluded from such agreements) remain 
particularly powerless before the collusive tactics of the richer member states. The 
proliferation of regional trade agreements compromises both WTO rules per se as well as 
the multilateral process of WTO trade negotiations and exacerbates the WTO’s 
legitimacy problems.  
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Civil society dissatisfaction with the WTO at a global scale started soon after the creation 
of the organization. 84 One of the very first instances of this backlash against the WTO 
occurred in November 1999 in Seattle, during a ministerial meeting that would launch the 
next round of negotiations.85 Inside the doors of the negotiating rooms, it was starting to 
become clear that the negotiating priorities of developing countries were very diverse, 
while the Quad (EU, US, Japan and Canada) had lost their stature in the WTO, to be 
replaced by middle-income countries, together with India and Brazil. Outside the doors of 
the ministerial the anti-WTO, anti-globalization events were also broadcast by activist 
internet media sources (most notably the Indymedia project) that emerged while the 
protests were occurring.86 This internet coverage of the events changed the landscape of 
global events coverage altogether87 and Seattle became “synonymous with tear gas and 
gridlock”88 Ironically, as the WTO’s court, the Dispute Settlement Body was developing 
its transparency jurisprudence, and as the organization was publishing most of its 
documents online, the backlash of protests- the so-called “external transparency issue”- 
widened. 
 
NGOs demanded to have their voice heard in a formal fashion, during the trade 
negotiations and the dispute settlement. The impressive volume of the WTO Agreements 
was negotiated and decided upon almost in obscurity, in the traditional diplomatic 
fashion of treaty negotiations. In 1995 few news reports, mostly from large newspapers, 
published relatively short announcements for the creation of the WTO. Shortly thereafter, 
the extent of trade regulation authority that was transferred from nation states to the WTO 
became discernible to a large number of stakeholders around the world: the intended 
beneficiaries of tariff reductions, workers, farmers, environmental groups, consumer 
groups and individual consumers, students and concerned citizens, among many, realized 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 David Sanger, ECONOMIC VIEW; Global Food Fights: The Worst Are Yet to Come, NEW YORK TIMES 
(25 July 1999). 
85 Interestingly, the Seattle events reflected criticism and civil anger directed against the WTO as much as 
globalization itself. See Storm over globalisation THE ECONOMIST U.S. ed... 15 (27 Nov. 1999). 
86  Indymedia and Indybay History http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2005/03/11/17262451.php by 
indybay (Friday Mar 11th, 2005). 
87 Paul D. Almeida & Mark I. Lichbach., To the Internet, from the Internet: Comparative Media Coverage 
of Transnational Protest, 8:3 MOBILIZATION 249-272 (2003). 
88 Joseph Kahn, The Next Center of the World,  NEW YORK TIMES (28 January 2001). 
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that they could no longer rely on their local politicians for produce regulation, nor get 
plausible answers from their governments on practices adopted or participate in debates 
that directly impacted on their lives. Voting and debating on trade issues in national 
democracies mattered much less. Most of the debate and the decisions on tariff reductions 
and non-tariff trade laws (such as environmental and health related regulations) that 
affect civil society at large, occurred either a while ago in Uruguay, or on a daily basis in 
Geneva.  
 
Left without a voice in matters that affect everyone’s lives significantly, civil society 
groups took to the streets most notably during the meetings of WTO member states’ 
ministers in Geneva and Seattle. Since then, civil society groups have tried to raise their 
concerns with respect to the international trading system at large but also specific 
regulations, on numerous occasions. The WTO, reluctantly at first, tried to open its doors 
to civil society. Soon it became evident that institutions such as the WTO Public Forum, 
participation of NGOs in Ministerial Conferences and the much-contested amicus curiae 
brief issue before the Dispute Settlement Body have done little to address the severed 
connections between the WTO and civil society and serve merely a decorative function. 
The lack of meaningful participation of civil society actors and genuine consideration of 
their concerns remains an important issue in the WTO to this day, further aggravating its 
legitimacy problems.  
 
Developing countries feel locked in a trade system that they see as filled with 
commitments and obligations, giving no useful returns; the same negotiation processes- 
in the form of the trade round- that brought about the WTO have been at a stalemate for 
almost two decades. In addition to the shareholders, stakeholders are becoming visible 
and are demanding a voice at the table. Furthermore, the line separating the WTO 
shareholders and the stakeholders is becoming progressively blurry. WTO member states 
and civil society organizations have joined forces, as is evident in the case of Oxfam and 
its relationship with developing and least developed countries.  
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This dire situation has not left the WTO administration entirely indifferent. In 2005, the 
WTO Secretary General Panitchpakdi commissioned a report on the occasion of the 
organization’s tenth birthday, supervised by a former WTO Secretary General, formally 
under the title “The Future of the WTO” but informally known under its supervisor’s 
name as the “Sutherland Report.” The report describes a fragment of the aforementioned 
marginalizing phenomena, insisting that the WTO is addressing them adequately and 
does not have a legitimacy problem as an organization. The WTO has found itself in 
crossroads. As noted in the Sutherland Report:  
 
Generally, the efforts to create new partnerships between state and non-
state players in the global arena have been marked by tensions. The simple 
ideological divide that market the global political order during the Cold 
War has been replaced by more complex alliances among a larger and 
more diverse body of actors.89 
 
At the same time, in 2001 a new international organization, the Advisory Center on WTO 
law or ACWL is created with a mandate to provide “advice, support and training to 
developing and least- developed countries.” It has to date prepared over 900 legal 
opinions and assisted developing countries in 38 cases in Dispute Settlement.90 Still, there 
is a long way to go. The limited use of dispute mechanisms and the oftentimes observed 
reluctance to enforce adopted reports of the DSB and give tit-for-tat to developed 
countries (such as the case of Ecuador, which did not use its right to retaliate in the EC-
Bananas III case) shows that developing countries have not found themselves yet in a 
peer-to-peer position with developed ones. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, by Peter Sutherland et 
al., The Future of the WTO, Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium, Published by the 
WTO (2004), hereinafter The Sutherland Report Paragraph 181, page 41.  
90 ACWL website www.acwl.ch/e/documents/Quick%20guide%202011%20for%20website.pdf. 
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Another noticeable shift reflective of legitimacy concerns was occurring on the focus of 
the cases before the newly established Dispute Settlement Body.91 The cases brought 
before the DSB were no longer strictly cases of tariffs but they extended to alternative 
considerations, most notably public morals, 92 human, animal or plant life and health93, 
the environment94, consumer protection and the assistance for developing countries95.  
Other problems that arose immediately after the birth of the WTO were related to other 
smaller issues, that nevertheless reflected the larger systemic ones. In short, in the first 
five years of its existence the WTO managed to shift the focus of global protest and 
global political debate and become a focal point of contestation for not only international 
trade law but international law in general. 
 
In 2015, ten years after the publication of the Sutherland report, the legitimacy crisis has 
paralyzed the WTO’s Ministerial Conferences. Instead of insisting on new agreements 
and concessions, the organization has to first address its extant problems. Changes in the 
voting process (or lack thereof) or additional concessions for developing and least !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 Arie Reich, The WTO as a Law-Harmonizing Institution 25:1 U. PENN. J. INT’L ECON. L. 2004 321-382. 
The WTO regime is transformed to include harmonization of domestic policies, however this was a gradual 
evolutionary process.  
92 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross‑Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005, DSR 2005:XII, 5663 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, 
5475); Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross‑Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, adopted 20 April 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS285/AB/R, DSR 2005:XII, 5797. 
93  Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, 135; Panel Report, EC 
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by Canada, WT/DS48/R/CAN, 
adopted 13 February 1998, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 
1998:II, 235; EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the United 
States, WT/DS26/R/USA, adopted 13 February 1998, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998:III, 699; Appellate Body Report, European Communities – 
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos‑Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, 
DSR 2001:VII, 3243; Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos‑Containing Products, WT/DS135/R and Add.1, adopted 5 April 2001, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS135/AB/R, DSR 2001:VIII, 3305. 
94 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, 2755, Panel Report, United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R and Corr.1, adopted 6 November 1998, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VII, 2821. 
95 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2004, DSR 2004:III, 925; Panel Report, 
European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 
WT/DS246/R, adopted 20 April 2004, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS/246/AB/R, DSR 
2004:III, 1009. 
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developed countries (such as the ones agreed upon during the Bali Ministerial 
conference) may not be sufficient any more to resolve the crisis. Something also has to be 
done for the ever-increasing list of Preferential Trade Agreements Most importantly, 
WTO member states must concentrate on remedying the exclusionary precedent that has 
lasted for decades and has tainted the organization in a structural manner. The longer 
these issues remain without serious consideration or confrontation, the longer the crisis 
will persist, and worsen. 
 
Against this backdrop we will discuss transparency in the WTO. Both the WTO and its 
self-proclaimed opposition, namely a large number of NGOs, have developed narratives 
to discuss the legitimacy crisis facing the organization from the inside, with the inability 
to reach further agreements until developing nations are satisfied, and from the outside, 
with unpleased civil society keeping a close eye. One of the most significant narratives, 
which emerged during the last few years of the GATT and was amplified in the WTO 
was a multidimensional commitment on transparency. The formation of transparency as 
the WTO’s own institutional narrative was evidenced in the organization’s most recent 
self-assessment report, the Sutherland Report. Transparency according to the WTO has a 
dual role: first, it signifies a commitment to openness of market regulations- and thus 
becomes insurance against protectionism. Without clear and transparent rules and 
procedures in the markets of member states, trade-distorting practices can prevail. 
Second, transparency is the institutional response to critics who see the WTO as an elite 
institution, the organization purports that it publishes its documents and has set up a few 
events to introduce its work those interested. Civil society and citizens of WTO member 
states also ask for more transparency from the organization insisting that most decisions 
are still made behind closed doors without sufficient consideration of the interests of 
everyone affected. 
 
The question of whether transparency in the WTO mitigates (and how) legitimacy 
deficits falls under the exploration of the sources of normativity in the contemporary 
world and the pertinence (if any) of the Westphalian world order, as well as the 
progression from one to the other during the twentieth century. First, legal transparency 
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creates obligations for WTO member states that are supposed to benefit consumers and 
traders. Second, external transparency argues for the introduction of transnational actors 
in the WTO decision-making process. Administrative and internal transparencies also 
evidence the evolution of International Law in the direction of better governance and 
developing country emancipation. Before we examine each of these in detail, it is 
important to outline the various ways that legal scholarship has analyzed transparency in 
the GATT and the WTO. 
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I. A Context for WTO Transparency in International Law and International 
Relations Discourse 
 
A. Introduction 
 
This chapter aims at providing a comprehensive review of the literature related to 
transparency, legitimacy and global governance with respect to the WTO. Before 
discussing transparency in the WTO, the first part offers a brief analysis on transparency 
as a concept in law generally. Next follows a brief overview of transparency as defined 
specifically in the WTO context followed by an overview of the Sutherland Report, the 
commissioned report discussing WTO’s first decade. This is the first and most complete 
to date official institutional account acknowledging transparency forms that go beyond 
Article X of the GATT and its equivalents. Part E is a summary of transparency and 
global governance scholarship from many different scholarly groups, ranging from 
positivism in International Law to rationalism, critical International Law and Regime 
theory. The emphasis on this part is on public law theories and more specifically, 
constitutionalist approaches that currently appear to be the most prevalent account on 
transparency forms. 
B. A brief outline of transparency as a legal concept 
 
Transparency is a familiar concept in law, especially in the fields of administrative and 
corporate law. Open-meeting laws and sunshine laws 1  oftentimes set minimum 
procedural requirements for decision-making. Such legislation embodies the 
understanding that in the Rule of Law, citizens, shareholders and stakeholders, interested 
parties at large need to be informed about decisions that actually or potentially affect 
them, and in many cases need to be given the opportunity to participate, either in an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The word “sunshine” to describe transparency rules appears to have been used by LOUIS BRANDEIS, 
OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).  
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advisory or a decisive role in the decision-making process. In many instances, if such 
transparency rules are not followed, the decisions ensuing are rendered void. In effect, 
citizens cannot be ambushed with new regulations without their knowledge and/or 
consent.2 
 
Transparency in general is a term that cannot be defined easily3, which is ironic 
considering that dictionary definitions relate transparency with ease to perceive or detect. 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, transparency is defined as “Openness; clarity; lack 
of guile and attempts to hide damaging information.”4 It is often associated with shedding 
light on something that was formerly obscured5 and, in law it is related to the disclosure 
of information, the clarification of information and the explanation of its meaning. In this 
sense, it is central to the more general notion of the Rule of Law.  
 
In public administration the main goal of transparency is the publication and in general, 
the disclosure and clarification of information. In national administrative law, it takes the 
form of a right to information, which includes the obligation of authorities to publish 
their decisions and the right of the administrated to receive explanations when decisions 
concern them; the form of obligation to report on behalf of the administrators; and the 
provision of a communication avenue between the administrator and the administrated.  
Thus, transparency includes two levels of knowledge: the primary element of disclosure 
of information and the secondary element of explaining the rationale behind the 
information disclosed.  
 
Another useful way of defining transparency is by looking at its opposites. Transparency 
can be juxtaposed with both corruption and confidentiality. In the first case, it is almost 
self-evident that any disclosure that aims at combating corruption is an improvement and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See STEPHEN BREYER ET AL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY, PROBLEMS, TEXTS AND 
CASES 738-739 (2006). 
3  Laurence Boisson des Chassournes, Concluding Remarks: Changing Roles of International 
Organizations; Global Administrative Law and the Interplay of Legitimacies, 6 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 655-666 
(2009). 
4 Transparency in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed... 1999). 
5 Laurence Boisson des Chassournes, Concluding Remarks: Changing roles of international organizations; 
global administrative law and the interplay of legitimacies, 6 INT'L ORG. L. REV.655-666 (2009). 
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should be welcome. Transparency should be introduced in a meaningful and fair manner, 
aiming at improving administrative structures and adding to the long-term benefits of 
citizens, instead of being used in a fragmented fashion only to satisfy populist demands 
and utilized for political reasons and demagogy. 
 
The relationship between transparency and confidentiality is more complex. The 
concealment of information may have an operational purpose or value that cannot be 
easily discounted. Such a value became obvious in the CableGate case when Wikileaks 
published a large number of diplomatic correspondence, whose classification could be 
essential in the function of governmental external policy.6 A similar case that examined 
the value of disclosure versus that of public order protection was the case of the Pentagon 
Papers7 in 1971, which is one of the most important cases examining national security 
and a court order restricting speech. At the time the New York Times and the Washington 
Post published excerpts of a study requested by Secretary of Defense under the Johnson 
Administration, Robert McNamara on the Vietnam conflict consisting of both historical 
analysis and classified government documents. After the publication of few articles out of 
a forty seven-volume report, then president Nixon and Attorney General John Mitchell 
obtained an injunction forcing the times to cease the publication. The case went all the 
way up to the Supreme Court, which decided that the US government failed to 
demonstrate the burden of proof required in First Amendment cases.8 Overall, with 
respect to decisions of disclosure of information that may be of sensitive nature, there 
should be a number of reasons for the information to remain confidential. These could be 
related to private information, physical and mental health or safety of individuals, or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See Rainey Reitman, The Best of Cablegate: Instances Where Public Discourse Benefited from the Leaks,  
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/01/cablegate-disclosures-have-furthered-investigative (January 7, 
2011) Mark Fenster, Disclosure's effects: WikiLeaks and transparency 97 IOWA L. REV. 753 (2011). 
Andrew Murray, Transparency, scrutiny and responsiveness: fashioning a private space within the 
information society 82.4 POLIT. QUARTERLY 509-514 (2011). 
7 US Department of Defense, UNITED STATES- VIETNAM RELATIONS 1945-1967: A STUDY (1967) 
8 New York Times Co. V. United States (403 U.S. 713). See also Joseph E. Stiglitz, On liberty, the right to 
know, and public discourse: the role of transparency in public life, paper (1999). Alasdair Roberts, 
WikiLeaks: the illusion of transparency 78.1 INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCIENCES 116-133 (2012). Also Mark 
Fenster, Disclosure's effects: WikiLeaks and transparency 97 IOWA L. REV. 753 (2011). 
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public order and national security, to name a few.9 In such cases, the competing interests 
of those that confidentiality is geared to protect should be balanced against the gains from 
transparency.10  
 
Arguably, three distinctions can be made on transparency rules, based on their normative 
strength, their relational nature and their content. Depending on whether transparency 
norms are enforceable rules or aspirational commitments, they can be distinguished in 
hard law transparency rules and soft law transparency guarantees/pledges. Depending on 
which parties it involves, transparency can be internal, external and administrative. 
Depending on the content of the transparency rules, they can be procedural or 
substantive/regulatory. 
 
Table 1 Possible Transparency Classifications 
Normative strength of rule Relational nature of rule Content of rule 
Soft law transparency Internal transparency Procedural transparency 
Hard law transparency External transparency Regulatory transparency 
Administrative 
transparency 
 
Soft law transparency usually appears as a general principle, either in the form of a good 
governance commitment at the political level (documents and codes related to the 
practice of an organization11 or speeches of high ranking administrators), or a preambular 
general principle. In this form, it has the least normative effect, and it can be used (at 
best) either as a guideline of persuasive value to shape the behavior of the actors it can 
affect or as an interpretative tool for the better understanding of concrete rules, in case !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 See generally discussion of first amendment considerations and public order, and in particular the notion 
of clear and present danger in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616 (1919), Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
10 Accountability mechanisms generally aim at enhancing transparency but if pushed too far transparency 
may threaten the level of discretion required for administrative practice. See also here Anne Trebilcock, 
Implications of the UN Convention Against Corruption of International Organizations: Oversight, Due 
Process and Immunities Issues 6 INT'L ORG. L. REV.513, 538 (2009).  
11  Todd Grierson-Weiler & Ian Laird, Standards of Treatment in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 259-304, 278 (Peter Muchlinski, et al. EDS., 2008) citing OECD 
Recommendation of the Council of the OEDC on Improving the Quality of Government Regulation and 
APEC Leaders Statement to Implement APEC Transparency Standards. 
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this somehow becomes relevant before a tribunal, which examines obligations of parties 
in light of their commitment to transparency. 12 
 
The other form transparency can take is hard law, that is, binding commitment. It can be 
either a procedural or a regulatory obligation, or a combination of both. In the domestic 
context, procedural transparency rules impose the obligation for different administrative 
bodies to follow a specific procedure, make their meetings open to the audience or certain 
interested or affected parties or to publish the results of such meetings and to publish the 
rules that underlie their decision-making. This form of transparency helps to add to the 
predictability of decisions.  
 
At the international level procedural transparency has achieved a hard law status usually 
in the area of arbitration and dispute settlement, as far as it concerns the choice of judges 
and the following of formal procedures.13 In some cases, it also establishes elements of 
the “right to be heard” for interested parties and more specifically, organized groups of 
civil society, professional associations, unions, or NGOs. A third, more hybrid form of 
transparency, which departs slightly from the soft law category, is “administrative 
transparency.”  
 
In international law, soft law transparency can be further distinguished into internal 
transparency, when it affects the conduct of diplomatic negotiations and other relations 
among member states to the organization, and external transparency, relating to the 
“public relations” of the organization, namely its outreach to the general public. 
Transparency can be of regulatory or substantive in nature when the obligation to 
disclose, publish, inform on a certain matter is self-standing. That is, if the organization 
or network or actor or state fails to be transparent by not publishing a specific decision or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  Erika de Wet, Governance through Promotion and Persuasion: The 1998 ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1429, 1448 (2008). 
13  See Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw Procedural Transparency" in in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 721-788 at 756-777 (Peter Muchlinski, et al. EDS., 
2008).  
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law, it is solely accountable for that omission, regardless of whether this caused harm to a 
certain individual or other organization.14 
 
Consideration of context along with balancing potentially conflicting interests become 
crucial in circumstances when transparency is competing with corruption concerns as 
well as when confidentiality is at stake. For example, when a majority political party 
insists on adopting certain rules during elections that seem to be designed to promote 
transparency, one should examine whether this request is geared towards disempowering 
smaller minority parties or dissent within the country. Similarly, in the domestic context, 
trials often take place behind closed doors when the rights of vulnerable groups (such as 
children) are at stake. At the international level, we should be cautious when transparency 
provisions that are tailored to the needs of western states are being imposed upon 
developing countries.15  
 
C. Defining transparency in the WTO 
 
Traditionally transparency is coupled with disclosure of information. In the WTO context 
it has acquired a more expanded meaning. It includes the possibility of expanded 
participatory rights for citizens and consumers or external transparency; and also refers to 
the position of developing countries’ with respect to decision-making, also called internal 
transparency. Administrative transparency is the closest type to the traditional definition, 
as it refers to publication of documents and disclosure of information from the WTO 
administration. Finally, in the GATT and other agreements are articles under the title 
“Transparency” that refer to the publication of national trade related laws and the 
existence of administrative and judicial review mechanisms for decisions that relate to 
tariffs. These last two categories invite less debate over their content.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Anne-Marie Slaughter & Thomas Hale, Transparency: Possibilities and Limitations, 30 FLETCHER FOR. 
WORLD AFF. 153, 154 (2006) where they say that ransparency is not synonymous to accountability.  
15 See also on disadvantages of transparency Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural 
Transparency, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 721-788 at 762-763 
(Peter Muchlinski, et al. EDS., 2008). 
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Internal transparency was defined in Paragraph 10 of the Doha Declaration as “the 
effective participation of all Members” referring specifically to developing countries.16 I 
call this aspect “internal transparency stricto sensu” as it is the one traditionally accepted 
in the WTO. I argue that similar characteristics to internal transparency stricto sensu 
appear elsewhere, and thus a proper examination of the term needs to extend to two more 
categories: Acceding countries and Preferential Trade Agreements. The reasons for this, 
further elaborated on in the chapter on Internal Transparency are threefold. The first 
relates to the text of the Doha Declaration, which does not name developing countries 
explicitly when it mentions problems of effective participation. Instead the reference 
made is to the expanding membership of the WTO. Second, the preferential treatment of 
development and developing countries, regional, bilateral and other plurilateral trade 
agreements and accession protocols that give incoming members obligations on top of 
what they sign for in the WTO Agreements is similar: they are all deviations from classic 
MFN and National Treatment. Third, in all three cases we can observe a stronger versus 
weaker state paradigm, in other words power imbalances are easily decipherable. 
 
External transparency is a term originating outside the WTO. In fact, WTO member 
states have strongly refuted that any effort from non-state actors to participate in the 
WTO can be called a “transparency” issue. It remains unclear why there is such strong 
opposition to calling for example the amicus curiae submissions a transparency issue. 
WTO member states have not explained why they object the terminology. In their 
objections they cite the intergovernmental nature of the WTO and they often say that if 
they had wanted more involvement for civil society, they would have written that into the 
WTO Agreements. Most likely, civil society has clustered all the requests made towards 
the organization into the three greater ones: more participation, more consideration of 
areas affected by trade (such as the environment) and more transparency. As the door to 
the WTO for citizens, consumers and NGOs is a very narrow one, and publication of 
documents may very well be the only actual product of transparency, the other two, 
participation and consideration of trade-related interests were tagged on to the first one. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS 149-150 (2008). 
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Added to that is the non-transparent informal (and infrequent) practice of corporate 
interest participation in dispute settlement.  
 
I use the term “civil society” in this dissertation in the broadest sense possible. It includes 
both organized civil society (NGOs, labour and consumer unions, interest groups and 
lobbies), as well as citizens, academics, “netizens” (those who become active in online 
fora, blogs, twitter, instagram, etc), protesters (organized and individual), members of 
political parties and coalitions. In a sense, I aspire to include any politically motivated 
participants and stakeholders in world trade. This may imply that corporations are also 
actors included in civil society. The reason behind such an expansive definition relates to 
amicus curiae briefs and their admissibility in the WTO dispute settlement process. I 
realize that it may be controversial to include in the same group both environmental 
groups and big oil corporations, or human rights’ NGOs and big pharmaceutical 
corporations. However, if the WTO were to institute a process for the submission of 
memoranda that ask to be heard in the dispute settlement, as with national courts, 
standing should be as expansive as it is possible. Moreover, in the design of such a 
mechanism, special attention should be given towards ensuring access to the Dispute 
Settlement Process- perhaps with a two-tier mechanism for individuals and non-profit 
organizations versus for profit institutions. 
 
The only two transparencies that have been discussed by the Panels and the Appellate 
Body have been legal transparency, since the 1980s and external transparency, with 
respect to amicus curiae briefs. For the latter, the Panels and Appellate Body have not 
used the term “transparency” in reports.  
 
The following table summarizes the terminology used in each of the following chapters. 
 
Transparency Definition 
Internal stricto 
sensu 
Internal transparency stricto sensu refers to decision-making deficits 
of developing countries in the WTO. It highlights the significance of 
trust in the WTO institutional processes, such as negotiations, 
decision-making, dispute settlement and trade monitoring that the 
representatives of member states should have in order for the WTO 
 
56 
system to function productively.17 
Internal lato 
sensu 
Internal transparency lato sensu is introduced in this thesis as an 
extension of decision-making deficits. Power imbalances in the WTO 
that have led to developing countries’ exclusion have also created 
other asymmetrical outcomes, specifically in the areas of new 
member accession and preferential trade agreement proliferation. 
External External transparency refers to the relationship of the organization 
not with its own member states, its shareholders, but with anyone else 
affected by the rules and procedures introduced under its auspices, 
the stakeholders. Although generally civil society is understood to be 
represented by NGOs, this thesis will discuss not only the 
interactions of the WTO with the organized civil society, but it will 
look at all possible communication and information flows between 
the WTO and citizens of WTO member states and non-member 
states, namely the public at large. 
Administrative Administrative transparency refers to transparency aspects in the 
administrative level of the WTO. The functions of the WTO are 
carried at the political level by the diplomats who are employed by 
WTO member states and at the administrative level by the WTO 
secretariat, namely the permanent staff of the WTO. The Secretariat 
assists the main organs consisting of diplomats in their function. In 
addition, the Secretariat with its legal officers assists the Panelists 
and Appellate Body members during the resolution of trade disputes. 
The transparency issues that arise in this context are mainly related to 
the selection of the WTO employees, judges and other participants in 
the administration of international trade. 
Legal The obligation of WTO member states, outlined in Article X of the 
GATT and its equivalents in other agreements, to publish their trade-
related legislation and the rule of law obligations to maintain 
adequate recourse mechanisms for traders and consumers in order to 
resolve issues that may arise in transnational trade matters, at the 
border upon the entry of products and in the domestic market. 
Table 2 Transparency forms in the WTO 
D. The Sutherland Report  
 
Transparency existed as a rule in the GATT, Article X, since 1947, but was officially 
brought to the forefront of institutional discussions with the Sutherland Report no earlier 
than 2005. In view of the WTO 10th anniversary in 2005, then Director-General Supachai 
Panitchpakdi commissioned a report from a consultative board consisting of the former 
Director-General of the WTO, Peter Sutherland and a few select members of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Doha Ministerial Declaration  WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 20 November 2001 Paragraph 10 (internal 
transparency definition and commitment). 
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governments, academics and policy-makers. The result was a report entitled “The Future 
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium.” Previously, in 
1983, GATT Director-General Arthur Dunkel similarly commissioned the “Leutwiler 
Report”, which actively pushed towards the initiation of the Uruguay Round and the 
establishment of a robust multilateral trading system. The Sutherland report looks at the 
functioning of the WTO as an institution. Although the report is not directly related to the 
Doha deadlock, the assessment of institutional parameters has as a goal among other 
things to find productive avenues that can be used to address the issues underlying the 
Doha negotiations’ problems.  
 
The report purports to be an evaluation of the WTO and to discuss legitimacy concerns 
concerning the WTO. In its nine chapters, the report discusses central issues such as the 
relationship between the WTO and Globalization and Sovereignty (Chapters I and III), 
the erosion of non-discrimination mostly due to national protectionism and regional and 
preferential trade agreements (Chapter II), the problems of the consensus voting rule, 
political reinforcement, process efficiency and the WTO’s variable geometry (Chapters 
VII and VIII), the relationship of the WTO with other international organizations 
(Chapter IV), transparency and civil society participation (Chapter V), the dispute 
settlement system (Chapter VI) and challenges and improvements of administrative 
nature for the Secretariat and the Director General (Chapter IX). 
 
Even though the report includes some (albeit very limited) constructive criticism for the 
WTO, it largely is an apologetic document, a defense of the WTO 18 and those aspects of 
globalization that provide fertile ground for the economic paradigm under which the 
organization operates. It has been criticized as a “trade liberalization gospel”19 which is 
“trapped in [its] functionalist straightjacket.” Its conclusions are seen as unconvincing20 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Joost Pauwelyn, The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, 
Globalization and Reforming the WTO 8:2 J. INT’L ECON. L.  329 at 329(2005). 
19 Deborah Z. Cass, The Sutherland Report: The WTO and its Critics 2 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 153 at 154 
(2005). 
20 Armin Von Bogdandy & Markus Wagner, The Development of the WTO-Remarks on the Sutherland 
Report 2 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 167 at 168 (2005). 
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as being an attempt to defend “the status quo by WTO insiders.”21 Indeed, the members 
of Consultative Board are linked to the WTO, the report was written only by them, 
without the participation of civil society actors, and it even mentions that one goal of the 
report is to “revisi[t] some of the fundamental principles of the trading system that, in our 
view, have been greatly misunderstood or misrepresented.”22 Among the academics 
discussing the Sutherland Report, a small fraction who have or have had an institutional 
affiliation with the organization are the only ones who agree with the analysis and 
conclusions of the Report.23 The usefulness of the Sutherland Report does not lie in 
providing answers for the legitimacy problems of the WTO, as it seems to be giving the 
WTO a perfect score. However, it helps delineate some issues, and thus we can sketch a 
rough territory where the WTO needs improvements. 
 
Several themes transpire from the scholarship discussing the Sutherland Report. First, 
scholars point out that the report did not adequately address the central issue of 
development in the WTO, in the form of the negotiating asymmetries for developing 
countries as well as the incomplete and fragmented understanding of development needs, 
coupled with a blind trust on the trade liberalization paradigm. For as long as trade 
negotiations resulted in lower trade tariffs, the legitimacy issues facing the international 
trading system (the GATT at the time) remained less visible. Developing countries 
voiced their frustration in a number of occasions, but the institutional response, reflecting 
developed countries’ convictions was that as long as developing countries stay on the 
trade train, they will eventually gain some speed, reduce poverty and create prosperity for 
themselves. Since 1995 and the Uruguay Round results, we have yet to witness a 
successful trade round. Legitimacy as a derivative of trade negotiations and their 
resulting tariff reductions is no longer a plausible narrative in WTO discourse. Thus, in 
the ten-year anniversary of the WTO, the Sutherland Report had the opportunity to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Joost Pauwelyn, The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, 
Globalization and Reforming the WTO 8:2 J. INT’L ECON. L.  329 at 329 (2005). See also page 7 of the 
Sutherland Report, the short bios of the Consultative Board, all of which have long-standing careers in 
international organizations.  
22 Sutherland Report, 5. 
23 For example see William J. Davey, The Sutherland Report on Dispute Settlement: A comment  8:2 J. 
INT’L ECON. L.  321 (2005) and Mitsuo Matsushita, The Sutherland Report and its Discussion of Dispute 
Settlement Reforms 8:3 J. INT’L ECON. L.  623 (2005).  
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reframe the issue of development in the WTO. In view of the Doha Development Round, 
the Report could take advantage of the opportunity and revisit the liberalization 
paradigm. Instead, citing a number of “empirical studies” and in sync with the Report’s 
tone, development and internal transparency concerns are barely addressed. It is their 
own “autarkic, inward-looking policies” and “their own protection” 
 that “undermined the developing countries’ export performance by creating a ‘bias 
against exports.’”24 Countries who benefit from preferential rules become “over-reliant 
on preference.”25 
 
The “it’s-not-us-it’s-you” tone of the report continues during the second theme, which 
dominated the criticism of the report. The openness of the organization towards civil 
society and NGOs is deemed satisfactory; the Secretariat does not have sufficient 
resources to do more; and, some of these organizations are intransparent themselves. This 
type of reasoning was greatly criticized, and rightfully so, in the literature. Such a line of 
argumentation, besides not addressing but fueling legitimacy problems, it also carries 
little normative value and does not contribute to a good governance model. 
 
Another major point of discussion for academics engaging with the Sutherland Report 
was the Dispute Settlement Understanding and the proposals for its reform. The Panels 
and Appellate Body are perhaps the only example in international law of such a prolific 
system of adjudication, and a high rate of implementation. Implementation is successful 
when countries have- even theoretically- the opportunity to cross retaliate in their 
markets, should another country be found non compliant with WTO law. However, some 
implementation problems remain when smaller economies are involved in dispute 
settlement, developing countries still underutilize the system. Generally the Sutherland 
Report moved in the right direction with respect to pointing out some institutional 
concerns and offering suggestions to address them. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Sutherland Report para. 92. 
25 Sutherland Report para. 101. 
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Finally, the Report falls short of explicitly and systematically discussing larger 
institutional problems and power asymmetries in the WTO, as well as the balance 
between legitimate national concerns for regulation and the principle of non-
discrimination. State sovereignty has been eroded through participation in the WTO. The 
WTO has a long reach and affects a large segment of the domestic legal orders of its 
members, because of the pervasive nature of trade. Unlike environmental treaties, or 
agreements on the law of the sea, trade touches almost any activity. Additional 
Agreements, especially TRIPS, TBT and GATS can leave economists hard-pressed to 
think of areas where the WTO has no relevance. The Sutherland Report adopts an 
analysis that treats the WTO as one of many intergovernmental organizations and the 
reduction of state sovereignty as a product of the proliferation of organizations. This 
obscures the fact that trade regulation is highly intrusive on national legislations and 
since the Uruguay Round the WTO has extended its reach in a vast area of jurisdiction. 
As such, national parliaments are de facto sidestepped. Any legitimacy discussion surely 
does not need to propose the demise of the current trading system, intrusive as that 
system may be or seem. Instead, the Report could have pointed out avenues for the 
repoliticization of interest areas in order to re-introduce debates and participation of 
stakeholders that would have been part of national deliberation processes had the WTO 
not acquired jurisdiction in these areas. Both for underestimating the deflation of 
sovereignty, and for failing to remedy the legitimacy issues that deflation causes, the 
report falls critically short. 
 
1. Transparency in the Sutherland Report 
 
Transparency as a theme in the WTO is prominently featured in the report, as it occupies 
an entire chapter (out of nine in total). Additionally, transparency-related issues are 
scattered throughout the report in the other eight sections. The Sutherland report directly 
addresses external transparency and it alludes or discusses less elaborately all other forms 
of transparency that will be discussed in this thesis, namely internal, legal, and 
administrative.  
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First and foremost, the report explicitly refers to external transparency in Chapter V, 
entitled “Transparency and dialogue with civil society.” The report here mentions that: 
 
176. A distinct feature of the tremendous transformation that has taken 
place in the global order over the past two decades has doubtless been the 
expanding role of civil society. The rise of mass democracy, or what some 
have called the “global associational revolution” was particularly 
powerful in the decade of the nineties as the UN world conferences 
galvanized the forces of civil society globally in a bid to promote a more 
inclusive, participatory and transparent system of global governance. This, 
amidst a growing sense that many global problems could only be 
effectively addressed through a partnership of state and non-state actors. 
 
177. This new partnership has not been without its tensions. The concerns 
of civil society organizations for more meaningful and substantive 
participation, the anxieties of sovereign governments about the invasion of 
their hitherto uncontested space, and the challenges faced by global 
institutions in reconciling their mandates and legal frameworks with these 
new realities are still very much alive.  
 
178. Even so, the new partnership has in many ways been a welcome and 
beneficial experience. It has focused political and public opinion on the 
importance of trade and often has revealed key intersections between trade 
policies and economic, foreign, social and other policy areas. At the same 
time for those who recognize the large benefits the multilateral trading 
system has brought to hundreds of millions of people across the globe, it 
has often been a frustrating and discouraging experience. While some non-
governmental organizations have sought to acquire the necessary 
expertise on trade issues to make a productive contribution, others have 
not, being content to protest the existing order.26  
 
Altogether, the chapter on civil society has been characterized as “disappointing.”27 This 
last part should be read together with a perplexing excerpt from the conclusions of the 
report. The report there mentions that “[t]he Secretariat is under no obligation to engage 
seriously with groups whose express objective is to undermine or destroy the WTO.”28 
This is a very troubling statement. Assuming that the Sutherland report is not referring to 
criminal organizations (which naturally can be excluded as they do not contribute to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Emphasis added. 
27 Deborah Z. Cass, The Sutherland Report: The WTO and its Critics 2 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 153 at p 161 
(2005). 
28 Sutherland Report Page 80 paragraph 12.
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public debate), it is reasonable to expect some serious contributions from organizations 
that may oppose segments (even large ones) of the WTO’s mandate. If such organizations 
care enough to submit proposals that oppose the current WTO status quo in a courteous 
manner and maintain such a level of discussion, it is unclear why these organizations 
should not be engaged with. If this note simply refers to organizations who perpetrate 
crimes (such as the destruction of public property in protests), then it is unnecessary. This 
excerpt gives the wrong message about the WTO, namely that the organization might not 
engage, at all, with voices from the inside or the outside that directly oppose its mandate, 
so the only possible debates can occur with anyone who thinks the WTO has to continue 
working as it does. 
 
Generally, it is the organization’s responsibility to filter voices from civil society, and 
establish transparent and legitimate mechanisms and thresholds to distinguish among all 
NGOs willing to participate. Moreover, the failure of the Seattle Ministerial, the only 
Ministerial to date that took place during huge protests at its doors, did not fail because of 
those who were dressed as turtles and yelled “Kill the WTO.” The death came from the 
inside: the developed/developing country divide, Charlene Barshefsky’s (the US Trade 
Representative at the time) decision to reach a final declaration in a smaller group setting, 
and Bill Clinton’s hijacking of the conference’s agenda in a direction that developing 
countries could not accept.29 To turn this around and accuse NGOs for their lack of 
transparency, or direct attention to national mechanisms of citizen participation does not 
address the WTO’s legitimacy problems. Instead, it discusses other actors’ legitimacy 
problems.30  
 
Amicus curiae briefs are interestingly absent from the part discussing criticisms of WTO 
jurisprudence. 31  Only the chapter discussing the relations with other international 
organizations briefly mentions that:  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS 57 et seq. (2009). 
30 Cho agrees with the reports position on the legitimacy of NGOs- even though he links legitimacy to 
transparency, see Sungjoon Cho, A Quest for WTO’s Legitimacy, 4:3 WORLD TRADE REV. 391(2005).  
31 Sutherland Report Page 55, paragraphs 246 et seq. 
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“[t]he dispute settlement system of the WTO, due to its special 
characteristics and being self-contained in its jurisdictional 
responsibilities, offers no legal space for cooperation with other 
international organizations except on a case-by-case basis derived from 
the right of panels to seek information. The Board endorses the 
maintenance of this policy.”32 
 
It is unclear why the report does not elaborate the issue of amicus briefs, which we will 
discuss in the Chapter on external transparency. The limited discussion in the Report, 
compared to Appellate Body practice is even deemed to be a “step backwards.” 33 In any 
event the briefs were by the time of the publication of the Report an informal, not 
officially endorsed yet frequent practice before the Appellate Body. The report came out 
in 2005, after the 2001 General Council decision opposing the briefs, but nevertheless 
relating them to the notion of transparency. The absence of any analysis is troubling.  
 
Framing civil society participation and external transparency in such a wide framework 
initially appears to provide a more comprehensive perspective on the issue of global civil 
society mobilization and participatory mechanisms in world affairs. However, this 
analysis obscures the unique to the international trading system protests, objections and 
formal and informal requests for participation as well as the WTO-specific challenges 
with respect to civil society participation.  
 
For example, seen under this light of a general expansion of civil society role in world 
affairs, the amicus curiae brief issue that will be discussed in a following chapter 
acquires a different significance: the response of WTO member-states, the Secretariat and 
the Sutherland Report moves along the lines of the legal personality and the subjects of 
public international law and intergovernmental organizations under a Westphalian 
perspective. States and states only can participate, following the formal mechanisms of 
participation outlined in the Dispute Settlement Understanding, in any disputes, either as 
claimants and respondents, or as third parties. This official response, reiterated over the 
last two decades in several occasions however represents the role of civil society and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Sutherland Report Page 39 paragraph 167. 
33 Joost Pauwelyn, The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, 
Globalization and Reforming the WTO 8:2 J. INT’L ECON. L.  329 at 335(2005). 
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NGOs in the WTO inaccurately. The WTO Agreements contain several formal 
mechanisms for the participation of transnational actors, and others that were established 
through case law and will be discussed in this thesis. Extending this case law to include 
amicus curiae briefs, seen under the light of traditional international law and the system 
of international organizations, is a big stretch.  
 
The Sutherland Report itself places “business and consumers” at the center of 
stakeholdership in multilateral trade negotiations.34 To be absolutely clear on the report’s 
intensions vis-à-vis civil society, they add the word “rightly” in this part. 35  The 
opportunity to envision a role for these stakeholders in formal mechanisms is greatly 
missed.36 If civil society participation is placed under the light of the WTO law and case 
law, then it appears to fall within acceptable institutional margins, together with scientific 
opinions, consumer preferences and corporate interests. In this respect, it has also been 
observed that the WTO is focused on producers and exporters, who have many incentives 
to support protectionism37, much more than it is on consumers and citizens.38 Beyond 
obscuring the external transparency deficits, the report also fails to recognize the uneven 
focus of the WTO rules and the economic paradigm that it puts forward on only one side 
of the stakeholders, namely businesses. Even more, it is the consumers that would mostly 
benefit by the lowering of tariffs, and currently, businesses lobby at a national level to 
increase protectionism. The Report overall fails to capitalize at the NGO potential to be a 
“direct, transnational interface or voice mechanism where citizens and consumers can 
transmit concerns and obtain information about WTO activities and decisions.”39 
 
Another aspect of external transparency discussed in the Sutherland Report relates to 
opening of Panel and Appellate Body meetings to the public. This positive attitude 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Sutherland Report Para. 278. 
35 See the discussion in Jan Klabbers, New Logo: The Sutherland Report and the Rebranding of the WTO 2 
INT'L ORG. L. REV. 177 at 177(2005). 
36 Steve Charnovitz, A Close Look at a Few Points 8:2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 311 at 316 (2005).  
37 Joost Pauwelyn, The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, 
Globalization and Reforming the WTO 8:2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 329 at 333 (2005). 
38 Id. at 331. 
39 Id. at 342-343. 
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towards transparency in the dispute settlement has a very large number of supporters40 
mostly from non participants (civil society and academics) but also from some WTO 
representatives, as it can initially be done on a voluntary basis with state consent (as it 
currently happens) and progressively open up the process, perhaps by only requiring one 
state to request the opening of the meetings during the process, or, in the traditional WTO 
decision-making fashion, establish that all larger meetings are open unless consensus 
exists among parties to a dispute to the contrary. It has also been observed that 
uncoupling the WTO Public Forum or Public Symposium from the WTO Ministerial 
Conference reduces the former to a “show-and-tell” event, instead of taking the 
opportunity to build civil society into the negotiating process.41 The conclusion in the 
Transparency chapter is positively supportive to the WTO, even providing a long passage 
on the necessity of secrecy for negotiations,42 or the idea that there is such as thing as 
“excessive transparency.”43 
 
Chapter V contains some discussion on internal transparency, that is, negotiating 
asymmetries among WTO member states, especially present in the tension between 
developed and developing countries.44  Internal transparency ironically is discussed in the 
context of justifying the need for secrecy of negotiations. Interestingly, despite the Doha 
Development Round and its challenges, and its explicit mention in Paragraph 10 of the 
Doha Declaration, the report does not elaborate on how internal transparency is 
compromised in the WTO by the treatment of developing countries.45  
 
Paragraph 222 of the report interestingly notes that developing countries participate much 
more in the Dispute Settlement Process than in the GATT, and “developing countries –
even some of the poorest (when given the legal assistance now available to them) – are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 See for the Sutherland Report William J. Davey, The Sutherland Report on Dispute Settlement: A 
Comment 8:2 J. INT’L ECON. L.  321 at 328 (2005)  and Niall Meagher, So Far, so Good: but What Next? 
The Sutherland Report and WTO Dispute Settlement 4:3 WORLD TRADE REV. 409 at 416 (2005). 
41 Steve Charnovitz, A Close Look at a Few Points 8:2 J. INT’L ECON. L.  311 at 318 (2005). 
42 Sutherland Report Paragraph 199. 
43 See for example Sutherland Report paragraph 198 page 44. 
44 Robert Wolfe, Decision-Making and Transparency in the ‘Medieval’ WTO: Does the Sutherland Report 
have the right prescription? 8:3 J. INT’L ECON. L.  631at 639 (2005). 
45 Joost Pauwelyn, The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, 
Globalization and Reforming the WTO, 8:2 J. INT’L ECON. L.  329 at 336-337 (2005). 
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increasingly taking on the most powerful. That is how it should be.” This statement is 
largely exaggerated. In fact, a number of countries have never participated in the dispute 
settlement system, not even as third parties. Isolated examples like that of Antigua and 
Barbuda show that perhaps the system works, but it works for those who use it, which is 
not the overwhelming majority of the WTO. Also despite its victory against the United 
States during dispute settlement, the subsequent effective inability to implement the, 
report should warrant a revision of the implementation rules. When cross-retaliation is 
allowed only within the domestic market of the winner, and the winner is a micro-state, 
then cross-retaliation is meaningless: no sector can be large enough to harm the strong 
state that stood on the other side of litigation. That is not “how it should be.” 
 
Once again in the report, the opportunity is missed to discuss at a pragmatic level how to 
bring developing countries not up to speed with trade, but on equal footing with their 
peers at an institutional level.46 The repeated failures to conclude a negotiating round in 
Doha and later in Bali demonstrate that the institutional and collective reluctance to 
tackle internal transparency as a serious issue comes at a high cost that threatens the 
WTO’s main function. This institutional reluctance is evident in the Sutherland Report. 
The Green Room issue is barely addressed. Emphasis is instead placed on need for 
confidentiality, a discussion on variable geometry and a gospel for the current negotiation 
arrangements that perpetuate the internal transparency deficits and are, in relative terms, 
archaic, since they are reminiscent of the GATT days. 
 
Some discussion on Least-Developed countries appears later in the report47 but not 
exploring their real problems with the WTO. They are mentioned as “unfortunately, 
insignificant in terms of world trade (even collectively).” However, as it appears from the 
Doha Round, collectively they can contribute to blocking further decision-making and 
their accession process takes a very long time (despite their ‘insignificance’) as we will 
see in the chapter on accessions and internal transparency lato sensu.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Dan Sarooshi, The Future of the WTO and its Dispute Settlement System 2 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 
129 151 (2005). 
47 Sutherland Report page 67 et seq., paragraph 306 et seq. 
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It is important to note here that even though the Sutherland Report rightly observes that 
the institutional and monetary resources of the WTO are not unlimited, this does not 
mean that focus on one form of transparency necessarily needs to occur at the expense of 
the other.48 This perspective fails to capture that institutional and pecuniary constraints 
reflect a lack of support from member states, another issue that should be remedied. Also, 
considering the extent of the WTO’s legitimacy crisis, addressing these legitimacy 
problems should be a first priority for the organization, both at the internal and at the 
external level. 
 
The Sutherland Report does not discuss asymmetries caused by accession, although the 
Chinese candidacy has brought many of the internal transparency issues during accession 
processes into light.49 The Report does focus on Preferential Trade Agreements and 
regionalism.50 Although it mentions that the vast majority of the PTAs and RTAs have 
not been notified and all but one have never been examined to check their compatibility 
with the WTO Agreements, the Report does not encourage the organization to expose this 
state of affairs.51 It engages in a discussion on whether such agreements promote or 
undermine the world trading system, only to conclude that the evidence and research is 
inconclusive. The systemic reluctance to discuss regional trade agreements remains. We 
can hypothesize that this occurs at the expense of the less powerful players in the WTO. 
52  Insofar PTAs are not even notified with the WTO, and power asymmetries are caused 
and perpetuated by PTAs the transparency deficit in this respect is massive, and it results 
both from the lack of disclosure and marginalization of member states.  
 
Chapter V discusses legal transparency when it defers to WTO member states for the 
management of civil society voices and concerns in national parliaments. In this context, 
the Sutherland report mentions that governments are under the obligation to openly 
discuss their trade-related legislation, which is linked to the obligation embodied in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Donald McRae, Developing Countries and ‘The Future of the WTO’ 8:3 J. INT’L ECON. L.  603 (2005). 
49 Bernard Hoekman, Proposals for WTO rRform: A Synthesis and Assessment 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 324 
passim (2011). 
50 Sutherland Report Paragraph 68, and paras 75-87. 
51 Pieter Jan Kuijper, Do Parallels with Other International Organizations Help, 2 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 191 
at 194 (2005). 
52 Id. 
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Article X of the GATT and its equivalents.53 With respect to the relationship of Member 
states and civil society, the report notes: 
 
“It must continue to be recognized that the primary responsibility for 
engaging civil society in trade policy matters rests with the Members 
themselves. While the WTO's relations with civil society have their own 
integrity and dynamics, they are inextricably bound with government /civil 
society relations at the national level.54” 
 
Fourth, aspects related to administrative transparency are discussed in Chapter IX, 
entitled “The role of the Director-General and Secretariat.” The Sutherland report 
acknowledges that the WTO Secretariat is “one of the smallest among major international 
institutions”55 but interprets its small size as an institutional constraint, rather than a 
caveat to the organization’s legitimacy. Instead, the report notes in paragraph 361 that 
“the legitimacy of decision-making is adequately protected by the consensus principle.”56 
The Secretariat could assume greater responsibility in ensuring that the information 
published publicly and internally is meaningful in the way it is presented to citizens of 
WTO member states and traders that have their own systemic constraints in using the vast 
amount of data produced and presented by the WTO, with increased emphasis on 
consumers, developing and least-developed countries.57 The selection of the members of 
the Secretariat is limited to the senior positions of the Director-General’s deputies58 
without any word on the selection of the remaining more than five hundred employees. 
Moreover, the “pro-trade ethos” of the Secretariat does not allow a fruitful dialogue and 
the formation of internal dissent clusters. Instead, similarly to the Sutherland Report the 
Secretariat is there to defend the status quo.59  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Sutherland Report Paragraphs 204-205 
54 Id. Paragraph 212 emphasis in the original. 
55 Id.  73 paragraph 337. 
56 Id. page 77. 
57 Gregory Shaffer, The Role of the Director-General and Secretariat: Chapter IX of the Sutherland Report 
4:3 WORLD TRADE REV. 429 at 435 (2005). 
58 Sutherland Report paragraph 354 page 75 onwards. 
59 Armin Von Bogdandy & Markus Wagner, The Development of the WTO-Remarks on the Sutherland 2 
INT'L ORG. L. REV. 167 at 172 (2005). See also Deborah Z. Cass, The Sutherland Report: The WTO and its 
Critics 2 INT'L ORG L REV 153 at 154 (2005). 
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E. WTO and Transparency in International Law and International 
Relations’ discourse 
 
Academic discourse focusing on the legitimacy problems facing international 
organizations has been around for some time.  Legitimacy concerns and discussions were 
coupled even during the birth and early years of those institutions.60 The failure of the 
League of Nations, coupled with the Second World War became an early symbol of the 
problématique of international institutions: the League of Nations was one of first 
permanent structures created after international negotiations that failed shortly thereafter. 
The UN, the IMF, the World Bank and the GATT/WTO have been dealing with 
legitimacy problems throughout their history. Dissatisfaction and disappointment ensue, 
together with long discussions on how to remedy the problems that these institutions face, 
and review their normative frameworks and agendas. The peak period of legitimacy 
discussions are mostly the last forty-five years. With respect to the international trading 
system that timeframe is slightly smaller- legitimacy-related discourse did start as early 
as the late sixties, however, the vast volume of scholarship appeared in the late eighties 
and peaked after the nineties- during the Seattle and surrounding events and the initiation 
of the Doha Round of negotiations.  
 
Both in the international and the domestic domain, the formal and informal exercise of 
political authority produces normative outcomes whose legitimacy is constantly tested.61 
Under the notion of the Rule of Law, a number of principles have emerged in order to 
ensure legitimate decision-making. Transparency, openness or disclosure of information !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 See for example the work of Hans Kelsen following the creation of the United Nations, HANS KELSEN, 
THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS. VOL. 11. 
(1950), Hans Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense under the Charter of the United 
Nations 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 783 (1948). 
61 Terry MacDonald, Citizens or stakeholders? Exclusion Equality and Legitimacy in Global Stakeholder 
Democracy, in GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 47-68 at 57 (Daniele 
Archibugi, et al. eds. 2011), on understanding legitimacy as “consisting […] in the justifiability of 
institutions in terms of reasons embedded in the real social identities of the existing political agents who are 
participants in the institution in question. […] Legitimacy is concerned […] with the actual political 
acceptability given some background set of sociological facts about the identities that political actors 
possess through their shared participation in these institutions.” 
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is an important form of substantiating legitimacy. In the WTO, it is formally become both 
a rule binding member states to publish their trade rules and an institutional commitment 
on behalf of the organization itself. Transparency and legitimacy discussions first crossed 
paths at the domestic level. In international law, Global Administrative Law 
systematically defined and explored a normative space where transparency was one of 
few prominent principles. A significant number of scholars in WTO law, International 
Law and International Relations have also examined transparency in their work. A 
fraction of the contributions on transparency in International Law and International 
Relations frequently refers to the WTO, either exclusively, or to compare it with other 
international organizations, more specifically the EU and the World Bank and IMF. Some 
scholars have dealt specifically with transparency in the WTO.  
 
After summarizing the scholarship directly reacting to the Sutherland Report and its 
transparency issues, I will group the scholarly contributions into five large categories62: 
first, positivism, realism and rationalism; second, mainstream WTO law and 
transparency; third international public law; fourth, critical public international law; and 
fifth, societal constitutionalism. Furthermore, the third group, international public law, 
has a number of significant variations within its domain, which will be addressed in a 
separate chapter.  
 
The table below summarizes the positions of the four groups with respect to each group’s 
position on seven key questions. The first column presents the attitude towards global 
governance as the overall discourse platform in which discussions on the WTO should 
take place. Here the two main camps are those who assume that the WTO is an 
intergovernmental organization, analyzed under traditional international law (with 
emphasis on state sovereignty and the doctrine of pacta sunt servanta) and those who 
discuss WTO law in the context of some form of “global governance” theory- 
introducing more variables.63  The second column summarizes the degree of emphasis on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 The grouping may be artificial, as numerous writings exhibit more than one group’s properties, but the 
categorization is based on the main or more recurring theme or argument in one’s work. 
63 In international relations theory, this distinction is seen as corresponding to rationalism versus weak 
cognitivism. See ANDREAS HASENCLEVER ET AL., THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, 136-138 (1997). 
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the WTO’s legitimacy problems, which ranges from almost non-existent to central. The 
third issue is the strength of a link between legitimacy and transparency. The fourth 
question, based on the four transparency forms, is which types of transparency are 
analyzed. The next two questions are what are the positions of these groups towards 
sovereignty and civil society in the WTO (or at the global level generally).  
 
 
Table 3 WTO Transparency Theoretical Approaches 
The following analysis will discuss each of these groups in detail. 
1. The scholarly debate on the Sutherland Report 
 
 WTO and 
Global 
Governance 
WTO and 
Legitimacy 
problems 
Relation of 
Transparency 
to Legitimacy 
Transparency Sovereignty 
of States 
Civil Society in 
the WTO 
Sutherland 
Report 
Classic International 
Law/Rationalism/Reali
sm/ Positivism/ 
Trade Law 
NO (or 
tautology 
between global 
governance 
and 
international 
community) 
Not as 
pronounced 
and crucial 
Loose link Emphasis on 
legal and 
internal. Some 
administrative 
YES- only 
states can 
bind 
themselves 
Filter through the 
nation state 
Agreement in 
spirit, some 
criticisms on 
trade law related 
issues 
International Public 
law 
∗ GAL 
∗ IPA/IPL 
∗ Constitutionalism 
-see Table 3. 
YES 
(resembling a 
domestic 
public law 
order) 
Crucial but 
“public-law 
like” Global 
Governance 
can help 
solve them 
Strong link Emphasis 
mostly on 
external, and 
then internal 
YES with a 
global 
polity 
Element of 
deliberative or 
representative 
democracy 
Disagreement in 
parts, 
opportunity to 
extrapolate 
publicness in 
others. 
Critical Public 
International Law/  
Opposition to IPL/ 
Sutherland Report 
reactions 
YES (critical 
of existing 
structures, 
transnationalist 
elements) 
Crucial, 
unclear how 
(if) global 
governance 
will (can) 
handle the 
erosion of 
the nation-
state and 
power 
asymmetries 
Medium/ 
Strong link 
Emphasis on 
internal and 
external 
YES-eroded Important as part 
of transnational 
actors, at times 
amorphous, at 
times more 
organized 
Stronger 
reaction and 
criticism 
Societal 
Constitutionalism 
YES 
(transnational 
constitutionali
zation) 
Crucial 
(socio-legal 
analysis 
necessary)  
Medium link Discussion on 
deliberative 
polyarchy and 
knowledge, 
capacity for 
action and 
power of 
implementatio
n 
YES (but 
national 
constitution
s are 
structurally 
inadequate 
to deal with 
global 
problems) 
YES (massive 
external- 
including civil 
society- 
intervention will 
trigger the 
internal process 
of change 
N/A 
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Transparency has been discussed in the context of the extensive debate following the 
Sutherland report. Transparency as a theme in the WTO is prominently featured in the 
report, as it occupies an entire chapter (out of nine in total). Additionally, transparency-
related issues64 are scattered throughout the report in the other eight sections. The 
Sutherland report directly addresses external transparency and it alludes or discusses less 
elaborately all other forms of transparency that are discussed in this thesis, namely 
internal, legal, and administrative. After its publication, a number of scholars organized 
symposia discussing the missed opportunities of the report to address legitimacy issues 
raised in the report, and criticizing it for missing the mark on legitimacy concerns in 
global governance and trade governance, praising the organization instead. Some of these 
contributions, led by Jan Klabbers,65 identified global governance deficits and serious 
concerns with respect to developing countries, the dispute settlement process and civil 
society participation in the WTO. Many scholars from the GAL and IPA/IPL projects 
participated in the symposia. As the main lens of this discussion was to address the 
problems of the WTO as an institution, they extended the debate on the law of 
international organizations (IOs), examining institutional structures and deficits of IOs 
and comparing different IOs and their practices. These works are understandably critical 
of the self-evaluation of the WTO. 
 
The Sutherland report was criticized as an apologetic document, a defense of the WTO  
and those aspects of globalization that provide fertile ground for the economic paradigm 
under which the organization operates, a “trade liberalization gospel” which is “trapped 
in [its] functionalist straightjacket.” Its conclusions are seen as unconvincing as being an 
attempt to defend “the status quo by WTO insiders.”66 With respect to transparency, 
despite the observation in the Sutherland Report that the institutional and monetary 
resources of the WTO are finite, focus on one form of transparency should not occur at 
the expense of the other. The critiques of the Sutherland report related to transparency 
mostly discuss the issue of internal transparency and more particularly, developing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 As previously defined in Part C. 
65 Jan Klabbers, Forum: The Future of the WTO: Introduction 2 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 127 (2005), the same, 
New Logo: The Sutherland Report and the Rebranding of the WTO 2 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 177 at 177 (2005). 
66 Joost Pauwelyn, The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, 
Globalization and Reforming the WTO 8:2 J. INT’L ECON. L.  329 (2005). 
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country meaningful and equal participation in WTO processes. They also focus on 
external transparency and civil society participation. The majority of these contributions 
are appropriate responses to the Sutherland Report, which suffers from an almost 
absolute lack of critical self-reflection.  
 
Pauwelyn noted that report does not elaborate on how internal transparency is 
compromised in the WTO by the treatment of developing countries. Instead it 
demonstrates an incomplete and fragmented understanding of development needs, 
coupled with a blind trust on the trade liberalization paradigm.67   Wolfe emphasized the 
negotiating asymmetries among WTO member states, especially present in the tension 
between developed and developing countries. Moreover, the “pro-trade ethos” of the 
Secretariat does not allow a fruitful dialogue and the formation of internal dissent 
clusters. Instead, similarly to the Sutherland Report the Secretariat is there to defend the 
status quo.68 Kuijper criticized the report for another form of internal transparency 
deficits, caused by Preferential Trade Agreements and regionalism. Although the vast 
majority of the PTAs and RTAs have not been notified and all but one have never been 
examined to check their compatibility with the WTO Agreements, the Report does not 
encourage the organization to engage in a discussion on PTAs and RTAs. The systemic 
reluctance to discuss regional trade agreements remains at the expense of the less 
powerful players in the WTO. 69 
 
The report purports that the openness of the organization towards civil society and NGOs 
is deemed satisfactory and the positive attitude towards transparency in the dispute 
settlement has a very large number of supporters. The Sutherland Report itself places 
“business and consumers” at the center of stakeholdership in multilateral trade 
negotiations but not as participants, as Klabbers correctly points out. 70 Charnovitz 
concurs that the opportunity of envisioning a role for these stakeholders is greatly missed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Id. 
68 Robert Wolfe, Decision-Making and Transparency in the ‘Medieval’ WTO: Does the Sutherland Report 
have the Right Prescription? 8.3 J. INT’L ECON. L.  631-645 (2005). 
69 Pieter Jan Kuijper, Do Parallels with Other International Organizations Help, 2 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 191 
at 194 (2005). 
70 Jan Klabbers, New Logo: The Sutherland Report and the Rebranding of the WTO 2 INT'L ORG L REV. 
177 at 177(2005). 
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and adds that the WTO Public Forum has been reduced to a “show-and-tell” event, 
instead of taking the opportunity to build civil society into the negotiating process.71 
Pauwelyn notes that WTO is focused on producers and exporters, who have many 
incentives to support protectionism, much more than it is on consumers and citizens and 
the Report overall fails to capitalize at the NGO potential.72 Finally, Shaffer observes 
Secretariat could assume greater responsibility in ensuring that the information published 
publicly and internally is meaningful in the way it is presented to various stakeholders 
that have their own systemic constraints in using the vast amount of data produced and 
presented by the WTO, such as consumers or developing and least-developed countries.73 
On a similar tone, external transparency has been discussed by Delimatsis.74 
2. Positivism, Realism and Rationalism 
 
In order to approach the positivist approach to transparency, I will first look at positivism 
in legal theory in general and give an overview of its history. Positivism in the domestic 
legal context and positivism in international law exhibit a number of significant 
differences, mainly due to the lack of centralized enforcement in the international 
community. As such, this chapter will continue to examine the positions of positivists in 
international law before moving to positivism in WTO law more specifically. Finally, I 
will discuss positivist accounts of transparency in WTO law. Two more theoretical 
streams, realism and rationalism will be briefly discussed in this chapter, as in many 
instances the argumentation of positivists approximates that of realists and rationalists.75  
 
Positivism stems from the 19th century withdrawal from natural law and focus on written 
decisions and laws by the government as the only ones having the legal power to regulate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Steve Charnovitz, A Close Look at a Few Points 8:2 J. INT’L ECON. L.  311(2005). 
72 Joost Pauwelyn, The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, 
Globalization and Reforming the WTO 8:2 J. INT’L ECON. L.  329 (2005). 
73 Gregory Shaffer, Can WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Serve Developing Countries 23 
WIS. INT'L L. J. 643 (2005). 
74 Delimatsis Panagiotis. Transparency in the WTO Decision-Making, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2012-
006 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2001919 (2012). 
75 Briefly: Realism: international law is not really law because it cannot be enforced. Rationalism: nations 
obey international law only when it serves national self-interest. See also the distinction between soft and 
hard legal positivists John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, at 202 (2001). 
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human conduct. In the tradition of Hobbes, Bentham and Austin76, H.L.A. Hart insisted 
on the separation of law as it is and as it ought to be.77 Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law78 
follows in the same tradition and so do contemporary positivists such as Coleman and 
Raz. 79In the tradition of H.L.A. Hart80, positivists often distinguish between primary 
rules (under the understanding that law is a command) and secondary rules, or rules of 
enforcement.   
 
In international law, the concept of sovereign equality and resulting lack of hierarchy, 
which further produces lack of centralized enforcement mechanisms have had a strong 
influence on positivist theories. During the first half of the 19th century the departure 
from natural law approaches resulted in the emergence of two positivist legal traditions.81 
In continental Europe, first Jellinek and Triepel, followed by Kelsen introduced 
methodological legal positivism in international law, while in the Anglo-American 
tradition, Austin and H.S. Maine and later to some extent H.L.A. Hart posited that 
“international legal science” should focus on “positive custom of nations as actually 
practiced.” 82  The continental tradition recognized reciprocity as the foundation of 
international law, as evidenced through the express and tacit consent of states in treaty 
and custom. Kelsen argued that a pluralistic view of legal systems is not attainable. 
Instead, national and international law form a single and hierarchical legal system. 83 
However, the entire edifice relies on the existence of a “Grundnorm”, a basic norm whose 
characteristics are reminiscent of natural law rather than positivism proper. 84  Hart 
conceded to Kelsen that international law can be conceived as a decentralized system of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, at 200 (2001). 
77 H.L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593-629 at 
595(1958). 
78 Hans Kelsen, The pure theory of law and analytical jurisprudence 55 HARV. L. REV.  44-70 (1941). 
79 John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, at 200 (2001). 
80 H.L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71:4 HARV. L. REV. 593-629 (1958). 
81 WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 503-515 (2000). 
82 Id. 
83 Detlef von Daniels, Is positivism a state-centered theory in LAW, MORALITY, AND LEGAL POSITIVISM 25 
(Patrick Capps ed. 2004). 
84 Marco Haase, The Hegelianism in Kelsen’s Pure theory of Law Marco Haase, The Hegelianism in 
Kelsen’s Pure theory of Law in LAW, MORALITY, AND LEGAL POSITIVISM 97, and 94-96 (Patrick Capps ed. 
2004). 
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law with no secondary rules.85 The Anglo-American positivist tradition embraced the 
natural law foundations of international law more openly and acknowledged that 
international law is not law in the strict meaning. Thus, both the sources’ thesis and the 
separation thesis were obscured by reference to a common shared morality in 
international relations.86 
 
Despite the fact that positivism in international law was never “genuine” as it was 
strongly diluted with natural law elements, its initial theses on sovereignty, the dualistic 
separation between national and international law and the exclusivity of legal personality 
for states remain central to many approaches in contemporary international law. 
Koskenniemi observes this paradoxical turn and posits that positivism and naturalism are 
not as separate as they appear in the writings of their respective proponents. Rather, they 
are relational and have significance only in opposition to each other. 87 The resulting 
inconsistencies continue to be the problem in the theories, which insist on the primacy of 
treaty as a contract and the codification of international law. This Westphalian-centric 
attitude renders contemporary international law analysis murkier. For transnational 
phenomena that are still in the process of formation (for example civil society 
participation at the international level), positivism gives an answer to those who do not 
think these are normatively relevant. They resort to the mantra that international relations 
are still the exclusive domain of sovereign states.  
 
The more theoretically elaborate perspective on positivism is discussed by Palmeter and 
by Trachtman. This section will focus on these two, as well as Richard Steinberg’s 
analysis on internal transparency issues in the WTO, mainly because in their work the 
link between transparency and legitimacy is more clearly evidenced, albeit a loose one. 
The next section will discuss other formalist approaches on transparency from the 
mainstream WTO scholarship. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Detlef von Daniels, Is positivism a state-centered theory in LAW, MORALITY, AND LEGAL POSITIVISM 25 
(Patrick Capps ed. 2004). 
86 Patrick Capps, Methodological legal Positivism in Law and International Law in LAW, MORALITY, AND 
LEGAL POSITIVISM (Patrick Capps ed. 2004).   
87  MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENT 131-132 and 164 (2006).  
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The positivist scholars examine transparency as a rule in WTO law mainly by tracing the 
history of Article X of the GATT and its jurisprudence. With respect to other forms of 
transparency and especially external and internal transparency, positivists turn to a 
rationalist approach, which posits that information disclosure is a strategic tool for states 
and only occurs when it is to their interest. Realist approaches in international law, which 
argue that international law is not really law because of the lack of enforcement are very 
similar to “hard” Hartian positivism 88  which cites the lack of secondary rules in 
international law as evidence for its nature as not “true” law.   
 
The general disposition of positivist approaches towards WTO legitimacy concerns is 
summarized well in Joel Trachtman’s analysis on civil society participation in WTO 
adjudication, which we will see in more detail at the end of this chapter. Trachtman 
notes: 
 
 “It is best to avoid conclusory assertions of the rightness, fairness, 
democracy, or legitimacy of private participation in WTO dispute 
settlement. Private participation in dispute settlement should not be 
determined by natural law assertions, for the market is constructed, and 
the property contract, and trading rights allocated to individuals are 
determined, not by natural law but by politics, hopefully informed by 
comparative institutional analysis. The right to litigate should be 
understood as a component of individual rights in the same way.”89 
 
The underlying rationale here is the separation between law and behavior, which prompts 
a centralist approach in international law, whereby only treaties bind states and focusing 
on specific rules will clarify how and when compliance occurs.90 Legitimacy, fairness 
and democracy are displaced to the periphery of the academic discussion  and not 
explicitly linked to specific rules in the WTO. At best, they appear in non-binding 
chapeaux of treaties. As such, any link between transparency and legitimacy is not 
plausible. Positivism discusses rules, and their enforcement in a “pragmatic” fashion, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, at 202 (2001). 
89 JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 (2008). 
90 Robert Wolfe, See you in Geneva? Legal (Mis) Representations of the Trading System 11:3 EUR. J. INT’L 
REL. 339-365 at 344 (2005). 
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instead of looking at the “quality of the legal regime.”91 This implies more than the 
possibility of analytical separation between law and legitimacy: it argues that such a 
separation is not only possible but a better framework for analysis. The result is that 
legitimacy and state-interest are eventually collapsed into each other.  
 
Trachtman’s version of positivism is described in his book “The Economic Structure of 
International Law” as a “social scientific approach to international law”92 and more 
specifically “methodological and normative individualism”93 According to Trachtman, 
his positivist analysis focuses only on secondary rules, namely rules that induce and 
ensure enforcement of international obligations.94 His approach however to rules’ and 
institutional design as a means for states to induce the type of compliance they desire 
approximates rationalism more than positivism.95 Similarly, for the WTO Trachtman 
posits that depending on each member’s interests, the WTO system authorizes members 
to breach obligations and pay compensations as a result. 96 He specifically says that the 
implementation of the GATT as a treaty is based on power politics and reputation.97 As 
such, any type of “constitutional changes” for the WTO occur when there are shifts in 
state preferences, induced by public pressure, technological advancement, or health 
concerns. 98 Any discussion on concessions in key sectors to developing countries or the 
Green Room problems is absent for the most part.  
 
A different positivist perspective is adopted by Palmeter who discusses all treaty regimes, 
including the GATT as regimes of primary rules. 99 However, without secondary norms 
the primary rules are not “serious” enough. 100 This reflects a realist understanding of 
international law, namely that without enforcement mechanisms international law is not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11.4 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 763-813 (2000). 
92 JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2008). 
93 Id at 6. 
94 Id. at p. xi and 25.  
95 Id. at 1-6. 
96 Id. at 144 
97 Id.  at 172. 
98 Id.  at p 172, 184 
99 David Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System 24 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 444 at 454 (2000). 
100 Id. 473-474 
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law. Thus, Palmeter observes that the negotiators of the Uruguay Round, which resulted 
in the creation of the WTO wanted an independent adjudicatory system. Furthermore this 
dispute settlement system has evolved from a more formalist application of rules to 
introducing value considerations. 101  This observation can be seen as Palmeter’s internal 
critique to his originally positivist thesis.102 
 
As a result from the aforementioned approaches on WTO rules, transparency is analyzed 
in two different ways by scholars who identify their theories as positivist. As mentioned 
before there is a significant portion of Article X of the GATT formalistic analysis. This 
approach is also adopted by Palmeter, who categorizes Article X as a primary rule.103 
Even with the realist and rationalist elements, this scholarship is closer to a narrow, or 
hard positivism. The other two positivist approaches do not look at article X but more 
towards internal, external and administrative transparency. At first it seems odd (perhaps 
even encouraging) that the non-legal forms of transparency are of interest to positivists. 
However, as mentioned before, when discussing the WTO, positivists appear to be closer 
to realism and rationalism than a Kelsenian approach to international law. Thus, the 
following theorists can be classified as soft positivists or even pseudo-positivists.  
 
Trachtman explicitly discusses private rights of action in the WTO. This form of private 
participation is also called “external transparency” and involves NGOs, corporations and 
members of civil society at large who wish to formally participate in WTO’s judicial 
proceedings. The absence of an explicit legal right of such parties to participate in the 
DSU, except in some specific cases in TRIPS (approximating NAFTA’s Chapter 11) lead 
Trachtman to conclude that such private rights are absent from the WTO.104 However, 
this is a very narrow understanding of the WTO’s normative framework. As we will see 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 Id. at 480. 
102 Sol Picciotto, The WTO's Appellate Body and the Legalization of Global Governance WORKING PAPER 
14 SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON ISSN 1479-9472 available at 
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further, especially in the Asbestos case105 the Panels and the Appellate Body have the 
opportunity, through formal rules of procedure to introduce an ad hoc platform for civil 
society participation in dispute settlement. Overall, Trachtman’s analysis does not explain 
the few but consistent filed amicus curiae briefs.106 
 
An extension of the same rationalist rationale behind Trachtman’s account on the WTO is 
adopted by Steinberg where all “information gathering” (which includes mostly internal 
transparency but also elements of external transparency). Transparency is seen under the 
lens of “maximizing efficiency in policy making.”107 More specifically, Steinberg points 
that: “[t]he agenda setters from powerful states must have good information about each 
country's preferences, the domestic politics behind those preferences, and risk tolerances-
across all of the topics that might be covered- to understand potential zones of agreement 
on a package acceptable to all. To be most useful, the available information must be 
sincere and not provided for strategic purposes (that is, not for purposes of yielding an 
outcome that would make the information provider better off than if he or she had 
provided sincere information).” 108  Thus, not only is information used against less 
powerful states, but the sincerity of their disclosure is manipulated. External transparency 
and administrative transparency are weaved together in Steinberg’s analysis, and in terms 
of external transparency, information signals preferences and is utilized in agenda-setting 
processes without any regard for legitimacy altogether. 109Steinberg to some extent down 
acknowledges this as a problem and even characterizes this as “organized hypocrisy.”110 
However, he misplaces attention and blames the consensus rule for all the extant WTO 
problems, while the real issue at stake is the underlying disregard for development needs 
and the economic theory that lacks legitimacy. It is the lack of meaningful consensus- 
and this would be the same even if the voting rules were diametrically different, and 
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involved weighted decision making, or even simple voting. 111 It is not the decision-
making process that induces legitimacy.112  
3. Formalist and fragmented analysis of Transparency in the 
WTO 
 
Traditional WTO scholarship on transparency is either focused on a formalist analysis of 
Article X, its history, case law and other implications, and the trade review and 
monitoring mechanisms that exist in the WTO. Moreover, some of the analyses focus on 
either internal or external transparency problems. This second stream of transparency 
scholarship breaks away from a formalist perspective and introduces non- Article X 
transparency forms, however it does so in an isolated and fragmented manner. After 
bringing forward the current state and problems related to internal or external 
transparency no links are drawn between the two or the rest of transparency forms and as 
a result the engagement with transparency remains unfinished.113 Publication of WTO 
documents is often mentioned and the WTO’s track record on openness is seen 
positively. Any proposals for improvements on transparency focus on the utilization of 
existing rules, advocating for the protection of the inter-state nature of WTO agreements, 
which create rights and obligations only for their member states and only after their 
consent to limit their sovereignty.  
 
This fragmented approach to transparency isolates and de-contextualizes each of the 
transparency forms. More specifically, governmental attitudes towards these different 
forms vary significantly, to the point that some governments may support one form of 
transparency and celebrate it as pivotal, while trying to stop efforts to promote another. If 
an open and transparent attitude towards world trade regulation is beneficial to traders, 
consumers and citizens, then it becomes less and less obvious why one form is desirable 
while others are polemically engaged with. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 Id.  at 342. 
112 Id.  at 361 says that one is preferred over the other to create legitimacy.  
113 With the exception of PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS (2008) and Steve Charnovitz, Transparency and 
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Most traditional analyses on transparency recognize the legitimacy conundrums in the 
WTO and identify rather loose links between transparency and legitimacy. Padideh Ala’I, 
114 a prolific Article X scholar, mainly focuses on the history of GATT and WTO 
jurisprudence.  Although she links the emphasis of the WTO on legal transparency to 
good governance, she does not elaborate more on the implications of this emphasis, other 
than to say that transparency is moving to the forefront of international trade law. In 
particular, she traces the emergence of the rule from obscurity to prominence in 
jurisprudence and extends her analysis on the affect the expansion of the trade mandate 
that the WTO brought about to transparency. Her more recent work on transparency is as 
editor of a book and author, co-edited with Robert Vaughn, which focuses mainly on 
general theory of transparency and transparency in domestic law. In the last part, entitled 
Transparency in Global Governance, the last of three contributions by Padideh Ala’i and 
Matthew D’Orsi discusses transparency in the WTO. The analyses does not depart from 
Ala’i’s previous work, discussing transparency under classic international law and 
focusing on Article X of the GATT and implementation of related reports. Biukovic also 
explores legal transparency and the national trade and administrative practices of China 
and Japan.115 
 
In addition to providing the only, very brief account of the four types of transparency in 
the WTO in his book,116 Van Den Bossche also discusses external transparency in a 
separate article, where he looks at other international organizations in addition to the 
WTO.117 Charnovitz elaborately discusses the pre-GATT history of transparency and the 
GATT and WTO case law in a manner similar to Ala’i. Additionally, he introduces 
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private participatory rights118 that appear in the Safeguards Agreement, the GATS and the 
TBT Agreement. In his article, he also mentions administrative transparency119, external 
transparency,120 as well as the relationship between other governmental organizations and 
the WTO, drawing some links to the organization’s accountability. He also includes some 
suggestions for the future of the WTO. This work perhaps is the only to-date article that 
incorporates almost all forms of transparency, but in a score-card fashion, albeit with 
very limited analysis on the implications of each form. 
 
Drawing a comparison with the EU, Weiss discusses legal transparency and briefly 
mentions amicus curiae briefs.121 Asif Qureshi focuses on the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism, its history and work, without further elaborating on the institutional 
framework and the overall effect of the mechanism in international trade culture. Etsy 
and Bonzon draw links with good governance that place them much closer to Global 
Administrative Law. Etsy discusses transparency in the context of links between the 
WTO’s governance and administrative law while Bonzon’s analysis focuses more on 
public participation avenues within the WTO. De Brabandere in a similar note discusses 
public participation, but in the context of adjudication and the submission of amicus 
curiae briefs by NGOs. He links such participation to what he sees as “public interest” of 
a dispute, which begs the question of which WTO decisions lack such interest.122 
Mavroidis and Hoekman discuss external transparency peripherally in the national legal 
orders’ framework and civil society voices are seen as best filtered within domestic 
administrations.123 
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Wolfe and Mavroidis in a recent article124 salute transparency as “the real jewel in the 
WTO crown” 125  and part of the “WTO’s DNA.” 126  They focus entirely on legal 
transparency, although some of their comments on developing countries and Preferential 
Trade Agreements allude to internal transparency issues. Looking at the history of Article 
X transparency they identify three generations of transparency norms127, where the first 
generation is Article X of the GATT, the second generation includes monitoring and 
surveillance mechanisms in the WTO (such as the various notification and policy review 
mechanisms), and the third generation is related to the WTO’s enlargement and access of 
the public to information. In their analysis, unclear at parts, they mention that information 
can be of assistance to traders and consumers, or citizens.  
 
They cite the establishment of inquiry points but mention that “the ‘intensity’ of 
information” given to traders should be different as “traders do not possess sophisticated 
bureaucracies that will ‘process’ supplied information for them.” This is one of the more 
obscure parts of their analysis, as it is not entirely evident what type of information would 
require a sophisticated bureaucracy in order to be understood. Usually, traders are 
interested in a single product or a class of products, and given their familiarity with their 
specific trade area, they may be very capable to understand, assess and utilize 
information given to them with respect to the commodities of interest. A similar rationale 
applies to labor and trade unions. Moreover, instead of keeping information from 
reaching the public unless filtered and processed, especially considering the internet’s 
low publication cost, it is better to publish more and provide filters of assistance when 
those are available.  
 
Their analysis turns towards treating information like a scarce commodity.128 Three major 
points are not at all addressed, or are not addressed sufficiently. First, the notion of 
internal transparency asymmetries, or the systematic exclusion of developing countries. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124 See Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert Wolfe, From Sunshine to a Common Agent. The Evolving 
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They note that small countries need more from the WTO without any mention of the 
collusive practices endorsed by developed countries, such as the Green Room.129 Second, 
they mention citizens and the general public but do not elaborate on how to make the 
organization and its functions more accessible, both at an informational level but also 
during litigation, when interested citizens try to submit amicus briefs. Finally, they allude 
towards administrative capacities of the WTO, but do not discuss at all any aspects of the 
WTO’s administrative transparency. In particular, they do not propose any concrete 
measures to improve institutional capacity that will promote more reporting of 
information meaningful to traders and consumers.  
 
Any proposals for improvements on transparency focus on the utilization of existing 
rules, advocating for the protection of the inter-state nature of WTO agreements, which 
create rights and obligations only for their member states and only after their consent to 
limit their sovereignty. The vast majority of the aforementioned analyses do not differ 
much from the WTO official day-to-day discussions on transparency, obscuring the large 
internal and external problems, and instead focusing on trade monitoring alone.130 Most 
importantly, the different forms of transparency are always discussed in isolation from 
each other. These contributions adopt many of the classic international law scholarship 
characteristics lacking a coherent framework for transnational phenomena and are 
distinguishable from global governance discussions in the sense that they filter out 
transnational governance.  
4. International Public Law 
 
International public law scholarship has been very prolific in discussions on the Rule of 
Law, transparency, accountability and participation in global governance. In particular, a 
large number of scholars have discussed the aforementioned themes in the context of 
international organizations, transnational actors and regimes, such as the UN, the WTO, 
the Basle Committee, WADA, the International Red Cross and others. Early works pre-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/ddgra_10jul14_e.htm 
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dating the proliferation of this scholarship focused mainly on arms control, disarmament 
(nuclear and otherwise) and nuclear energy. In the nineties and throughout the last 
decade, many public international law scholars identified the proliferation of international 
institutions and tribunals and the ensuing institutional crises, and set out to create an 
analytical framework that would provide investigations and potential solutions to 
problems. All of the scholarship in the group of international public law gravitated 
strongly towards public law analyses. They engage in discussions of global governance, 
which they trace in the emergence and consolidation of principles such as transparency, 
accountability and participation, as well as global rights and legal orders above the nation 
state. Four sub-groups emerged within International Public Law, all of them using parts 
of the domestic public law conceptual metaphor: first, the Global Administrative Law 
(GAL) theorists, second those who discussed the exercise of public authority in 
international organizations, the constitutionalists and finally, societal constitutionalism.131  
 
Based on three different factors, the following table summarizes the position of each 
group. The first column summarizes the type of domestic public law that each theory uses 
as its main analogy for its approach on WTO law and on principles such as transparency. 
The second column discusses the types of actors each group places emphasis on: state 
and non-state actors, intergovernmental organizations, for profit and non-profit non-state 
actors, formal and informal governance networks and individuals. Finally, the third 
column summarizes the relationship between the international public law theory and the 
notion of hierarchy, which in domestic public law exists in a more pronounced manner. 
The approaches to hierarchy range from non-existent, fluid or heterarchical to more 
structurally defined and approximating the Kelsenian order.132 
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131 As distinctions become more specific, many works overlap within two or all of the three groups. 
132 Hans Kelsen, The pure theory of law and analytical jurisprudence 55 HARV. L. REV. 44-70 (1941). 
 Domestic Law 
Analogy 
Actors Hierarchy 
GAL Administrative Law All Fluid/Amorphous 
IPA/IPL Public Law All (states and international 
organizations more pronounced) 
Two orders: domestic public and international 
public 
Constitutionalism/ 
Democratization 
Constitutional Law/ 
Democratic theory 
All Pyramid (on top combination of democratic 
values and constitutionalism) 
Societal Autonomy of All Two orders: Constitutional  law (with the 
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Table 4 International Public Law Theories 
a) Global Administrative Law 
 
The field of Global Administrative Law (GAL), as a coordinated scholarly effort to 
examine how global governance works, emerged at the end of the last century at New 
York University School of Law and carried itself into the first decade of the new century. 
The GAL project had a transnational approach to the evaluation and interpretation of 
principles of administrative law that emerge in the global space. Its focus was less 
directed to the nation-state. It is based on two conceptual notions. First, most of what is 
described as “global governance” is in fact regulatory administration, namely 
administrative action that occurs at various levels. Second, this administrative action is 
governed by principles of administrative law. Global administrative law is not restricted 
to formal and traditional international law, nor does it exclude national law. In addition to 
these, it extends to hybrid regulatory networks, informal institutional arrangements, 
transnational initiatives and private governance and regulatory schemes. The principles it 
focuses on are mainly participation, transparency, accountability, reasoned decision 
making and review. In the words of its architects:  
 
“We […] regard global administrative law as encompassing the legal 
mechanisms, principles, and practices, along with supporting social 
understandings, that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of 
global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring these bodies meet 
adequate standards of transparency, consultation, participation, rationality, 
and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions 
these bodies make.133” 
 
Thus, GAL looks at processes, structures, norms and actors that are involved in global 
regulatory decision-making and implementation. The analysis that the GAL project did !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133  See Global Administrative Law - Resources Concept and Working Definition available at 
http://iilj.org/GAL/GALworkingdefinition.asp. 
Constitutionalism societal 
constitutions (loose 
link with 
constitutional law) 
pouvoir constituant), ordinary law  
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not only revolve around the legal nature and the effects of these normative phenomena, or 
the validity of their sources but it extended to examining how they affect the 
accountability of global administrative bodies. 134 The GAL project adopts a transnational 
approach to the evaluation and interpretation of principles of administrative law that 
emerge in the global space. It is based on two conceptual notions. This approach 
essentially traces global governance in any form of administrative action that occurs in a 
“global space.” As such, it does not assign a higher quality to the exercise of 
administrative action when it originates in international organizations or national 
institutions, versus that of informal networks, NGOs, private initiatives and multinational 
corporations. This approach departs from the narrow Westphalian-centric view, suggests 
that the origins of global governance lie in any form of administrative action with a cross-
border element, and it moves away from statist concepts of exercise of public authority. 
GAL is not restricted to formal and traditional international law, nor does it exclude 
national law. In addition to these, it extends to hybrid regulatory networks, informal 
institutional arrangements, transnational initiatives and private governance and regulatory 
schemes.  
 
Transparency and information disclosure are prominent regulatory principles in national 
administrative law, and GAL scholarship traces these principles at the transnational and 
international level, discussing their function and proposing ways to improve them. 
Transparency takes many forms, such as openness 135 , participation, right to 
information136 and access to documents.137 Transparency is also explored in the context 
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of promoting stability.138Etsy discusses administrative principles and transparency, and 
good governance.139 Bonzon traces the different levels through which civil society (or 
global citizens/consumers) engage with the WTO administration, comparing them with 
other organizations, and discussing ways to improve these participatory platforms.140 
Stewart explores the push for transparency from national governments (with a focus on 
the US).141 The GAL project focuses on soft law transparency, although the project 
extends into the other forms as well. It refers mainly to the process of selection, every-
day works and working procedures for international administrators, employees of the 
organization. When examining transparency, scholars of the Global Administrative Law 
project focus equally on intergovernmental organizations, formal and informal regulatory 
bodies, mutual recognition arrangements, indirect regulatory powers of international 
organizations and hybrid public-private or private transnational bodies. Some trace the 
development of transparency in traditional administrative law, but identify a paradox in 
the asymmetry of focus in transparency in the domestic level compared to the 
international level.142  
 
The GAL project thus sees transparency as structurally linked to participation 143 and 
accountability. 144 It is not confined in the realms of structures and processes that 
resemble those of national administrative law. Instead, transparency in GAL extends to 
private initiatives and hybrid regulatory networks. Its coupling with participatory 
elements is a clear attempt to locate some form of democratic legitimacy at the global 
level, and to further argue for ways to increase these quasi-democratic elements. There is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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an aspirational inclination, faintly captured in this debate, to eventually introduce 
electoral democracy beyond the borders of the nation-state. Scholars even go as far as to 
deposit on transparency and participation their hopes for electoral democracy in the 
transnational level.145 
 
Extending the domestic law analogy, the most important aspect of WTO transparency 
under GAL is external transparency. Transparency in the WTO according to GAL is 
linked to public access to documentation. Until the Uruguay Round there seemed to be 
lack of adequate minutes of meetings and thus, the reports of the meetings did not 
provide the public with sufficient information. This has been addressed in part by the 
publication of a greater amount of documents that shed light into the negotiations 
between member states. Moreover, the WTO website is an important gateway for 
efficient access to information and documents relating to the works of the organization. 
The second theme that appears in the transparency of the WTO discussion in GAL is 
participation of interested parties, like NGOs in WTO processes.146 The third theme 
involves the review of transparency requirements by the Appellate Body. Authors such as 
Shaffer and Nicolaides147, Benvenisti148, Chimni149 and Cassese150 have very briefly 
looked at instances where the Panels or the Appellate Body have tackled issues of 
substantive transparency. However they have tied this analysis with a more general 
discussion on accountability in international organizations and systemic issues facing the 
WTO. Finally, GAL discusses internal transparency in the WTO briefly, mostly under the 
lens of fairness and the Rule of Law.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
145 Martin Shapiro, "Deliberative," "Independent" Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will the Globe 
Echo the E.U.? 68:3 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 341-356 (2005). See page 341 “Perhaps, the future 
transnational administrative law will emerge creating sufficient transparency and participation such that 
transnational technocracy will achieve some meaningful level of pluralist, if not electoral, democracy.” 
146  Daniel Esty, Good Governance at the World Trade Organization: Building a Foundation of 
Administrative Law, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L.  509-527 (2008); Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model 
and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PENN. J. INT’L ECON. L.  
359-381 (1996).  
147 Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance 
without Global Government 68:3-4 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 263-317 (2005). 
148 Eyal Benvenisti, The Interplay between Actors as a Determinant of the Evolution of Administrative Law 
in International Institutions 68:3-4 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS  323-340 (2005). 
149 Bhupinder Singh Chimni , International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1-37 (2004). 
150 Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 
111-126 (2005). 
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Two problems with GAL theorists are the lack of linkage between transparency and the 
organization’s unique history as well as the underemphasized legal transparency. GAL 
literature insists on soft law transparency. GAL does move away from the treaty-centric 
analysis of rationalism and realism, and closer to knowledge-based or cognitive theories 
in international law, since it explores the normative potential emerging out of civil 
society initiatives, scientific communities, and consumer-citizens. However, GAL 
remains complimentary to the analysis of treaty-based transparency, and thus, appears to 
introduce a weak cognitivist perspective. Weak cognitivism adopts a critical perspective 
towards rationalist approaches by introducing the perspective of normative elements of 
transnational actor participation in global governance. Strong cognitivism would, instead 
provide a single framework of analysis for both the internal WTO discourse (legal, 
internal and administrative transparency) as well as the external discourse (external 
transparency).  In seeking such a common thread, theories responding to GAL introduced 
notions such as “constitutionalism” or “global norm” in order to show that transparency 
has a meta-normative value. In reality, GAL in its definition also alluded to the meta-
normative value of administrative principles. The entire theoretical account aims to show 
that the collective analysis of the administrative law principles that appear in international 
law produces a result larger than the aggregate of the principles, a new group of rules, 
Global Administrative Law. The next groups counter this meta-normative perspective 
with Global Constitutionalism.  
  
b) The exercise of Public Authority at the International 
Sphere 
 
The response to the Global Administrative Law project came from the second sub-group, 
the Max Planck Institute for International Law, where scholars captured this debate 
focusing mostly on public law elements of the exercise of international authority by 
extending domestic notions of public authority to the international level (International 
Public Authority- International Public Law, or IPA/IPL) under the understanding that the 
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nation-state still had a significant role to play in the discussion of global governance. 151 
The Max Planck School extends domestic notions of public authority to the international 
level.152 Such extension is the focus on the “publicness” of public international law, 
including administrative law, constitutionalism and any other examples of domestic 
public law.153 Global governance exists insofar the adoption of such principles by 
international institutions (or other networks) occurs as exercise public authority, similarly 
to the domestic legal order. The IPA/IPL theorists discuss the regulatory authority from 
non-state actors and hybrid networks but show emphasis on state-created institutions, 
especially international organizations, their tribunals and their committees.  
 
According to Armin Von Bogdandy: 
 
“a public law approach to the law of international institutions is a way to 
further legal understanding of the phenomena of global governance […] 
The development of general principles of international public authority, 
such as the principle of attributed competence, or of human rights 
protection, aims at the strengthening of the publicness of public 
international law. So far the general principles of international law 
correspond mainly to private law principles or principles of litigation 
between equal subjects, i.e. private law litigation. The emergence of the 
public law component together with principles of international public 
authority is not just a sectoral phenomenon since international institutions 
are of considerable importance in many fields of international law. 
Therefore this development heralds an overall strengthening of the 
publicness of public international law and evolves the general principles of 
international law. We propose as the disciplinary point of departure for 
studying global governance phenomena the discipline of international 
institutions. […] One should not only study principles of such 
international institutions which are subjects of international law but also of 
other institutions such as treaty organs or informal institutions which 
exercise public authority.”154 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 One of the main publications of the Max Planck School discussing public authority in international 
institutions is volume 9 issue 11 of the GERMAN L. J. special issue “Public Authority and International 
Institutions” 2008. 
152 Armin von Bogdandy, General Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a Research 
Field, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1909-1938 (2008). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 1914-1915. 
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This approach suggests that the origins of global governance lie in national administrative 
law. In particular, the principles of participation, transparency, accountability and review 
of reasoned decision-making were substantiated in the national level after the French 
Revolution and have been elaborated on extensively both in administrative practice but 
also through judicial review. Thus, they are now considered part and parcel of rule of law 
requirements for governments. 
 
The Heidelberg response to the Global Administrative Law project begins under the 
understanding that transparency is a fundamental value of public institutions in liberal 
democracies155. Under a Weberian analysis, governments were seen as seeking exclusive 
access to knowledge as a method of increasing their power.156 Instead of focusing on 
informal participatory elements, which, if identified are seen as underdeveloped at 
best157, the Max Planck School directs the focus of the transparency debate to free access 
to documents.158 It is generally seen as a “fuzzy” concept, which can be understood when 
seen under the lens of a particular institution. 159 
 
Transparency in IPA/IPL is discussed under the administrative law paradigm. Bogdandy, 
Goldmann, Ioannides and Venzke observe transparency as the legitimizing element of 
international public authority in the WTO, the international public law substitute to the 
lack of a parliamentary authority and majoritarian democracy at the global level and a 
method to limit unjustified discrimination. De Wet and Feichtner argue that transparency 
will improve the efficacy of monitoring and oversight mechanisms themselves. Thus, the 
Max Planck School focuses on formalized processes that promote transparency and are 
coupled with specific “global bureaucracies”, that is, formal administrative processes that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 Armin von Bogdandy et al, Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal 
Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1375-1400, 1384 (2008). 
156 Ingo Venzke, International Bureaucracies from a Political Science Perspective – Agency, Authority and 
International Institutional Law, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1401-1428, 1418 (2008). 
157 Clemens A. Feinäugle, The UN Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee: Emerging 
Principles of International Institutional Law for the Protection of Individuals? 9 GERMAN L. J. 1513-1539, 
1538 (2008). 
158 Diana Zacharias, The UNESCO Regime for the Protection of World Heritage as Prototype of an 
Autonomy-Gaining International Institution 9 GERMAN L. J. 1833- 1864, 1850 (2008). 
159 Karen Kaiser, WIPO’s International Registration of Trademarks: An International Administrative Act 
Subject to Examination by the Designated Contracting Parties, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1597-1624, 1617 (2008). 
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exist in the context of intergovernmental organizations. Any potential democratic 
elements of transparency beyond that of “legitimacy substitution” are altogether eluded, 
but without any formal explanation other than the general mandate of focus on 
“publicness.” 
 
With respect to the WTO, the transnational idea of involvement of non-state actors and 
networks is obscured.160 Rather, the focus shifts on circulation of documentation to all 
members by the secretariat and the move toward multilateral review of documentation.161 
The main distinction examined here is between informal and formal meetings, and the 
conceptual dichotomy that results is between formality and informality.162 
 
c) Constitutionalism 
 
A very prominent and illuminating set of analyses that discuss transparency in the WTO 
come from two groups of scholars who engage in discussions of constitutionalism in 
Global Governance and in WTO Governance. We will divide these into two groups, 
namely “endogenous” and “exogenous” constitutionalists, depending on whether they 
treat the WTO as their main case study, emphasizing the uniqueness of the organization 
and thereby, their conclusions, or they see the WTO as one of few examples of the 
manifestation of transparency as a norm. The origins and aspirations of each 
constitutionalist perspective differ to a certain extent. Both scholarly streams appear to 
exhibit a form of angst with respect to the political space in global governance.163 
Constitutionalist theories in International Law seek a framework with elements that 
resemble the domestic public legal order. They recognize common features between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
160 Isabel Feichtner, The Administration of the Vocabulary of International Trade: The Adaptation of WTO 
Schedules to Changes in the Harmonized System, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1481-1512 (2008) and also (mainly) 
Joseph Windsor, The WTO Committee on Trade in Financial Services: The Exercise of Public Authority 
within an Informational Forum, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1805-1832 (2008) but also Ravi Afonso Pereira, Why 
Would International Administrative Activity Be Any Less Legitimate? – A Study of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1693-1718 (2008). 
161 Feichtner, id, 1494. 
162 Id.  p.1500, 1502, Joseph Windsor, The WTO Committee on Trade in Financial Services: The Exercise 
of Public Authority within an Informational Forum 9 GERMAN L. J. 1805, 1816 (2008). 
163 Opposite argument by Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s “Constitution” and the 
Discipline of International Law, 17:3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647 (2006). 
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national parliaments and plenary organs of international organizations, the judiciary and 
international tribunals, and the executive (government) and international administrations. 
 
First, exogenous constitutionalists, namely Global Governance constitutionalists, form 
the outer limit of theorists in International Public Law/International Public Authority. 
Amongst IPA and IPL analyses the constitutionalist perspectives demonstrate the 
strongest public law features. They are concerned with legitimacy deficits in international 
organizations and identify patterns of normative distillation into norms that resemble 
those of the national constitutions, which, they argue, have consolidated into “global 
norms.” Transparency in Constitutionalism as an extension of IPA/IPL legitimizes 
international rules and enables, through the dissemination of information, to the 
possibility of deliberative democracy at a global level. Just like IPA/IPL, IPA/IPL 
constitutionalism focuses on external transparency in the WTO and openness and prompt 
publication of dispute settlement proceedings. As such, transparency is an enabling 
condition or a pre-condition of constitutionalization of global governance. 
 
Within the IPA/IPL discourse, and in opposition with the constitutionalist voices who are 
his peers, Delimatsis explicitly refuses the constitutional qualities of transparency in the 
WTO, together with constitutionalization generally, claiming that a “constitution without 
distributional effects cannot be conceived.” This demonstrates that his theoretical 
approach is pegged to national constitutionalist structures. He discusses a few aspects of 
three transparencies, namely internal, external and administrative transparency, leaving 
legal transparency entirely outside this debate. He adopts an institutionalist approach with 
some critical elements, resembling the IPA/IPL scholarship but falls short of adopting the 
constitutional dialect of Peters.164 
 
Most analyses tracing constitutional qualities in international transparency are either 
bound by the constraints of Article 38, gravitating towards the formal pronouncement of 
transparency as a general principle of law, tied to due process and the rule of law, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
164 Panagiotis Delimatsis, Institutional Transparency in the WTO, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 112-141 (A. Bianchi & A. Peters, eds. 2013). 
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simultaneously are tied to the domestic administrative law and constitutional paradigms. 
They either emphasize a link to the nation state, or to Article 38 of the ICJ Charter, which 
is reflective more of the Westphalian world-order. Possibly a saving grace of the latter 
tendency is the linkage to general principles of law, the source less connected to pacta 
sunt servanta.  
 
Such a framework of analysis is highly reminiscent of early 20th century scholarship on 
general principles of law, identified as general principles of the common law and civil 
law.165 In this vein, Andrea Bianchi traces transparency to national democracies166 which 
further explains the “operational” quality assigned to transparency as a principle of 
national administrative law.167 The definitions of transparency adopted also retreat from 
the idea of “meaningful” information, which would embrace a more contextual approach 
to transparency in the internet era, as we will see in the next chapter. Thus, transparency 
is coupled with the “adequacy, accuracy, availability, and accessibility of information”168 
or to the “degree to which information is available to outsiders that enables them to have 
informed voice in decisions and/or to assess the decisions made by insiders.”169 
 
Megan Donaldson and Benedict Kingsbury, who offer the following twelve hypotheses 
on the effects of transparency in global governance, adopt a clearer outlook towards 
transnational elements of transparency: 
 
1. “Transparency measures […] may affect choices about what information to 
produce and how it is presented.”170 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
165 See Maria Panezi, Sources of Law in Transition: Re-visiting General Principles of International Law, 66 
ANCILLA IURIS, available at www.anci.ch (2007).  
166 Andrea Bianchi, On Power and Illusion: The Concept of Transparency in International Law in 
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (A. Bianchi & A. Peters, eds. 2013). 
167 Hinojosa Martínez & Luis Miguel, Transparency in International Financial Institutions in in 
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 102-103 (A. Bianchi & A. Peters, eds. 2013). 
168 Julie Maupin, Transparency in International Investment Law: the Good, the Bad, and the Murky in 
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (A. Bianchi & A. Peters, eds. 2013) citing Chayes Chayes and 
Mitchel. 
169 Cosette Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, Transparency at Home: How Well do Governments share Human 
Rights Information with Citizens? in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (A. Bianchi & A. Peters, 
eds. 2013). 
170 Megan Donaldson & Benedict Kingsbury, Power and the Public: The Nature and Effects of Formal 
Transparency Policies in Global Governance in in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 522 (A. 
Bianchi & A. Peters, eds. 2013). 
 
97 
2. “The impact of transparency depends on the existence of intermediaries 
wiling and able to make use of the information provided.”171 
3. “Transparency measures may alter existing inequalities between states in 
access to information held or collected by global governance 
institutions.”172 
4. “Impacts of transparency measures on particular States depend on 
resources and capacity to make use of information.”173 
5. “Transparency measures may increase the influence of some States over 
the programmes of global governance institutions, relative to the influence 
of other states.”174 
6. “Transparency measures may play a role in shifting relations of power 
within states.”175 
7. “Transparency measures may reduce cooperation of some States with an 
institution and/or decrease willingness to seriously address particular issues 
within that institution.”176 
8. “Transparency measures can enable greater scrutiny and contestation of, or 
conversely support for, policies being pursued at the instigation of a global 
institution.”177 
9. “Transparency measures may foster productive contributions to an 
institution’s work by other actors, facilitating reform and development 
within the institution and/or strengthening its epistemic authority.”178 
10. “Transparency measures can break down an institution’s epistemic 
authority.”179 
11. “Transparency measures may multiply and diversify relationships between 
global institutions and non-State actors.”180 
12. “Transparency measures may empower actors who are in a position to 
process information and render it comprehensible to others, altering the 
influence of non –State actors on the work of global institutions.”181 
 
These twelve points offer a comprehensive approach to transparency in global 
governance. They offer a typology of different possible relationships that transparency 
creates within and outside international organizations and an insight in the different 
dynamics that transparency produces. According to Kingsbury and Donaldson, six types 
of relationships become possible with transparency. The first two are unidirectional, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
171 Id. 524. 
172 Id. 525. 
173 Id. 526. 
174 Id. 526. 
175 Id. 527. 
176 Id. 527.  
177 Id. 528. 
178 Id. 528. 
179 Id. 529. 
180 Id. 530. 
181 Id. 530. 
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referring to the global institution as the source of information (1) and the possibility of 
intermediaries to distribute information (2). The other four involve two or more actors: 
relations among states (3, 4), relations between the state and the institution (3, 4, 5, 7, 8), 
relations within a state (4,6 for example, among political powers, the governing and the 
governed, or various constituencies) and relations between the institution and the global 
community at large (9, 10, 11, 12).  
 
All four forms of transparency fall within this typology. For example, administrative 
transparency relates to the first point, external transparency to the last four, three and four 
relate to internal transparency, and points three to eight can apply to legal transparency. 
Three more things are noteworthy at this point with respect to this list and the WTO. 
First, legal transparency, the obligation of states to disclose information appears in more 
robust form in the WTO (as it is a specific treaty obligation) and it is litigated on. Second, 
the WTO has developed peer-to-peer monitoring mechanisms, and thus point 8, on 
scrutiny is built into the WTO agreements, thus it is not an outcome of transparency but 
one of its constitutive elements. Third, transparency in this analysis appears to be induced 
by institutional preference. In other words, it exists as a result of a choice made by the 
global administration itself. That may be accurate for many international organizations, 
however it only describes part of the WTO’s transparency landscape. External 
transparency for example has been at times initiated by civil society alone, as it happened 
with the amicus briefs.  
 
This is possibly the most extensive analytical framework on transparency in Global 
Administrative Law and global constitutionalism. It indicates that transparency can take 
multiple forms, but stops short of exiting weak cognitivism and the proximity to the 
national paradigm of administrative law.182 The four transparency forms explored in this 
thesis aspire to follow a similar typology and identify relations among different actors 
and the effect transparency has on their dealings. However, it combines this analysis with 
the points Howse, Nicolaides and Cass have made on democratization in an attempt to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
182 Kingsbury and Donaldson id. only say that there is no one transparency rule but stop at that. 
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depart from weak cognitivism and the nation-state prototype that lies beneath the 
transparency analysis.   
  
The most constitutionally conscious approach on transparency comes from Anne Peters. 
She sees the transition of transparency towards the status of a global norm183, a global 
public good, non-rival and non-excludable.184 and insists on its public law elements, as it 
is a component of publicness, necessary for deliberative democracy.185  She notes that   
 
“In yet another sense, transparency is both the driver and the manifestation 
of a paradigm shift to ‘public’ international law. Transparency seems 
indispensable to international practices and rules, because the element of 
transparency supports the qualification of these rules and practices as law 
in the modern sense.”186  
 
A very illuminating observation is her argument on the compensatory nature of 
transparency. The forces of globalization resulted in a proliferation of norms as well as 
the lack of transparency within many regimes. The GATT for example was barely 
newsworthy before 1995. Only in 2002 did the organization start publishing its 
documents online. Yet, the tens of thousands of pages of documents regulate trade to an 
impressive extent. The force that produced this need for transparency has come from 
globalization itself. 187 She also acknowledges the lack of a right to transparency, when 
she observes that “international organizations generally do not acknowledge the 
individual rights of persons to access their documents”188 Rather, transparency exhibits 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
183 Anne Peters, Towards Transparency as a Global Norm in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 536 
(A. Bianchi & A. Peters, eds. 2013). 
184 Id. at 542. 
185 Id. at 603. 
186 Id. at 602. 
187 Id. at 540. 
188 Id. at 545: True, in the WTO that is not actionable. But think about the provisions in treaties that 
obligate states to create transparency. Perhaps we can speak of the formation of indirect rights. 
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both strong emancipatory elements, as a power shifter.189 Transparency’s enabling role is 
a recurrent theme in Peters’ work on democracy in global governance.190 
 
Peters draws a link between transparency and democracy referencing Madisonian 
democracy.191 She further briefly notes that “the international legal system may have a 
proto-democratic quality in which transparency plays a role”192 Her analysis is replete 
with a domestic understanding of constitutionalism, publicness and democracy, although 
there are many important observations on the role of NGOs, experts and international 
administrations with respect to global governance and democratization. 193 She mentions 
for example that  
 
“the transparency of global governance should be improved in order to 
assume those very constitutional and in particular democratic functions 
transparency performs in domestic law.”194 
 
Her insistence on the national legal system characteristics of transparency appear 
throughout her analysis. Moreover, transparency and its costs may be not compatible with 
Peters’ constitutionalism.195 She hails the EU transparency, although in her analysis196 the 
multifaceted role of EU transparency norms is not evident. Finally, she declares that 
“Most importantly, transparency in itself does not bring about democracy. It is only, but 
importantly, a pre-condition for democratic procedures.” 
 
Second, endogenous constitutionalists, or WTO constitutionalists, primarily examine 
WTO legitimacy issues. They mostly identify as WTO scholars and are exploring 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
189 Id.  at 555 resembling the analysis of Kingsbury and Donaldson. 
190 Anne Peters, Dual Democracy in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  266 ( J. 
Klabbers et al eds. 2009). 
191 Anne Peters, Towards Transparency as a Global Norm in in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
562 (A. Bianchi & A. Peters, eds. 2013). 
192 Id. at 564. 
193 Anne Peters, Dual Democracy in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  288, 292 ( J. 
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195Id. at 327. 
196 Id. 329 et seq. 
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patterns of constitutionalization within the WTO and insist on the possibility of WTO 
reform.  
 
First, John Jackson puts forward an institutionalist form of constitutional theory, which 
locates the constitutional elements in the WTO in the dense institutional forms that have 
consolidated over the GATT years and became a lot more pronounced and formally 
institutionalized in the WTO, especially in view of the establishment of the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism in the transition to the WTO. Second, Ernest-Ulrich Petersmann 
proposes a trade-rights-based constitutionalism. He emphasizes the constitutional 
dimensions of a fundamental right to trade, which limits the power and reach of 
governments. According to this approach, a set of normative values have concentrated in 
the organization to the extent that they effectively give rights to citizens and limit the 
power and reach of governments.197 As the right to trade resembles the rights in domestic 
constitutions it contributes constitutional qualities to the WTO. External transparency is 
both an aspect and a manifestation of this right. Petersmann places economics above 
politics in the constitutional structure that he designs. The flaw in Petersmann’s construct 
stems mainly from the circularity of legitimizing an economic regime through the use of 
economic rights. It becomes self-referential to expect the economic system that was built 
based on a neoliberal economic paradigm and produced certain rights as a result of its 
underlying economic thinking and principles to be in its turn legitimized by the very 
same rights.198 Neither Jackson nor Petersmann appear to have a concrete agenda for the 
role of transparency in their constitutional constructs, although one could imagine that for 
Petersmann it forms part of the economic rights he proposes as the basis of his rights’ 
constitutionalism.  
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197Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Constitutionalize International law and Foreign Policy for the Benefit 
of Civil Society?, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1-30 (1998); the same: The WTO Constitution and Human Rights 3 
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198 GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
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The third approach by Deborah Cass argues that we can trace constitutional elements in 
the WTO generally, and more specifically in the organization’s adjudicating processes 
(judicial constitutionalization). Cass however suggests we should move beyond the 
efforts to create a single constitutionalist theory in the WTO. She posits that 
inconsistencies in the interpretation of WTO rules will be avoided if we replace trade 
constitutionalization with trading democracy. The shift towards the democratic rule 
mitigates the circularity that is apparent in Petersmann’s account. With respect to 
transparency, her focus is mostly on external transparency and existing inconsistencies 
with respect to individual and NGO participation and access to information. Allowing 
more transparency and participation of more actors according to Cass will strengthen 
deliberative processes, and contribute to trading democracy. A similar approach, linking 
transparency directly to democracy is adopted by Howse and Nicolaides who identify 
transparency as a ‘key value’ in the WTO demonstrating “the embrace of the political 
ethics of democracy.” We will follow up on their very useful critique of constitutionalism 
in favor of democratization in the beginning of the next chapter. When Howse and 
Nicolaides discuss the connection between constitutionalism and legitimacy, they note 
that: 
 
“In the short run, at least, the application of the language of 
constitutionalism to WTO is likely to exaggerate the hopes of 
globalization’s friends that economic liberalism can acquire the legitimacy 
of higher law- irreversible, irresistible, and comprehensive. At the same 
time, it is likely to exacerbate the fears of the “discontents” of 
globalization that the international institutions of economic governance 
have become a supranational Behemoth, not democratically accountable to 
anyone.”199  
d) Societal Constitutionalism 
 
Teubner proposes a form of constitutionalism that actively steps outside the bounds of the 
nation-state and adopts a different lens of analysis for transnational constitutional forms. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
199 Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and global governance: Why Constitutionalizing the 
WTO is a Step too far: Efficiency, equity, Legitimacy—The multilateral trading system at the millennium 
227-252 at 228 (2001), Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: 
Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity? 16.1 GOVERNANCE 73-94 (2003). 
 
103 
Following Koselleck’s analysis200, he observes that transnational regime constitutions do 
not reach the density of national ones.201 
 
Teubner addresses global governance and its legitimization in the context of societal 
constitutionalism. He refutes the ‘unitary bias’ of the term “constitution” and instead he 
traces constitutionalism in several different regimes, intergovernmental and private, 
applying constitutionalism to “fragments” of global society, such as the economy, law, 
art, science and others.202 He identifies the constitutional emancipation of the WTO in the 
existence of the Dispute Settlement Body, the Most Favored Nation principle, the 
prioritization of trade rules and the direct effect of WTO law. 203 However, any “one-
sided ‘neo-liberal’ reduction of global constitutionalism” cannot be sustained.204 The 
WTO’s constitutive elements are heavily biased pro-trade and pro-MFN, with few 
exceptions (and even then, the exceptions are strategically allowed only when they follow 
the pro-trade ethos).205 
 
The push from the periphery of the WTO has grown stronger and as a result, 
‘deliberative-participatory polyarchy’ can show the way to democratic avenues for 
stakeholder participation. Such theories of ‘deliberative-participatory polyarchy’ draw 
emphasis on “the political relevance of civil society but also [attempt] to discover their 
democratic potential and to design procedures of civic participation.”206 Such a process of 
societal constitutionalization allows for the establishment of norms that draw their 
legitimation from their public interest character.207 
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200 Gunther Teubner, The Project of Constitutional Sociology: Irritating Nation State Constitutionalism, 4.1 
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202 Id. and GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
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203 GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
GLOBALIZATION 55(2012). 
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This socio-legal analysis actively moves away from the domestic analogies that almost all 
constitutionalist theories use and adds two crucial elements that will help us dissect 
transparency in a much better light: polyarchical democratization, namely democratic 
forms that do not necessarily stem from voting processes, and legitimization through the 
public interest. Coupled with Cass’, Howse and Nicolaides’ recommendations to move 
towards democratization and away from constitutionalism in the WTO we will in Chapter 
II propose a theoretical frame to utilize transparency in order to understand how such 
analysis may be practically possible in the WTO today. However, before that, two more 
theoretical strands deserve our attention: a critical perspective on global governance in 
international law from the global south and its global north counterparts, and the 
contributions of regime theory. 
 
5. TWAIL and Critical International Law 
 
Transparency was discussed in the works of others who critically engaged with the works 
of the Global Administrative Law and the Max Planck groups. Scholars from the Global 
South, as well as their counterparts in the North, which I will group here as “Critical 
International Law”, criticized the scholars in these previous two groups (IPL) for their 
lack of adequate consideration for development needs and the celebratory analysis of 
administrative principles as “good governance principles.” All agree on the existence of 
inconsistencies in global governance discussions and the need for a more critical 
approach towards principles that are borrowed from domestic legal systems and may 
carry particular histories not applicable in all contexts or in international law, cautioning 
against legal transplants.  
 
In its discussion of transparency generally and transparency in the WTO more 
specifically, Critical International Law scholarship is divided into two distinct groups: 
those who see the current status of transparency in international financial institutions as 
inadequate and urge for more and more meaningful transparency as one terrain for the 
resolution of legitimacy conundrums and those who view transparency skeptically 
altogether, citing either the origins of the rules in national administrative law that was in 
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and of itself a product of troublesome national histories, or its links to the Mandate 
system or finally because of overall skepticism on the political process that labeled some 
administrative principles from the domestic legal order into “good governance” principles 
at the international level.  
 
The transparency supporters urge for a need for more transparency and openness of 
governance at the global level. 208  Chimni addresses skeptically the relocation of 
sovereign powers to the benefit of international organizations, and discusses the potential 
compensatory effects of more transparency, which may induce better accountability 
mechanisms: 
 
“The relocation of sovereign space in international organizations has 
undermined resistance in third world countries. Accountability is not even 
theoretically envisaged today. Those affected in the third world are 
prevented from expressing their doubts directly to the concerned 
international organization. Thus, for example, the WTO has no address in 
India. It is impossible for Indian farmers to protest, like their French and 
Belgian counterparts, in front of the WTO office in Geneva.”209 
 
The lack of formal judicial avenues for civil society at the international level render 
transparency the next best thing according to Chimni.210  
 
Dongsheng Zang offers the only to date monograph on transparency in the WTO. He 
focuses extensively on the negotiations of Article X as well as the political and legal 
origins of transparency, which he mainly traces in the US administrative law. He then 
looks at the case law in the GATT and the WTO and argues that liberalism as the core 
ideology in the WTO is related to the transparency requirements. His approach focuses 
on legal transparency mostly, and transparency-related institutional discourse, as well as 
national administrative law. Similarly, Zumbansen cautions against the conceptualization 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Institutions 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 897-913 at 899 (2003). 
209 Id.  
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106 
of international norms outside their “historical-intellectual contexts.” Similarly to Zang, 
he argues that the publication of transparency laws coincided with state systems or 
judicial eras that had devastating results for the world history and economy.211 Elsewhere, 
he questions the attitudinal differences towards different administrative law principles 
when he says that:  
 
Whereas administrative law for a long time has been described as the law 
governing “the processes and mechanisms of the welfare and regulatory 
states,” the changes in conceptualization and delivery of “public” services, 
the role of private actors in public governance and the resulting 
ambiguities of political representation, transparency and accountability 
have contributed to a new context of administrative governance.212 
 
Also a skeptic, Anghie discusses the links of administrative law principles and the 
concept of “good governance” to the Mandate system.213 Rajagopal elaborates on the 
colonialist origins of administrative law and good governance: 
 
“Once defined this way development comes to include everything that is 
seen by the ruling classes as desirable or necessary for the catching up of 
the Third World with the West: economic growth, poverty alleviation, 
anticorruption and transparency, environmental sustainability, and even 
democracy and freedom/rights. The ideology of 'catching up' is itself a 
complex notion: an aspiration as well as a programme.”214 
 
Harlow, seeking the principles and values behind the “fashionable” good governance 
principles echoes the reservations expressed by Anghie and Rajagopal.215 She also 
identifies the distinct history that transparency had in the EU context and its emergence 
as a general principle of administrate law, having received judicial recognition after the 
Maastricht treaty. A similar reluctance to expand the notion of transparency in the context !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
211 Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Comparisons Theory and Practice of Comparative Law as a Critique of 
Global Governance in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE LAW (M. Adams & J. Bomhoff 2012). 
212 Id. 509 
213 Antony Anghie, Time present and time past: globalization, international financial institutions, and the 
third world 32 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL.243 (1999) and James Thuo Gathii, TWAIL: A brief history of its 
origins, its decentralized network, and a tentative bibliography 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 26 at 31, 42 (2011).  
214 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Counter-hegemonic international law: rethinking human rights and 
development as a Third World strategy 27:5 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 767-783 at 776 (2006). 
215 Carol Harlow, Global administrative law: the quest for principles and values 17:1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187-
214 at 195 (2006). 
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of the WTO has been put forward by Steger, 216  although she belongs to more 
conventional WTO scholarship. In conclusion, the treatment of transparency by TWAIL 
is different in each of the two scholarly streams. Both groups however are preoccupied 
with the meaningful participation of developing countries in international organizations 
and also the genuine consideration of their interests without the constraints of the 
neoliberal paradigm. 
6. Theory of International Regimes 
 
Examining transparency in the WTO under the lens of Global Governance also relates to 
International Regimes’ Theory to the extent that the latter involves institutional 
evaluations and normative proposals combining International Law, International 
Relations and Global Governance in the context of international organizations. We have 
already briefly discussed realism, rationalism, weak and strong cognitivism. This part 
will elaborate on these categories and others that appear in Regimes’ theory. 
 
The three larger categories of International Regimes’ theories depending on their 
explanatory variables217 are first, power-based or realist assessments that consider power 
dynamics as the most plausible lens of analysis in international relations: powerful 
nations dominate normative production based only on self-empowering motivations; 
second, interest-based or neoliberal perspectives mostly based on economic analyses and 
game theory, treating states as rationalist interest-maximizers; and finally, knowledge-
based or cognitivist perspectives (weak and strong), examining the origins of state 
interests and adopting sociological analyses to explain state behavior and interests. The 
three different theoretical strands assign a different degree of value to international 
institutions, from weak (realism) to medium (neoliberalism) to strong (cognitivism).218 
 
Stephen Krasner in the introductory chapter of the 1982 spring issue of International 
organization introduces the first four elements of international regimes: normativity (at !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
216 Debra Steger, Afterword: The “Trade and...” Conundrum-A Commentary, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 135, 137 
(2002) discussing how the GATT “became something greater than a contract.” 
217 ANDREAS HASENCLEVER ET AL EDS., THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1-2 (1997). 
218 Id. 3. 
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various degrees of potency), decision-making, enforcement, and specificity, namely focus 
on an issue-area. He defines international regimes as:   “principles, norms, rules and 
decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-
area.”219    He further defines principles as “beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude”, 
norms as “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations”, rules as 
“specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action” and decision-making procedures as 
“prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.”220 In the same 
volume, Ernst Haas, similarly to Krasner221, adds issue-specificity to the definition of 
regimes, when he notes that regimes are: “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations”222 He further distinguishes the notion of a regime from 
that of an order in that: 
 
“regimes are artificial creations designed to bring about particular 
orderings of values among actors; there is no general international "order." 
The qualities we have in mind when we use the term order in general are 
those associated with the concept of system. We can only speak of 
particular orders devoted to equity, efficiency, justice, survival or 
whatever we value. Order, then refers to the benefits a regime is to 
provide; system refers to the whole in which collaboration toward an order 
takes place.”223 
 
Certain elements from regime theory are useful in discussing global governance issues. 
First the turn from a state-only analysis of international relations to the 
transnationalization of legal relationships is embracing the critique that cognitive 
approaches express against the Westphalian-oriented international law. A cognitive 
approach criticizes realism for assuming that states are rational actors.224 It remains a 
fact, however, that the WTO is a member-driven organization, however multilateralism !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
219 Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36:2 
INT’L ORG. 185-205,186 (1982). 
220 Id.  
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combined with globalization is not of the same nature as it was before the proliferation of 
international organizations.225 It is important at the same time to internalize levels of 
governance that extend beyond the nation state. NGOs and the amorphous maze of the 
global civil society, either in the form of consumers or in the form of protestors, are 
relevant to the WTO. 226A cognitive approach takes these actors into account and a 
measures their relevance to law.  
 
An intergovernmental organization, or a transnational network needs to develop its own 
institutional history 227 , during which normative expectations are created and 
distinguished. Time allows for negotiation, agreement, conflict, resolution and thus 
consolidation of norms. It also allows for dynamics to develop between members, thus 
revealing asymmetries that can further produce bargaining and stabilization. If bargaining 
results in instability and further conflict without resolution, organizational structures 
break down, and thus the possibility of a regime becomes remote. A regime also 
demonstrates properties of self-governance and flexibility in the legal obligations its 
members assume, which over time will favor change of normative forms228 to a more 
optimal location.229 Moreover, a regime works as a stabilizer of relationships amongst 
actors, which necessarily implies some conflict resolution properties, and the shared 
understanding of principles.230 Conflict resolution corrects ambiguity in legal, economic 
and political relationships and that process can be described as evolution in the 
organization. The GATT and the WTO, through the negotiation rounds, the GATT 
jurisprudence and the numerous decisions the organization has adopted over the years has 
clearly evolved.  By the time of creation of the WTO a prolific legal system consisting of 
Agreements, jurisprudence and binding decisions was in place. Then the Uruguay round !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
225 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 261 (2005). 
226 Achilles Skordas, Self-determination of peoples and transnational regimes: a foundational principle of 
global governance, in TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN MODELS 
207-268, 253 (N. Tsagourias ed. 2007). 
227 See also Robert Keohane, The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European-American 
Research Programme, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 23-45, 28 (V. Ritteberger & P. 
Mayer eds. 1993).  
228 HELMUT WILLKE, SMART GOVERNANCE: GOVERNING THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 21(2007). 
229 See also Mark Neufeld, Interpretation and the 'Science' of International Relations 19:1 REV. INT'L 
STUD. 39, 55 note 55 (1993). 
230 Friedrich Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of 
the State 40:4 INT’L ORG. 753 at 764 (1986). 
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resulted in the further enlargement of the legal Agreements. 231  Issue specificity is also 
important, as international regimes form a “web of meaning” and linkages in specific 
issue areas.232 
 
Finally, regime theory considers the WTO compliance record as relevant. Louis Henkin 
observed that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and 
almost all of their obligations almost all the time.”233 However, when this occurs in a 
consistent manner, rather than sporadically, it is relevant to the formation of a global 
governance regime. It is important to consider here also that many legitimacy concerns 
often raised in international law are related to implementation and the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms in international law. The existence of the Dispute Settlement 
Body in the WTO is unique in international relations.234 The WTO has established a 
mechanism for the resolution of disputes that in the last 17 years has been prolific, with 
425 cases having been brought before it, and with an impressive compliance record. Even 
though retaliation is authorized at the end of Panel and Appellate Body Reports quasi-
automatically, only four cases have ended with actual retaliation (i.e. suspension of 
concessions) in the WTO.235All others were complied with, settled, terminated or are still 
in consultations. No other international tribunal has had such a large number of cases 
being brought before it and a similarly notable compliance record. As we mentioned 
before, there exist some serious problems when cases involve larger and smaller 
economies and compliance.  
 
Complementing a socio-legal analysis of transparency in the WTO with a cognitive 
approach of international relations complements global governance and international law !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
231 See also the analysis on why the human rights regime is not a global governance regime due to lack of 
effective enforcement mechanisms: James W. Nickel Is Today's International Human Rights System a 
Global Governance Regime? 6:4  THE J. OF ETHICS 2002, pp. 353-371 p.371. 
232 Mark Neufeld, Interpretation and the 'Science' of International Relations 19:1 REV. INT'L STUD. 39, 43 
(1993). 
233 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47( 2nd ed... 1979).  
234 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS 51(2008) sees the DSU as the single most important achievement of the Uruguay Round. 
235 EC – Bananas III (US), EC – Hormones (Canada), US – FSC and US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), 
see also PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, 
CASES AND MATERIALS 226-229 (2008). 
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theory with many useful components that can help measure the degree to which 
transparency as a principle has the potential to establish and maintain a normative 
framework that lies outside the WTO agreements and include WTO stakeholders, NGOs, 
and the civil society at large. Complementing the analysis on transparency with links of 
each form of transparency to democratization and further to legitimacy aspires to move 
towards a strong cognitivist perspective with respect to the WTO legal system. 
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II. Transparency through the lens of democratization in the 
WTO 
A. Constitutionalism and its discontents 
 
The presence of elaborate constitutionalist analyses in global governance and the 
incorporation of transparency as an enabling principle for global constitutionalism 
indicates the omnipresent fascination with the rule of law in the nation state and the 
difficulties of formulating an analytic framework that can address challenges posed by 
globalization and transnational aspects in Westphalian terrains and particularly 
international organizations. More specifically we could identify five shortcomings from 
constitutionalism in global governance theory. 
 
The first problem is the intimate and intricate relationship between the constitution and 
the nation state. National constitutions became the communication point, a document that 
was used to govern the relations between the political system and the legal system during 
revolutionary periods. Constitutions did not emerge necessarily from bloody revolutions 
and it can be argued that they are the social contract that legal systems draw legitimacy 
from. Constitutions emerge out of a social contract momentum in order to organize 
national polity when a demos or a government distinctly understands itself as dissimilar 
or even opposite that its predecessor. Many similar moments, of seeming constitutional 
nature exist in international law: the treaty of Westphalia, introducing the nation state as 
it was understood for the past three centuries; the first and second World War and the 
Holocaust, which established the United Nations and unconditional respect for human 
rights; the pronouncement of Martens clause, to which the respect for humanity is traced 
back to; the Brian Kellogg Pact, outlawing war and establishing peaceful coexistence as 
the only acceptable modus operandi among nation states; decolonization and the 
formation of the G-77, breaking with the colonizing past and the distinction between 
“civilized and the rest”; the fall of the Berlin Wall, the September 11 events and the end 
of history euphoria. However, reflecting the difference between government and 
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governance, these constitutional moments did not result into constitutions,1 as they lacked 
several other elements beyond the absence of a written text.2  
 
The second problem in global constitutionalist perspectives is that the emphasis on the 
notion of a constitution may imply a reluctance to genuinely move to a post-Westphalian 
analysis where international organizations and non-governmental actors can and do create 
a new public space, which can in turn become normative space through the emergence of 
meta-principles. Howse and Teitel allude to the potential of treaty regimes to expand their 
normative space when they discuss the notion of ultra- compliance. International law can 
produce: 
 
“ultra-compliance […] which mean[s] it can have normative effects that 
are greater or more powerful or different than what may be desired or 
consistent with the values or intentionally that might be plausibly be 
attributed to the “creators” of the norms.3 
 
Such normative effects can be the result of a treaty regime. Linking meta-principles with 
the creation of public space has other benefits. Global constitutionalism requires some 
consolidation process for the rules it entails, and possibly in the future agreement among 
state actors or state and non-state actors on its scope. Public space can emerge 
spontaneously, at any time, without an explicit agreement (online, in forums, or during 
protests, or on twitter).4 Transparency and the dissemination of information as well as 
transparency linked to participation possibilities enable the formation of this public space 
instantaneously. The meta-principles that emerge can in some cases be of a quasi-
normative nature, that is, they exhibit many law-like elements but do not stem from 
international agreements or national laws. This is the case for example for the traditional 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Although the opposite claim has been made with some frequency. See for example Bardo Fassbender, The 
United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 529 
(1998). 
2This is what Dunoff calls the problem of translation. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The 
WTO’s “Constitution” and the Discipline of International Law, 17:3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647, 673 (2006). 
3 Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel. Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters 1.2 
GLOBAL POLICY 127-136, 22 of pdf version (2010). 
4 See Sol Picciotto, Democratizing Globalism in THE MARKET OR THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, AND OTHER 
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and classic source of lex mercatoria and a more modern one is the legal elements of 
Second Life.  
 
Third, the celebratory side of seeking hierarchies to understand transnational regimes and 
analyzing transnationalism through the constitution may be paired with such theoretical 
approaches seeking a form of Kelsenian stability in order to deal with the omnipresent in 
international law “anxiety of fragmentation”.5 However, it is optimal to contextualize 
fragmentation rather than obscuring the debate by adopting quasi-hierarchical forms of 
analysis in an attempt to avoid its risks altogether. 
 
Fourth, constitutionalization oftentimes relies on overemphasis on adjudicatory processes 
while it obscures other elements that may contribute to the legitimacy debate.6 This is 
particularly true for the WTO. This form of institutionalist analysis does not stress the 
importance of domestic mechanisms in some (albeit few) countries that allow industries, 
corporations and those involved in cross border commercial activities to file direct 
complaints which their governments will take before the WTO.7 Peters notes that the 
emphasis on judicialization is harmful to constitutionalism itself:  
 
“Promotion of judicial protection reinforces the lopsidedness of the 
constitutionalization of international law. This process has so far been 
adjudicative rather than deliberative. This is most visible in the WTO and 
the related sector-constitutionalization debate. What has been identified by 
some scholars as a constitutionalization of the WTO boils down to the 
legalization of the dispute settlement mechanism, judge-made principles, 
and constitutional techniques applied by the panels and Appellate Body, 
such as balancing […][T]his reading foists an impoverished, legalist 
(judicially made), a-political conception of a constitution. So exclusive 
focus on the improvement of judicial protection in international law is not 
only a foul trick to define away the democratic deficit, but might moreover 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Ruti Teitel,  Debating the Global Rule of Law a Half Century after Hart/Fuller: Different Transitions, 
New Perspectives on Morality and Legality, ANU COLLEGE OF LAW,  Draft available at 
law.anu.edu.au/sites/all/files/teitel.pdf 
6 GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 
(2012). 
7 For example the petition process in US Section 301. 
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undermine the persuasiveness of the constitutionalist reconstruction of 
international law.”8 
 
However, this does not mean that adjudication is not crucial for the analysis that will 
follow, it just has to be complemented with other normative equivalents within the 
organization that can produce more discourse space to address the democratic deficit. 
Peters’ remarks also allude to another problem stemming from constitutionalism in 
international law, namely the attempt to de-politicize the debate by insisting on 
consolidated normative forms, instead of ones that are constantly being negotiated and 
expanded.9 Andrew Lang among many cautions strongly against such de-politicization in 
the WTO.10 
 
The question asked in this thesis is: can there be a theory that allows for the re-
politicization of the WTO debates, without using constitutionalism as a framework? The 
answer stems from the observations of Howse, Nicolaides and Cass11 who hint on the 
value of democracy in the WTO. Democratic occurrences can occur outside the 
constitutional framework, at any public or even private space. For example, a corporation 
can adopt democratic practices, or a university, or the denizens of a small neighborhood. 
Such events do not need to be systematic. In the WTO, transparency as a notion offers 
glimpses of such space for democratic moments. In some instances the participatory 
effects of transparency are more mature than others (where we identify deficits in the 
WTO). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Anne Peters, Dual Democracy in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 264-341, at 341 
( J. Klabbers et al eds. 2009). 
9 See Jan Klabbers, Constitutionalism Lite 1 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 31 at 54 (2004) and Robert Howse, From 
Politics to Technocracy-and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 
94-117 (2002). 
10 ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
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11 Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the 
WTO is a Step too far Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy—The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium 
227-252 at 228 (2001), Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: 
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116 
The analysis followed here on the democratization potential of transparency cannot solely 
rely on previous theoretical accounts on WTO transparency, since none of them has 
evaluated the aggregate democratizing potential of the norm, and instead have insisted on 
its constitutional qualities or its role as an aid to, or a prop for global constitutionalism. In 
the words of Peters transparency is a condition for constitutionalism and “serves more of 
a reformative quality for democracy, a preventor of ills, instead of something that in and 
of itself expands the democratic space.” Rather, this dissertation adopts this 
polynormative perspective whereby transparency is analyzed as a norm within the legal, 
political and economic frameworks in the WTO. My analysis extends beyond the 
traditional sources of international law and I argue that normative impetus can potentially 
be traced in transparency forms that have not distilled to any form of law (not even soft 
law). 
B. Democratization as an alternative framework 
 
Finding normative space that enables more legitimacy in global governance can be done 
through a focus on democratization. Peters, Cass, Howse and Nicolaides and Teubner 
have all noted, others briefly and others extensively, that this discussion on 
democratization is not only possible but also necessary. Howse and Nicolaides in 
particular emphasize the re-politicization properties of democratic fragments in the WTO. 
Cass also sees it as a better alternative to constitutionalism in the discussion of the history 
and development of legal principles in the WTO.  
 
Democracy stricto sensu is currently not possible at the international level.12  Robert Dahl 
however argues that a more expansive definition of democracies can occur in 
polyarchical structures. Polyarchies may be thought as relatively democratized regimes, 
popularized, liberalized and “highly inclusive and extensively open to public 
contestation.”13 Thus, all institutions and processes, formal and informal can be involved 
in the exercise of governance and are affected or affect transnational actors, individuals, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Anne Peters, Dual Democracy in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ( J. Klabbers et 
al eds. 2009).  
13 ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 8 (1973). 
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corporations, unions, NGO’s governments and parts of governments, other regimes and 
international organizations. My argument is premised on the understanding that 
transnational regimes, or regimes of transnational governance such as the WTO include 
multiple levels of exercise of authority and affect a very large number of stakeholders 
either directly or indirectly with trade rules and policies. They do so with both contractual 
rules and soft law principles or guidelines. As such, the WTO as a transnational regime 
exhibits two fundamental characteristics: it is a polyarchy, a relative but incomplete 
regime with few democratic elements and its normative reach can be described as 
polynormative, ranging from guidelines to contractual obligations.  
 
To revisit the mapping of the various approaches in global governance, this 
democratization perspective is critical of existing structures in the WTO but recognizes 
the global governance aspects in the organization with many transnational elements and 
argues that legitimacy problems should be discussed on the understanding that an 
expansion of discourse and normative space in the WTO is possible. A strong link exists 
between transparency, legitimacy and democracy and all four transparency forms in the 
WTO are discussed under the single narrative of composite democracy.  
  
Note: The shaded areas are parts of my approach that correspond to others. Darker shade implies stronger 
overlap.  
 WTO and 
Global 
Governance 
WTO and 
Legitimacy 
problems 
Relation of 
Transparency 
to Legitimacy 
Transparency Sovereignty 
of States 
Civil Society in 
the WTO 
Sutherland 
Report 
Classic International 
Law/ Positivists/ 
Trade Law 
NO (or 
tautology 
between global 
governance 
and 
international 
community) 
Not as 
pronounced 
and crucial 
Loose link Emphasis on 
legal and 
internal 
YES- only 
states can 
bind 
themselves 
Filter through 
the nation state 
Agreement in 
spirit, some 
criticisms on 
trade law 
related issues 
International Public law 
∗ GAL 
∗ IPA/IPL 
∗ Constitutionalism 
See also Table 5 
YES 
(resembling a 
domestic 
public law 
order) 
Crucial but 
“public-law 
like” Global 
Governance 
can help 
solve them 
Strong link Emphasis 
mostly on 
external, and 
then internal 
YES with a 
global 
polity 
Element of 
deliberative or 
representative 
democracy 
Disagreement 
in parts, 
opportunity 
to extrapolate 
publicness. 
Critical Public 
International Law/  
Opposition to 
GAL/Sutherland Report 
reactions 
YES (critical 
of existing 
structures, 
transnationalist 
elements) 
Crucial, 
unclear how 
(if) global 
governance 
will (can) 
Medium/ 
Strong link 
Emphasis on 
internal and 
external 
YES-eroded Important as part 
of transnational 
actors, at times 
amorphous, at 
times more 
Stronger 
reaction and 
criticism 
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Table 5 Links to other constitutionalization theories 
 
C. Theory of composite democracy 
 
handle the 
erosion of 
the nation-
state and 
power 
asymmetries 
organized 
Societal 
Constitutionalism 
YES 
(transnational 
constitutionali
zation) 
Crucial 
(socio-legal 
analysis 
necessary)  
Medium link Discussion on 
deliberative 
polyarchy and 
knowledge, 
capacity for 
action and 
power of 
implementatio
n 
YES (but 
national 
constitution
s are 
structurally 
inadequate 
to deal with 
global 
problems) 
YES (massive 
external- 
including civil 
society- 
intervention will 
trigger the 
internal process 
of change 
N/A 
Theory of Composite 
Democracy  
YES (critical 
of existing 
structures, 
many 
transnational 
elements 
Crucial but 
global 
governance 
can help 
with 
legitimacy 
problems 
through the 
expansion 
of 
discourse 
and 
normative 
space 
Strong link Analysis of all 
four 
transparency 
forms under 
one single 
narrative of 
composite 
democracy 
without 
elections 
YES- 
eroded with 
the 
possibility 
of global 
democracy 
substitutes 
Element of 
composite 
democracy 
(closer to Cass’ 
democratization 
of trade and 
Howse’s 
democracy in the 
WTO) 
Disagreement 
in parts, 
opportunity 
to emphasize 
the 
prevalence of 
transparency. 
 Domestic Law Analogy Actors Hierarchy 
GAL Administrative Law All Fluid/Amorphous 
IPA/IPL Public Law All (states and 
international organizations 
more pronounced) 
Two orders: domestic public and 
international public 
Constitutionalism/ 
Democratization 
Constitutional Law/ Democratic 
theory (representative, deliberative 
democracy) 
All Pyramid (on top combination of 
democratic values and 
constitutionalism) 
Societal Constitutionalism Autonomy of societal constitutions 
(loose link with constitutional law) 
All Two orders: Constitutional  law 
(with the pouvoir constituant), 
ordinary law  
Democratization without 
Constitutional elements 
Democratic theory 
(composite/compound democracy) 
All Fluid/Amorphous until it 
becomes constitutional- then two 
orders (not domestic/ 
international, but 
constitutional/ordinary) 
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In the Spirit of Laws Montesquieu was the first to discuss checks and balances extending 
beyond democratic legitimation and put in place in order to ensure the liberties that 
democracy enabled in the first place. In particular, Montesquieu notes: 
 
“It is true that in democracies the people seem to act as they please; but 
political liberty does not consist in an unlimited freedom. In governments, 
that is, in societies directed by laws, liberty can consist only in the power 
of doing what we ought to will, and in not being constrained to do what 
we ought not to will. […][C]onstant experience shows us that every man 
invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it 
will go. Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself has need of 
limits?  To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of 
things that power should be a check to power. A government may be so 
constituted, as no man shall be compelled to do things to which the law 
does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain from things which the law 
permits. […][T]here is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated 
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the 
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the 
judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, 
the judge might behave with violence and oppression.  There would be an 
end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the 
nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting 
laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of 
individuals.” 14 
 
Similar ideas are echoed by Madison in the Federalist Papers: 
 
“It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be 
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government 
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were 
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, 
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. 
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, 
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to 
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A 
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the 
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary 
precautions.”15 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE LA BRÈDE ET DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS BOOK 
XI. OF THE LAWS WHICH ESTABLISH POLITICAL LIBERTY, WITH REGARD TO THE CONSTITUTION (The 
Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu 4 vols trans. T. Evans, 1777). 
15  The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper 
Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments (1788). 
 
120 
  
It is in the writings of the two statesmen that scholars trace the origins of composite 
democracy, or the idea that elections alone do not guarantee good government, nor secure 
individual rights and freedoms. In his work, Robert Dahl extended the Madisonian and 
Montesquieuian paradigms and established a pluralist theory of democracy, or as he calls 
it, polyarchy. Dahl, like Montesquieu and Madison posited that elections alone do not 
guarantee democratic governance. There should be in place a sophisticated and flexible 
set of institutions, norms and processes that ensure constant access to bargaining and 
checks and balances. As a result, many of the so-called democratic states did not 
withstand the test of being a polyarchy, while other institutions or even processes 
exhibited elements of democratization outside electoral processes and possibly outside 
the nation state. Knowledge, access to information and participation are cornerstones of 
his pluralist democratic construct. More specifically Dahl observes:  
 
“Because of its inherent requirements, an advanced economy and its 
supporting social structures automatically distribute political resources and 
political skills to a vast variety of individuals, groups and organizations. 
Among these skills are resources and knowledge, […] skill in organization 
and communicating; and access to organizations, experts and elites. These 
skills and resources ban be used to negotiate for advantages – for oneself, 
for a group, for an organization. When conflicts arise […], access to 
political resources helps individuals and groups to prevent the settlement 
of the conflict by compulsion and coercion and to insist, instead, upon 
some degree of negotiation and bargaining – explicit, implicit, legal, a-
legal. Thus, systems of bargaining and negotiation grow up within, 
parallel to, or in opposition to hierarchical arrangements; and these 
systems help to foster a political subculture with norms that legitimate 
negotiating, bargaining, logrolling, give and take, the gaining of consent as 
against unilateral power of coercion.”16 
 
Further he notes that:  
 
“The condition that no subculture be indefinitely denied the opportunity to 
participate in the government can be met in two ways: - by a system 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 76-77 (1973). 
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oriented toward unanimity or by a system of shifting coalitions, that, over 
time allow each group to shift out of opposition into the government.” 17 
 
If such conditions are not met, then we can anticipate decisional immobility and other 
major problems. 18 Dahl places discourse pluralism at the heart of polyarchies. At the 
international level, a great example of such multilayered governance with incomplete 
democratic forms has been analyzed in the context of the European Union. Heritier 
discusses composite democracy this setting.  
 
The first and very strong element of democratic legitimation is the periodic, free and fair 
elections. The representativeness of European elections for EU issues is not as strong 
however, as oftentimes national political divides and issues carry themselves over at the 
EU level. In addition to the limited representativeness, the European Parliament has 
incomplete decision-making powers. 19  Secondly, legitimacy stems from executive 
representation, at the level of the Council of Ministers and the European Council. The 
executive branch of the EU at the level of the Council of Ministers has received indirect 
legitimation through national elections. 20  The third legitimation aspect is mutual 
horizontal control, stemming from Montesquie’s and Madison’s separation of powers, 
close also to Dahl’s pluralist democracy, so that no single group dominates decision-
making and minority voices are represented in government. 21 The fourth legitimazing 
element in the EU composite democracy is associative and expert representation 
“reflected in the fact that policymaking often takes place in policy networks in which 
sectoral interests are represented and negotiated among associative and independent 
experts often nominated by the member states.”22 Finally, the EU democracy provides for 
certain rights for EU citizens (rights’ based legitimacy), among which transparency plays 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Id. 118. 
18 Id. 120. 
19 Adrienne Héritier, Composite democracy in Europe: the role of transparency and access to information 
10:5 J EUR. PUB. POL’Y 814 at 815(2003). 
20 Id. at 816.  
21 Id. at 817.  
22 Id. at 818. 
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a prominent role, as a right to access to information as well as a pre-requisite for 
decision-making.23 The next table summarizes the above legitimacy elements. 
 
Form of legitimation Expression  EU form 
Vertical legitimation Voting/Majority European Parliament 
Executive representation Negotiation European Council and 
policy networks 
Horizontal mutual control Diversity of actors and 
bodies 
CJEU, Council, Parliament 
Associative and expert 
representation  
Deliberation/ consultation Policy networks 
Individual- Rights’ based 
legitimacy  
Individual demand/ 
complaint mechanisms 
Access to information, 
transparency, CJEU 
 
Table 6 Elements of Composite Democracy in the European Union 
Heritier emphasizes the subsidiary role of access to information as a component of 
democratic legitimation in the European Union.24 In fact, the increased emphasis on 
transparency may imply the deficiency of EU institutions and other legitimizing 
processes to genuinely address legitimacy concerns that arise within EU governance. The 
recent financial crisis is also demonstrative of this fact: more laws and new organizations 
and facilities does not imply consideration of social concerns that are assume radical 
forms and produce political impasse at national levels.25 
 
There are many fundamental differences between the EU and the WTO. Most visibly, the 
WTO does not hold any kind of elections, and the EU is a regional organization while the 
WTO is global. The EU integration is nearing federalism, while the WTO maintains its 
intergovernmental organization structure. The disparities among the WTO member states 
in terms of economic and political histories are more divisive than within the EU.26 With 
respect to transparency, the meanings it has assumed within the WTO as we will see in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Id.  at 818-819. 
24 Id. at 824. 
25 See Maria Panezi, Whose Crisis Is It Anyway? Normative Frameworks in the Greek Financial Crisis, 
40:2 OHIO NORTHERN U. L. REV. (Forthcoming 2015) 
26 See Geoffrey Garrett & James McCall Smith, The Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement, LEITNER 
PROGRAM WORKING PAPERS ISSUE 5 11-12 (1999) 
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/30237/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/a5fd2fd0-
a3e4-4d2c-b475-cb807e39797d/en/1999-05.pdf  
 
123 
the next chapter are distinct to the notion of transparency within the EU. As such, the 
subsidiary nature of the principle in the EU does not transpire in the WTO. The left 
column of Heritier’s composite democracy matrix as summarized here can thus be 
utilized to discuss how the different forms of transparency in the WTO formulate a 
composite democracy space.  
 
Dahl perhaps more clearly links the notion of “competition of ideas” and public 
contestation as direct result of transparency to a pluralistic social order. 27 In such 
polyarchies even when they assume the elementary shape if transnational regime, Dahl’s 
“competition of ideas” is coupled with demands to participate in decision-making (in 
opposition to hegemonic systems).28 Issue specificity of the regime can also allow for 
more genuine competition of ideas. Originally the WTO was seen as the face of 
globalization (during the protests in Seattle, Geneva and Montreal), but progressively this 
response was replaced by the sophistication of arguments against the trade liberalization 
paradigm which corresponded to a sophistication of participatory forms and more 
importantly the insistence of civil society to be heard in the adjudicatory processes 
through amicus briefs. 
 
Finally, discussing the relationship between transparency and democracy, Hollyer et al. 
answered the question whether democracies are more transparency than other political 
regimes affirmatively, utilizing Dahl’s concepts of polyarchy. Other works on 
transparency as complementary to democratic polity come from Mitchell29, Vishwanath 
and Kaufmann30Stasavage31, Florini32, Bellver and Kauffman33, all linking transparency !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 3 Table 1.1 (1973). 
28 Id. 78. 
29 Ronald B. Mitchell, Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes 42.1 INT’L 
STUDIES QUARTERLY 109-130 at 109 (1998) and the same, Transparency for Governance: The Mechanisms 
and Effectiveness of Disclosure-Based and Education-Based Transparency Policies 70.11 ECOLOGICAL 
ECONOMICS 1882-1890 (2011).  
30 Tara Vishwanath & Daniel Kaufmann, Toward Transparency: New Approaches and their Application to 
Financial Markets, 16.1 THE WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 41-57 (2001). 
31 David Stasavage, Transparency, Democratic Accountability, and the Economic Consequences of 
Monetary Institutions 47:3 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389-402 (2003). 
32 Ann M. Florini, Increasing Transparency in Government INT’L J. ON WORLD PEACE 3-37(2002). 
33 Ana Bellver & Daniel Kaufmann, Transparenting Transparency: Initial Empirics and Policy 
Applications,  WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1-72 (2005). 
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and accountability in democratic governance. Kono34 however cautions that transparency 
in democratic regimes may induce the adoption of even more complex and opaque trade 
policies by governments. Kono examines if democracies trade more than autocracies and 
where transparency and liberalization are more robust.35 He concludes that the adoption 
of transparent policies in terms of tariffs carries a backlash, as it encourages less 
transparency non-tariff barriers to trade.36 The next part will outline the four transparency 
forms in the WTO before linking them to each of Heritier’s legitimation aspects in the 
last section of this chapter. 
D. Transparency forms in the WTO 
 
Transparency in the WTO context has been seen as an unclear notion.37 It appears in 
multiple forms and many instances. The following matters are discussed under the term 
“transparency” in the WTO: power asymmetries among WTO member states  (“internal 
transparency”), openness, publications and participation of non-state actors, civil society 
and individuals in the WTO (“external transparency”), transparency as an administrative 
principle invoked in the selection and operations of various WTO bodies, such as the 
Secretariat, the Dispute Settlement Body and the General Council (“administrative” or 
“institutional transparency”), and transparency as an obligation to publish national laws 
and maintain judicial remedy mechanisms for traders, assumed by WTO member states 
in Article X of the GATT and its equivalent in other WTO Agreements (“legal 
transparency”). Moreover, transparency in the WTO normatively takes the form of: soft 
law, as part of the organization’s operational dogma and as an administrative principle; 
general principle of international law in the meaning of Article 38 para.1 c) of the ICJ 
Statute; and, treaty obligation, in the meaning of Article 38 para.1 a).All four forms of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Daniel Y. Kono, Optimal obfuscation: Democracy and trade policy transparency 100: 3 AM. POL. 
SCIENCE REV. 369-384 (2006). 
35 Id. at 369.  
36 Id. at 381. 
37 Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT’L & FOREIGN AFF. 1-21, 1 
(1998-1999) Karen Kaiser, WIPO’s International Registration of Trademarks: An International 
Administrative Act Subject to Examination by the Designated Contracting Parties, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1597-
1624, 1617 (2008). 
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transparency are relevant to the main argument of this thesis as they all correspond to a 
form of democratic legitimation under the theory of composite democracy. 
1. External Transparency 
 
External transparency appears as a global governance principle in relation to civil society 
at large (citizens, consumers, for profit and non-profit non-governmental organizations). 
The first element of external transparency is information, namely the declassification and 
publication or online availability of a very significant number of WTO documents. Also, 
information includes the opening of WTO meetings at various levels of the organization’s 
day-to-day work to the public. This opening occurs via either online streaming or in a 
televised presentation in the WTO building in Geneva. Even though for the latter limited 
seating is available, it appears that all interested parties so far have been admitted to 
watch the meetings. In exceptional cases where the parties agree to do so, the WTO 
dispute settlement process can be open to the public through a real time closed-circuit 
television broadcast, as it recently occurred in the EC-Canada case on seal products.38 
 
The second element of external transparency is participation of everyone other than WTO 
member states. To this day, such participation is not of a decisive nature. In particular, 
NGOs can participate in Ministerial Councils as observers and can also submit amicus 
curiae briefs during the Dispute Settlement process. Moreover, the international 
community is invited every year to participate in a usually three-day event, the WTO 
Public Forum (previously known as the public symposium)39, where members of the civil 
society, media, academics, business representatives and government officials meet to 
discuss the most recent developments in international trade. Even though the Public 
Forum has minimal normative value, it promotes transparency in the form of outreach 
and openness towards the general public. 40 Another formal category of non-state !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 WTO meeting on seal products dispute opened to the public 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/hear_ds400_401_18feb13_e.htm .See also Registration 
begins for public observation of appeal in renewable energy disputes 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/hear_ds412_426_14mar13_e.htm . 
39 Public Forum http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum_e/public_forum_e.htm . 
40 Interesting examples of analogous transparency improvement are the OECD, see James Salzman, 
Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 68 L. 
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participants in the WTO dispute process is experts, whose opinions can requested by the 
Panels or the Appellate Body when needed. 41 Finally, representatives of large industries 
involved in a particular dispute have participated in the Dispute Settlement Process, 
either informally, or as ad hoc members of national missions.42 
2. Internal Transparency  
 
Internal transparency as it has become known in the WTO context is the problem of 
effective participation of developing countries in WTO decision-making. Indicative of 
the internal transparency problem is the famous “Green Room” where only a small part 
of member states participate in discussions, as well as incidents during the Seattle 
Ministerial Council and others, where informal consultations took place only in the 
presence of certain WTO member states while others were excluded.43  
 
This issue extends to the underutilization of adjudicatory processes. This problem appears 
first, in limited usage of the dispute settlement system by developing countries. Second, 
countries with smaller economies are reluctant to seek enforcement of decisions once 
they have won against a bigger trading WTO country in fear of retaliatory consequences 
(such as the case of Ecuador, which did not use its right to retaliate in the EC-Bananas III 
case). Finally, even when developing countries attempt retaliation, WTO rules limiting 
retaliatory measures in the domestic markets limits the ability of developing countries to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
& CONTEMP. PROBS 191-227 (2005) and the Basle Committee, see Michael Barr & Geoffrey Miller, Global 
Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15-46, 17 (2006) and Lorenzo Casini, 
Global Hybrid Public-Private Bodies: The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), 6 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 421-
446, 445 (2009). 
41  See for example Article 13 Dispute Settlement Understanding, appendix 4 Dispute Settlement 
Understanding. The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM) and the Technical Barriers 
to Trade Agreement (TBT) also establish permanent groups of experts in order to assist and consult the 
Panels and Appellate Body or provide the relevant committee with advisory opinions. See Article 14.2, 
14.3 and annex 2 TBT and Articles 4.5 and 24.3 SCM. See also Article 11.2 SPS, 19.3, 19.4 and annex 2 of 
the Agreement on implementation of VII GATT (AD). 
42 Jeffrey Dunoff, The Misguided Debate over NGO Participation at the WTO, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L.  437 
(1998). 
43 Maria Perez-Esteve, WTO Rules and Practices for Transparency and Engagement with Civil Society 
Organizations (2012) WORKING PAPER Draft Prepared for the IISD--Entwined Workshop (May 9, 
2011) Robert Wolfe, Decision-Making and Transparency in the ‘Medieval’WTO: Does the Sutherland 
Report have the Right Prescription? 8.3 J. INT’L ECON. L.  631-645 at 638 (2005). 
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get effective compensation at the end of adjudication. Moreover, developing countries 
lack the armies of lawyers that large nations can afford.  
 
Similar problems of exclusion and powerlessness of weaker economies have been caused 
by the proliferation of preferential trade agreements that result essentially in collusion 
amongst their members, as their rules are never inspected for their compatibility with 
WTO rules. Finally, take-it-or-leave it agreements are imposed to candidate member 
states during their accession process. In this thesis these two areas of exclusionary tactics 
and take-it-or-leave-it deals are discussed as problems of internal transparency lato sensu. 
 
The WTO differs from other organizations with respect to the length and complexity of 
negotiations and accession instruments. Accession to the WTO occurs through several 
stages. Negotiations for accession have been very different from case to case. Indicative 
of the spectrum of proceedings is that the shortest accession to this day, Kyrgyzstan, 
lasted for almost three years, while the longest, China, lasted for more than fifteen years. 
The WTO puts forward an elaborate process with many thresholds to be met. These are 
not uniform for all candidate members and the WTO does not operate under a “checklist” 
type of criteria. Rather, for each country that wants to accede, all current members can 
put forward their interests and through negotiations at different levels, reach an 
agreement on rules, tariffs and other issues covered by agreements under the WTO 
umbrella. Thus, the accession requirements vary, to a lesser or a larger extent, from 
country to country, thus questions for lack of transparency. 
 
In recent years, especially with the accessions of China and Russia, negotiations have 
extended to a number of commitments that exceed the WTO baseline of obligations, as 
these are outlined in the WTO Agreements. More specifically, partly due to the fact that 
both countries are considered Non Market Economies (NMEs) but also due to the trade 
volume that the two countries engage in44, existing member states feared that admission 
to the WTO would send shock waves through their domestic markets and their external !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 In fact, as it turns out, Russia’s trade volume is far from comparable with China’s. The WTO Plus 
elements of the Russian Accession protocol were mostly pushed by the United States in order to achieve 
domestic approval of the terms and possibly reflect a Cold War mentality that affected the negotiations. 
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trade. They also feared that both countries would not be prepared to participate on equal 
terms with existing WTO member states. Thus, an additional set of obligations was 
imposed to them, the so-called WTO-Plus. 45 
  
3. Administrative or Institutional Transparency 
 
The next type of transparency is administrative or institutional transparency. This form of 
transparency relates to the main participants in managing the WTO as an organization, 
the less than 700 people46 who are employed by the WTO Secretariat with short or long-
term employment contracts. Together with them, another six hundred or so liaison 
officers and representatives to WTO47 located in the same building since 1977 in Geneva, 
manage international trade. 48  The limited information published on the Secretariat 
furthered the idea that the organization suffered from a significant compositional flaw: a 
very small number of diplomats and international technocrats, working within the legacy 
of the original architects of the WTO, namely a handful major WWII-era neoclassical 
economists, are now the key actors of the international financial system. This “elite 
administration” has not been elected and remains unaccountable for advancing normative 
changes in the area of international trade that affect the lives of the vast majority of the 
world population. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 See Julia Ya Qin, “WTO Plus” Obligations and Their Implication for the World Trade organization 
Legal System: An appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37:3 J. WORLD TRADE 483-522 (2003) and 
also the same, The Challenge of Interpreting ‘WTO-Plus’ Provisions, 44:1 J. WORLD TRADE 127-
172(2009). 
46 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS 135 (2008). Today its staff consists of 629 people. See Overview of the WTO Secretariat 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_e.htm. 
47 Interestingly enough, it is very difficult to find an approximate number of the liaison officers and 
representatives to the WTO. In any event an accurate number could be found in the internally published 
annual phone directory. In 1999 C. Michalopoulos, based on this directory, reported that the number of 
member-state representatives was 540. The entry of China and Russia to the organization pressumably 
changed this number, to bring it closer to 600. See Constantine Michalopoulos, The Participation of the 
Developing Countries in the WTO, MIMEOGRAPH (1999).  
48 Hoekman and Kostecki, [BERNARD HOEKMAN & MICHEL KOSTECKI THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 55 (2nd ed... 2001)] observe that the small size of the WTO Secretariat does not 
accurately reflect the very large network of diplomats in Geneva and civil servants within national 
administrations of member states which work “in close cooperation.” As they note: “The total size of the 
network is impossible to determine, but certainly spans at least 5,000 people.”  
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Transparency concerns can be raised specifically with respect to the hiring process of 
WTO employees. The original GATT was administered by a very small number of 
international officials, mostly lawyers and economists.49 Their duties were not only 
administrative, but they were required to help the committees working on tariffs, provide 
expert assistance to national delegations, support negotiations among different groups 
and provide statistical assistance. 50  As the organization expanded, the size of the 
secretariat remained proportionally small with respect to the size of the GATT 
membership. After the transition from the GATT to the WTO, the secretariat doubled in 
size, and the WTO delegations have increased proportionately. Ordinarily, the hiring 
process begins with the public announcement of a position. Only citizens of WTO 
member states can apply and interested candidates can submit an application online. Up 
until this point the process is quite transparent. No other information exists publicly with 
respect to the interview process and the types of questions asked, or average candidate 
profiles.51 For those who have not participated in this process, very little information is 
publicly available, unlike, for example, the hiring processes of the European Union or the 
United Nations. 
4. Legal Transparency 
 
Last, but not least, the final form of transparency in the WTO is legal transparency, 
namely transparency as a legal obligation for member states substantiated in several rules 
in the WTO Agreements and other related documents, such as Accession Protocols and 
Trade Policy Reviews. 52 Member States are required to publish information related to 
legislation that can have an effect on trade that are regulated by the WTO Agreements 
that they are parties to and notify other members with respect to any changes in such 
legislation (publication and notification requirement). Additionally, WTO Members are 
required to establish enquiry points to provide information. Finally, several committees !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 IRWIN DOUGLAS A., MAVROIDIS PETROS C. & SYKES ALAN O., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 118 (2008). 
50 Id. at 118. 
51 Id., at 135. 
52 See also on transparency forms PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 461-466 (2008). Van Den Bossche mentions four kinds of 
transparency requirements in the WTO: the publication requirement, the notification requirement, the 
requirement to establish enquiry points and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. He examines them in the 
context of mitigating the issue of non-tariff barriers to trade in goods.  
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and mechanisms are put forward, including the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, in 
order to produce reports with respect to trade policies of Member States (trade policy 
review process). 53  
 
Transparency as a legal obligation is embodied principally in Article X of the GATT, 
entitled “Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations.” The transparency 
obligation also appears in Article III of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). Article III of the GATS imposes obligations for publication of legislation and 
notification of changes in laws that affect trade in services and prompt response to 
requests by other members on any of the regulations affecting trade in services.54 The 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Part V, 
under the title “Dispute Prevention and Settlement”, contains Article 63 on Transparency, 
effectively extending the obligations of publication, notification and establishment of 
review mechanisms to the subject matter of this Agreement. Articles 5, 6, 12 and 13 of 
the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) contain provisions that address transparency 
related issues relevant to anti-dumping investigations. Transparency related are also 
Articles 11, 12, 22 and 23 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Article 1 of the Import Licensing Agreement, Articles 3 and 12 
of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article 2(g) of the Agreement on Rules of Origin 
and Article 12 of the Valuation Agreement which make reference to Article X. Finally, 
the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement also contains provisions to 
ensure transparency in Article V, Article VII paragraph 2, Article VIII, Articles IX to 
XVII and finally Article XVII, which explicitly addresses transparency. 55 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 There are over 200 notification requirements embodied in the various WTO agreements and mandated by 
ministerial and General Council decisions. See BERNARD HOEKMAN & MICHEL KOSTECKI THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 71 (2nd ed... 2001). 
54 See Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20:3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 575-
614 (2009)  and Richard H. Steinberg, The Hidden World of WTO Governance: A Reply to Andrew Lang 
and Joanne Scott  20:4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1063-1071 (2009) discussing administrative issues with respect to 
WTO Committees and WTO governance involving the GATS and SPS Agreements. 
55 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS 474 (2008).  
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Dispute settlement with respect to Article X has an interesting history in the GATT and 
the WTO. Until 1980, transparency was never mentioned in any Panel reports. Even if 
claims were raised by member states, they were not examined by the members of the 
Panels. The transparency case law began in the eighties, and expanded within the overall 
framework of the US-Japan disputes, which dominated the first period of Article X. With 
the transition from the GATT to the WTO, the proliferation of disputes examined in the 
dispute settlement process coincided with a proliferation of Article X claims. An 
impressive number of disputes filed since 1995 cite Article X and its equivalents in other 
WTO Agreements. Out of those, many have resulted in panel and Appellate Body reports 
discussing the notion of transparency.  
 
Another very important mechanism fostering the culture of transparency in the WTO is 
monitoring of countries’ trade policies and practices. Trade monitoring first occurs on an 
ad hoc daily basis at various WTO committees Second, the member states have 
established two permanent monitoring bodies, one general and one specific, the Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) 56 and the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). The 
various councils and the committees in the WTO act as ad hoc monitoring mechanisms, 
since, among other things, they are responsible for observing members’ activities related 
to the GATT and other agreements.57 Each specialized committee issues reports and 
updates on countries’ notifications and compliance with WTO obligations. Some of the 
notification, information-sharing and monitoring procedures at the committees’ level are 
directly linked to transparency,58 especially when the documents produced are de-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement (WTO 1995) Under A (i) objectives: “…contribute to improved 
adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements […] and hence to the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving 
greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members.” 
57 See for example, Articles 17 and 18 of Agreement on Agriculture, establishing the Committee on 
Agriculture, Article 3 paragraphs 4 and 5 and Article 12 paragraphs 1-4 of the SPS Agreement establishing 
the SPS Committee and the collaboration of WTO members with international organizations whose 
mandate is to develop and harmonize standards on Sanitary and Phytosanitary products, Article 18 of the 
Customs Valuation Agreement, Article 7 of the TRIMS, Article 4 of the Import Licensing Agreement, 
Article 13 of the Agreement on Safeguards etc. Each Agreement regulates to a lesser or a larger extent the 
relevant committee.  
58 Members’ transparency toolkit  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_toolkit_e.htm  
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classified and published. But even prior to publication, the internal information 
monitoring and sharing promotes a culture of transparency within the organization.59 
E. Composite democracy and transparency in the WTO 
 
All the phenomena labeled as transparency in the WTO carry a number of characteristics 
prevalent in democratic regimes, such as participation and meaningful information. 
Whether these amount to constitutional principle is a derivative point: first we have to 
understand the democratizing potential of transparency and how it can expand the WTO’s 
normative space.  
 
In other words, if there exist principles that have emerged above the WTO Agreements, 
first we must understand how these principles add to the existing normative framework, 
and then assess their constitutional quality. The appropriate framework has to steer clear 
from nationally embedded public law and national notions of the constitution, and instead 
first explore the democratizing potential of transnational principles, before moving to 
transnational constitutionalism. In the absence of elections at the global level, composite 
or compounded democracy offers a full list of other potential democratic functions in 
governance. It extends beyond voting, for example into the executive representation, 
horizontal mutual control, associative and expert representation, and legitimacy based on 
individual rights.  
 
To each of the four forms of transparency corresponds to a different aspect of composite 
democracy. There exist very few and incomplete elements of vertical legitimation 
through external transparency as well as intermediate democratic legitimation (or 
secondary vertical legitimation) to the extent that governments of democratic member 
states represent the interests of their citizens periodically legitimized through national 
elections. Internal transparency parallels horizontal control (mutual at a political level and 
structural at the permanent review bodies). The participation of NGOs and experts in the 
WTO relates to both secondary vertical legitimation and associative or expert !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS 138 (2008). 
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representation present in composite democracy. Finally, Article X, directly assigning 
informational and adjudicatory resources for traders exhibits elements of individual-
rights based legitimacy. 
 
Form of legitimation Expression  WTO form 
Vertical legitimation Incomplete secondary 
vertical legitimation 
National legitimacy 
processes of WTO member 
states’ governments 
Executive representation General Council, 
Ministerial Conferences 
Internal transparency, 
consensus and meaningful 
decision-making  
Horizontal mutual control Permanent in trade review 
bodies and mechanisms, 
exceptional during the DSU 
process 
Legal and administrative 
transparency 
Associative and expert 
representation  
Amicus curiae briefs, expert 
testimonies, NGO 
participation in Ministerials 
etc. 
External and administrative 
transparency 
Individual- Rights’ based 
legitimacy  
Publication of WTO 
documents, national inquiry 
points, Article X and 
equivalents national 
administrative and 
adjudicatory recourse 
mechanisms 
External and legal 
transparency 
Table 7 Transparency and Composite Democracy forms in the WTO 
The numerous forms of transparency in the WTO also display these two characteristics: 
polyarchy in the sense that transparency appears at various levels of governance and 
involving numerous actors, and polynormativity because of the varying legal nature of 
transparency forms.  
 
However, the dominant neoliberal pro-trade ethos, prevalent in the WTO, on one hand 
refutes the value of internal and external transparencies, stubbornly ignoring the former 
for decades, until having reached a veritable deadlock today, and reducing the latter to a 
non-issue during decision-making. Administrative and legal transparencies on the other 
hand are perceived as conducive to the acceleration of trade liberalization and are 
promoted with the proliferation of relevant case law and trade monitoring bodies. I will 
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address this contradictory treatment of transparency. Legal and administrative 
transparencies are useful to trade access and to eliminate unnecessary transaction costs, 
while external and internal transparencies have more deeply embedded potential to 
remedy imbalances in the world trading system.  
 
All forms of transparency as they appear in the WTO can favor the proliferation of 
discourse space in international trade regulation, by allowing for the dissemination of 
trade information, the meaningful participation of developing countries and the inclusion 
of civil society. However, their significance for the WTO varies. Publishing laws and 
trade monitoring means more trade for WTO member states. Systematically sidestepping 
the interests of developing countries and civil society has the potential of causing the 
demise of the WTO. 
 
I propose that for this reason that there can be a common red thread that cuts through all 
the transparency forms. Adopting a sociological perspective to examine the four forms of 
transparency is crucial for four reasons: first, the current inconsistencies with respect to 
each of the transparency forms do not become obvious in the debate that discusses each 
one separately, but when examined alongside. Second, a direct comparison of how 
different forms of transparencies has evolved shows common histories that coincide with 
the emancipation of global civil society, the refinement of their arguments and the 
systematic push for accountability of national governments and international 
organizations and the expansion of democratic discourse space at a global level to match 
that which may exist at the national level in many countries. Third, demonstrating the 
interconnectedness of different transparency forms and their relationship to 
democratization gives developing countries more terrains to pursue fair and meaningful 
integration of their economic needs at the WTO level. Finally, a sociological approach in 
law that refocuses the transparency analysis in the WTO from constitutionalism to 
democratization seeks to not limit participatory platforms to those allowed by the GATT 
and other normative forms. Instead, an analysis that includes both legal and other 
transparencies in the context of democratization will allow multiple and innovative 
participatory forms to emerge and be proposed by developing country members outside 
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the “rigidness” of an analysis based on constitutional consolidation. Rather, democratic 
fluidity is proposed as the main analysis framework.  
 
The two most contestable elements of this matrix are both related to the WTO demos. 
The first is the possibility of indirect vertical legitimation, otherwise known as transitive 
legitimacy. Second is the question of whom the WTO peoples consists of. 
 
Transitive legitimacy is based on the link between periodic elections for national 
governments and the representation of national interests at international fora and in the 
bodies of international organizations. Anne Peters extensively discusses transitive 
legitimacy as a factor for global democracy that will additionally result in the promotion 
of global goods.60 She further adds that: 
 
“[D]omestic democracy is warranted as a basis for the transitive 
democratization of global governance, and […] promotes global 
constitutional values, notably peace. [I]nternational law as it stands 
already demands fulfillment of the international constitutional ideal of a 
community of democratic nation states, while strictly limiting the means 
of enforcing the spread of domestic democracy. Although the application 
of the democratic prescription remains selective, the quest for domestic 
democracy in the international lex lata is an indicator of the 
constitutionalization of international law.”61 
 
The data that Freedom House publishes every year on the quality of national democracies 
are not as encouraging as Peters’ conclusions. There may be a rhetorical push towards 
democracy, and it is an interesting and sometimes puzzling fact that the overwhelming 
majority of countries in the world, all but one or two, describe themselves as free, or as 
democracies. An overview of where democracy functions properly and where not is 
much different. Using the WTO membership list as our sample group, and Freedom 
House three-fold ratings we can see that 40 out of 160, or 25 percent of WTO member 
states are authoritarian in practice, 76 out of 160 or 47 percent are free and everyone else 
falls somewhere in between. This could be considered as a majoritarian victory for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Anne Peters, Dual Democracy in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 271, 273 ( J. 
Klabbers et al. eds. 2009).  
61 Id. 286. 
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democracy in the WTO. However, considering the always-observed consensus rule, we 
never witness in the auspices of the WTO Ministerials or General Council meetings a 
show of hands that demonstrates a divide in values based on mode of governance. It is 
also hard to imagine a democratic value-based divide in voting considering the trade-
specific mandate of the WTO.  
 
Finally, the demographics of the WTO may be only in theory weighing towards 
democracy. The balance of 47 percent democratic states versus 25 percent authoritative 
does not adequately describe the quest for democratic values in international law. In fact, 
a comparison of population data for the very same countries paints a different picture. 
The 40 authoritarian member states account for approximately 2 billion 348 million 
people, while the 76 democratic ones have a population of 2 billion 831 million. This 
changes the dynamics significantly, especially when one considers the end-consumer of 
trade policies, the consumer-citizen herself.  
 
These statistics render any efforts on behalf of the WTO as an organization to give an 
outlet to civil society voices directly at the international level all the more important, as 
such discourse and opportunities for influence and dissent may be entirely lacking at the 
national level. Thus, the argument that some62 have put forward that the nation state is the 
appropriate terrain and filter for civil society voices may work well in the EU, US, 
Canadian, Japanese and other national contexts but it does not necessarily apply to the 
rest of the world in quite the same way. Moreover, even if national constituencies are 
heard at the national level, the Green Room practice may not allow for the representatives 
of many countries to ever bring the considerations that were nationally discussed 
forward. Picciotto more strongly than Peters argues for complementing the 
transformation of global democratic space with domestic pro-democratic 
transformations.63 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 See Petros Mavroidis, Amicus Curiae Briefs before the WTO: Much Ado about Nothing in EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION: STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN 
HONOUR OF CLAUS-DIETER EHLERMANN 317 (A.V. Bogdandy, et al. eds. 2002). 
63 Sol Picciotto, Democratizing Globalism in THE MARKET OR THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, AND OTHER 
CONTRIBUTIONS IN REDRAWING THE LINE 338-339 (D. Drache ed. 2005). 
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Another problem with transitive democracy is that the WTO Agreements are only 
legitimized through treaty signing by a single government at a single time. Their 
successors are to a large extent “locked in.” The process of treaty conclusions 
significantly adds to this problem. Peters observes this when she notes that: 
 
“…even within democratic states, the democratic foundation of foreign 
policy is traditionally weak. International treaties are negotiated, signed, 
and ratified by members of national executives, who enjoy less direct 
democratic legitimacy than national parliaments. In democratic states, 
parliaments are involved in the conclusion of treaties, but often in a late 
stage when the text is already fixed. They can for the most part only take 
or leave the treaty and have no creative power to introduce amendments or 
carve out single articles.”64 
 
A second issue that has been discussed with respect to the WTO, as it has in the EU 
context is who exactly belongs to the WTO demos. I argue that this question is not as 
relevant and has been sufficiently answered by Kjaer, who notes that a functional 
equivalent of the EU peoples at the global level is “the concept of stakeholders, defined 
as affected parties operating within a formalized institutional framework.”65 Instead of 
arguing who may be the recipient of WTO policies (as the answer to that today may very 
well be “everyone”), it is more pertinent to insist on the expansion of the WTO’s public 
space and similarly the expansion of other international organizations’ public space. 
Delineating a specific demos may even become a hurdle if it is eventually identified as a 
procedural requirement for participation in any processes in the WTO. In theory, the 
WTO Public Forum which invites everyone and anyone to participate in its three-day 
discussions on trade should serve as a prototype at least to the extent of not excluding 
anyone from the trade debate. Encouraging the expansion of public space in the WTO, 
that is, improving external transparency, is a conditio sine qua non for addressing the 
organization’s legitimacy issues. Drache links this public space with transparency and a 
“strengthen civic order”: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Anne Peters, Dual Democracy in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  291 ( J. 
Klabbers et al eds. 2009). 
65 POUL F. KJAER, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE GLOBAL REALM: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 35-36 (2014). 
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“[W]ithin a globalized world, public domain activities are becoming more 
significant in the core economic jurisdictions, as well as many developing 
and advanced states that are having to confront globalization and a range 
of intractable distributional issues. International organizations like the 
WTO, stress the need for transparency and the rule of law, both of which 
require a strengthened civic order.” 66  
 
Similarly Picciotto identifies the expansion of public forums as crucial to democratic 
deliberation,67 and the assessment of expertise.68 He sees the establishment of WTO 
contact points as a step in the right direction, and summarizes the need for a global 
deliberative space and its establishment through democratic legitimacy: 
 
“[D]emocratization of global governance is not a matter of creating a 
global version of an already outdated national model of representative 
democracy, but part of a more general process of the development of new 
democratic principles responding to changes in the character of the public 
sphere. The meaning and content of globalization are as much political as 
economic questions: the construction of global governance has been under 
way for some time, but it has been dominated by international elites. The 
issue now is whether it is possible to provide democratic legitimacy 
through appropriate constitutional principles, in the broad sense of 
ensuring the allocation and exercise of public power in ways that can be 
responsive to the values and preferences of those affected by relevant 
decisions.”69 
 
The next four chapters will elaborate on each of the four transparency forms and discuss 
whether they can provide for such “public spaces”, in the sense of “normative discourse 
spaces” and create opportunities for democratization in the WTO. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66Daniel Drache, The Return of the Public Domain after the Triumph of Markets: Revisiting the Most Basic 
of Fundamentals in THE MARKET OR THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, AND OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS IN REDRAWING THE 
LINE 63 (D. Drache ed. 2005). 
67 Sol Picciotto, Democratizing Globalism in THE MARKET OR THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, AND OTHER 
CONTRIBUTIONS IN REDRAWING THE LINE 342 (D. Drache ed. 2005) putting forward an argument based on 
Habermas.  
68 Id. 344. 
69 Id. 339. 
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III. Internal Transparency  
 
Internal transparency in the WTO is defined as “the issue of effective participation of 
developing countries in WTO decision-making.”1 In 2001, internal transparency was 
included as an issue in Paragraph 10 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration as follows: 
 
“Recognizing the challenges posed by an expanding WTO membership, 
we confirm our collective responsibility to ensure internal transparency 
and the effective participation of all Members. While emphasizing the 
intergovernmental character of the organization, we are committed to 
making the WTO’s operations more transparent, including through more 
effective prompt dissemination of information, and to improve dialogue 
with the public. We shall therefore at the national and multilateral levels 
continue to promote a better public understanding of the WTO and to 
communicate the benefits of a liberal rules-based multilateral trading 
system.”2 
 
Paragraph 10 of the Doha Declaration addresses both internal and external transparency, 
although it only mentions the former by name. In this chapter we will focus on the 
internal transparency aspects of paragraph 10, and later we will also explore external 
transparency in the relevant chapter.  
 
Arguably, Paragraph 10 could be divided in two parts, discussing internal transparency 
until the first period, and external for the rest of the paragraph. However, certain elements 
in the part after the first period can be seen as qualifiers for internal transparency: the 
WTO’s intergovernmental character refers not only to the membership to the WTO and 
the conference of rights and duties reserved exclusively for states and not for other non-
state entities, but also, can be a reference to sovereign equality as the foundation of 
international treaty making competence. Sovereign equality is alluded to as it is possibly 
seen as a counterbalance, a cardinal notion in the foundation of international law that 
aspires to offset the problematic notion that some countries are not participating as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS 150 (2008). 
2 Emphasis added. 
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effectively as others, which the first sentence just spoke of. Even if internal transparency 
was formally recognized in the Doha Declaration, immediately after the recognition was 
tampered by an indirect reference to sovereign equality.  
 
The last sentence of paragraph 10 makes the notion of internal transparency even 
murkier. Issues of transparency are directly linked to lack of public understanding, 
without it being further clarified if developing countries and their constituents are also 
victims to such a “misunderstanding” or this is a reference only to external transparency 
and non-state stakeholders, citizens, consumers and for profit and non-profit entities. 
Finally, the last sentence, perhaps the most problematic of the entire paragraph is the one 
directional notion that only benefits are to be reaped from the liberal rules-based system 
that is the WTO. Even more here lie the notions that first, the problem with the WTO is 
not the lack of benefits, or that such benefits come from its liberal rules-based nature, but 
that all the above have somehow been lost in translation and not been communicated 
properly to those who are interested or care, or are affected by these rules; and second, 
that the very nature of the WTO as a legal system is decided and set, and what needs and 
can be negotiated is the communication of the benefits. This reduces Paragraph 10 to a 
debate on the WTO’s public relations’ agenda, and obscures the real issues that exist 
within the organization and that have resulted to a negotiations’ standstill.  
 
Since the Doha negotiation’s deadlock, it is evident that internal transparency problems 
entail a lot more than an anomaly in the WTO’s communications’ strategies. This 
conclusion is also evident through literature that discusses law and development in the 
WTO: the lack of effective participation of developing countries is due to more 
embedded issues that date before the creation of the WTO, and even before the 
conclusion of the GATT, and are not unique to the international trading context. 
Moreover, when one explores exclusionary practices from some WTO member states 
against others in general, problems appear outside the development framework as well.  
 
Thus, I argue that the definition of internal transparency should not be pegged to 
developing countries. Instead, it should be extended for three reasons: the first is in order 
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to remain more faithful to the letter of the Doha Declaration: Paragraph 10 stipulates that 
internal transparency problems are linked to the expanding WTO membership, without an 
explicit mention of developing countries. Therefore, other participation hurdles caused by 
the increasing size of the organization should be considered under paragraph 10. Second, 
there are some similarities in the legal framework that addresses development in the 
WTO and two others, namely regionalism and accession. A set of exceptions are set forth 
to address a different issue each time, putting in question the validity of cardinal rules in 
the WTO and whether they function as intended. In other words, it is paradoxical why 
such sets of exceptions are necessary to rules that represent the liberal rules-based trading 
system, which provides its members with benefits only. Third, contextual parameters of 
the three sets of two-tiered processes exhibit similarities. There exist most importantly 
obvious stronger-versus-weaker state (or groups of states) dynamics, which further 
influence the processes followed to conclude these rules, their content and their 
monitoring mechanisms (when those are in place).  
 
For these reasons I argue that internal transparency should extend to countries who are 
left out of Preferential and Regional Trade Agreements as well as countries who are in 
the process of acceding to the WTO. Or, one could argue that developing countries’ 
participation problems are issues of internal transparency stricto sensu while the other 
two, accession and PTAs/RTAs belong to internal transparency lato sensu. Extending the 
definition of internal transparency to non-development related exclusionary problems can 
help us better understand the issue of non-effective participation to the world trading 
system, and can also help address fairness questions that do not exclusively appear in the 
development context.  
 
A WTO member state can be facing exactly the same issues of complete disregard for its 
economic needs and inability to do much about it in the WTO context during its 
accession process or because of being left out from Preferential Trade Agreements. The 
former scenario happened for example in the case of Vanuatu, which, in order for its 
accession to be approved, was essentially being coerced into signing the plurilateral 
Agreement on Aviation even though the country has no civil aviation system. The 
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possibility of such anecdotes in accessions negotiations exists due to the structure of 
accession in the WTO. With respect to PTAs, the mega-agreements signed between the 
EU and Canada (CETA) and negotiated between the EU and the US (TTIP) can easily 
exacerbate the problems from extant subsidization practices from all three parties for 
their products at the expense of small economies. The three WTO members are already 
dominating the world trading system. New agreements between them without the 
obligation to extend the privileges agreed through MFN to anyone else can block entire 
sectors of global markets from any chances for prosperity. Additionally, a significant 
amount of intransparency exists with respect to PTAs in the WTO. 
 
The first part of this chapter will discuss internal transparency stricto sensu, namely as it 
relates to developing countries. The second and third parts will extend to transparency 
lato sensu, in PTAs, RTAs and the accession process. The chapter will aim to highlight 
the significance of trust in the WTO institutional processes, such as negotiations, 
decision-making, dispute settlement and trade monitoring that the representatives of 
member states should have in order for the WTO system to function productively, 
observe similarities and differences amongst the three areas where internal transparency 
is relevant and link internal transparency to democratization in the WTO. This chapter 
acts as a form of “internal” critique to the WTO discourse, namely it adopts the Doha 
Declaration definition and examines how it can be better understood. 
A. Internal Transparency stricto sensu: Developing Countries in the 
WTO 
 
The problems with respect to internal transparency stricto sensu became more widely 
known during the Green Room incidents in the first few years of the GATT operations. 
The Green Room refers to a room adjacent to the office of the GATT and then the WTO 
Director-General where smaller group meetings traditionally took place.3 Such meetings !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 An eloquent account on the Green Room appears in PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST 
FAVORED NATIONS 28 (2009): “Arif Hussain’s eyes sparkle when he recalls the Green Room. A former 
Indian civil servant who joined the GATT Secretariat in 1984, Hussain even kept the old Green Room 
furniture in a small chamber across from his office at the Centre William Rappard. The room was named 
for the tacky color (“goat-vomit green,” one of Hussain’s former colleagues calls it) of the fabric and 
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include countries with higher financial stakes in certain products or the outcomes of 
certain negotiations and result in faster negotiations of rules, excluding the bulk of WTO 
member states. Thus, the familiar tactic of alliance formation during treaty negotiations 
was quasi-institutionalized. The exclusionary incidents proliferated to the point that 
countries with large delegations would meet in several small working groups who were 
convening in parallel and at the same time during Ministerial Meetings. Countries with 
smaller delegations, mostly smaller economies, developing and least developed countries 
would not have similar diplomatic armies and would thus be excluded from efficient 
representation of their interests in such meetings. Efforts of these countries to unite and 
conquer the meetings partially remedied the problems but cannot fully work, as the 
interests of developing countries and smaller economies are not uniform with respect to 
tariffs, products and agreements. To this day, internal transparency problems remain as 
one of the cardinal legitimacy deficits in the WTO. 
 
This chapter will discuss the context and the rules related to internal transparency. The 
origins of the internal transparency deficits can be traced beyond the GATT and the WTO 
and the problems with developing country participation at international fora is not unique 
to the WTO. Instead of disembedding the treatment of developing countries with respect 
to WTO rules from the internal transparency problem, I argue that only through 
examination of the GATT development decisions can we fully understand how internal 
transparency became to be seen as an issue in the WTO in the first place and how deeply 
rooted internal transparency is to the tension between the “rules-based liberal trading 
system” and the economic needs of developing countries. The growing frustration of 
developing countries did not emerge after the creation of the WTO, and is not limited to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
upholstery that graced its walls and chairs. It was the director-general’s conference room, which became 
famous in trade circles as the gathering place for representatives from a select group of powerful countries, 
usually twenty or so, at the invitation of Arthur Dunkel, the director-general from 1980 to 1993. “There 
was lots of cigar and cigarette smoke in the air,” Hussain recalls. “Negotiators were poring over papers and 
drafts, with liberal servings of wine and sandwiches.” The idea was to create the proper ambience for 
reaching agreements that could be sold to all the countries participating in the GATT. Although the former 
Green Room is no longer green—it has been elegantly appointed with wood paneling, modern art paintings, 
and a polished oval wooden table—neither the tradition nor the term have faded into history. “Green 
rooms” are held often under WTO auspices—the term will come up repeatedly in this book—and consist of 
small groups of negotiators who try to strike key compromises in a manageably sized forum before the 
larger WTO membership considers them.” 
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being left out of the Green Room, or not having large enough delegations to fully engage 
in tariff negotiations. Instead, developing countries have voiced concerns of their 
interests being side-stepped throughout the history of the GATT and as a result, 
periodically the GATT member states and later the WTO member states have taken steps 
to rectify the problem. However, such steps are first, too few and too late, and second, 
they are introduced on an exceptional basis and not through a proper development-
oriented dialogue.  
 
In this chapter I argue that the marginalization of developing states during WTO 
meetings and the marginalization of development needs in international trade are linked. 
Developing countries have traditionally been excluded from discussing the needs of their 
economies in the WTO: many of their industries cannot sustain the pressure of extensive 
liberalization and competition in global markets. Instead of benefiting from comparative 
advantage, domestic markets have plummeted to extinction. This decline was greatly 
exacerbated by globalization. Not being heard, and not being taken seriously resulted 
instead in the adoption of “Band-Aid” frameworks such as the GSP and the Enabling 
Clause, and agreements with insignificant stature or restricted to single products like the 
ones adopted for Least Developed Countries during the Bali Ministerial. Therefore, the 
incomplete nature of development rules is coupled to a more systemic reluctance in the 
WTO to question the ideological foundations of the world trading system. This is 
evidenced inter alia by the wording of Paragraph 10 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
as we saw earlier, which is replete with disclaimers and qualifiers that negate the severity 
of the development issue. The “Green Room” saga and the failure to create a 
development-friendly normative agenda are having mutual spillovers onto one another. 
Thus they will be discussed together in this chapter.  
 
The first part will begin the conversation of development outside the world trading 
system and provide an overview of the history of development in order to show that this 
lack of consideration for development needs is a more systemic issue in international 
affairs. In the second part, I will discuss the history of development and the legal 
parameters of development in the GATT and the WTO. This part will focus on the 
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Generalized System of Preferences, the Enabling Clause, the most important DSB report 
discussing the issue of development, EC-Tariff Preferences, and the status of 
development after the Doha Ministerial Conference.  This analysis will help demonstrate 
the extent of the deficit on a proper consideration of development needs. The third part 
will link the conclusions from the first two parts to the notion of internal transparency. 
More specifically, I will first examine how development is, as shown, a complicated 
concept that encompasses a series of considerations and a plethora of diverse national 
interests. International administrations and global governance more generally has been 
struggling to form a proper development agenda. However, returning to internal 
transparency, I will argue that it will never be possible to include developing needs in 
multilateral trade negotiations without including developing countries in the dialogue as 
well.  
 
a) A very brief overview of Development 
 
The concept of development mainly arose during the period of decolonisation following 
World War II. In that sense, the dynamics between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ 
countries can be said to be a direct result of the convoluted and complex history of 
colonialism.4 Development is hard to define, and contains elements such as infrastructure 
and poverty, which are also difficult to define, and can incorporate a number of biases 
that may be difficult to identify.5 It has been a central matter of contestation and attention 
in the work of development economists, economic geographers, international political 
economists, lawyers, sociologists, anthropologists, managers, production engineers and 
others.6 In an attempt to define development, we could consider notions such as the 
standard of living (and how to improve it), economic and labour factors, and the desire to 
eradicate poverty. Tied to the notion of development are the history of colonialism, the 
economics of scarcity in goods, food and other commodities, labour economics, legal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 For an analysis of this background see SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011). 
5 Paul Glewwe & Jacques van der Gaag, Identifying the Poor in Developing Countries: Do Different 
Definitions Matter? 18 WORLD DEVEL. 803 (1990). 
6 RAPHAEL KAPLINSKY, GLOBALISATION, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY: BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD 
PLACE xii (2005). 
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pluralism and comparative law, and, finally, human rights discourse. These analytical 
categories include a large number of further distinctions that fall outside the scope of this 
thesis.  
 
Development has been the meeting point for historical, economic and legal concepts and 
analyses.7 It has also been the preoccupation of political and civil society actors and 
international organisations.8 The notion of development differs from one country to the 
next, reflecting the varied development needs of each country. It also differs based on 
who defines it: lawyers, historians, economists, NGOs, the people living in developing 
countries, their politicians, other governmental structures such as international 
organisations (the WTO, World Bank, IMF), or the G20. Each discipline and stakeholder 
has developed multiple narratives, which are often not compatible with other descriptions 
of the same phenomenon. Accordingly, navigating development from the point of view of 
law is particularly challenging for lawyers and legal scholars. Globalisation amplified the 
difficulty of this task by accentuating more transnational dimensions in existing legal 
relationships. 
 
Development economics is perhaps the most prolific discipline occupied with 
development. It is the discipline that had the greatest role in informing all other 
development-oriented disciplines. The focus of development economists can be 
summarised in two questions: Why are the poor countries still poor? What can be done to 
remove their persistent poverty?9 
 
Notwithstanding classical economists and Marx, the history of development economics 
began in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It includes many schools of thought ranging 
across the political spectrum, from neoliberal laissez-faire economists to neo-Marxists. It 
includes institutionalist theories, theories of endogenous and exogenous growth, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See Nicholas Crafts, Historical Perspectives on Development (with chapter comments by Avner Greif and 
David Landes) in FRONTIERS OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: THE FUTURE IN PERSPECTIVE (G.Meier & J. 
Stiglitz eds. 2001).  
8  LEONARDO MARTINEZ-DIAZ & NGAIRE WOODS (EDS.), NETWORKS OF INFLUENCE? DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES IN A NETWORKED GLOBAL ORDER (2009). 
9 GERALD M MEIER, BIOGRAPHY OF A SUBJECT: AN EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 7(2004). 
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heterodox theories, theories of path dependency, varieties of capitalism, developmentalist 
economics, external trade optimists and skeptics, theories exploring the world population, 
agriculture, technology and their effects on development, comparative political economy 
and many others.10 A lawyer approaching this field is provided with an extensive menu of 
economic theory choices examining a variety of socioeconomic factors. At the same time, 
many of these theories are in stark opposition to others and offer opposite accounts for 
the same economic phenomena or the same case studies.11 
 
Law and Development emerged in legal discourse in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s it 
took the form of an aggregate of loosely connected theoretical accounts from comparative 
law scholars, legal anthropologists, Third World specialists and social theorists.12 This 
original stream of work focused on establishing a model for the relationship between law 
and society and an explanation for the relationship between law and development.13 In 
their seminal article ‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in 
Law and Development Studies in the United States’, David Trubek and Mark Galanter 
deconstructed the ‘liberal legalism’ paradigm of previous accounts by challenging its 
underlying assumptions of law as an instrument for change towards the ‘ideal’ form of 
Western rule of law models.14 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 For elaborate accounts of these streams, see Meier, ibid; JAMES M CYPHER & JAMES L DIETZ, THE 
PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2009); MARK IRVING LICHBACH & ALAN S ZUCKERMAN (EDS.), 
COMPARATIVE POLITICS: RATIONALITY, CULTURE, AND STRUCTURE (2009); ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2011); PETER HALL & 
DAVID SOSKICE, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE (2001); Peter Hall & Daniel W Gingerich, Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional 
Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis 39:3 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 449 (2009). 
11 See GERALD M MEIER & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ (EDS.), FRONTIERS OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: THE 
FUTURE IN PERSPECTIVE (2001) and more specifically the chapter by Gerald M Meier, The Old Generation 
of Development Economists and the New with comments by Philippe Aghion & Hla Myint; also see David 
M. Trubek, Law and Development in the Twenty-First Century in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA (G. 
McAlinn & C. Pejovic eds. 2011). 
12 David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law 
and Development Studies in the United States, 4 WISC. L. REV. 1062, 1067 (1974). 
13 Ibid. 1071, describing liberal legalism. 
14 Ibid. 
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Legal reform and legal education were featured as prominent tools for law and 
development in the first two decades of the movement.15 In the 1980s, Trubek, among 
others, identified that in the 1980s ‘Rule of Law’ theories replaced previous Law and 
Development debates.16 The first ‘Rule of Law’ wave emerged during the era following 
the end of 1980s Washington Consensus.17 Very soon, the promise of solutions that 
would ensue endogenously through domestic market and rule-of-law reforms was 
replaced by an understanding that development needs varied significantly not only from 
one country to the next, but within geographic districts of the same country. Poverty 
alleviation and sustainable growth could not be attained based on prescribed development 
strategies.  
 
In the post-Washington Consensus era,18 law and development can no longer afford to 
disembbed economic from social considerations.19 Soft law, informal norms, social 
norms, networks and culture must be considered during any attempt to formulate a 
development strategy.20 As the vast majority of theories and assumptions of development 
economics has been drastically revisited, law and development is following suit.21 The 
evolving Rule of Law discourse in the World Bank22 is still far from proposing a positive 
roadmap to growth.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15  David M Trubek, Law and Development in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 8443 (NJ Smelser and P. Baltes eds.) 2001). See also John K.M. Ohnesorge, 
Developing Development Theory: Law and Development Orthodoxies and the Northesast Asian Experience 
28 U. PENN. J. INT’L ECON. L.  219(2007); David Trubek et al., Towards a New Law and Development: 
New State Activism in Brazil and the Challenge for Legal Institutions UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LEGAL 
STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 1207 (2012). 
16 David M Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present and Future and David 
Kennedy, The “Rule of Law”, Political Choices, and Development Common Sense in THE NEW LAW AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (D. Trubek & A. Santos EDS.. 2006). 
17 The harmonised efforts of the International Financial Institutions, the World Bank, the IMF and the US 
Treasury to provide recipes for countries facing economic crises. 
18 Roughly from the end of the previous millennium up to the present day. 
19 Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the Incorporation 
of the Social (2004) 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 199. 
20 Ibid, 200, 206, 217–22. 
21 See the contributions in DAVID M TRUBEK AND ALVARO SANTOS (EDS.), THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (2006). See also AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 
(1999). 
22 See Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development in 
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (D. Trubek & A. Santos eds. 2006). 
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b) Development in the GATT and the WTO 
 
The complexity of development is well-known in historical, legal and economic analyses 
of trade and development.23 Sonia Rolland gives a concise definition of development in 
the organisation as the ‘unspoken … non-negotiated understanding … transpir[ing] from 
the GATT and WTO practice regarding special and differential treatment’. According to 
Rolland, the objectives of the special and differential treatment are in sum ‘the promotion 
of North-South trade’, ‘allowances for domestic development policies that may be trade 
restrictive’ and ‘increase of South-South trade’, albeit limitedly. The establishment of 
special and differential treatment, with its multiple facets,24 occurred throughout the 
history of the GATT and the WTO.  
 
The question of how to increase benefits from trade for developing countries arose 
shortly after GATT came into existence in 1947. Ten out of the 23 original GATT 
members were developing countries and more acceded shortly after the conclusion of the 
GATT. 2526 The strain of colonisation inevitably followed the developing countries in 
their multilateral trade responsibilities. Originally, the distinction among developed and 
developing nations was yet another outfit of the mandates’ and the colonies’ apparatus.27 
The dynamics between the two groups were a direct result of the history of colonialism 
but also the de facto position of developing countries, which accessed only limited 
resources of wealth, comprising mainly of primary products.28 There was substantial 
discussion on development during the negotiations of the ITO but no aspects of it 
transpired to the GATT to form any kind of concrete legal rules.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 See for a socio-legal analysis  RAJ BHALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2003) and for a 
more economic-oriented JAMES CYPHER & JAMES DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
(2009). 
24 See Edwini Kessie, The Legal Status of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions under the WTO 
Agreements in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 23-34 (G. A. Bermann & P. C. Mavroidis, eds. 
2007). Special and Differential Treatment provisions aim at increasing trade opportunities, requiring 
developed members to consider the needs of developing ones, allowing for lesser obligations and 
transitional time periods for developing countries and providing technical assistance. 
25 See DOUGLAS A.IRWIN ET. AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 76-77, 120 (2008) looking at initial 
developing country reactions to the pre-GATT texts and their participation as Founding Members. 
26 Although China, Lebanon and Syria withdrew. 
27 ROBERT E HUDEC,. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 6(1987). 
28 Id. 76-77. 
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Until 1954, developing countries participated as equal partners in the GATT. Article I of 
the GATT, entitled ‘General Most-Favoured Nation Treatment’ (MFN), contained an 
obligation to automatically extend the lowest tariff level in any given product that applied 
to one member of the GATT to all members. One ultimate goal of the cardinal GATT 
provision is an overall reduction in tariffs for its members. This was a cumbersome 
obligation for developing countries, whose domestic markets could not sustain the direct 
competition of foreign products. With the participation of developing countries in the 
GATT and later the WTO, opportunities for national protectionism and subsidies 
diminished.29 National manufacturers had to compete with global prices, and domestic 
industries were left vulnerable to shocks of exposure to world markets. 30  Any 
opportunities of subsidies in order to help national manufacturers were originally 
inhibited by the GATT rules. For the developing GATT member states, membership in 
the organisation seemed to be an obstacle to, rather than an opportunity for, growth. To a 
large extent, formal equality translated to unequal rewards.31  Developing countries 
pushed immediately for changes in the GATT system. As early as 1954, during the first 
GATT Review session, Article XVIII providing for infant industry exceptions was 
revised. Article XVIII (B) was adopted, giving the opportunity to countries with balance 
of payment problems to adopt exceptions. Finally, Article XXVIII (bis) lowered the 
reciprocity requirements for developing countries. 
 
Later on, with the formation of the G77 group, and the negotiations of the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the New International Economic 
Order32, the GATT Contracting Parties gained some negotiating power in the WTO. 
Partly responding to almost two decades of pressures from their developing members, 
partly due to concerns of progressive replacement by UNCTAD (whose mandate also 
was directly related to trade), WTO members chose to adopt Part IV of the GATT, under !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 See Bernard M. Hoekman & Kym Anderson, Developing Country Agriculture and the New Trade 
Agenda CEPR DISCUSSION SERIES No 2096(1999); T.N. Srinivasan, Developing Countries and the 
Multilateral Trading System after Doha, YALE UNIVERSITY ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER DISCUSSION 
PAPER No 843 (2002). 
30 Ibid. 
31 SONIA ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT AT THE WTO 7 (2012). 
32 Id. 124-126 
 
151 
the title “Trade and Development.” Even though Part IV does not contain any concrete 
legal obligations vis-à-vis development, it can be seen as a victory of developing 
countries. In any case, UNCTAD offers a comparable framework, equally aspirational in 
nature.  
 
The creation of UNCTAD, another organisation specialising in Trade and Development, 
acted as a warning for the developed members of the GATT: their developing 
counterparts could abandon the organisation. Such a move would compromise the 
developed bloc’s universal membership ambitions, which gained particular significance 
during the Cold War. 33 The Committee on Trade and Development was created in the 
GATT and Part IV of the GATT was adopted as a response. Part IV, entitled Trade and 
Development, consists of three articles entitled ‘Principles and Objectives’, 
‘Commitments’ and ‘Joint Action’. The content of these articles is more aspirational and 
declaratory than compulsory. It does not create any obligations for developed countries, 
nor rights for developing ones.34  
 
Shortly thereafter, another three waivers to the Article I MFN clause were adopted with 
the aim of assisting developing countries. Most importantly, in 1971 the GATT member 
states agreed to the Generalized System of Preferences,35 which granted tariff preferences 
to developing countries without a reciprocity requirement (as MFN would otherwise 
require). This was essentially a waiver, containing an expiration date whose extension 
was to be further decided. Its significance was strengthened eight years later, when it was 
concretized during the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations. In 1979, at the end of the 
Tokyo Round, the temporary waivers of the previous decade were made permanent in the 
Enabling Clause36. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 ROBERT E. HUDEC,. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 39 (1987). 
34 Ibid, 64–65. 
35 Decision on Generalized System of Preferences (25 June 1971) BISD 18S/24. 
36  Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries, (28 November 1979) L/4903. 
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Waivers were granted under the GATT framework37, which remains unchanged in the 
WTO. One could claim that they are mostly isolated and sporadic. Even though each 
waiver was granted for a legitimate reason, the explanation behind each one is on an ad-
hoc basis and the conclusions to be drawn from such waivers are limited. In any case, 
waivers as exceptions portray a return to the bilateral structure,38 juxtaposed to the 
sweeping MFN and National Treatment. The waiver mechanism for developing countries 
creates an elaborate system under the GATT/WTO, which targets a specific group for a 
particular reason with large political and economic parameters. 
 
The special and differential treatment of developing countries could be seen as adhering 
to the principle of equality and doing so quite faithfully. Indeed, equality in law obliges 
one to treat equal cases equally, and unequals unequally39. As was pointed out by the 
Rapporteur of the Subcommittee on General Principles, in the Report of the Committee 
on Legal Aspects of a New International Economic Order:  
 
“From a legal point of view […] the equality principle (or the non-
discrimination-principle) means that equal cases should be treated equally 
and unequal cases unequally. […] [U]nequal cases should be treated 
unequally in proportion to their inequality. In view of the objectives of the 
rules and policies concerned and particularly in view of the objectives of a 
NIEO this will mean in particular that developing countries have to be 
treated more favourably by developed countries in proportion to their level 
of under-development.”40 
 
There are three main parts to the legal framework of development under the WTO/GATT 
umbrella. First, the GATT provisions. Article XVIII of the GATT contains a detailed 
support structure in case developing countries need to adopt measures regarding infant or 
otherwise necessary for development industries. Part IV of the GATT is a lot more vague, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Waivers are granted under Article XXV para. 5 of the GATT. 
38 JACKSON JOHN H., SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
164 (2006). 
39 This understanding of equal treatment is quite old. Elaborate references can be found, for instance in 
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΑ), book number VII, chapter 14 as well as PLATO, LAWS, (ΝΟΜΟΙ) Book 
VI, 757a-e, 758a. 
40 International Law Association, Third Report of the Committee on Legal Aspects of a New International 
Economic Order 61 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE REPORT 131-132 (1984) 
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setting out ambitions and principles with limited legal application. This lack of legal 
obligations was even at the time of the adoption of part IV, depicted as an advantage.41 
 
Second, the Generalized System of Preferences, paragraph (a), according to which: 
 
“…without prejudice to any other Article of the General Agreement, the 
provisions of Article I shall be waived for a period of ten years to the extent 
necessary to permit developed contracting parties […] to accord 
preferential tariff treatment to products originating in developing countries 
and territories with a view to extending to such countries and territories 
generally the preferential tariff treatment refereed to in the Preamble to this 
Decision, without according such treatment to like products of other 
contracting parties…”  
 
Third, the Enabling Clause adopted in 1979, which in the first paragraph provides that: 
 
“Not withstanding the provisions of article I of the General Agreement, 
contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment 
to developing countries, without according such treatment to other 
contracting parties.” 
 
Further, it says in Paragraph 2: 
 
The provisions of paragraph 1 apply to the following: 
(a) Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting 
parties to products originating in developing countries in accordance with 
the Generalized System of Preferences. 
 
Of importance is also Footnote 3 (referring to paragraph 2a).  
 
“As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25 
June 1971, relating to the establishment of “generalized, non-reciprocal 
and non discriminatory preferences beneficial to the developing countries” 
(BISD 18S/24). 
 
Two areas of increased significance for developing countries were left out of the GATT 
until the Uruguay Round: trade in textiles and agricultural products. Another important !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 ROBERT E. HUDEC,. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 59 (1987). 
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issue, especially for sub-Saharan African countries, was that of the prices of drugs for 
many diseases that plagued large numbers of their populations. They were asking 
essentially to be able to produce generic versions of the drugs, circumventing the lengthy 
periods of expensive patents. The deal resulting from the Uruguay Round of negotiations 
in the next decade was in the form of a single undertaking and included an Agreement on 
Agriculture and one on Textiles and Clothing, as well as TRIPS on Intellectual Property. 
GATT Members had to accept all agreements as a package deal.  
 
The inclusion of crucial to developing countries sectors, especially textiles and 
agriculture was only a Pyrrhic victory. The agreements themselves did not result in any 
changes to the benefit of developing country industries. In the meanwhile a number of 
regional initiatives attempted to assist developing countries, such as the EU Cotonou 
Agreement,42 the United States’ Caribbean Basin Initiative,43 as well as the US African 
Growth and Opportunity Act.44  
 
The new tariff schedules and their implementation reserved unpleasant surprises. First, 
agricultural concessions were entered into on an average basis. Compared to the less than 
4% average tariffs of manufactured goods, agricultural products’ tariffs were cut on 
average by 36% according to the Uruguay Round results. An average cut of 36% 
however does not entail significant liberalization, as countries can pick and choose 
products that are of lesser interest (or more difficult to grow, producing smaller volumes 
of exports) and eliminate tariffs completely, while keeping them intact for products that 
are of pivotal interests in domestic economies, as long as on average the cut amounts to 
36%.  
 
On top of that generous subsidies of domestic markets, as it happens for example for the 
US cotton industry, can help flood world markets with cheap US cotton. As a result, 
cotton, a key sector for sub-Saharan Africa’s external trade is rendered much less !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 See the Cotonou Agreement at https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/african-caribbean-and-pacific-acp-
region/cotonou-agreement_en. 
43 Caribbean Basin Security Initiative http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cbsi/ 
44 African Growth and Opportunity Act http://trade.gov/agoa/ 
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competitive. In 2005, former Mali President Amadou Toumani Toure summarized the 
importance that cotton acquired throughout the Doha Round of negotiations.  
 
“Cotton is by no means the only issue at stake in the agricultural sector in 
the Doha Round negotiations. But it must be recognized that, between 
Cancùn and Hong Kong, cotton has become the symbol of the African 
fight for fair and equitable trade, a fight that is supported by various 
international non-government organizations. A few years ago, cotton was 
a source of wealth for us. Now it has become a burden, and a factor in 
increasing poverty. This trend has become worse over the past few years, 
which have been marked by a major fall in global prices. Although a 
number of factors have led to this situation, agricultural subsidies are the 
main cause of market disruption, which has serious consequences for our 
economies. In addition to the macroeconomic impact of losses in 
government revenue, due to subsidies paid by developed countries to their 
producers, 15 million people in West and Central Africa, of whom over 
three million are farmers, depend directly on cotton for their livelihoods. 
These people are suffering the socio-economic costs. The current situation 
generates poverty in the rural areas of Africa, and particularly in the 
cotton-growing regions. This poverty in turn is causing an exodus of 
people from the rural areas. The paradox of the situation is that, while 
African cotton is the most competitive in the world, African farmers can 
no longer manage to survive by growing it. […]The crisis in the cotton 
industry eloquently demonstrates that it is not enough for our countries to 
produce efficiently in order to hope for fair recompense for the efforts of 
our farmers.”45 
 
During the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference, developing countries found 
themselves at the front line of opposition on the so-called Singapore issues, trade and 
investment, trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and 
trade facilitation. Later, a 1999 World Bank Report addressing the question of whether 
trade conducted based on WTO rules would result in assisting developing countries 
contributed a comprehensive analysis to what empirically developing countries were 
experiencing long before the creation of the WTO. In particular the report said that: 
  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Eric Hazard, International Trade Negotiations and Poverty Reduction: The White Paper on Cotton, 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/04/cotton_book_en.pdf ENDA PROSPECTIVES DIALOGUES POLITIQUES 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS, n° 249 Preface, pages 5-6 (2005), emphasis added. Mali, Benin, Burkina Faso and 
Chad requested an elimination of cotton subsidies and compensation to be given to least developed 
countries for the period those subsidies lasted.  
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“the WTO obligations reflect little awareness of development problems 
and little appreciation for the capacities of least developed countries to 
carry out the functions that SPS, customs valuation, intellectual property, 
etc. regulations address. The content of these obligations can be 
characterized as the advanced countries saying to the others, Do it my 
way!”46 
 
Another very important point that this study put forward was that the continuous lack of 
participation for least developed countries resulted in a lack of “sense of “ownership” of 
the reforms to which WTO membership obligates.” Although the report was focusing on 
market reforms that the Uruguay Round necessitated, its conclusions were directly 
referring to the Green Room problems that we have described to some extent already. 
The report notes that problems include the lack of resources for least developed country 
delegations, the fragmented communication of the WTO delegations and the 
governments back home as well as the non-existent involvement of domestic 
stakeholders.47  
 
In addition, the Uruguay Round was a single undertaking process, developing and 
developed countries could not opt in the Agreements and concessions that their domestic 
economies could endure. The conclusions of the World Bank paper are damning for the 
WTO. The Agreements provide, mostly to a significant extent, both “inappropriate 
diagnoses” for development issues and “inappropriate remedies.”48 The paper concludes 
that:  
 
“Though the agreements allow for the possibility that alternative 
approaches might be developed and recognized, they provide no such 
alternative. As to developing alternatives, the WTO negotiations are a self-
interest propelled process. Narrowly interpreted, that places the burden of 
developing alternatives that are appropriate to least developed countries’ 
needs and their resources on the least developed countries themselves.”49 
 
The report finally mentions that some projects are in place to assist least developed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Michael Finger, J. & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Urugauy Round Commitments: The Development 
Challenge 23:4 THE WORLD ECONOMY 23.4 511-525 online version- Page 1 (2000). 
47 Id. online version p. 8-9. 
48 Id. online version 28. 
49 Id. online version 29. 
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countries. Dani Rodrik has discussed the trade and development relationship in a similar 
line focusing not only on least developed countries but developing as well. He notes that 
the “success stories” of world trade, such as China or Korea adopted a large amount of 
protectionist measures in order to assist domestic industries before exposing them to 
world market shocks. He challenges the idea that benefiting from international trade 
through the GATT and WTO rules alone.50  Essentially, he proposes a shift from 
evaluating the trade regime from the perspective of whether it maximizes the flow of 
trade in goods and services and to asking whether “the trading arrangements –current and 
proposed—maximize the possibilities of development at the national level” instead. 51 In 
a sense, it is a little like learning how to swim for the first time in the middle of the ocean. 
Those who survive and thrive in the current trading system had the opportunity to “learn” 
in a controlled environment. Furthermore, intra-country inequalities persist in those 
countries. Their GDP may be rising but a large segment of the population in some cases 
is still living under the poverty line. Even their benefit from global trade is relative. 
 
The dissatisfaction of developing countries was carried over to the next two Ministerial 
Conferences in Geneva and Seattle. The failure to launch the next round in Seattle 
demonstrated that the problem of development couldn’t be fixed with fragmented 
concessions and ad hoc solutions. The mainstream logic in trade that granting periodic 
privileges would push poorer countries’ participation in world markets and market 
dynamics would take care of the rest and improve national economics was fundamentally 
challenged.  
 
The eventual launch of the 2001 Round of negotiations, the Doha Round was linked to a 
strong commitment of member states to place the interests of developing countries in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 See Dani Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness work Vol. 24. 
Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council (1999), THE SAME, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF TRADE: 
AS IF DEVELOPMENT REALLY MATTERED (2001), Dani Rodrik, Trading in illusions, FOREIGN POLICY 55-62 
(2001). Also, see various entries at his blog http://rodrik.typepad.com/. 
51 DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF TRADE AS IF DEVELOPMENT REALLY MATTERED, PAPER 
PREPARED FOR THE UNDP (Revised July 2001). 
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forefront. The round was subsequently named the “Doha Development Round.”52 The 
Doha agenda comprised of a number of issues: liberalization of trade in agricultural 
products, market access for non agricultural products, continuing liberalization in trade in 
services, improvement in rules on dumping, intellectual property rights and regional trade 
agreements, clarification of the relationship of trade and the environment and further 
integration of developing countries in the WTO.  
 
Two important developments occurred two years later, in 2003. The first was during the 
Cancun Ministerial, the formation of a new and strong coalition of developing and least 
developed countries, the so-called G20 (whose variations were the G30 and the G40). 
Led by India and Brazil, who decided to set their trade dissimilarities aside, the group 
strongly opposed being coerced to more cumbersome concessions and agreements. Other 
developing country groups tried to push new agendas forward during the preparations of 
the Ministerial.53 
 
The second event in 2003 was the delivery of the EC-Tariff Preferences report. 54 The 
Generalized System of Preferences and the Enabling Clause were given a more specific 
meaning during the EC Tariff Preferences dispute. The Panel and the Appellate Body in 
the EC-Tariff Preferences decision were called upon to answer some significant questions 
with respect to the legal treatment of developing country products in the WTO.55  First 
the Panel and Appellate Body discussed whether the Enabling Clause consists an 
exception to Article I:1 of the GATT, and thus the two are mutually exclusive, or Article 
I:1 applies to measures falling under the Enabling Clause. Article I:1, embodying one of 
the cardinal rules of the GATT provides for non-discrimination of like products !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 See Pascal Lamy, The WTO Doha Development Agenda: Working for a Fairer Global Trading System  
in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5-14 (M. Janow, V. et al 
eds. 2008)  
53 For example, the Core group see Jeffrey Dunoff, Comment on Nordström Håkan Participation of 
Developing Countries in the WTO – New Evidence Based on the 2003 Official Records in WTO LAW AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 189 (G. A. Bermann & P. C. Mavroidis, eds. 2007). 
54 Panel Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing 
Countries WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003) Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for 
the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter: 
EC-Tariff Preferences] 
55 Appellate Body Report EC-Tariff Preferences ¶ 90. 
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originating from different member states when these products reach the market of a third 
member state. If the Enabling Clause is an exception to Article I:1 then, any measures 
adopted within the Enabling Clause context do not need to be automatically extended to 
all developing countries in the WTO. However, if the Enabling Clause were found not to 
be an exception to Article I:1 but a self-standing commitment, then, Article I:1 would 
apply to it, as it does to all WTO commitments. Thus, any privileges granted to one 
developing country would automatically need to be extended to all developing countries. 
The Panel decided, and the Appellate Body affirmed that the Enabling Clause is an 
exception to Article I:1. Specifically, the Appellate Body said: 
 
The ordinary meaning of the term “notwithstanding” is, as the Panel 
noted, “[i]n spite of, without regard to or prevention by”. By using the 
word “notwithstanding” , paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause permits 
Members to provide “differential and more favourable treatment” to 
developing countries “in spite of” the MFN obligation of Article I:1. Such 
treatment would otherwise be inconsistent with Article I:1 because that 
treatment is not extended to all Members of the WTO “immediately and 
unconditionally”. Paragraph 1 thus excepts Members from complying with 
the obligation contained in Article I:1 for the purpose of providing 
differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, 
provided that such treatment is in accordance with the conditions set out in 
the Enabling Clause. As such, the Enabling Clause operates as an 
“exception” to Article I:1.56 
 
Furthermore the Panel and Appellate Body were asked whether there exists for developed 
countries an obligation to extend the same privileges, once granted, to all developing 
countries. In other words, does the exception need to be as such applied in a non 
discriminatory manner. the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s findings. It said that 
extending tariff preferences to all developing countries in a non-discriminatory manner 
does not mean that identical treatment is ensured for all. Any privilege-granting member 
can choose what form and level of privileges it will give to different countries.  
 
In particular the Appellate Body said: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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It does not necessarily follow […] that “non-discriminatory” should be 
interpreted to require that preference-granting countries provide 
“identical” tariff preferences under GSP schemes to “all” developing 
countries. 57 
 
For all these reasons, we reverse the Panel’s finding […] that ‘the term 
‘non-discriminatory’ in footnote 3 [to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling 
Clause] requires that identical tariff preferences under GSP schemes be 
provided to all developing countries without differentiation, except for the 
implementation of a priori limitations. 58 
 
Further down, the Appellate Body restates the thesis that ‘developing countries’ may 
mean “less than all developing countries.”59 In a sense, this differentiation among 
developing countries can support the claim that the Appellate Body may be keen on 
recognizing the rationale that lies behind the so-called ‘graduation’ principle. This 
principle, which has been often been seen as mercantilist and monolithic60 very briefly 
says that developing countries, once they reach a certain level of development that puts 
them in a position noticeably better and comparable to developed countries, they should 
“graduate” from their “developing-country” status and receive no further privileges. The 
principle was accused as mercantilist61 because it implies that, once it graduates the 
country will be in a position to grant preferential treatment to those still in a developing 
status.  
 
The Appellate Body in EC-Tariff Preferences offered a systemic interpretation of the 
obligations contained in the Enabling Clause and the GSP: 
 
Furthermore, as we understand it, the participants in this case agree that 
developing countries may have “development, financial and trade needs” 
that are subject to change and that certain development needs may be 
common to only a certain number of developing countries. We see no 
reason to disagree. Indeed, paragraph 3 (c) contemplates that “differential 
and more favourable treatment” accorded by developed to developing 
counties may need to be “modified” in order to “respond positively” to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Id. ¶ 156. 
58 Id. ¶174. 
59 Id. ¶ 176 Emphasis in the original. 
60 ROBERT E. HUDEC,. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 131 (1987) .  
61 Id. 
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needs of developing countries. Paragraph 7 of the Enabling Clause 
supports this view by recording the expectation of “less-developed 
contracting parties” that their capacity to make contributions or concession 
under the GATT will “improve with the progressive development of their 
economies and improvement in their trade situation”. Moreover, the very 
purpose of the special and differential treatment permitted under the 
Enabling Clause is to foster economic development for developing 
countries. It is simply unrealistic to assume that such development will be 
in lockstep for all developing countries at once, now and for the future.62 
 
Since the launch of the Doha Round, not a single agreement was reached in twelve years 
until the Ministerial Council in Bali in 2013. The Doha Round indicated that developing 
country issues had no easy solution, and ignoring the problem was not an option any 
more. Negotiations reached a stand-still, and until today, there is still a rift in at least 
three important areas. 63 The most pressing present interests of developing countries, as 
the current Doha agenda indicates, are primary agricultural products, which are generally 
exported for further processing, access to medicines covered by patent agreements,64 and 
implementation specifics with respect to special and differential treatment.65  
 
Recently, during the Bali Ministerial Conference in December 2013, the Doha 
Development Agenda was revisited. Agriculture and Development were at the centre of 
the agenda.66 Many developing countries expressed a desire to avoid small Green Room 
group negotiations.67 The conclusion of the Bali package was the first positive outcome 
of the Doha Development Round. It includes three pillars: trade facilitation (reducing red 
tape and speeding up port clearances); agriculture, focusing on food security and finally !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Appellate Body Report EC-Tariff Preferences ¶  160. 
63 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohasubjects_e.htm. 
64 See Bernard M. Hoekman & Kym Anderson, Developing Country Agriculture and the New Trade 
Agenda CEPR DISCUSSION SERIES No 2096 195 (1999) and T.N. Srinivasan, Developing Countries and the 
Multilateral Trading System after Doha, YALE UNIVERSITY ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER DISCUSSION 
PAPER No 843 8 (2002).  
65 See ‘Subjects Treated under the Doha Development Agenda’ (World Trade Organization), 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohasubjects_e.htm; Suyash Paliwal, Strengthening the Link in 
Linkage: Defining “Development Needs” in WTO Law 27:1 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 37(2012). 
66 ‘Day 1: Bali Conference Kicks Off with Warnings that Failure will Hurt the Poor’ (World Trade 
Organization, 3 December 2013), http://wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/mc9_day1_e.htm. 
67 Maria Perez-Esteve, WTO Rules and Practices for Transparency and Engagement with Civil Society 
Organizations) WORKING PAPER DRAFT PREPARED FOR THE IISD–ENTWINED WORKSHOP (2012; Robert 
Wolfe, Decision-Making and Transparency in the “Medieval” WTO: Does the Sutherland Report have the 
Right Prescription? 8:3 J. INT’L ECON. L.  631, 638(2005).  
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including an agreement on cotton products from least developed countries; and 
provisions aiming at assisting the group of least developed countries.68 The emphasis on 
developing and least-developed countries in the Agreements is prevalent.69 Additionally, 
the mandate of the Monitoring Mechanism is extended to the implementation of special 
and differential treatment provisions.70 It is still very soon to determine whether the reach 
of these agreements will result in a noticeable improvement in the position of developing 
countries. 
 
Overall, Developing Countries have come a long way, from not being heard at all during 
the ITO negotiations, to causing an impasse at the last negotiation rounds. Still, there is a 
long way to go. The limited use of dispute mechanisms and the oftentimes observed 
reluctance to enforce adopted reports of the DSB and give tit-for-tat to developed 
countries (such as the case of Ecuador, which did not use its right to retaliate in the EC-
Bananas III case, 71 or the Antigua and Barbuda case on gambling services against the 
US) shows that developing countries have not found themselves yet in a peer-to-peer 
position. This imbalance is still explained both by the actual economic position of 
developing countries in the world trading system, but also, historically by their 
continuing behavioral stance vis-à-vis the “Developed Country” paradigm, which, seen as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68  See ‘Days 3, 4 and 5: Round-the-Clock Consultations Produce “Bali Package”’ (World Trade 
Organization, 5–7 December 2013), http://wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/mc9sum_07dec13_e.htm. 
69 Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes — Draft Ministerial Decision (Ministerial Conference 
Ninth Session Bali, 3–6 December 2013) WT/MIN(13)/W/10, 
https://mc9.wto.org/system/files/documents/w10_1.pdf; Cotton — Draft Ministerial Decision (Ministerial 
Conference Ninth Session Bali, 3–6 December 2013) WT/MIN(13)/W/13, 
https://mc9.wto.org/system/files/documents/w13_0.pdf; Preferential Rules of Origin for Least-Developed 
Countries — Draft Ministerial Decision WT/MIN(13)/W/14, 
https://mc9.wto.org/system/files/documents/w14.pdf; Operationalization of the Waiver Concerning 
Preferential Treatment to Services and Service Suppliers of Least-Developed Countries — Draft 
Ministerial Decision WT/MIN(13)/W/15, https://mc9.wto.org/system/files/documents/w15.pdf; Duty-Free 
and Quota-Free Market Access for Least-Developed Countries — Draft Ministerial Decision 
WT/MIN(13)/W/16, https://mc9.wto.org/system/files/documents/w16.pdf; Monitoring Mechanism on 
Special and Differential Treatment — Draft Ministerial Decision WT/MIN(13)/W/17, 
https://mc9.wto.org/system/files/documents/w17.pdf. 
70 See ‘Bali Ministerial Declaration, Revised Draft’ (Ministerial Conference Ninth Session, Bali, 7 
December 2013) WT/MIN(13)/DEC/W/1/Rev.1, https://mc9.wto.org/system/files/documents/decw1r1.pdf; 
‘Revised Drafts of “Bali Package” Sent to Ministers after Intensive Consultations’ (World Trade 
Organization, 6 December 2013), 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/brief_monit_mecha_e.htm. 
71 Hunter Nottage, Trade and Development in the OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
496 (2009). 
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a “success”, comes forward and imposes itself authoritatively with economic and legal 
recipes and a paternalistic attitude. The message that comes across towards developing 
countries is “you either follow or fall behind.” The two factors, the pragmatic and the 
attitudinal perpetuate the existing imbalances. 72 
 
c) Development and Internal Transparency 
 
The system in place for developing countries has been very much criticized, especially 
during the last twenty years.73 The provisions, instead of assisting developing countries, 
are seen as in fact reproducing power and bargaining asymmetries. The WTO, just like 
GATT, stressed market-access as a sacrosanct target. The world trading system operates 
under the assumption that inclusion will produce larger volume of trade and this would 
semi-automatically bring developing countries out of any fiscal dead-ends. It reflected the 
belief that once in the marketplace, price mechanisms for commodities will allocate 
resources in an optimal manner. 
 
There is no such thing as a recipe for development. There are only long histories of trial 
and error. In particular, within legal discourse, no framework can ever be taken for 
granted to produce positive results. 74  The successes and failures, among many, of China, 
Vietnam, the East-Asian Tigers, Russia, Chile, Argentina allow us to draw one 
conclusion only: no universally accepted set of rules (not even a minimal one) can lead to 
development, nor can it prevent financial collapse when it is bound to happen. Each case 
is vastly different from the next one. Labor, history, education, property law and contract 
law choices, political histories, relationship to neighbors and geographic location, current !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 See eg Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations 31 TEX. INT’L L. J.  
574 (2010); Amrita Narlikar & Pieter Van Houten, Know the Enemy: Uncertainty and Deadlock in the 
WTO in DEADLOCKS IN MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 142–63 (A. Narlikar ed. 
2010); RORDEN WILKINSON & JAMES SCOTT (EDS.), TRADE, POVERTY, DEVELOPMENT: GETTING BEYOND 
THE WTO’S DOHA DEADLOCK (2012). 
73 Among many, RAJ BHALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2003) and Kevin Watkins, 
Penny Fowler, Rigged rules and double standards: trade, globalisation, and the fight against poverty Oxfam 
Campaign Reports (2002). 
74 RAJ BHALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2003) and for a more economic-oriented 
JAMES CYPHER, & JAMES DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENt  at 171 et seq (2009). 
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or historical relationship to systems of economic organization (capitalism/communism 
before 1989), lack or existence of natural resources, weather, prioritization of 
commodities in the global market, religion, cultural habits, and everything under the sun 
are affecting the development of a country.75 Even earthquakes and tsunamis can reverse 
in a matter of minutes any possible progress. If we loosely, and for the purposes of this 
paper, call this “the economic environment”, it affects trade in a great number of ways, 
but there are only two legal instruments (Enabling Clause and GSP) that are on some 
level legally binding and are addressing the issue, and, just to make matters worse, the 
adherence to them by developed countries is done on a voluntary basis. So far, cursory 
attempts to formalise concessions granted to developing countries without careful 
consideration of context have only led to an aggravation of already existing problems. 
 
The questions we ask in this last part are two: first, can it be argued that there is a 
correlation between internal transparency problems and a development-friendly 
development agenda? Will improving the first increase the chances of finding more 
solutions for the second? I answer this in the affirmative. Second, are there any practical 
proposals to help with the internal transparency problems? We will look at some 
suggestions below.  
 
The WTO is a member-driven organization where decisions are made through an 
informal type of consensus. This means that unless anyone present at a meeting76 
formally objects, a decision is deemed to have been made.  Voting occurs secretly, in the 
form of polling. A study conducted using records from 2003 showed that small 
economies and least developed countries are under-represented in Geneva.77 Moreover, 
written submission figures show a dominance from the US and the EU in formal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 On the complexity of such issues, see among many, PARTHA DASGUPTA, HUMAN WELL-BEING AND THE 
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT (2001), especially Parts II and III. 
76 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Article IX paragraph 1 Footnote 1. 
77 Nordström Håkan, Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO – New Evidence Based on the 
2003 Official Records in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 155 (G. A. Bermann & P. C. Mavroidis, 
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participation.78 Not only do smaller countries make fewer submissions, they also make 
fewer individual submissions, indicating that they often have to reach compromises with 
other developing and least developed countries whose interests may vary.   
 
Developing countries lack the diplomatic resources to participate in lengthy and costly 
negotiations. At the same time they do not have the global political stature of large 
trading nations. This puts them at an inferior negotiating position. A larger national 
mission has the advantage of rotating its diplomats during the on-going negotiations, and 
also participates in simultaneous negotiating groups. Developing countries have small 
missions who cannot be present at all times in the time and energy consuming negotiation 
processes. This problem has been mitigated to some extent by the formation of groups of 
developing countries with common interests. Thus, they can benefit from joining forces 
and dispersing their missions in order to manage a continuous presence in areas where 
their interests converge. Even though this tactic has obvious practical advantages, as well 
as the opportunity of power-pooling that gives developing countries a negotiating edge, 
still, it can obscure variations in the positions of these countries. However close their 
interests might be, they are not identical. The three working languages of the WTO - 
English, French and Spanish- also play a role in participation by developing countries. 
Working in one’s own language is seen as carrying an advantage.79  
 
Overall, despite the open doors policies of the WTO, “countries that can afford to be 
active are the most active ones.”80 However, in the Doha Round, developing countries are 
more active than usual81 and mostly in areas of interest to them.82 The Cancun alliance 
formation seems to have been paying off to some extent. The WTO administration should 
try and assist on finding ways to ensure that developing countries continue to participate 
similarly in the day-to-day works of the organization in view of the scarcity of their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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resources and strong power dynamics present.83 The organized world trading system has 
been around for quite some time, and only for the last decade have we observed such a 
level of engagement from developing countries. The deadlock of the Doha shows that 
developing countries can demand that their needs are taken seriously in the WTO. 
 
The replacement of the Quad with the group of Five Interested Parties is an important 
step forward. Middle income countries, developing countries with higher GDPs as well as 
the four very strong actors in international trade transactions, Brazil, China, Russia and 
India, have rightfully demanded and gained a central position in WTO negotiations. 
However, not all developing countries are equal. Those closer to LDCs in terms of GDP 
and per capita income are not in a similarly strong negotiating position. Such groups are 
less powerful in negotiations and cannot induce similar changes in rules. Also in the 
group of the Five Interested Parties are Brazil and India, two of the largest developing 
countries in the world. 
 
Additionally any negotiating inferiority of least developed countries and developing 
countries outside BRICS also extends to their reluctance to utilize the Dispute Settlement 
mechanism and enforce adopted reports of the Dispute Settlement Body (such as the case 
of Ecuador, which did not use its right to retaliate in the EC-Bananas III case). 
Developing countries lack the armies of lawyers that large nations can afford. The 
Advisory Center on WTO law (ACWL), which was created with a mandate to provide 
“advice, support and training to developing and least- developed countries” has only 
assisted few developing countries in only 38 cases in Dispute Settlement.84 The limited 
use of dispute mechanisms has been and continues to be a symptom of the lack of trust in 
the WTO processes. WTO case law keeps growing at a remarkable pace for international 
standards, thus making entry costs for first-time developing and least-developed litigants 
much higher. One idea is to allow for smaller economies that win dispute settlements in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS at 149-150 (2008). See also Jeffrey Dunoff, Comment on Nordström Håkan Participation 
of Developing Countries in the WTO – New Evidence Based on the 2003 Official Records in WTO LAW 
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 189-193 (G. A. Bermann & P. C. Mavroidis, eds. 2007), who argues that 
participation is overrated and maybe developing countries should keep their “best and brightest at home.”  
84 ACWL website www.acwl.ch/e/documents/Quick%20guide%202011%20for%20website.pdf. 
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the WTO to either get compensation that dates to the initiation of proceedings or be 
allowed to retaliate outside the national market. This may reduce the number of violations 
on behalf of stronger economies simply because they can currently afford to do so.85 
 
As a step towards improving developing country positions and clarifying the status of 
preferences, we can discuss the possibility of a development definition in the WTO. This 
is not a proposal that suggests immediate and practical solutions in the WTO. The 
reluctance on behalf of developed countries to grant preferences, inter alia is due to free-
rider fears86. This is further enhanced by the lack of any definition or clarity on the notion 
of a “developing country” under the WTO. Originally it was left to each industrial 
country to decide who qualified but later their status was based on self-identification. The 
situation varies for Least-Developed Developing Countries where the WTO uses the 
United Nations’ lists.87  
 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, two international organizations 
with, inter alia a development mandate, have analogous working definitions of what 
constitutes a developing country. Perhaps the voting allocation of members based on 
quotas and the direct dependence of developing countries on external funds renders such 
definitions super-imposed. Adopting their definitions as a transplant would hardly ever be 
a success. Such recipe-like clauses could be avoided in the polarized negotiations of the 
WTO, where developing countries sit at one side and have the power to sustain the 
existing deadlock. They could set terms, to a certain extent. Moreover, the regime of 
international trade needs a differentiated definition for development due to many 
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differences, and oftentimes contradictory positions among the developing countries.88 
Overall, even though development is very difficult to define, the World Bank and the 
IMF have managed to adopt working definitions, for the purposes of fulfilling their 
functions. Some attempt to introduce a set of rules that moves beyond the current non-
binding legal framework would assist the WTO to tackle the issue of defining 
development and moving forward with development solutions. 
 
The WTO political organs and the Director General must focus on ensuring that small 
group meetings do not become debilitating for any of the WTO members (developed 
versus developing, high-GDP developing versus low-GDP developing). Instead of 
encouraging the Green Room practices they should at least try to promote the opposite, 
open meetings for all. Finally, in the WTO there should be a serious discussion on the 
merits and the disadvantages of the consensus rule. Returning to voting rules, at least for 
some meetings can mitigate Green Room exclusionary practices. There has been a lot of 
pressure towards members that were not part of the Green Room discussions to accept 
what was decided in order for meetings to move forward and still adhere to the WTO’s 
consensus practice. It may be a good idea that this precedent, which as we saw almost 
results in bullying tactics among various sides can be questioned and potentially 
abandoned when that is possible. Also, a majority rule is a lot more democratic than 
questionable consensus. 
B. Internal Transparency lato sensu 
 
1. Preferential Trade Agreements 
 
The multilateral trading system established by the GATT and the WTO does not prevent 
its members from concluding bilateral or multilateral trade agreements of a more limited 
scope (namely among only few WTO member states). Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs) used to be traditionally signed among countries in terrestrial proximity but !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 For an account on the issues put forward see LORI WALLACH & MICHELLE SFORZA, WHOSE TRADE 
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currently the term in the WTO refers to reciprocal trade agreements between two or more 
partners. They include free trade agreements and customs unions. Preferential trade 
arrangements (PTAs) involve unilateral trade preferences. They include Generalized 
System of Preferences schemes as well as other non-reciprocal preferential schemes 
granted a waiver by the General Council.  
 
 
Figure 1 Map of RTA participants89 
 
PTAs and RTAs are an exception to the Most Favored Nation rule of Article I:1 of the 
GATT. In essence, both the GATT/WTO and PTAs/RTAs aim towards trade 
liberalization, albeit at a different scale, and while the WTO is based on the principle of 
non-discrimination, not the same applies to PTAs/RTAs, who have a discriminatory logic 
in their rationale.90 The two schemes pursue the same goal using contradictory rules, 
creating some reasonable frustration with respect to their compatibility.91 The rationale 
behind the door existing in the GATT for such agreements is that more liberalization, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Source: WTO website 
90 See Roberto V. Fiorentino et al., The Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements and WTO Surveillance in 
MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 54-55 (P. Low & R. 
Baldwin eds. 2009). 
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& Henry Wan, An Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of Customs Unions, 6 J. INT’L 
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even if it occurs at a bilateral level, is better than no liberalization at all. Moreover, the 
GATT Founding Members at the time most likely did not want to annul their regional 
trade relations agreements, so instead of dealing directly with a possibility of conflict 
between multilateralism and preferential access to certain markets, they included an 
exception. Thus, it is very likely that the same subject matter is covered by PTAs/RTAs 
and the WTO rules, creating the potential for conflict.92 
 
This asymmetry is intensified due the large volume and the importance of regional 
agreements [See Figure 1 for data on numbers of Regional Trade Agreements concluded 
between 1948-2014]. We need to go no further than point to the European Union, 
NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN. These agreements have strong impact for the trade 
amongst their members and are only four of the hundreds of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements that essentially provide an exception to the cardinal GATT rule of non-
discrimination. As such, concerns have been raised that such agreements undermine “the 
transparency and predictability of trade relations.”93  
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Figure 2 Regional Trade Agreements Concluded between 1948 and 201494 
Concerns with respect to the exclusionary nature of PTAs and RTAs are not unwarranted. 
It is very interesting to see the reaction of the US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, 
following the Cancun Ministerial. As developing countries finally demanded that their 
needs be part of the agenda, or else they would not allow for the negotiations and the new 
Round to move any further, instead of embracing these requests, even in the slightest, the 
US Trade Representative retaliated with turning to a form of “coalitions of the willing.” It 
is interesting to see how Paul Blustein reported Zoellick’s reactions after the G-20’s 
Cancun stand-off. 
 
“Reflecting his frustration over the events in Cancún was an op-ed he 
wrote in the Financial Times on September 22, 2003, a few days after the 
meeting. He blasted his adversaries—Brazil was mentioned five times—
for having fostered a “culture of protest that defined victory in terms of 
political acts rather than economic results.” He made it clear that he was 
going to reward cooperative countries and punish uncooperative ones by 
intensifying his “competitive liberalization” strategy of pursuing trade 
deals on multiple levels:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 Source: WTO website. 
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[Zoellick wrote]: “The key division at Cancún was between the can-do 
and the won’t-do. For over two years, the U.S. has pushed to open markets 
globally, in our hemisphere, and with sub-regions or individual countries. 
As WTO members ponder the future, the U.S. will not wait. We will move 
towards free trade with can-do countries.”  
America’s market of 300 million free-spending consumers, in other words, 
would be used as both a carrot and a stick. Countries that shared 
Washington’s enthusiasm for freer trade would obtain preferential access 
to that market by signing bilateral and regional agreements eliminating 
most trade barriers between them and the United States. Meanwhile, the 
ranks of the reluctant would be left at a disadvantage; their products 
would be subject to the tariffs that Washington maintained on MFN terms 
for members of the WTO. Eventually, they would recognize that their self-
interest lay in joining the U.S.-led bandwagon, the result being that small 
deals would prove to be “building blocks” toward bigger ones and, 
ultimately, a worldwide one.”95 
 
This chapter will first outline the legal framework and the types of PTAs/RTAs that are 
regulated in the GATT and other WTO Agreements, including the limited case law in this 
area. Second, I will describe the two different recently established Transparency 
Mechanisms for PTAs and RTAs and the WTO General Council Decisions of December 
14 2006 and 2010 establishing them respectively. In the last part I will discuss the two 
different transparency aspects of PTAs/RTAs. The first relates to the contribution of the 
Transparency Mechanisms in the overall transparency record of the WTO and the 
significant deficiencies, mostly stemming from the lack of an enforcement mechanism 
obliging member states to report PTAs/RTAs that they have entered in.  
 
The second form of transparency stems from the underlying exclusionary tactics of large 
trading countries such as the US in their decision to move forward with PTAs and RTAs 
and relates to the internal transparency problems we discussed in the previous chapter. As 
with developing countries whose economic needs have been systematically sidestepped 
for decades, and this is mirrored in their exclusion from closed meetings, PTAS/RTAs 
extend this small circle process of the Green Room. The difference here is that those 
“Green Rooms” are no longer located in Geneva and conducted under the auspices of the 
WTO Director General and his Secretariat, but in Washington, Ottawa, Brussels and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS 174 (2009) emphasis added. 
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Beijing. The reason why this is the WTO’s internal transparency problem and not just a 
parallel phenomenon is that on one hand the GATT allows for these bilateral and 
plurilateral agreements to be signed without any control on how many are concluded and 
on the other hand all the notification and monitoring mechanisms for PTAs and RTAs are 
underutilized to the extent they are rendered meaningless. Thus, beyond the obvious 
proposal to strengthen the existing Transparency mechanisms, I will adopt one of Paul 
Blustein’s proposals, to somehow put a cap on PTAs and RTAs.   
a) The Legal Framework for PTAs/RTAs 
 
The exception of PTAs/RTAs is considered the most important exception to Most 
Favored Nation.96 The basic PTA rules are XXIV of the GATT under the title “Territorial 
Application – Frontier Traffic – Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas”, together with 
the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, Article V of 
the GATS and the Enabling Clause. These provisions introduce five types of Preferential 
or Regional Trade Agreements, included in the WTO Agreements and deemed to 
generally be WTO- compatible.  
 
During the initial negotiation of the GATT, there was discussion to preserve only those 
preferential schemes that were long-standing, however this suggestion did not prevail.97 
The so-called London Draft discussed the inclusion of existing and future Custom Unions 
within the GATT.98  The notion of Free Trade Agreements was added later on. 99 
Mavroidis et al, reject the claim that this inclusion was put forward in order to 
accommodate the subsequent creation of the European Communities.100 Preferential trade 
exceptions were negotiated to some extent, and resulted to a relaxed scheme, which is 
based on three obligations: to notify, to liberalize among members to the Regional Trade 
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Agreement or the Customs Union (internal requirement) and not to raise protectionism 
towards non-members (external requirement).101   
 
An interpretation consistent with the principle of pacta sunt servanta evidently favors any 
agreement the Contracting Parties made. Even if RTAs are not encouraged in the WTO, 
at least they are tolerated. Article XXIV paragraph 4 discusses the overall framework for 
such RTAs: 
 
“The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom 
of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements of closer 
integration between the economies of the countries parties to such 
agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of 
a free trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent 
territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties 
with such territories.” 
 
Paragraph 5 explicitly proclaims that: 
 
 “…the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the 
territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a 
free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the 
formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area.” 
 
Customs Unions are described in Paragraph 8 (a) of Article XXIV as follows: 
 
“For the purposes of this Agreement: A customs union shall be understood 
to mean the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more 
customs territories so that  
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (…) are 
eliminated with respect to substantially all trade between the constituent 
territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade 
in products originating in such territories, and, 
(ii) […] substantially the same duties and other regulations of 
commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade 
territories not included in the union.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Paragraph 5 (a) of Article XXIV limits customs unions by explaining that: 
 
“with respect to a customs union […] the duties and other regulations of 
commerce imposed at the institution of any such union […]in respect of 
trade with contracting parties not parties to such union […] shall not on 
the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the 
duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories 
prior to the formation of such union […].”102 
 
Similarly, second category of RTAs, Free Trade Areas, are regulated in the same 
Paragraph 8 of Article XXIV, under (b): 
 
A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more 
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce (…) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the 
constituent territories in products originating in such territories.  
 
Article XXIV 5 (b) also restricts the scope of Free Trade Areas: 
 
“with respect to a free trade area […] the duties and other regulations of 
commerce maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable 
at the formation of such free-trade area […] to the trade of contracting 
parties not included in such area […]shall not be higher or more restrictive 
than the corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing 
in the same constituent territories prior to the formation of the free-trade 
area […]” 
 
Free Trade areas and Customs Unions essentially overlap since their members have to 
liberalize trade among them. The difference between the two is that a Customs Union 
additionally establishes a common external commercial policy. Also with respect to 
Customs Unions the effect in trade restriction is examined overall, unlike Free Trade 
Areas where individual instruments are investigated. 
 
The third- hybrid- category, discussed in Article 5 under both (a) and (b) are the interim 
agreements necessary for the formation of a customs union or a free-trade area. Such 
interim agreements must be concluded within a “reasonable length of time” according to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 Emphasis added. 
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Paragraph 5 (c) of Article XXIV. According to the Understanding on Article XXIV, a 
reasonable length of time does not exceed the duration of ten years.103 
 
Very important in terms of setting the foundations for transparency in this context is 
paragraph 7 of Article XXIV which reads as follows: 
 
7. (a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-
trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a 
union or area, shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and 
shall make available to them such information regarding the proposed 
union or area as will enable them to make such reports and 
recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate. 
(b) If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an interim 
agreement referred to in paragraph 5 in consultation with the parties to that 
agreement and taking due account of the information made available in 
accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (a), the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES find that such agreement is not likely to result in the formation 
of a customs union or a free-trade area within the period contemplated by 
the parties to the agreement or that such period is not a reasonable one, the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall make recommendations to the parties to 
the agreement. The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the case 
may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify in accordance 
with these recommendations.  
(c) Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in paragraph 
5 (c) shall be communicated to the CONTRACTING PARTIES which 
may request the contracting parties concerned to consult with them if the 
change seems likely to jeopardize or delay unduly the formation of the 
customs union or of the free-trade area. 
 
The fourth type of such agreements appears in Paragraph 2 (c) of the Enabling Clause 
that is now part of the GATT. The Enabling Clause establishes a PTA. According to 
paragraph 2 (c) the differential and more favourable treatment of Paragraph 1 applies also 
to: 
 
“Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed 
contracting parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in 
accordance with criteria or conditions which may be prescribe by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994 para. 3. 
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CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or elimination of 
non-tariff measures, on products imported from one another.” 
 
The fifth type of agreements is Economic integration Agreements under Article V of the 
GATS (entitled “Economic Integration”), according to which: 
 
“This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a party 
to or entering into an agreement liberalizing trade in services between or 
among the parties to such an agreement, provided that such an agreement:  
(a) has substantial sectoral coverage, and 
(b) provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all 
discrimination, in the sense of Article XVII, between or among the 
parties, in the sectors covered under subparagraph (a), through, 
(i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or 
(ii) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures,  
either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a 
reasonable time-frame […]. 
 
Article V paragraph 5 of the GATS further requires an at least 90-day advanced notice 
period. Article Vbis of the GATS discusses labor market integration agreements, also 
notified, just like Agreements of Article V GATS to the Council for Trade in Services. 
Arguably, Article V is stricter than Article XXIV, since the former discusses “substantial 
sectoral coverage”, including trade volume and modes of supply104 while the latter 
“substantially all trade.”  
 
To date, 258 regional trade agreements and 26 Preferential Trade Agreements have been 
notified under the GATT/WTO system and are in force either between countries (the 
majority105), or between countries and existing PTAs and CUs (see Annexes 1 and 2). 
Very few cases have been brought before the Dispute Settlement Body with respect to 
PTAs and RTAs. The limited amount of jurisprudence is considered not surprising,106 
especially in view of the complex landscape these agreements create and the content of 
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Article XXIV and others. The original burden of proof for a complaint relating to article 
XXIV and its equivalents is easy to meet: all RTAs and PTAs are deviations from the 
Most Favored Nation rule by definition. As the burden of proof shifts to the defendant, it 
is up to them to demonstrate that the PTA or RTA is compatible with their GATT 
obligations. Conducive to this confusion and reluctance to litigate is also the lack of 
adequate monitoring mechanisms.   
 
The cases that brought the issue of RTAs and PTAs to be examined before the Dispute 
Settlement Body are Turkey-Textiles107 and Argentina-Footwear (EC)108 mainly, but also, 
Canada Autos109, Brazil-Tyres110 and US- Steel Safeguards111. Turkey-Textiles focused on 
Customs Unions and the Appellate Body ruled that a Customs Union may be inconsistent 
with the GATT, and in Argentina-Footwear, the Panel discussed some GATT-
consistency aspects of MERCOSUR. 112 A test for RTAs and PTAs under the GATT has 
three components: first, a procedural requirement (the notification), second, a substantive 
internal requirement, the obligation to liberalize all trade amongst PTA/RTA members, 
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and third, a substantive external requirement, the obligation not to raise the overall level 
of protection.113 
b) The Doha Transparency Mechanisms 
 
The Doha Round has been known, among other things, for not having produced any 
agreements in almost over a decade since its launch. However, the General Council 
adopted two decisions, one in 2006 and one in 2010, establishing two transparency 
mechanisms, one for Preferential Trade Agreements and one for Regional Trade 
Agreements. Arguably, both mechanisms address issues covered in the Doha agenda. 
More specifically, the preamble of the Doha Ministerial Declaration emphasizes the 
compatibility of Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO: 
 
“We stress our commitment to the WTO as the unique forum for global 
trade rule-making and liberalization, while also recognizing that regional 
trade agreements can play an important role in promoting the liberalization 
and expansion of trade and in fostering development.”114 
 
Within this framework, paragraph 29 of the Doha Declaration further provides that: 
 
“We also agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving 
disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying to 
regional trade agreements. The negotiations shall take into account the 
developmental aspects of regional trade agreements.” 
 
As such, with the increasing number of Regional Trade Agreements being signed by 
WTO member states, the regulatory turn on “procedures applying to existing WTO 
provisions” focused on the lack of a functioning multilateral surveillance mechanism for 
RTAs. 115 Thus, the Negotiating Group on Rules focused on transparency since October 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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2002116 and in 2006 the General Council adopted the first decision on transparency 
entitled “Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements” (hereinafter: the 
RTA/2006 Decision).117 In 2010, the General Council adopted the second decision, 
entitled “Transparency Mechanism for Preferential Trade Agreements” (hereinafter: the 
PTA/2010 Decision).118 Both decisions can be immediately implemented on a provisional 
basis, as is explained in paragraph 47 of the Doha Declaration, even though the Doha 
Round is treating all negotiations as a single undertaking. The scope of the two 
instruments differs in that the first discusses any sub-multilateral trade agreements among 
WTO member states, while the second discusses any non-reciprocal preferential 
treatment measures adopted on behalf of more developed countries in order to assist less 
and least developed WTO member states.  
 
The most important contributions of the new RTA mechanism to the existing system 
provided in Article XXIV of the GATT are the early notification mechanism and the 
procedures for consideration and publication of RTAs. The PTA mechanism also 
establishes a similar consideration and publication mechanism, although slightly less 
stringent with respect to the process and the time-frames involved.  
  
The early notification mechanism introduced in the RTA/2006 Decision in part A 
paragraph 1 provides that:  
 
[…](a) Members participating in new negotiations aimed at the conclusion 
of an RTA shall endeavour to so inform the WTO.  
(b) Members parties to a newly signed RTA shall convey to the WTO, in 
so far as and when it is publicly available, information on the RTA, 
including its official name, scope and date of signature, any foreseen 
timetable for its entry into force or provisional application, relevant 
contact points and/or website addresses, and any other relevant 
unrestricted information.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 above is to be forwarded to 
the WTO Secretariat, which will post it on the WTO website and will 
periodically provide Members with a synopsis of the communications 
received.  
 
Paragraph 3 of Part B in the RTA/2006 decision clarifies the prompt notification period 
discussed in Paragraph 7 of Article XXIV GATT, defining it as “no later than directly 
following the parties' ratification of the RTA or any party's decision on application of the 
relevant parts of an agreement, and before the application of preferential treatment 
between the parties.” Paragraph 4 requires that the full text of the RTAs is notified to the 
WTO.  
 
The mechanism described in the RTA/2006 Decision under “Procedures to Enhance 
Transparency” applies to both RTAs and PTAs, but with respect to PTAs it is further 
elaborated on in the PTA/2010 Decision. In particular, the RTA/2006 Decision provides 
that after notification, RTAs are considered by Member states within the year of the date 
of notification. The WTO Secretariat also prepares a factual presentation in which it 
“shall refrain from any value judgment” and which cannot be used as a basis for dispute 
settlement. Already in this provision becomes evident the tension between 
multilateralism and regionalism and the reluctance of the WTO as an institution to take a 
firm stance for or against such RTAs. Another crucial contribution of this mechanism 
appears in paragraph 13, according to which:  
 
“All written material submitted, as well as the minutes of the meeting 
devoted to the consideration of a notified agreement will be promptly 
circulated in all WTO official languages and made available on the WTO 
website.” 
 
Additionally, paragraph 21 further discusses the electronic database to be established and 
maintained by the Secretariat, which “should be structured so as to be easily accessible to 
the public.” Finally, Part E outlines the two committees entrusted with the 
implementation of the transparency mechanism, first the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements (CRTA) for RTAs and second the Committee on Trade and Development 
(CTD) for PTAs. Paragraph 19 authorizes the WTO Secretariat to provide technical 
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support to developing and least-developed countries, another new feature introduced 
under the RTA/2006 Decision.  
 
Besides the more lenient time-frames, the PTA/2010 Decision clarifies the role of the 
Secretariat and the CTD in the process of consideration of PTAs. An elaborate 
description of the contents of the factual presentation prepared by the WTO Secretariat is 
described in paragraph 9 of the PTA/2010 Decision:  
 
[T]he Secretariat may also include in the factual presentation, as 
appropriate, the following elements: background information, scope and 
coverage (products and countries), exceptions, S&D provisions, specific 
rules concerning the application of the scheme (graduation, eligibility for 
additional preferences), rules of origin, provisions affecting trade in goods 
(IP, labour, environment, TBT, SPS, trade remedies, if applicable), 
specific customs-related procedures, composition of merchandise imports 
from beneficiary member, fulfillment of TRQs, relationship with other 
PTAs by the same Notifying Member and imports under the PTA in the 
last three years, if applicable. 
 
Similarly an electronic database, available to the public, exists for PTAs in the WTO 
website. Figure 3 gives a summary of the consideration process flow chart established in 
both Decisions.119  
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Figure 3 Processes established by the RTA/2006 and PTA/2010 Transparency 
Mechanism Decisions120 
These Decisions are a serious attempt to address the issues that Working Groups faced 
under the GATT when considering Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas. In very few 
cases had such Working Groups reached a conclusion on the compatibility of such 
agreements and the GATT. 121  Transparency, namely disclosure, consideration and 
publication, is a significant first step in that direction. Still, neither decision, similarly to 
Articles GATT XXIV and GATS V provide for any consequences, should member states 
violate this process. As such, the enforcement record of both decisions is fragmented at 
best.122 The WTO website indeed has two portals, one for PTAs and one for RTAs.123 It 
appears however that not all RTAs and PTAs are notified there124 and overall, even the 
ones notified are not properly evaluated by the WTO.125 Another view is that the existing 
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system has been overwhelmed by the legal definitions included in Articles XXIV GATT 
and V GATS, another issue impeding the RTA and PTA review process.126 
 
Notably, an agreement was recently signed between Canada and the European Union, 
CETA, or the Canada-European Union Trade Agreement.127 Canadian Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper and EU President Jose Manuel Barroso discussed the significance of the 
Agreement in a news conference, where Mr. Harper acknowledged that “This is a big 
deal. Indeed it is the biggest deal our country has ever made. This is a historic win for 
Canada.”128 The translation and approval processes, in the EU member states’ languages, 
and by provincial parliaments in Canada and as provided in the EU has been cited as the 
reason why the agreement has not been published yet.129 The Canadian government 
published a summary of the agreement,130 which Trade Minister Ed Fast argued it 
provides “everything Canadians need to know.”131 Even though the translation and 
notification procedures are reasonable in international relations, under the RTA/2006 
Decision, the parties should already notify the WTO under the early announcement 
process or the bilateral trade agreement. Nothing of the sort has occurred to date. Even 
though both Canada and the European Union are two of the strongest transparency 
proponents in the WTO, the two parties have failed to maintain a consistent attitude 
towards transparency and publish their agreement. Essentially, the CETA example is 
indicative of the low enforcement capabilities of both General Council Decisions.  
c) Transparency and Trade Preferences 
 
The debate on regional integration as an optimum versus the multilateral path as the only 
way to faster trade liberalization has yet to produce concrete and conclusive results. On !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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one hand it can be argued that regional trade integration leads to faster trade 
liberalization, even if it occurs outside the WTO. Economic ties amongst smaller groups 
may be stronger, the costs of negotiations are lower since fewer parties are involved and 
elimination of tariffs inside the PTA or the RTA can occur much faster than in the 
multilateral framework. Coupled with this idea is that political reasons (not only 
economic) may lie behind deeper integration, as is the case for the (arguably unique in 
this respect) EU. This argument favors PTAs and RTAs as they appear to be creating 
more trade.132 Another interesting phenomenon in the RTA proliferation has been the rise 
of “new players” in international trade, such as the trading bloc of South American 
countries133, the Asian Tigers,134 BRICS and Middle Income countries, fundamentally 
changing the landscape of international trade.  
 
On the other hand, several studies on customs unions and free trade areas suggest that the 
trade-diversion effects may be greater than the trade-creation, especially since PTAs and 
RTAs favor trade amongst participants, resulting to less trade with members of the PTAs 
and non-members. 135 Trade economists have in fact argued that regionalism leads to 
factionalisation, and PTAs may be optimal to protectionism, but they will always fall to 
the second-best spot 136  compared to a functioning global free trade system, since 
multilateralism in the WTO context entails a global vision lacking in regionalist 
integration models.137  
 
Moreover, regional trading agreements cannot be fully open to accession from third 
parties. If they remained opened to membership, the original parties would have little 
incentive to commit to lowering trade tariffs in fear of considerable changes in value of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS at 695 (2008). 
133 Which Gantz calls the Jaguars. 
134 MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK,. & ROBERT HOWSE. THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, (3rd ed... 
2005) discussing the rapid growth in intra Asian trade at page 197 and DAVID A. GANTZ, LIBERALIZING 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AFTER DOHA: MULTILATERAL, PLURILATERAL, REGIONAL, AND UNILATERAL 
INITIATIVES (2013). 
135 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS at 696 (2008). 
136 ROBERT LAWRENCE, REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND DEEPER INTEGRATION, 29-30 (1996). 
137 MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK,. & ROBERT HOWSE. THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 195 (3rd ed. 
2005). 
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their preferences with the accession of a new party. Such problems are not as prevalent in 
a multilateral context. For example, the accession of China, a huge country and a great 
trading partner, may have taken years to conclude but the commitment to trade 
liberalization always supports accession of new members instead of exclusion. The 
exclusionary potential is however prevalent in regionalism. 
 
The intensified attention on PTAs and RTAs in the Doha Declaration reflects the current 
“regionalization” of international trade (or “new regionalism”138) and is portrayed as a 
group systems which are “not attempting to shield themselves from the global economy 
and are rather trying to maximise their participation in it.”139 However the inefficiency of 
existing transparency mechanisms as well as the utilization of Preferential trade 
Agreements as a way out of negotiation difficulties at the multilateral level have rendered 
PTAs “stumbling blocks” for world trade for smaller economies who cannot negotiate 
such agreements as equals and rely on the GATT MFN for access to other countries’ 
trade markets.140 
 
With respect to transparency and monitoring, despite the existence of substantial 
mechanisms, in addition to Article XXIV and the Understanding on Article XXIV, 
Article V of the GATS and the Generalized System of Preferences, their enforcement 
momentum is low, at best. The web of RTAs and PTAs is growing very fast in the last 
decade. In contrast to the Doha Development Round, where all agreements must be 
considered under a single undertaking and also need to be agreed upon by consensus, 
regionalism has significantly expanded, to cover for the regulatory space of trade 
liberalization that multilateralism does not seem to achieve, albeit only for small groups.  
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138 For its characteristics see CHAD DAMRO, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
23-42, 27 (2006). 
139 JAMES MATHIS, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE GATT/WTO 127 (2002). See more recently 
Gantz DAVID A GANTZ, LIBERALIZING INTERNATIONAL TRADE AFTER DOHA: MULTILATERAL, 
PLURILATERAL, REGIONAL, AND UNILATERAL INITIATIVES 201(2013).  
140 Nordström Håkan, Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO – New Evidence Based on the 
2003 Official Records in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 170 (G. A. Bermann & P. C. Mavroidis, 
eds. 2007). 
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The WTO has committed institutionally to monitor, consider and publish the RTAs and 
PTAs. As it remains unclear whether in fact such regional initiatives undermine the 
multilateral agenda of the WTO, consideration beyond a superficial examination is 
rendered difficult. Similarly, not all agreements have been published as we saw in the 
previous section, illustrated by CETA. A possible solution for this problem is to 
introduce some form of a penalty system for failure to properly notify and publish such 
agreements in the WTO. Another more obvious solution is to raise the budget for the 
monitoring mechanisms, partially remove their member-driven elements and assign a 
new part of the WTO Secretariat just in monitoring duties. Instead of relying on member 
state committees, Working Groups, for the vast amount of monitoring, rely on the 
administration instead. Working Groups can be introduced at a second stage, after the 
collection of sufficient economic data and the drafting of initial but extensive reports.  
 
As RTAs and PTAs have multiplied over the years, they have been described as a 
“spaghetti bowl”, or a “noodle bowl” or even a “lasagna dish.” 141 Pasta-metaphors aside, 
RTAs and PTAs create a very large web of agreements that can have negative effects on 
all those left outside of these cooperative structures and compromises general trust in the 
multilateral structure of trade negotiations. Keeping track on them alone consumes a part 
of the WTO resources. One proposal in order to remedy these detriments is to place a cap 
on the number of the Agreements.142  Introducing a straightforward cap on PTAs and 
RTAs may cause a sort of revolution in the WTO and never reach consensus. Thus one 
form of moratorium could be based either on trade volume covered, or a set of products 
that can be agreed on by all WTO members to remain outside the scope of PTAs and 
RTAs. If the US and the EU are serious about their commitment to multilateralism then 
such an agreement can given them an opportunity to show it. Additionally WTO 
members could discuss the possibility for compensatory mechanisms in case of 
Agreements, which are found to violate WTO rules.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 Jagdish Bhagwati, US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with FTAs, ACADEMIC COMMONS (1995), the same, 
The noodle bowl Why Trade Agreements are all the Rage in Asia, THE ECONOMIST (Sep 3rd 2009). 
142 PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS 277 et seq. (2009). 
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Finally, we should note here that there is one set of PTAs that should not be touched. 
Agreements giving preferential treatment to least developed countries should be 
sustained, as they are key to their economies and trade143 or at least be converted to 
import subsidies that would benefit them equally. 144 Moreover there is an additional 
positive spillover of PTAs for least developed countries. During smaller scale 
negotiations smaller countries can refine their negotiating tactics. An interesting example 
is the case of Zambia and Mauritius as participants in the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). The participation of the two countries in both Regional Trade Agreements has 
assisted them in preparations for negotiations in the WTO context by providing training, 
raising awareness, and overall giving a more familiar forum with countries facing similar 
issues for the exchange of trade information and ideas.145 
2. Accession Protocols 
 
This chapter discusses transparency issues with respect to a narrow group of countries. In 
particular, it explores two main transparency dimensions that emerge during the 
accession process of new member states. The process became much more elaborate and 
gained significance since the creation of the WTO. The new organization has a specific 
division handling accessions, the accession division. Since 1995, 32 countries have 
acceded to the organization, among which are China and Russia, bringing up the total 
membership to the organization to 160 countries. Moreover, another 23 countries have 
applied and are currently negotiating their membership. Once current negotiations are 
concluded, the organization will be representing more than 99.9% of world population, 
GDP and trade volume. 
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In theory, soon the accession division will become obsolete, when all candidate members 
accede and no more countries apply for membership. However, a discussion on accession 
will remain pertinent even then, because of the so-called WTO Plus/Minus commitments. 
These are commitments that acceding members states are bound by that are either below 
or beyond the WTO package of Agreements. On one hand, WTO minus do not pose as 
much of a problem, due to their nature, as they fall under the rules in place to assist 
developing and least developed countries. These include longer time frames, less 
stringent rules and like regulations. On the other hand, the WTO Plus commitments, 
imposing rules applicable only to certain acceding countries become problematic because 
they introduce asymmetries between WTO member states similarly to the issues facing 
developing countries in the WTO.  
 
A second transparency-related issue in the accession process appears in the Working 
Party Reports and the Accession Protocols. The majority of these binding accession 
documents contain sections entitled “Transparency”, introducing mainly two types of 
obligations, Notification and Publication obligations. These obligations refer to national 
legislation of WTO member states and measures that need to be notified with the WTO 
or published. Such chapters in accession instruments demonstrate the importance of 
transparency obligations during the accession process. Even though these transparency 
provisions technically fall under the rubric of Legal Transparency, examined in Chapter 
Five, they will be discussed here, since they organically belong to the accession process.  
 
This chapter will first elaborate on the accession process in the WTO. Then I will discuss 
the example of the Chinese Accession Protocol and its WTO Plus transparency 
requirements. Finally, I will examine the legal position of WTO Plus commitments under 
traditional public international law and WTO law, and the relationship of such 
commitments to internal transparency. 
a) The idiosyncrasies of the accession process 
 
The WTO Agreement provides for two procedures of acquiring membership to the 
organization. First, Article XI, under the title “Original Membership” says that GATT 
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contracting parties that were members of the GATT at the time of the entry into force of 
the WTO Agreement which accepted this and relevant agreements “shall become original 
Members of the WTO.” 146 Second, Article XII, under the title “Accession” provides as 
follows: 
 
“1. Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the 
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters 
provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements 
may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the 
WTO. Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements thereto. 2. Decisions on accession shall be taken by the 
Ministerial Conference. The Ministerial Conference shall approve the 
agreement on the terms of accession by a two-thirds majority of the 
Members of the WTO. 3. Accession to a Plurilateral Trade Agreement 
shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement.”147 
 
Obtaining membership through accession to the WTO is fundamentally different than the 
process followed by other international organizations, even though the basic elements of 
admission are similar. In the majority of governmental organizations, as in the WTO, 
their constituent treaties establish the criteria and the procedure of admission. The 
process usually begins with an application or an equivalent show of interest by the 
candidate country and it ends when the organizations competent organ concludes its 
decision making on the application. The WTO differs from other organizations with 
respect to the length and the complexity of negotiations that intervene between the 
opening and the concluding point, as well as in the sometimes complicated accession 
instruments. 
 
In most international organizations acquiring membership seems rather straightforward 
and is based on criteria such as statehood148 and commitment to the organization’s 
mandate. International economic organizations in their constitutions reserve sometimes 
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146 Article XI WTO Agreement. 
147 Emphasis added. 
148 Usually based on the Montevideo criteria, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 
signed December 26, 1933, entry into force December 26, 1934. However, statehood, or rather sovereignty 
is not necessary for membership to an international organization, examples of that are the membership of 
the Ukraine and Belarus among many in United Nations.  
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the option to adapt the procedures and the conditions for membership in special 
circumstances. For example, the IMF in its Article II, section 2 of its Articles of 
Agreement provides that: “Membership shall be open to other countries at such times and 
in accordance with such terms as may be prescribed by the Board of Governors.” 
However, the provision limits this flexibility with the next sentence: “These terms, 
including the terms for subscriptions, shall be based on principles consistent with those 
applied to other countries that are already members.” The European Union process for 
acquiring membership is also multilayered like that of the WTO. Candidate countries 
must comply with the “Copenhagen Criteria” 149 and according to Article 49 of the Treaty 
on the EU, the decision for the accession is made by the Council, which consists of all 
current EU member states, after consulting the European Commission, and a majority 
vote of the European Parliament.  
 
Accession to the WTO occurs through several stages. Mainly, the distinguishing elements 
of the WTO accession process are the number of products, rules, services and other areas 
of interest in international trade where agreement must be reached, as well as the option 
for all current members to conduct bilateral negotiations with the acceding country. As a 
result, negotiations for accession have been very different from case to case. Indicative of 
the spectrum of proceedings is that the shortest accession to this day, Kyrgyzstan, lasted 
for almost three years, while the longest, China, lasted for more than fifteen years. 
Accession requirements also vary, to some extent, from country to country. 
 
This structure is the product of years of negotiation under the GATT. According to 
Article XXXIII of the GATT:  
 
“A government not party to this Agreement, or a government acting on 
behalf of a separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the 
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters 
provided for in this Agreement, may accede to this Agreement on its own 
behalf or on behalf of that territory, on terms to be agreed between such 
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government and the Contracting Parties. Decisions of the Contracting 
Parties under this paragraph shall be taken by a two-thirds majority” 
 
During the second round of negotiations after the signature of the GATT, which took 
place in Annecy in 1949, the Parties agreed upon the Procedures Governing Negotiations 
for Accession, the Annecy Protocol of Terms of Accession, which provided for the 
accession of ten more countries, and a Model Protocol of Accession. The procedure was 
based on the establishment of a working party which examined the application and 
submitted recommendations to the Council, which could include a draft Protocol of 
Accession. 
 
The discussion in the working party was not much different from the discussion under the 
WTO. The candidate country first submitted a memorandum on its foreign trade regime, 
and then the Contracting Parties posed questions to which the candidate member 
answered. Furthermore, negotiations took place on the schedule of concessions between 
the acceding country and those Contracting Parties that were interested. Once these were 
concluded, a draft Decision, Protocol of Accession and Working Party report were 
submitted to the Council for adoption (report) and approval (the other texts). Once a 
positive decision on accession was made, the country would become a member thirty 
days after singing the Protocol.150 
 
The process in the WTO is regulated by Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
According to Article XXII: 
 
“1. Any state or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the 
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters 
provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may 
accede to this Agreement, on  terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. 
Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements annexed thereto.  
2. Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference. The 
ministerial Conference shall approve the agreement on the terms of 
accession by a two-thirds majority of the Members to the WTO. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
150 WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 941-949 (2012), PETROS MAVROIDIS, THE 
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, A COMMENTARY, 258-259 (2005) 
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3. Accession to a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the 
provisions of that Agreement.” 
 
Also relevant to Article XII is Article IV:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement which provides 
that the General Council can decide on Accessions in the intervals between meetings of 
the Ministerial Conference. It is worth noting here that Article XXXIII of the GATT and 
Article XII of the WTO Agreement are very similar. 
 
The process of accession begins with the interested government making the initial contact 
with the organization either informally first, by approaching the Secretariat for 
information, or directly and formally, with a letter of application to the Director-General. 
Countries usually have the option of participating in the General Council as observers 
before applying for membership. Usually the next General Council that occurs after the 
formal application for membership invites the interested country to introduce the main 
features of its foreign trade regime and provide reasons for its application. Then the 
Council considers the application and the establishment of a Working Party, to examine 
the application.  
 
All Working Parties have the same terms of reference, namely “to examine the 
application” and “to submit to the General Council/Ministerial Conference 
recommendations which may include a draft Protocol of Accession.” Membership to the 
Working Party is open to all WTO members. Countries with trade interests related to the 
upcoming accession usually join the Working Party, thus its size varies from one 
accession to another. Four countries, Australia, Canada, Japan and the US, together with 
the European Communities, which all together represent 63% of world trade have been 
members to all Working Parties so far.  
 
The Working Party process takes place in three stages. The first phase of the Working 
Party process focuses on collecting factual information on the applicant’s foreign trade 
regime. The applicant country submits a relevant memorandum and members of the 
Working Party pose questions both in writing and orally, to which the candidate member 
responds. During the second phase, countries negotiate the terms of accession with the 
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candidate. Four types of negotiations take place: first, multilateral negotiations on rules, 
where all the members of the Working Party and the candidate participate; second, 
plurilateral on agriculture and export subsidies, where a group of those members of the 
Working Party, who are interested, discuss with the applicant; third, bilateral on goods’ 
concessions, where each member has the opportunity to discuss concessions in goods 
with the candidate member on a one-to-one basis; finally, bilateral negotiations take place 
for members to discuss commitments in services with the applicant. Bilateral meetings 
are a platform oftentimes for a more efficient discussion on complex matters. The 
bilateral process is confidential and so are any bilateral agreements signed at this time. As 
bilateral negotiations are concluded, the agreements are signed by both parties and sent to 
the Secretariat.  
 
The Secretariat, once all bilateral agreements have been submitted to it, prepares a 
consolidated draft Goods Schedule. According to the Most Favored Nation principle, the 
lowest percentage that the candidate member has bound its tariffs with one of the current 
members will apply to all members to the WTO, regardless of whether higher tariffs were 
agreed upon in bilateral meetings with other members. Essentially, the consolidation of 
agreements by the Secretariat multilateralizes the products of bilateral agreements. At the 
third stage of the Working Party process, the draft report is finalized and so are 
commitments and a draft protocol of accession. The three phases often overlap more or 
less in practice. This entire process essentially balances the interests and needs of the 
acceding country with the interests of WTO members and the credibility of the WTO 
system as a rules-based system. 151 
 
The General Council or Ministerial Conference then approves the text of the draft 
Protocol and Decision of Accession and adopts the Draft Decision and the Working Party 
report. This decision, as all decision making in the WTO is reached by consensus. 
According to the Agreement of the General Council 152 only when consensus cannot be 
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152 WTO document WT/L/93, 15 November 1995. 
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reached, will WTO members resort to a two-thirds majority vote. A consensus is 
considered to be reached in the lack of formal objections. 
 
Protocols usually contain a set of similar provisions but also obligations specific to the 
new member. All commitments of the Working Party report that are explicitly referred to 
in the Protocol are an integral part of the Protocol and the WTO Agreements as such. In 
some cases commitments by acceding members are more strict than those assumed by 
current WTO members. The introduction of novel commitments for new members creates 
a “ratchet effect” whereby once accepted, these new commitments become apart and 
parcel of the negotiations with the next acceding country. 
 
In the next three to six months after the decision by the General Council or the 
Ministerial Conference to accept the applicant as a new member, the government of the 
acceding country completes all necessary internal procedures. It has been argued that in 
most cases, governments are undergoing a national reform process on which “they have 
already embarked for their own reasons”153  After the applicant completes internal 
reforms, it accepts the Protocol and thirty days later it enters into effect and the candidate 
country becomes a member to the WTO. 
 
In the two decades from 1995 to 2004, thirty-one countries have acceded to the WTO. 
The longest accession process lasted for nineteen years and two months, in the case of 
Russia. The shortest accession so far has been that of the Kyrgyz Republic, only two 
years and ten months. The average time from the day of application by the candidate 
member until the adoption of the accession instruments by national authorities is 9.6 
years. With the exception of China, Accession Protocols tend to be short, one to three 
pages long. However, most of the commitments assumed are included in the Working 
Party reports, which are much lengthier and detailed documents. Six of the countries that 
have acceded belong to the category of least-developed countries, while another eight 
LDCs are candidates for accession (for the accession statistics and data see Annexes 4 
and 5). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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b) WTO-Plus transparency obligations for acceding member 
states: the case of China 
 
Under the GATT (pre-Uruguay Round), accession negotiations were presumed to be 
restricted only to GATT obligations and related to GATT duties and rights such as 
market access, existing trade barriers etc. This principle faded after the Uruguay 
Round.154 Accession now is seen as a “difficult and time-consuming process.”155 Reasons 
behind the lack of enumeration of terms, put forward could be first that each country 
accepts a unique set of terms and different concessions on tariffs156, and second: 
  
“that the drafters of Article XXXIII of GATT 1947, on which WTO 
Article XII is based, saw the need to provide flexibility to ensure that the 
terms provided for a balance of advantage.”157 
 
Some commentators define WTO plus Agreements as including “areas not covered by 
WTO Agreements such as commitments on privatization, investment regime and 
bindings of export tariffs” and WTO minus as “commitments far beyond those accepted 
by the original WTO members, including (i) non-application of the rights under WTO 
Agreements available to WTO members such as transition periods, and tariffication and 
special safeguards for agricultural products.”158 Charnovitz, using as a comparative 
baseline that of “rules that exist for countries in that development class that were original 
members of the WTO”159 redefines WTO plus/minus as anything above or below this 
baseline.160 WTO plus commitments in particular, when they are not directly related to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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trade, as was the case with China, are seen as “dissonant with the egalitarian self image of 
the WTO.” 161  The procedure of concluding the accession agreements has been 
characterized as non-transparent162. Steve Charnovitz notes in this respect that: 
 
 “Unlike most other multilateral organizations, where the membership 
process for states is routine, transparent and predictable, the WTO imposes 
significant barriers to entry because incumbent members use the lure of 
membership to induce economic policy changes in the applying country. 
Such linkage appears to be driven by both normative and procedural 
reasons. The normative reason is that the conventional wisdom in and 
around the WTO is that locking in economic changes in an applicant 
country will redound to the benefit of that country and will also help 
exporters and investors of incumbent members. The procedural reason is 
that a consensus of incumbent members is required in order to admit an 
applicant government.”163 
 
A very large number of the accession requirements involves information that the 
candidate country must disclose and discuss in order to move forward and become a 
WTO member. Moreover, a specific chapter entitled “Transparency” is included in all 
accession protocols. Transparency consists of two forms of commitments, namely 
Publication and Notification. According to the WTO Handbook on Accession the content 
of the Publication obligation entails that: 
 
“[A]ll relevant measures of general application should be published in 
such a way as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted 
with them; […] measures should be officially published before being 
enforced; [ confidential information need not be provided if contrary to the 
public interest or prejudicial to legitimate commercial interests of 
particular enterprises.” 
 
The relevant provision also determines the method of publication (a website, an official 
publication, such as the national gazette or legislation bulletin or both). China and 
Chinese Taipei were also required to provide translations of measures into one of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161 Steve Charnovitz, Mapping the Law of WTO Accession, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW 
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WTO official languages, English, French, or Spanish, an unprecedented requirement.164 
Until 2004 only Bulgaria, Cambodia and Nepal had only publication requirements. The 
second form of commitments is that of Notification, which contains a requirement to 
notify on measures taken or not taken in one of the official languages of the WTO. This 
ensures that acceding members make their initial notifications immediately available. 
This was the most common transparency obligation until 2004. Since 2004 and to date, 
all members had both notification and publication requirements (see Annex 4).  
 
A striking example of a departure from the “GATT package” was China’s Accession 
Protocol. 165  China’s Accession Protocol came as a result of numerous bilateral 
agreements. The US and EU China negotiations are particularly noteworthy, as is the 
length of China’s overall accession process which lasted 14 years altogether and the 
Accession Protocol, which is a striking departure from the WTO Secretariat’s “model 
accession protocol.”166 Some examples of the WTO Plus commitments made by China 
that can be deemed as “discriminatory” compared to the “GATT Package” are: ironically, 
the transparency requirement (2.C); the Judicial Review commitment (2.D); the Right to 
Trade provisions (5.1, 5.2, which were also under review by the Panel and the Appellate 
Body); and, the regulation of State Trading (transparency 6.1, and information 
requirement, 6.2). 
 
The Chinese Accession Protocol is impressive in length and content. 167 It is the longest 
protocol of Accession and comes as a result of the intricacies in the Chinese Accession, 
as well as the duration of the process itself, so far the longest accession to the WTO. 168 
The larger the interests at stake, the longer the process will be as the Chinese case !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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indicates169. The Protocol also contains rules that appear for the first time in an Accession 
document and significantly add to the obligations of regular members, who became 
members to the WTO upon its founding, as well as countries, which became members 
after 1995. The Protocol has received a significant amount of criticism. 
 
Part 2 of the General Provisions under the title “Administration of Trade Regime” 
addresses four issues: first, the uniform administration of measures in the territory of 
China, which includes autonomous areas, border trade regions, Special Economic Zones, 
and other territories where special regimes are in place. Local governments are also in 
obligation to conform with the WTO Agreements. Second, China assumes under its 
Protocol of Accession the obligation to provide information on its special economic areas 
and the legislation which is applicable there. The third and fourth sections of Part 2 
address issues of transparency and judicial review respectively.   
 
Section A paragraph 2 provides that  
 
“China shall apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable 
manner all its laws, regulations and other measures […] pertaining to or 
affecting trade in goods, services, trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights ("TRIPS") or the control of foreign exchange.” 
 
This obligation is accompanied by the establishment of a mechanism where both 
individuals and enterprises can report cases of “non-uniform application of the trade 
regime” to national authorities. 170 China must also notify to the WTO all the legislation 
related to the special economic areas. The obligations for the establishment of a review 
mechanism for trade related legislation and the notification of laws is further expanded in 
the next two parts, C and D. Part C specifically, entitled “Transparency” provides for the 
following obligations: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
169  Richard H. Steinberg, Institutional Implications of WTO Accession for China, POLICY PAPERS, 
INSTITUTE ON GLOBAL CONFLICT AND COOPERATION, UC BERKELEY 5-7 (1998)  
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/43p951xk. See also Karen Halverson, China’s WTO Accession: 
Economic, Legal, and Political Implications, 27 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 319-370 (2004). 
170 Protocol part 2 A para 4. 
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1. China undertakes that only those laws, regulations and other 
measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the 
control of foreign exchange that are published and readily available to 
other WTO Members, individuals and enterprises, shall be enforced. In 
addition, China shall make available to WTO Members, upon request, all 
laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in 
goods, services, TRIPS or the control of foreign exchange before such 
measures are implemented or enforced. In emergency situations, laws, 
regulations and other measures shall be made available at the latest when 
they are implemented or enforced. 
 
2. China shall establish or designate an official journal dedicated to 
the publication of all laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to 
or affecting trade in goods, services, TRIPS or the control of foreign 
exchange and, after publication of its laws, regulations or other measures 
in such journal, shall provide a reasonable period for comment to the 
appropriate authorities before such measures are implemented, except for 
those laws, regulations and other measures involving national security, 
specific measures setting foreign exchange rates or monetary policy and 
other measures the publication of which would impede law enforcement.  
China shall publish this journal on a regular basis and make copies of all 
issues of this journal readily available to individuals and enterprises. 
 
3. China shall establish or designate an enquiry point where, upon 
request of any individual, enterprise or WTO Member all information 
relating to the measures required to be published under paragraph 2(C)1 of 
this Protocol may be obtained.  Replies to requests for information shall 
generally be provided within 30 days after receipt of a request. In 
exceptional cases, replies may be provided within 45 days after receipt of 
a request. Notice of the delay and the reasons therefor shall be provided in 
writing to the interested party. Replies to WTO Members shall be 
complete and shall represent the authoritative view of the Chinese 
government. Accurate and reliable information shall be provided to 
individuals and enterprises.171 
 
According to paragraphs 1 and, section C the Chinese government can enforce only the 
legislation that has been published in an official journal, whose copies are to be promptly 
available to enterprises and individuals. Further, paragraph 3 provides for the 
establishment of an enquiry point, which shall respond to requests for information within 
45 days at the latest. The next section on judicial review of administrative decisions and 
action with respect to trade sets forth the obligation to establish “partial and independent” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
171 Emphasis added. 
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tribunals that “shall not have any substantial interest in the outcome of the matter” and an 
appeal process. Decisions on appeals should be given in writing. This unique set of 
clauses extends rights not only to other WTO members, as is the case for most WTO 
Agreements and other GATT legal documents, but directly to enterprises and individuals. 
Thus, any trade- related legislation that has not been published and is not accessible is 
essentially rendered void. 
 
Issues relevant to accession, post GATT, under the WTO umbrella were brought before 
the Dispute Settlement Body in the China-Auto Parts case where the Panel found that 
Working Party report commitments are enforceable in WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings. 172 China-Publications is the first report from Panel and Appellate Body to 
undergo a complete analysis on the legal nature of the Protocol and the Working Party 
report, to proclaim its enforceability in a systematic way, and not exclamatory. Further, 
both Panel and Appellate Body organically tied the Accession Protocol and Working 
Party report to the GATT but and accepted that the exceptions of Article XX can be 
invoked in view of the accession commitments.   
 
c) WTO Plus, Public International Law and Transparency 
 
Both future members and commentators would opt for a straightforward process of 
accession, in favor of predictability. 173 However an important issue is that international 
trade relations involve legal, political and economic considerations. Thus, the negotiation 
process for the WTO cannot be blanket and involve the same amount and level of 
discussions for China, the single most important player remaining outside the WTO until !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
172 The decisions discussing China’s Accession Protocol and Working Party Report are: Panel Report, 
China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products WT/DS363/R (Aug.12 2009); Appellate Body Report, China-
Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009); Panel Reports, China – Measures Affecting 
Imports of Automobile Parts WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R (Jul. 18, 2008); and Appellate 
Body Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts WT/DS339/AB/R, 
WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2008).  
173  Steve Charnovitz, Mapping the Law of WTO Accession, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW 
SCHOOL PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER No. 237, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 
No. 237 http://ssrn.com/abstract=957651 4 (2007).  
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2001, and for instance a country with Developing or Least-Developed country status. 174 
Such differentiations are due to trade volume as a share of world trade, but also the 
amount of bilateral relations each potential member already has with all other 
members.175 Harmonizing the nexus of previous bilateral relations and integrating it to 
the WTO framework will be far more complex than merely a stabilized variation of the 
GATT/WTO legal documents, particularly in view of the existing bilateral agreements 
between the acceding member and the WTO members. This alone creates a natural 
asymmetry in the negotiation process and the consequent variation from country to 
country.  
 
One central issue involves the legal nature and enforceability176 of the Accession 
Protocols and Working Party Reports. Some have gone so far as to say that each 
accession protocol plus working party report is an amendment to the GATT/WTO177. The 
recent US-China Publications case not only manifestly demonstrates that such documents 
are enforceable, but both the Panel and the Appellate Body moved as far as to outline the 
organic relationship between the Protocol and Working Party Report and the GATT, 
where they examined and answered to the affirmative whether the exceptions of Article 
XX can be used as justifications for non-compliance with the accession commitments. 
This fortifies the position that WTO plus/minus agreements are not of exceptional nature, 
but are in fact structurally tied to the GATT legal instruments.  
 
Article XII talks about “terms” without further limiting existing Members as to the nature 
of the terms they can propose. Moreover, it is important to look at the balance between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
174 Very interesting issue in this respect are the challenges posed by the accession of Least Developed 
Developing Countries. See for instance: Mussie Delelegn, Accession to the World Trade Organization: 
Challenges and Prospects for the Least-Developed Countries (LDCs), 6:2 THE ESTEY CENTRE J. INT’L L. & 
TRADE POLICY 181 (2005)  
175 For example the accession process of the Kyrgyz Republic lasted only a little more than two years. 
According to the WTO Website “The process of accession has been greatly accelerated by the willingness 
of the Kyrgyz Republic to bring its economic and trade regime into conformity with WTO rules and 
obligations as rapidly as possible, by putting in place the necessary implementing legislation prior to 
accession.” See http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres98_e/pr109_e.htm. 
176 Steve Charnovitz, Mapping the Law of WTO Accession, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW 
SCHOOL PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER No. 237, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 
No. 237 http://ssrn.com/abstract=957651 10 (2007). 
177 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization, 8 J. INT’L 
ECON. L.  51, 57 (2005) 
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“object and purpose” on one hand, and “pacta sunt servanta” on the other in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (or VCLT) and the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International 
Organizations (or VCLTSIO). Assuming that the terms negotiated will not fall under 
article 53 of the VCLT, and thus will not conflict with a “jus cogens” norm, both treaties 
seem to create a balance between the agreement of the parties on one hand, and the object 
and purpose of the treaty on the other.  
 
A very important factor in “pacta sunt servanta” is the explicit consent to be bound by a 
treaty, as well as the full knowledge of the treaty’s terms. As for any reservations and 
amendments, there are no prohibited reservations under the GATT, any reservations or 
amendments are possible so long as they are negotiated and agreed upon by all parties (or 
after the obtaining a certain majority). Thus, the departure from any treaty provisions is 
very well possible, when there is consent. This extends to provisions central to the 
“object and purpose” as much as it applies to peripheral provisions. The VCLT and the 
VCLTSIO does not separate between the two. 178 179Thus, the conclusion we can draw 
here is that both the VCLT and the VCLTSIO prioritize the foundational rule of “pacta !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
178 See from the VCLT Article 15 – Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by accession, Article 18 – 
Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force, Article 19 – 
Formulation of reservations. See also Articles 20, 31, 32, 40, 41. From the VCLTSIO Article 17 paragraph 
2 – Consent to be bound by part of a treaty and choice of differing provisions: The consent of a State or of 
an international organization to be bound by a treaty which permits a choice between differing provisions is 
effective only if it is made clear to which of the provisions the consent relates. 
179 Article 15 Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by accession- The consent of a State to be bound 
by a treaty is expressed by accession when: (a) the treaty provides that such consent may be expressed by 
that State by means of accession; (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that 
such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession; or (c) all the parties have subsequently 
agreed that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of accession. Article 18 Obligation not 
to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force- A State is obliged to refrain from 
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has 
exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall 
have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its consent to be 
bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not 
unduly delayed.  Article 19 Formulation of reservations- A state may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, 
approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless: […] (c) in cases not failing under 
subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.  Other 
relevant articles Articles 20, 31, 32, 40, 41. Article 17 paragraph 2 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations 1986 
CONSENT TO BE BOUND BY PART OF A TREATY AND CHOICE OF DIFFERING PROVISIONS 
The consent of a State or of an international organization to be bound by a treaty which permits a choice 
between differing provisions is effective only if it is made clear to which of the provisions the consent 
relates. 
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sunt servanta” when examining permissible reservations and amendments instead of 
looking at the object and purpose of treaties.  
 
This interpretation should be accepted in the case of the GATT/WTO instruments, in 
particular in view of the opt-out provision in Art XIII of the WTO Agreement which can 
be seen as prioritizing consent to “object and purpose.” 180Any two members could opt 
out of the application of the Agreement between them, as long as this occurs during the 
time they become members and there is consent among them. This provision was 
included in order to accommodate countries that did not want to have formal trade or 
other relationships with another party for political or other reasons. Both a “formalistic” 
and a “progressive” interpretation should concur in the case of the WTO Agreement, that 
any terms can be possibly negotiated.  
 
The question of extra-treaty accession terms was discussed in the first advisory opinion 
given by the International Court of Justice in 1947 on the Conditions of Admission of a 
State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter). The Court decided 
that the list of Article 4 is exhaustive and no additional criteria can be imposed. 
According to an e contrario argument, the UN Charter enumerates the criteria of 
admission, while the Agreement Establishing the WTO explicitly refers to negotiated 
terms. The individual opinion by Alvarez also emphasizes the following:  
 
“…the fact should be stressed that an institution, once established, 
acquires a life of its own, independent of the elements which have given 
birth to it, and it must develop, not in accordance with the views of those 
who created it, but in accordance with the requirements of international 
life.”  
 
Thus, he departs from a formalistic interpretation to a more systemic and oriented 
towards viewing the organization as an organic entity and not a static treaty. The 
variations in the accession process can be attributed to the differences in the nature of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
180 Article XIII discusses the issue of Non-Application of Multilateral Trade Agreements Between 
Particular Members.  
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each organization. In a nutshell, the WTO Plus/Minus provisions are compatible with 
general public international law.  
 
However, it is important for the organization that at least some of the burdensome WTO 
Plus provisions can be renegotiated and phased out with time. Adding commitments 
beyond the WTO Agreements shows skepticism towards market access, or a mercantilist 
logic (for example, like the fears that Chinese products would saturate national markets 
of other member states). Possibly in the future negotiation rounds, such commitments can 
be phased out, in order to put all WTO members on equal standing, especially vis-à-vis 
the rules. The problems with lack of transparency during accession and imposition of 
rules as prerequisites appear as compromises to the WTO’s chances to develop a more 
democratic profile. However, the issue is rather limited, as by now most countries in the 
world have already acceded to the WTO, and those remaining do not have as big 
economies and their accession process is not expected to last as long. Generally, the 
process of accession can benefit from more openness, but that does not necessarily need 
to be achieved for the accession process itself, it can be the result of overall 
democratization of the organization.  
 
A final note on the transparency obligations in accession protocols: these conditions, 
even though they are additional to Article X of the GATT, they are important for the 
international trading system. They have become vehicles linking businesses and 
individual exporters and importers with WTO law. They contribute to the openness of 
trade in countries where perhaps legislation is not easily obtainable. Transparency in the 
Accession Protocols of large member states has promoted the unique and direct link 
between consumers and traders on one hand and WTO member states and the WTO 
regime on the other. Smaller countries that would be overly burden by such obligations 
are given the opposite option, the WTO Minus, giving them additional time-frames and 
assistance for implementation.  
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IV. External Transparency 
 
External transparency was the explicit focus of the Sutherland Report in its fifth chapter 
on Transparency, discussed earlier. External transparency generally refers to the 
relationship of the organization not with its own member states, its shareholders, but with 
anyone else affected by the rules and procedures introduced under its auspices, the 
stakeholders. Although generally civil society is understood to be represented by NGOs, 
this chapter will not only discussed the interactions of the WTO with the organized civil 
society, but it will look at all possible communication and information flows between the 
WTO and citizens of WTO member states and non-member states, namely the public at 
large.  
 
The first part will explore forms of interaction that are non-decisive. Even though the 
discussed transparency-related aspects are adding to the organization’s overall outreach 
profile and hope to address its legitimacy deficits, it is important to bear in mind that 
none of these aspects affect the rules or the outcomes of decisions, at least not to date. 
The second part will examine in detail a type of external transparency that has 
considerable potential to affect the outcome of dispute settlement in the WTO. Even 
though panel and Appellate Body reports are binding inter-partes and not erga omnes the 
rare cases where the WTO court has included civil society arguments in its reports are 
extremely significant. They are the first and only step to engage with civil society 
arguments and allow them to inform (even to a small extent) reports which are binding to 
member states.  
 
The first part will discuss first NGO participation in WTO Ministerial Conferences; 
second the new trend of (few) open meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body; third, the 
WTO symposia where academics, NGOs, business representatives and students often 
participate at, and the annual WTO Public Forum. Finally, this chapter will briefly 
discuss the publication of WTO documents at the WTO website, a very important and 
detailed source of information for the WTO. These non-decisive aspects of the WTO are 
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also often discussed in the context of Global Administrative Law. The second part begins 
with a brief history of amicus curiae briefs before it discusses the related case law in 
detail. Finally, after offering some statistical data on amicus briefs there is a short critique 
towards the Panel and Appellate Body’s ambiguous stance towards amicus briefs. 
A. Civil Society in Ministerial Conferences, Symposia, Publication 
1. NGO Observer Participation 
 
Attempts for participation from non-state actors began as early as 1946, during the ITO 
negotiations. At the London Preparatory Conference, the International Chamber of 
Commerce as well as the World Federation of Trade Unions expressed concerns for the 
status and content of the negotiations that eventually led to the GATT. 1 Yet, no provision 
in the GATT alluded to non-state actors, even though the GATT had some informal 
relationships with NGOs.2 This changed when the WTO was created in 1995. Article V 
of the Marrakesh Agreement discusses the outreach of the organization. The first 
paragraph in particular briefly mentions the WTO’s relationships with other 
intergovernmental organizations. The second paragraph, dealing with NGOs and other 
non-state actors provides as follows:  
 
The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation 
and cooperation with nongovernmental organizations concerned with 
matters related to those of the WTO. 
 
Shortly after the adoption of this article, in July 1996 the General Council adopted the 
“Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations.” The 
Guidelines unambiguously link transparency with NGO access to the WTO:  
 
“In deciding on these guidelines for arrangements on relations with non-
governmental organizations, Members recognize the role NGOs can play 
to increase the awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities and 
agree in this regard to improve transparency and develop communication !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Page 41 para 179 Sutherland Report. See also DOUGLAS IRWIN ET AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT (2008). 
2 See PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, 
CASES AND MATERIALS at 153 (2008) and Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and 
International Governance MICH. J. INT’L L. 255 (1997). 
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with NGOs. […] The Secretariat should play a more active role in its 
direct contacts with NGOs who, as a valuable resource, can contribute to 
the accuracy and richness of the public debate. This interaction with 
NGOs should be developed through various means such as inter alia the 
organization on an ad hoc basis of symposia on specific WTO-related 
issues, informal arrangements to receive the information NGOs may wish 
to make available for consultation by interested delegations and the 
continuation of past practice of responding to requests for general 
information and briefings about the WTO.” 
 
However, the General Council clarified that this participation could not be decisive in 
nature. In particular, the disclaimer the members added is related to a strict view of the 
WTO as an intergovernmental organization and nothing more, an idea that is strongly 
coupled with state sovereignty. As the Sutherland report will reiterate, if governments 
wish to allow for more NGO participation, they should do so at a national level:  
 
Members have pointed to the special character of the WTO, which is both 
a legally binding intergovernmental treaty of rights and obligations among 
its Members and a forum for negotiations. As a result of extensive 
discussions, there is currently a broadly held view that it would not be 
possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its 
meetings. Closer consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be met 
constructively through appropriate processes at the national level where 
lies primary responsibility for taking into account the different elements of 
public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-making. 
 
The Sutherland report hails the adoption of Article V:2, but moves cautiously and avoids 
discussing any decisive role for NGOs. In particular, it compares Article 71 of UN 
Charter authorizing the Economic and Social Council to “make suitable arrangements for 
consulting with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters within its 
competence” as less robust.3  
 
Since the adoption of the Guidelines, the General Council has addressed the issue of 
external transparency in its meetings on several occasions.4 In particular, the General !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Sutherland Report Paragraph 188. 
4 GC Meeting WT/GC/M/2930 September 1998, WT/GC/M/35 30 March 1999, WT/GC/M/45 2 August 
1999, WT/GC/M/57 14 September 2000, WT/GC/M/58 
8 November 2000, WT/GC/M/66 10 August 2001. 
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Council discussed after the Ministerial Conferences the results of NGO participation. 
NGOs participated as observers for the first time at the Singapore Ministerial Conference. 
The General Council concluded that the process and the results were successful and non-
governmental organizations could attend as observers at subsequent Ministerial 
Conferences (Geneva, Seattle, Doha, Cancún, Hong Kong, Geneva- See also Table 3).5 
 
Table 8 NGO participation in Ministerial Conferences 
Ministerial NGOs who received 
accreditation 
NGOs who attended Participants 
Singapore 1996 159 108 235 
Geneva 1998 153 128 362 
Seattle 1999 776 686 Approx. 1500 
Doha 2001 651 370 370 
Cancún 2003 961 795 1578 
Hong Kong 2005 1065 811 1596 
Geneva 2009 435 N/A Approx. 500 
Geneva 2011 234 N/A N/A 
Bali 2013 346 N/A 694 
 
The division which manages relationships with NGOs is the Information and External 
Relations Division, which communicates information about the WTO. It also organizes 
an annual Public Forum, which is discussed in the following section.6 NGOs become 
accredited to participate in Ministerial Conferences through a system similar to that in the 
United Nations. It is unclear what NGOs contribute during the Ministerial Conferences. 
The Sutherland Report discussed the bureaucratic burden of the accreditation process to 
the WTO Secretariat. It is clear that more institutional capacity is needed in the WTO.7 
The Director-General and members of the Secretariat meet regularly with NGOs.8 There 
is also an online forum for discussions in the WTO.9 NGOs may provide position papers, 
which the WTO Secretariat distributes to members states. A position paper is a written !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Ministerial Conferences http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minist_e.htm 
6 Information and External Relations Division 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/div_e.htm#ierd 
7 Sutherland Report paragraphs 207-208, Peter Van den Bossche, Debating the Future of the World Trade 
organization, Divergent Views on the 2005 Sutherland Report 8:3 J. INT’L ECON. L.  759 (2005) and PETER 
VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS at 154-155 (2008). 
8 Sutherland Report para.184. 
9 Forum http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/chat_e/chat_e.htm 
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statement asserting the position of an organization on a specific WTO issue.10 The 
position papers published at the WTO website are no more than a handful per year, 
although some years, such as 1999 and 2005 ten or more papers are submitted. As with 
the observer status in Ministerial Conferences, the usage of the papers is also vague. The 
WTO has been criticized for the selection process as a “supreme cognitive arbitrer” 
prohibiting thus any mitigation of the organization’s democratic legitimacy problems 
through the participation of NGOs.11 
2. WTO Public Forum and Open Day 
 
The WTO instituted an outreach event, which takes place annually, originally known as 
the Public Symposium, which later became the Public Forum.12 It was first held in 2001. 
Members of the civil society, media, academics, business representatives and government 
officials meet at the WTO during the Public Forum to discuss the most recent 
developments in international trade. Each year has a different theme (see Table 4). The 
Public Forum has minimal normative value, however it signifies the outreach and 
openness of the organization to the general public.13 The event according to the WTO 
regularly attracts over 1,500 representatives from civil society, academia, business, the 
media, governments, parliamentarians and inter-governmental organizations.14 
 
WTO Public Forum 
2014 “Why trade matters to everyone”  
2013 “Expanding Trade through Innovation and the Digital Economy” 
2012 “Is Multilateralism in Crisis?” 
2011 “Seeking answers to global trade challenges” 
2010 “The Forces Shaping World Trade” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 NGO position papers received by the WTO Secretariat 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/pospap_e.htm 
11 Anne Peters, Dual Democracy in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  315-317 ( J. 
Klabbers et al eds. 2009). 
12 Public Forum http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum_e/public_forum_e.htm 
13 Interesting examples of analogous transparency improvement are the OECD, see James Salzman, 
Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 68 
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 191-227 (2005)) and the Basle Committee (Michael Barr & 
Geoffrey  Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15-46 at17 (2006)), 
Lorenzo Casini,  Global Hybrid Public-Private Bodies: The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), 6 INT'L 
ORG. L. REV. 421-446 at 445 (2009). 
14 Public Forum http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum_e/public_forum_e.htm 
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2009 “Global Problems, Global Solutions: Towards Better Global Governance” 
2008 “Trading into the Future”  
2007 “How the WTO can help harness globalization?” 
2006 “What WTO for the XXIst Century?” 
WTO Public Symposium 
2005 “WTO After 10 Years: Global Problems and Multilateral Solutions” 
2004 “Multilateralism at a crossroads” 
2003 “Challenges Ahead on the Road to Cancún” 
2002 “The Doha Development Agenda and beyond” 
2001 “Symposium on issues confronting the world trading system ” 
Table 9 WTO Public Forum and Public Symposium 
Another outreach event is the Open Day which takes place at the end of June. According 
to the WTO website:  
 
“[t]he WTO opens its doors to the public on the occasion of the 
inauguration of its new building and the completion of the renovation of 
the Centre William Rappard. The WTO opened its doors to the public for 
the first time in 2009, attracting some 5,000 visitors who came to learn 
more about the WTO, the work of its staff, and the artistic treasures of the 
Centre William Rappard, the WTO's headquarters in Geneva. A second 
Open Day was held in 2010, offering a variety of entertainment and 
educational activities, including guided tours of the building and special 
activities for children. A web-only event was held in 2012 to introduce the 
members of the WTO.” 
 
Both events are mostly decorative. The cost to travel to Geneva would be prohibitive for 
anyone who is curious about the works of the WTO. If these events represent some form 
of engagement with civil society, then presumably it is only the elite civil society, 
academics, lawyers and representatives of NGOs with large budgets, or just those who 
already reside in Geneva and the surrounding areas who participate. The idea of web 
events may be a better way to introduce those interested in the works of the WTO. 
3. The WTO website 
 
Another aspect of external transparency is direct information on the WTO, namely the 
declassification and publication or online availability of a very significant number of 
WTO documents. The General Council since 2002 has authorized the derestriction of 
WTO documents almost at the time of their circulation among WTO member states. In 
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particular, in the decision entitled “Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of 
WTO Documents”15 the General Council “[e]mphasizing the importance of greater 
transparency in the functioning of the WTO”  decided that all official WTO 
documents shall be unrestricted unless requested otherwise by Member states. In the 
latter case, documents can remain unrestricted for up to sixty days.  
 
Minutes of meetings are restricted and are only released to the public forty-five days after 
the date of circulation. Documents relating to modification or renegotiation of 
concessions or to specific commitments are automatically derestricted after the 
certification of such changes in the schedules and   documents relating the accession 
process are automatically derestricted after the adoption of the report of the working 
party. Moreover all documents are translated in English, French and Spanish, the three 
official languages of the WTO, and are made immediately available at the WTO website, 
which now contains a very large number of documents in order to “[f]acilitate their 
dissemination to the public at large.” 
 
Considering the complex nature of the WTO as an institution, and the WTO rules and 
agreements, this derestriction is not as useful to those who are unfamiliar with the WTO 
as a system, mostly trade economists and trade lawyers. Even though the WTO website is 
an invaluable gateway for professionals, these documents are not as useful to the public 
at large. The WTO has attempted to remedy this problem with the introduction of various 
researched guides and simplified versions of the structure of the WTO. 16 
4. Public hearings during Dispute Settlement   
 
Finally, the opening of WTO meetings to the public has recently been occurring via 
closed-circuit televised presentations in the WTO building in Geneva.17 This form of 
transparency is identified as “auxiliary meta transparency measures” put in place to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 WT/L/452 16 May 2002 (02-2719) Decision of 14 May 2002. 
16 See for example: About the WTO http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm 
17 Anne Peters, Dual Democracy in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  328 ( J. 
Klabbers et al eds. 2009) reports that those hearings are public.  
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safeguard the efficiency of confidentiality of judicial mechanisms. 18Usually, limited 
seating is available. In exceptional cases where the parties agree to do so, the WTO 
dispute settlement process can be open to the public through a real time closed-circuit 
television broadcast, as it recently occurred in the EC-Canada case on seal products19 or 
the US-COOL case.20  
 
In this case, interested individuals must file a form with the WTO giving their name, 
address, phone, email, profession, organization, date of birth, nationality and passport 
number. It appears that any interested person, regardless of whether their country is a 
WTO member (for the small number of countries who are still not WTO members) can 
attend the meetings. Moreover, according to the disclaimer at the application form:  
 
“In the light of the limited seating capacity, the seats reserved for the 
public will be allocated on a first come, first served basis upon receipt of 
the completed form. […]A valid official photo identification will need to 
be presented on-site to access the viewing room. Please note that any form 
of recording or filming is prohibited. Security checks may delay access to 
the viewing room. […] Note that the names of those who have registered 
will be communicated to the parties and third parties in this dispute. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to note here that these closed circuit hearings are another example 
where the organization could be a lot more transparent. It is unclear why such meetings 
are not published at the WTO website. The fears of member states for the real-time 
transmission could be minimized if such broadcasting occurs only with the consent of all 
member state involved, and after the meeting is over and the Panel or Appellate Body 
report is issued. Publicizing a video of the DSB meetings would assist with making the 
process more transparent. It is unclear why this has not happened to this date.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Thore Neumann & Bruno Simma, Transparency in international adjudication in TRANSPARENCY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 472-473 (A. Bianchi & A. Peters, eds. 2013). 
19  WTO meeting on seal products dispute opened to the public 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/hear_ds400_401_18feb13_e.htm .See also Registration 
begins for public observation of appeal in renewable energy disputes 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/hear_ds412_426_14mar13_e.htm . 
20 WTO meeting on United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements - Recourse 
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico to be held on 18 and 19 February 2014 
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B. Participation in dispute settlement through amicus briefs 
1. History and case law of amicus curiae briefs 
 
In the first section we will first look at the history of amicus curiae briefs from 1995 to 
this day. The topic has been much discussed, as it is quite popular among WTO scholars. 
Many member states have been vocal on their disagreement with the interpretation of the 
DSU by the Panels and the Appellate Body who maintain that they have a right to accept 
unsolicited briefs. Yet, the Panels and Appellate Body, in most of the cases instead of 
opening their doors to briefs they engage in maneuvers of rejection unless the parties to 
the dispute incorporate the claims into their own submissions. As such, the member-
centric nature of the process is reinforced. The Panels and Appellate Body seem 
progressive in their interpretation of the DSU in almost every case. At the same time, 
they end up not examining the amicus briefs, again in almost every case. However, as the 
last section will demonstrate, an opportunity exists for erosion of this de facto 
traditionalist practice. Utilizing the lessons from US-Tuna II (Mexico), the only case 
where an amicus brief was explicitly relied upon in the Panel report, I will put forward a 
proposal on expanding this case law, based on the relevance of consumer preferences in 
WTO litigation.  
 
The history for amicus curiae submissions in the WTO began with US-Shrimp, a case 
involving a US prohibition on shrimp imports originating from countries using a certain 
type of net. The Panel in US-Shrimp received two amicus curiae briefs. While the United 
States, citing article 13 of the DSU, urged the panel to take into consideration any 
relevant information, regardless of its source, the applicants, India, Malaysia, Pakistan 
and Thailand explicitly requested that the Panel not consider the briefs. The Panel 
decided for the applicants in this case, noting that “the initiative to seek information and 
to select the source of information rests with the Panel”21 and therefore consideration of 
unsolicited information from parties other than the applicant(s), the respondent(s) and any 
third parties to the dispute is incompatible with the DSU. Moreover, the Panel noted that: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Panel Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/R, 
adopted 6 November 1998 para 7.8 
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“it was usual practice for parties to put forward whatever documents they 
considered relevant to support their case and that, if any party in the 
present dispute wanted to put forward these documents, or parts of them, 
as part of their own submissions to the Panel, they were free to do so. If 
this were the case, the other parties would have two weeks to respond to 
the additional material.”22 
 
The US-Shrimp Panel approach, as I will further demonstrate after reviewing all case law 
to date, has become the de facto response of the Panels and the Appellate Body to the 
majority of amicus curiae briefs. During the appeal of US-Shrimp, another four amicus 
curiae were submitted, some from the same parties as the ones before the Panel, and 
some new. The joint appellees requested again the rejection of the briefs, albeit on a 
different legal basis. Inter alia, they stressed that only issues of law and not of fact can be 
brought before the Appellate Body as per article 17.6 of the DSU.23 The Appellate Body 
responded that the admissibility of amicus curiae is in fact a legal issue.24 Avoiding to 
rule on whether the DSU allowed for the Appellate Body to accept unsolicited briefs, it 
ruled instead that as long as these materials are attached to the brief of either party, and 
insofar it coincides with the main submission of that party, the Appellate Body will 
consider it. The Appellate Body then reversed the Panel’s interpretation on its right to 
“seek information: 
 
Against this context of broad authority vested in panels by the DSU, and 
given the object and purpose of the Panel's mandate as revealed in Article 
11, we do not believe that the word "seek" must necessarily be read, as 
apparently the Panel read it, in too literal a manner. That the Panel's 
reading of the word "seek" is unnecessarily formal and technical in nature 
becomes clear should an "individual or body" first ask a panel for 
permission to file a statement or a brief. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Panel Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products WT/DS58/R, 
adopted 6 November 1998 para 7.8 
23 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998 
para. 80. 
24 Id. para 88. 
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The issue of amicus curiae was also discussed in the Article 21.5 US-Shrimp Panel and 
Appellate Body reports. By then, even though the briefs received were only two, an 
increasing number of organizations joined the previous ones in their efforts to be heard in 
the WTO dispute settlement context. Once again, Malaysia insisted that the DSU cannot 
accept or consider amicus curiae, but the Panel reiterated the previous position of the 
Appellate Body and exclaimed that it can consider such briefs, insofar they coincide with 
parties’ submissions.25 Another two briefs were submitted in the appeal during the 
compliance proceedings between the US and Malaysia. With respect to the first brief, 
which was attached to the US submissions, the Appellate Body repeated the Panel’s 
ruling in the compliance proceedings and the Appellate Body’s ruling in US-Shrimp. For 
the second brief, submitted by professor Howse, the Appellate Body simply stated that 
“we have not found it necessary to take into account the brief.” The rejection did not 
decrease professor Howse’s desire to be heard in the dispute settlement process.26 At the 
same time the tribunal’s reasonless declaration has been favored in many of the following 
disputes when amicus briefs were submitted.  
 
In the Panel proceedings of US-Lead and Bismuth II only one amicus curiae was 
received. The Panel stressed they have the authority to accept or reject the brief and 
proceeded to say that since the parties did not have adequate opportunity to comment on 
the brief, “serious due process concerns” were raised, and although the Panel could have 
delayed the proceedings so that parties have adequate time to submit their comments, this 
could not be justified.27 On appeal, Brazil, Mexico and the EC argued that the DSU does 
not have the authority to accept the briefs from non-parties to the proceedings as per 
article 17.4 DSU, also invoking article 17.10 DSU and confidentiality of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU by Malaysia WT/DS58/AB/RW adopted 21 November 2001 paras 5.15 and 5.16. 
26 He has since submitted more amicus curiae briefs, which were rejected under the same rubric and he is 
one of the few parties with the highest amicus submissions. See infra, section on Evaluation of NGO 
Participation. 
27 Panel Report, United States — Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and 
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom WT/DS138/R, adopted 7 June 2000 
para 6.3. 
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proceedings.28 The US rebutted that the Appellate Body as per article 17.9 DSU and Rule 
16.1 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review has the authority to create 
additional procedures when necessary.  
 
The Appellate Body in this case ruled on its ability to accept and consider amicus curiae 
briefs. It first noted that the DSU neither allows nor prohibits the acceptance of 
unsolicited information and effectively agreed with the US position.29 It further declared 
that access to the dispute settlement process as a legal right is reserved only for member 
states30 and that non-member individuals or organizations have no such legal right and 
therefore the Appellate Body has no legal duty to accept the submissions.31 The Appellate 
Body concluded that it has the legal authority under the DSU to receive the briefs, but in 
this case did not find it necessary to take the briefs into account.  
 
Another amicus curiae brief was submitted during the compliance proceedings of 
Australia-Salmon. This is the first case where a letter from a non-state actor, the 
Concerned Fishermen and Processors in South Australia, was considered relevant and 
was accepted by the Panel without attachment to a national brief or national 
endorsement.32 Interestingly enough, the tribunal emphasized that the claim raised by the 
Australian fishermen in their letter coincided with Canada’s position on Article 5.5 of the 
SPS.33 
 
US- Section 110 (5) Copyright Act is the next case where one amicus brief was submitted 
during the Panel proceedings. The United States, although they did not agree with the 
content of the letter, submitting that it had little value to the Panel since it provided no !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Appellate Body Report, United States — Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled 
Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138AB/R, adopted 7 
June 2000 paras. 36-37. 
29 Id. para. 39. 
30 Id.  para. 40. 
31 Id.  para. 41.  
32 Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Canada, WT/DS18/RW, adopted 20 March 2000 para. 7.8. The other two cases of unsolicited 
briefs being considered are the Moroccan submission in EC Sardines examined infra, which is largely 
distinct, considering the amicus comes from a Member state; and the US-Tuna II (Mexico) infra. 
33 Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Canada, WT/DS18/RW, adopted 20 March 2000 paragraph 7.9 
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additional information, still argued that private parties had a “right…to make their views 
known to the WTO dispute settlement panels.”34 The EC further added that the panel can 
accept factual information and technical advice by “individuals or bodies alien to the 
dispute”, however the panel’s authority excluded legal arguments and interpretations.35 
The Panel concluded that they accept the letter, as it is their right to do so36, but agreed 
with the parties that the letter contains “duplicate information” and therefore has not 
relied on it in its reasoning.37 
 
A new issue with respect to private party participation and confidentiality of the dispute 
settlement process surfaced in the next case. During the appellate proceedings of 
Thailand H-Beams, one amicus brief was submitted. The thorny matter in this case was a 
claim Thailand made on violation of confidentiality of the proceedings.38 In particular, 
Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC), a US-based private organization, 
referred to Section III.C.5 of Thailand appeal submissions. As Thailand claimed, the law 
firm hired by Poland in the dispute was also counsel for CITAC.39 Poland responded that 
neither their mission, nor the law firm hired had any insight on how CITAC came about 
the information cited, and in any case, they dismissed the law firm from the case.40 All 
third parties also informed the Appellate Body that they did not disclose the content of 
the Thai submissions. Interestingly, the US, a strong proponent of transparency in the 
WTO dispute process noted that:  
 
“this issue exemplified the need for enhanced transparency in WTO 
dispute settlement. In the view of the United States, the practice of 
claiming confidential treatment for submissions that did not contain 
confidential business information corroded public support for the WTO 
dispute settlement system and inhibited the ability of Members to 
represent fully the interests of their stakeholders.”41 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Panel Report, US—Section 110 (5) Copyright Act, WT/ DS160/R, 15 June 2000 para. 6.5. 
35 Id. para. 6.6. 
36 Id. para. 6.7. 
37 Id.  para. 6.8. 
38 Appellate Body Report, Thailand — Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or 
Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R, 2001, adopted 5 April 2001 para. 64. 
39 Id. para. 65. 
40 Id.  paras. 68-72. 
41 Id. para. 73.
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The Appellate Body, in a demonstration of the reluctance of its members to communicate 
with the amicus curiae submitting organization, rejected Thailand’s request to even 
simply inquire into how CITAC or the law firm obtained information about the brief. The 
Appellate Body considered the rejection of the brief provided sufficient remedy in this 
case and clarified that, in any event, the reason for the rejection of the brief was its 
irrelevance to the case at hand.  
 
Next in the DSB docket was the (in)famous EC-Asbestos case between the EC and 
Canada. The Panel received only 5 amicus curiae briefs, two of which the EC decided to 
attach in their own submissions. Subsequently, the Panel rejected the rest of the 
submissions, two without explanation and one because it was submitted very late in the 
process. The Appellate Body received the largest number of amicus curiae briefs 
submitted in one case to date: seventeen. 23 organizations, associations and firms and 
two individuals submitted the briefs after the establishment of specific procedures42 by 
the Appellate Body for amicus curiae submissions. Before filing a brief, interested non-
state parties would have to apply in order to file a brief, explaining their reasons in no 
longer than 3 typed pages.43 Initially, the Appellate Body received 13 submissions which 
were not submitted in accordance with the established procedures. 44 Subsequently, 
another 17 applications were submitted, six of which after the deadline set in the 
Additional Procedure.45 The remainder of the applications to file a brief were examined 
and the Appellate Body concluded that:  
 
“We carefully reviewed and considered each of these applications in 
accordance with the Additional Procedure and, in each case, decided to 
deny leave to file a written brief. Each applicant was sent a copy of our 
decision denying its application for leave for failure to comply sufficiently 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Called “Additional Procedure” based on Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures, copied in Appellate 
Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos‑Containing Products, 
WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2000Para 52. 
43  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos‑Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2000 Para 52. 
44 Id. Para. 53. 
45 Id. Para. 55. 
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with all the requirements set forth in paragraph 3 of the Additional 
Procedure.”46 
 
One last brief, submitted after the process was concluded, was also rejected. 
 
The Asbestos case is remarkable on the issue of amicus curiae briefs, for a number of 
reasons. First, the Appellate Body moves beyond simply recognizing its authority to 
accept unsolicited briefs, and establishes, for one and only time, a procedure by which 
such briefs will be submitted. The procedure is two-tiered, and interested parties have to 
first establish their interest in the case before actually submitting a brief. Second, EC-
Asbestos is the closest example of the “floodgates” argument put forward by skeptics of 
amici. The unremarkably small number of parties interested in weighing in in this case 
contradicted the feared outpouring of briefs. Seventeen briefs (even at 20 pages each, if 
they had in fact been accepted by the Appellate Body) could hardly be seen as 
excessively burdensome to the Canadian and European lawyers’ armies, especially in 
view of the large memoranda submitted during WTO disputes. One could also expect 
significant overlap in these briefs. Third, one cannot help but express disbelief upon 
reading Paragraph 56 of EC-Asbestos: it is unclear how all eleven applicants failed to 
comply with Article 3 of the Additional Procedure. This incidence becomes further 
troublesome if one assumes that at least one (if not many or all) of the organizations hired 
a law firm to assist them with the brief. 
 
Asbestos is particularly noteworthy also because of the emergency General Council 
Meeting of November 22nd 2000.47 While the case was pending and as the Appellate 
Body was accepting motions to file briefs, the General Council, the body assigned with 
the ‘day-to-day’ supervision of the WTO matters in between Ministerial Conferences, 
held a meeting discussing the issue of the amicus brief submissions. An overwhelming 
majority of member states expressed their disapproval to the Appellate Body practice, 
with only the United States agreeing to amicus brief submissions48. The representative of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos‑Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2000 Para 56. 
47 WT/GC/M/60 23 January 2001. 
48 WT/GC/M/60, 23 January 2001 paragraphs 74-77. 
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Egypt who requested this meeting notably acting on behalf of the Informal Group of 
Developing Countries said that the issue before the General Council “was not a 
transparency issue but was about the Appellate Body crossing its limits”49 further citing 
the danger of “severe harm and a grave imbalance” for developing countries.50 The 
question of amicus curiae briefs was also characterized as “constitutional”51, challenging 
the very “intergovernmental nature of the organization”52, threatening to contaminate the 
dispute settlement mechanism with “political issues”. 53  Furthermore, a number of 
members argued that it is a mistake to frame the amicus brief issue as an external 
transparency.54 
 
The next case, EC-Bed Linen55, simply repeated the unwillingness to accept the single 
brief submitted. Following that, the case of EC-Sardines on appeal faced another unique 
issue: the possibility for an amicus curiae brief coming not from a non-state actor but 
from a WTO Member State. After Morocco submitted an amicus brief, the Appellate 
Body ruled on the issue that lied behind the objection expressed by representatives of 
WTO countries that member states were put at a disadvantage vis-à-vis non-state actors 
and it was unclear whether they could be part of the same procedure. On the issue of the 
Moroccan submission, the Appellate Body, basing its reasoning on US- Lead and 
Bismuth II, argued it can accept amicus briefs from any party.56 However, the question 
arising in this context is that of a legal right of the member states to submit such briefs 
and a corresponding obligation of the Panels and Appellate Body to accept them. To this 
question, the Appellate Body in EC-Sardines answered negatively.57 Once a member 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 WT/GC/M/60, 23 January 2001 paragraph 14. 
50 Id. para. 18. 
51 Id. para. 22 Hong Kong. 
52 Id. para. 32 India. 
53 Id. para. 46 Brazil. 
54 See for example Canada, Turkey, Argentina WT/GC/M/60 23 January 2001 paragraphs 72, 81 and 93 
respectively. 
55 European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, 
WT/DS141/R, adopted 12 March 2001 para. 6.1. 
56 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, 
adopted 23 October 2002 para. 162. 
57 Id.  paras. 163-164. 
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state decides to participate via an amicus curiae brief, then it no longer has the right to be 
heard (as it would if it were a third party to the dispute)58.  
 
Reaffirming that the WTO is a member-driven organization, the Appellate Body for the 
first time summarized and addressed the arguments in an amicus brief. 59 It continued to 
reject most of the arguments (with the exception of the arguments on Article 2.1 TBT and 
GATT 1994). Even though the tribunal proclaimed it would treat all amici in the same 
manner, regardless of their origin, only one amicus to date from a non-state source has 
been given the same attention as the Moroccan brief in EC Sardines60. With respect to the 
brief submitted by “a private individual”, the Appellate Body repeated that it has the 
authority to accept the brief61 but it is not helpful for the court in this appeal.62   
 
The next case addressing an amicus brief was US-Countervailing Measures on Certain 
EC Products.63 The Appellate Body again rejected the single amicus brief submitted, yet 
interestingly now both the EU and the US affirmed that the Appellate Body has the 
authority to accept and consider briefs from non-state actors. 64 In the next few cases, US-
Softwood Lumber III, 65  US-Softwood Lumber IV, 66  US-Softwood Lumber VI 67 , US-
Softwood Lumber IV on appeal68 and US-Steel Safeguards on appeal69 the Panels and 
Appellate Body eventually dismissed each of the 11 briefs submitted in total in these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Id. para. 166. 
59 Id. para. 169. 
60 The amicus in Panel Report, United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale 
of Tuna and Tuna Products WT/DS381/R, adopted 13 June 2012. 
61 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, 
adopted 23 October 2002 paras. 156-160. 
62 Id. para. 160. 
63 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products WT/DS212/AB/R 
adopted 8 January 2003. 
64 Id.  paragraph 76.  
65 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber III United States — preliminary determinations with respect to 
certain softwood lumber from Canada, WT/DS236/R, adopted 1 November 2002. 
66 Panel Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain 
Softwood Lumber from Canada   WT/DS257/R, adopted 29 August 2003. 
67 Panel Report, Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada WT/DS277/R adopted 26 April 
2004. 
68 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada   WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 29 August 2003. 
69 Appellate Body Reports, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel 
Products WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R, WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, 
WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R, WT/DS259/AB/R adopted 10 December 2003. 
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cases, either as irrelevant or as submitted too late. Only the Panel in US-Softwood Lumber 
VI, in footnote 75 remarked that: 
 
“in light of the absence of consensus among WTO Members on the 
question of how to treat amicus submissions, we decided not to accept 
unsolicited amicus curiae submissions in the course of this dispute. 
However, we noted that we would consider any arguments raised by amici 
curiae to the extent that these arguments were taken up in the written 
submissions and/or oral statements of any party or third parties.” 
 
This analysis retracts from previous case law, referring in the discontent expressed by 
WTO member states with respect to the treatment of amicus briefs. This is the first time 
in the six years since the Panel of US-Shrimp that a report returns to a strict member-
driven rhetoric and rejects the brief on these grounds.  
 
Confidentiality of state-parties to a dispute and an amicus curie brief came up again in the 
case of EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar.70 This time the Panel directly communicated with 
WVZ, an association representing German sugar producers and requested information as 
to how they received confidential data from Brazil’s submissions. WVZ responded that: 
 
“it had been ‘able to examine’ an attachment to Brazil's submission. 
According to WVZ, this document was not designated as confidential. It 
also indicated that WVZ was ‘not in a position to reveal the source of its 
information regarding the evidence submitted by Brazil.’”71  
 
The Panel found there was a breach of confidentiality, noted that a similar issue arose in 
Thailand H-Beams, rejected the brief and reported the incident to the Dispute Settlement 
Body. 72 
 
The next six cases, EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar on appeal,73 EC-Chicken Cuts on 
appeal,74 Mexico-Taxes on Soft Drinks on appeal,75 US-Zeroing (EC), 76 EC-Selected 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 Panel Reports, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar WT/DS265/R, WT/DS266/R, 
WT/DS283/R adopted 19 May 2005. 
71 Id. paras. 7.92, 7.93. 
72 Id. 7.96-7.100. 
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Customs Matters77 and EC - Biotech Products (GMOs)78, the Panels and Appellate Body 
once again rejected the briefs on the usual grounds. In the case of Brazil- Retreated 
Tyres79 a unique request for webcasting the proceedings was made by the Center for 
International Environmental Law. The proposal was discussed with the parties to the 
dispute and was subsequently rejected.80 Similarly, the Panels and Appellate Body 
rejected the total of sixteen amicus briefs submitted in Brazil-Retreaded Tyres on 
appeal81, EC-Salmon, 82 China-Auto Parts on appeal,83 EC and certain member states- 
Large Civil Aircraft84 Australia- Apples,85 Thailand-Cigarettes,86 US- Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China) on appeal,87 Canada - Renewable Energy during the Panel 
process 88 and on appeal,89 and US-Clove Cigarettes on appeal90 either outright rejected 
the briefs or found their consideration unnecessary. In US-COOL the Panel accepted the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar WT/DS265/AB/R, 
WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R adopted 19 May 2005. 
74 Panel Reports, European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, 
Complaint by Brazil, WT/DS269/R, WT/DS286/R adopted 27 September 2005. 
75 Appellate Body Report, Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages WT/DS308/AB/R 
adopted 24 March 2006. 
76 Panel Report, United States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins 
(“Zeroing”), WT/DS294/R, adopted 9 May 2006. 
77 Panel Report, European Communities — Selected Customs Matters WT/DS315/R adopted 11 December 
2006. 
78 Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, adopted 21 November 2006. 
79 Panel Report, Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres WT/DS332/R 17 December 
2007. 
80 Id.  para. 1.9. 
81 Id. 
82 Panel Report, European Communities – Anti Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway, 
WT/DS337/R, adopted 15 January 2008 
83 Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339/AB/R / 
WT/DS340/AB/R / WT/DS342/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2009. 
84 Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/R, adopted 1 June 2011. 
85  Panel Report, Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand, 
WT/DS367/R, adopted 17 December 2010. 
86  Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, 
WT/DS371/R, adopted 15 July 2011. 
87 Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 25 March 2011. 
88 Panel Reports, Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector 
WT/DS412/R WT/DS426/R adopted 24 May 2013. 
89 Appellate Body Reports, Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation 
Sector WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R adopted 24 May 2013. 
90 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 
WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012. 
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claims in the one brief it received for the part that it coincided with the parties’ 
submissions91. 
 
One of the more recent cases which significantly departed from the previous case law is 
US-Tuna II.92 The Panel here not only accepted the submission of Humane Society, an 
organization which has frequently submitted amicus curiae briefs, but it went as far as to 
consider the claims contained in the brief, even beyond the parts cited by the United 
States, agree with their content, and utilize them in its decision-making.93 For example, 
the Panel said:  
 
We further note that it is undisputed that US consumers are sensitive to the 
dolphin-safe issue. This is acknowledged by both Mexico and the United 
States, and is also confirmed by the evidence presented with the amicus 
curiae brief to which the United States has referred to in its answers to 
questions. This evidence suggests that, following public campaigning by 
the environmental organization “Earth Island Institute” in the late 1980s 
(including through film footage shot in 1987-88 showing the capture and 
killing of dolphins during a fishing trip where setting on dolphins was 
used), tuna processors were under pressure to stop purchasing tuna caught 
in conditions that were harmful to dolphins. […] While this is only 
indirect evidence as to the final consumers’ behaviours, it suggests that the 
producers themselves assume that they would not be able to sell tuna 
products that do not meet dolphin-safe requirements, or at least not at a 
price sufficient to warrant their purchase. 94 
 
We further note in this respect that some of the evidence presented to the 
Panel suggests that 90 per cent of the world's tuna companies have 
adopted a strict “no setting on dolphins” standard. 95 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91  Panel Report, United States - Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements WT/ 
DS384,386/R, adopted 23 July 2012 paras. 2.9-2.10. 
92 Panel Report, United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and 
Tuna Products WT/DS381/R, adopted 13 June 2012. 
93 Id.  paras 7.182, 7.288, 7.289, 7.363, 7.368, Fn 559. 
94 Id.  paras.7.288-7.289 
95 Id. para 7.368 Emphasis added. The evidence referred to in this paragraph, is cited in Footnote 559 of the 
report: Amicus Exhibit-28. As explained in paragraph 2.9 above, insofar as the Panel deemed this 
information to be relevant for the purposes of its assessment, it invited Mexico to comment on it in order to 
take full account of Mexico's right of response and defense in respect of due process considerations. Panel's 
question No. 88. 
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On appeal the Appellate Body did not find the three briefs submitted to it to be relevant.96 
Similarly in the cases that followed US-Tuna II, the Panels and Appellate Body retracted 
the decision’s progressive approach.  
 
Finally, the recent EU-Seals case demonstrates how amicus curiae briefs are treated in 
the WTO since it summarizes the scope of the entire issue. The case involves a complaint 
brought by Canada and Norway against the European Union involving the latter’s ban on 
seal products. The ban mainly targets seal products and prevents them from entering the 
European Union market with some exceptions. Canada and Norway are amongst the few 
countries still engaging in seal trade. Pamela Anderson, a Canadian citizen, actress and 
PETA spokesperson was amongst the few non-state actors to submit an amicus curiae 
brief to the WTO Panel examining the case. Pamela Anderson requested that the Panel 
uphold the EU seal ban. In her one-page submission on behalf of PETA, she proposed a 
“practical exit strategy: a government buyout of the sealing industry, which would benefit 
both seals and sealers.” She concluded with the hope that her “beautiful Canada will 
finally leave this barbaric practice in the past.”97 It is relevant here to clarify that amicus 
briefs are submitted up until the first substantive meeting of the Parties and the Panel. In 
fact, the first substantive meeting is the de facto deadline for the submission of any 
evidence coming from the parties including third countries parties to the dispute, and the 
purpose of this procedural rule is to give members to the dispute time to respond and 
process all the information put forward during this meeting.  
 
The five briefs submitted in this case were: the first by a group of organizations, amongst 
which was Brigitte Bardot’s foundation. The Bardot set of briefs was promptly endorsed 
by the European Union and annexed to its submissions. The rest of the briefs fall under 
the category of unsolicited briefs; the second was by professor Robert Howse, another 
Canadian, together with Joanna Langille and Katie Sykes; the third, was by Pamela 
Anderson on behalf of PETA. The last two briefs were by the International Fur Trade !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Id. para. 8. 
97 Amicus curiae brief of Pamela Anderson on Behalf of PETA before the WTO, available at 
http://www.pamelaandersonfoundation.org/news/2015/3/3/before-the-world-trade-organization-dispute-
settlement-body-european-communities-measures-prohibiting-the-importation-and-marketing-of-seal-
products-wtds400-wtds401-wtds369. 
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Federation  and actor Jude Law. The first two briefs were accepted- and considered by 
the WTO, while the last three were rejected. Both Jude Law and the fur traders submitted 
briefs well after the first substantive meeting. Pamela Anderson and PETA and Professor 
Howse et al. both submitted briefs on time, and while one was considered, the other was 
rejected.98 No reason was given by the court for either choice- and the court cited 
professor Howse’s brief as an exhibit of the “public moral concerns” with respect to the 
ban of seal trade (which ended up being the deciding factor of the case as the court found 
that there were no less restrictive means to normatively express these concerns other than 
a flat-out ban on seal trade). 99 It remains unclear why one brief was accepted while the 
other was rejected. 
2. Critique of the treatment of amicus briefs 
 
Overall, regardless of the switch in interpretation and the rejection of the US-Shrimp 
dictum that accepting amicus curiae briefs is prohibited by the DSU, the end result is that 
the information contained in such documents is only considered during WTO dispute 
settlement when submitted as part of the parties’ submissions. When such briefs are 
simply annexed to the parties’ memoranda they are taken into account only insofar they 
coincide with the main positions of the country at hand, otherwise they are dismissed. 
Only in US-Tuna II (Mexico)100 and EC-Seals101 has a Panel addressed the substantive 
contribution of a non-state amicus brief and used it in its reasoning. The other amicus 
brief examined on the merits so far has been the submission by Morocco in EC-Sardines. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 On submission times see EC- Seals, WT/DS400/R WT/DS401/R (25 November 2013) para.1.17 and fn. 
16.  
99 See Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products, WT/DS400/R / WT/DS401/R / and Add.1, adopted 18 June 2014, as modified by Appellate 
Body Reports WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/DS401/AB/Rpara. 7.408 and fn. 672. 
100 Panel Report, United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and 
Tuna Products WT/DS381/R, adopted 13 June 2012. 
101 Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing 
of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/DS401/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014 Panel Reports, European 
Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/R / 
WT/DS401/R / and Add.1, adopted 18 June 2014, as modified by Appellate Body Reports 
WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/DS401/AB/R. 
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Thus, the somber truth remains: although the court refined its approach with respect to 
unsolicited briefs in the thirty or so disputes since US-Shrimp in 1998, in reality almost 
nothing has changed. The Panels and Appellate Body overwhelmingly insist they can 
accept unsolicited information from for-profit and non-profit non-state actors, despite the 
strong opposition from the vast majority of WTO member states during the EC-Asbestos 
proceedings. Yet, they have rejected any information not annexed or referred to in 
parties’ submissions, frequently without any further explanation. Non-governmental 
actors are only allowed to submit their briefs, but they remain excluded from any 
meaningful debate during the dispute settlement process. Moreover, it remains unclear 
why the Panels and Appellate Body insist on proclaiming their right to accept briefs, yet 
not a single time in the last fifteen years have they actually considered any of the 
information contained in those briefs, unless it was attached to a country’s submissions. 
Despite the extensive case law examining the issue of unsolicited briefs, in effect all 
NGOs since 1998 have by result received the same treatment as the US-Shrimp panel 
report. 
 
A brief summary of the amicus curiae statistics to date is illuminating when considering 
the doubts raised in the 2000 General Council emergency meeting on the issue. In the 
almost twenty years of the organization, a total of 87 amicus curiae briefs have been 
submitted for consideration in 41 Panel and Appellate Body proceedings of 33 
disputes.102 Of those, only 14 briefs are cited anonymously. The submitting organizations 
and individuals of the remaining 73 briefs are mentioned by name in the Panel and 
Appellate Body reports. According to these numbers, in 41 out of 329 Panel and 
Appellate Body reports combined (including Article 21 reports and the pending seals’ 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 Or 88 in 42 proceedings, if we count the brief filed in EC-Hormones. See Annex. In the numbers EC-
Seals is included, although it is pending. The disputes in which briefs have been filed are: US-Gasoline, 
EC-Hormones, US-Shrimp, US-Lead and Bismuth II, Australia-Salmon, US-Section 110(5) Copyright Act, 
Thailand-H-Beams, EC – Asbestos, EC-Bed Linen, EC-Sardines, US – Countervailing measures on Certain 
EC Products, US-Softwood Lumber III, US-Softwood Lumber IV, US-Softwood Lumber VI, US-Steel 
Safeguards, EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, EC-Chicken Cuts, Mexico-Taxes on Soft Drinks,  US-Zeroing 
(EC),  EC-Selected Customs Matters, EC - Biotech Products,  Brazil-Retreaded Tyres,  EC-Salmon, China-
Auto Parts,  EC and certain member states- Large Civil Aircraft,  Australia- Apples, Thailand-Cigarettes 
(Philippines),  US-Antidumping and Countervailing Duties (China), US-Tuna II (Mexico), EC-Seal 
Products, Canada-Renewable Energy, US-Clove Cigarettes and US-COOL. 
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report)103 non-state parties have submitted amicus briefs. This amount to a little over 12% 
of the reports issued. 
 
Approximately 130 organizations and individuals have tried to weigh in during the WTO 
dispute settlement process, based in a variety of countries, both developing and 
developed. The majority are organizations based in developed countries. Few academics 
have also submitted briefs. The mandate of the organizations varies depending on the 
case at hand. However, a few recurring names appear in the amici list: the first place is 
currently held by the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) with nine 
submitted briefs. CIEL is a U.S. non-profit organization based in Washington D.C. with a 
second office in Geneva. The second most prolific amicus submitter is Humane Society, 
also based in Washington D.C. Humane Society is the largest animal advocacy 
organization in the world and has submitted briefs either through its central or its regional 
offices. It is also the only organization to date whose submissions were explicitly 
considered by the Panel in US-Tuna II. Other repeated friends of the WTO dispute 
settlement system are Robert Howse, professor of International Trade law, Defenders of 
Wildlife, Friends of the Earth, the Foundation for International Environmental Law and 
Development (FIELD), the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Center for Marine 
Conservation and the Argentina-based Center for Human Rights and the Environment 
(CEDHA). 
 
The organizations or the individuals that submitted them have published some of the 
amicus briefs. The public briefs are neither excessive in length, nor do they advance 
unreasonable interpretations of WTO law. For example, the brief filed by the American 
Institute for International Steel (AIIS) during the appeal of US-Steel104 argues for the 
inclusion of consumer perspectives and the views of “users of steel” in public policy 
debates. The AIIS, in its 10-page memo further proposes the inclusion of consumers’ 
interests in the interpretation of the notion of “public interest” in Article 3.1 of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 For numbers and statistics see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.htm  
and http://worldtradelaw.net/ . 
104 Available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/amicus/aiissteelamicus.pdf . 
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Safeguards Agreement. On a similar tone, Ecojustice et al. in a 22-page memo105 
submitted during the Canada-Renewable Energy case argue for an application of Article 
XX GATT to the SCM Agreement. Professor Rubini also submitted a brief in this case, 
which advances a pro-green policy approach on the determination of subsidies. Similarly 
Professors’ Howse et al. offered a polemic approach in their brief on the seals’ case.106 
The brief submitted to the Panel argues against the current Canadian policy on seals. The 
last two briefs move closer to advocacy than the first two. All four though are examples 
of well-thought submissions to the Panel and Appellate Body. If they are indicative of the 
general form that amicus curiae briefs have, then they serve to demonstrate that the fears 
expressed during the General Council meeting may have been largely exaggerated. 
 
The argument that merits closer attention is the one about overburdening developing 
countries in the dispute settlement process. It is a valid concern, however, it is one that 
we should discuss more carefully. First of all, as we saw, the “floodgates” element of 
amicus brief submissions is highly exaggerated. Thus, the workload for developing 
countries will not be as burdensome as it appears. Moreover, this problem can be 
mitigated through procedural requirements that restrict the length of amici submissions. 
Second, it might be in the interest of developing countries to have a more pluralistic 
dispute settlement process. Their worries focus mainly on the possibility of NGOs and 
other non-state actors bringing forward environmental and labor concerns before the 
DSB. However, such considerations are weighed in during dispute settlement, they are 
not the only factor that will produce a decision on for example Article III or Article XX 
of the GATT. Labor issues are not covered by the WTO Agreements. Third, it is likely 
that the reluctance to accept amicus briefs may be related to the prevalence of the practice 
of such briefs in Western legal systems. That also is not entirely accurate. Many countries 
around the world have similar participation opportunities during various stages of 
national adjudicatory processes.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 Available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/ecojustice_amicus_curiae_brief.pdf . 
106 Available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/amicus/howsesealsamicus.pdf . 
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V. Administrative Transparency 
 
The functions of the WTO are carried at the political level by the diplomats who are 
employed by WTO member states, and at the administrative level by the WTO 
secretariat, namely the permanent staff of the WTO. This chapter will discuss the 
transparency aspects in the administrative level of the WTO. Before that, it is noteworthy 
to give a summary of the political organs of the WTO, since they are the main organs of 
the WTO, which the Secretariat assists in their function. I will then move to describe the 
structure of the Secretariat, and discuss the transparency issues that arise in this context 
and are mainly related to the selection of the WTO employees, judges and other 
participants in the administration of international trade.  
 
A. Political bodies in the WTO: the various faces of the General Council 
 
The political organs of the WTO are meetings of diplomats, who represent their national 
governments, the WTO member states, the candidate members and the countries who 
have acquired observer status. Selection of diplomats occurs at the national level, and it 
varies from country to country. The structure of the WTO as an organization appears in 
Figure 4. The Ministerial Conference consists of minister-level representatives and is the 
highest decision-making body, which meets approximately every two years. The 
permanent organ in the WTO, the General Council consists of ambassador-level 
diplomats and meets approximately every two months. The Chairperson of the General 
Council is the highest elected position at the WTO. The Dispute Settlement Body and the 
Trade Policy Review Body comprise of the same members as the General Council (they 
are in fact the same body), acting under a different capacity and a different Chairperson.1 
Below the General Council under its three forms are the Specialized Councils, 
Committees, such as the Committee on Trade and Environment, the Committee on 
Balance of Payment Restrictions, the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Article IV:3 and 4 of the WTO Agreement. 
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Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Trade Negotiations 
Committee, and Working Parties in the WTO. [see following table] 
 
Figure 4 WTO Organizational Chart2  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Source: WTO website. 
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B. The WTO Secretariat 
 
At the administrative level, the WTO Secretariat consists of about six hundred 
employees, hired on temporary or permanent contract status.3  
 
Director-General 
Roberto Azevêdo 
 
• Office of the Director-General 
• Council and Trade Negotiations Committee Division 
• Office of Internal Audit 
• Information and External Relations Division 
* The Appellate Body Secretariat reports to the DG for non-dispute-
related administrative matters 
** The Enhanced Integrated Framework Secretariat reports to the DG for 
administrative matters 
Deputy Director-General 
Yonov Frederick AGAH  
• Trade Policies Review Division 
• Development Division 
• Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation 
Deputy Director-General 
Karl BRAUNER  
 
 
• Legal Affairs Division 
• Rules Division 
• Administration and General Services Division 
• Human Resources Division 
Deputy Director-General   
David SHARK       
 
 
  
• Agriculture and Commodities Division 
• Trade and Environment Division 
• Accessions Division 
• Information Technology Solutions Division 
• Languages Documentation and Information 
Management Division 
Deputy Director-General 
Xiaozhun YI 
 
  
• Market Access Division 
• Trade in Services Division 
• Intellectual Property Division 
• Economic Research and Statistics Division 
Table 10 The WTO Secretariat: Divisions4 
The head of the Secretariat is the Director-General, who is appointed by the Ministerial 
Conference. Although the issue of choosing a Director-General has become contentious 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS at 135 (2008). Today its staff consists of 629 people. See 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_e.htm. 
4 Source: WTO website. 
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at times,5 he has always been appointed through a highly politicized process by the 
Ministerial Conference and as such he enjoys a minimum form of democratic legitimacy. 
His role is that of a facilitator in the decision-making process of member states. A similar 
selection process by member states applies to Deputy Directors General, who are 
appointed by the Director-General in consultation with member states. To this date, only 
men have been appointed Director Generals. All of them are career diplomats and/or 
former trade ministers in their countries. Only two holders of the post, the current 
Director General, Roberto Azevêdo as well as Supachai Panitchpakdi come from a 
developing country (Brazil and Thailand respectively). Panitchpakdi and Mike Moore 
shared the post for one half of a six year period each. To date, six Europeans have held 
the post as well as one New Zealander. 
 
The rest of the Secretariat, most of which are lawyers or economists are hired through a 
different process. The original GATT was administered by a very small number of 
international officials6 whose duties were not only administrative, but they were required 
to help the committees working on tariffs, provide expert assistance to national 
delegations, support negotiations among different groups and provide statistical 
assistance.7 Even though the organization expanded, the size of the secretariat remained 
proportionally small. In the transition from the GATT to the WTO, the secretariat 
doubled in size and the WTO delegations have proportionately increased.  
 
Still, the total number of WTO officials is very small. Currently, the WTO employs 
approximately six hundred employees 8  who are still mostly trade lawyers and 
economists. 9  Together with them, another six hundred or so liaison officers and 
representatives to WTO located in the same building since 1977 in Geneva, manage 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS at 132-133 (2008). 
6 DOUGLAS IRWIN ET AL. THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 118 (2008). 
7 Id. 
8 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS at 135 (2008). Today its staff consists of 640 people. See WTO Secretariat 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_e.htm. 
9 WTO Recruitment http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/vacan_e/recruit_e.htm . 
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international trade. 10  Interestingly enough, it used to be very difficult to find an 
approximate number of the liaison officers and representatives to the WTO. In any event 
an accurate number could be found in the internally published annual phone directory. In 
1999 C. Michalopoulos, based on this directory, reported that the number of member-
state representatives was 540. The entry of China and Russia to the organization has 
changed this number, currently reported as 640.11 Only recently has the WTO website 
provided specific information with respect to the Secretariat. The selection appears to be 
related to nationality more than merit.12 
 
The hiring process for the WTO personnel begins in the WTO website where vacancies 
are announced. There, interested candidates, who must be citizens of one of the WTO 
member states and under the age of 65, can submit an application for the advertised 
positions. Before that, candidates fill out an elaborate online form in lieu of a curriculum 
vitae, together with an optional cover letter. The form contains personal details, contact 
information, family information, secretariat, language and computer skills, areas of 
expertise, education, employment history, an optional, vacancy-specific cover letter and 
names of references.13  
 
Beyond this information, little is known about the selection process. The WTO website 
contains little information with respect to the duration of the selection process, which 
may last several months “due to the rigours of placement.”14 Moreover: 
 
As the organization is a relatively small one, the turnover of staff is 
accordingly limited. The vacancies which do occur are the subject of open 
competition and advertised by means of vacancy notices, the distribution !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM 55 (3rd ed. 2009). They observe that the small size of the WTO Secretariat does not accurately 
reflect the very large network of diplomats in Geneva and civil servants within national administrations of 
member states which work “in close cooperation.” As they note: “The total size of the network is 
impossible to determine, but certainly spans at least 5,000 people.” Which is still an elite number.  
11  See Constantine Michalopoulos, The Participation of the Developing Countries in the WTO, 
MIMEOGRAPH (1999).  
12 Anne Peters, Dual Democracy in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 292 ( J. 
Klabbers et al eds. 2009). 
13 WTO Recruitment https://erecruitment.wto.org/public/edit/hrd-cl-vac-app.asp . 
14 WTO Recruitment https://erecruitment.wto.org/public/hrd-vac-faqs.asp?hdroff=1&faqqid=489&faqid . 
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of which is made to all of the official representatives of the governments 
participating in the WTO and they are posted on this website. They are 
also occasionally advertised in the press. Upon receipt, applications for a 
specific vacancy are forwarded to the Division concerned for evaluation 
and selection of candidates. Selected candidates may then be invited to 
Geneva for an interview, which will normally be supplemented by a 
written test. After approval of the selection by the Director General, an 
offer of appointment is sent to the selected candidate. […] A person 
wishing to apply for such a position in the Secretariat should possess a 
post-graduate university degree in economics, international relations or 
law, with an emphasis on trade issues. The academic qualifications should 
be supplemented by at least five years of experience with a national 
government or with an international organization or other organizations or 
enterprises dealing with issues of trade policy and international trade 
relations. For the professional staff the general duties, in addition to any 
particular functions of an advertised position, consist of preparation of 
reports, research and analysis, both economic and legal, servicing of 
meetings, and working with delegations of member states. Drafting skills 
are particularly important.15 
    
Beyond this information, nothing is known on the content of the examination. No other 
information exists publicly with respect to the interview process and the types of 
questions asked, or average candidate profiles.16 For those who have not participated in 
this process, very little information is publicly available, unlike, other organizations, 
which are quite transparent with respect to their examination process, as it happens for 
example in the United Nations17 or the European Union EPSO exams.18 Candidates for 
the posts in the UN or the EU can be well-acquainted with the nature of the exam they 
will be taking in order to qualify for employment to the organizations. There is no 
available information for the exams in the WTO19 and candidates usually sign waivers 
not to disclose any information after sitting for an exam.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 General information on recruitment in the World Trade Organization  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/vacan_e/recruit_e.htm 
16 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS at 135 (2008). 
17 United Nations Examinations and Test Section http://www.un.org/exam/lpe/welcome/main.asp . 
18  CAREERS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION  by the European Personnel Selection Office  
http://europa.eu/epso/index_en.htm . 
19 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS at 135 (2008). 
 
237 
The administrative segment of the WTO has accentuated the organization’s legitimacy 
crisis, since it is perceived as non-transparent and unaccountable. To a large extent, the 
organization’s legitimacy issues are emphasized by its perceived significant 
compositional flaw: a very small number of unaccountable diplomats and international 
technocrats are the key actors of the international financial system has put the WTO 
under a lot of scrutiny. This “elite administration” has not been elected and remains 
politically unaccountable for advancing normative changes in the area of international 
trade that affect development and economic factors of all countries, developing and 
developed and by consequence the lives of a very significant fraction of the world 
population. 
 
The WTO Secretariat has contributed significantly in the development of the so-called 
Global Administrative Law. Transparency in particular is viewed as a fundamental value 
of public institutions in liberal democracies20. Transparency and accountability are 
structurally linked. 21 Shaffer and Nicolaides22, Benvenisti23, Chimni24 and Cassese25 have 
linked transparency and accountability.  
 
Transparency in the WTO secretariat context has been linked to the circulation review of 
documentation. 26  This focus is consistent with a Weberian analysis, whereby 
governments are seen as seeking exclusive access to knowledge as a method of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Armin von Bogdandy et al, Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal 
Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1375-1400, 1384 (2008). 
21  Benedict Kingsbury & Lorenzo Casini, Global administrative law dimensions of international 
organizations law, 2 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 319-356 (2009), pp and Nico Krish & Benedict Kingsbury, 
Introduction: Global governance and Global administrative law in the international legal order, 17:1 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 1-13 (2006). 
22 Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without 
Global Government 68:3-4 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 263-317 (2005). 
23 Eyal Benvenisti, The Interplay between Actors as a Determinant of the Evolution of Administrative Law 
in International Institutions 68:3-4 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 323-340 (2005).  
24 Bhupinder Singh Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 
EUR. J. INT’L L.   1-37 (2004). 
25 Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 
111-126 (2005). 
26 Isabel Feichtner, The Administration of the Vocabulary of International Trade: The Adaptation of WTO 
Schedules to Changes in the Harmonized System 9 GERMAN L. J.  1481 at 1494 (2008). 
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increasing their power 27  and therefore the publication of documentation becomes 
important as part of increasing the accountability of governments. We analyzed the 
circulation of documents in the previous section, as it is part of external transparency. 
Less attention has been directed towards the elite nature and the intransparent hiring 
processes of the organization, even though it is equally important. Steward and Ratton 
argue in this respect that strengthening the WTO’s “internal administrative branch” will 
assist the organization in addressing its legitimacy deficit. 28  
C. Panelists and Appellate Body Members 
 
The members of the Panel and the Appellate Body are selected through a process 
explained at the Dispute Settlement Understanding. The panelists are not permanent but 
they are selected ad hoc only for the dispute before them. On the contrary, the Appellate 
Body members serve four-year terms once renewable.29  
 
According to Article 8 DSU: 
 
1. Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-
governmental individuals, including persons who have served on or 
presented a case to a panel […]. 
2. Panel members should be selected with a view to ensuring the 
independence of the members, a sufficiently diverse background and a 
wide spectrum of experience. 
3. Citizens of Members whose governments are parties to the dispute or 
third parties as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 10 shall not serve on a 
panel concerned with that dispute, unless the parties to the dispute agree 
otherwise.30 
 
Even though panelists are only selected for the dispute before them, in the last two 
decades we can observe a few of trends in terms of panel member selection. The first is 
that certain members reappear in multiple disputes. It seems there is a reputational effect !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Ingo Venzke, International Bureaucracies from a Political Science Perspective – Agency, Authority and 
International Institutional Law, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1401-1428, 1418 (2008). 
28 Richard B. Stewart & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The World Trade Organization: Multiple 
dimensions of Global Administrative Law, 9:3-4 INT’L J CONSTITUTIONAL L. 556-586, 559 (2011). 
29 Article 17.2 DSU. 
30 Emphasis added. 
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in the judges’ approach to trade disputes, and thus panelists have incentives to decide in 
certain ways in order to get reappointed by countries.31 Second, possibly as a result from 
the first, there is a significantly large number of judges are citizens of certain countries, 
such as New Zealand and Canada.32 Panelists are selected from a roster as it is described 
in Article 8 DSU. 
 
4. To assist in the selection of panelists, the Secretariat shall maintain an 
indicative list of governmental and non-governmental individuals 
possessing the qualifications outlined in paragraph 1, from which panelists 
may be drawn as appropriate. […]. Members may periodically suggest 
names of governmental and non-governmental individuals for inclusion on 
the indicative list, providing relevant information on their knowledge of 
international trade and of the sectors or subject matter of the covered 
agreements, and those names shall be added to the list upon approval by 
the DSB.  
[…] 
6. The Secretariat shall propose nominations for the panel to the parties to 
the dispute. The parties to the dispute shall not oppose nominations except 
for compelling reasons. 
7. If there is no agreement on the panelists within 20 days after the date of 
the establishment of a panel, at the request of either party, the Director-
General, in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Chairman 
of the relevant Council or Committee, shall determine the composition of 
the panel by appointing the panelists whom the Director-General considers 
most appropriate […] after consulting with the parties to the dispute.  
[…] 
 
Paragraph 9 of Article 8 DSU discusses the independence of judges from their respective 
governments.33 In particular, panelists serve in their individual capacities and cannot 
receive instructions or be in any way influenced by their governments. Moreover, ex 
parte communications are not allowed, and as such both parties must be present in all 
communications with the Panel. Here, however we should note again the reputational !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Anne Peters, Dual Democracy in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  296 ( J. 
Klabbers et al eds. 2009). 
32 See Annex 5, with data from the WTO website.  
33 Moreover “any covered person is required to disclose the existence or development of any interest, 
relationship or matter that he or she could reasonably be expected to know and that is likely to affect or 
give rise to justifiable doubts as to that person’s independence or impartiality. Such disclosure has to 
include information on financial, professional and other active intersts as well as considered statements of 
public opinion and employment or family intersts. Right to challenge participation and request exclusion. 
RULES OF CONDUCT OF DSU, Page 27 , WT/DSB/RC/1 11 December 1996. 
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value of serving as a panelist and the desire to be re-appointed. As such, the temporary 
nature of the appointment as well as the popularity of certain panelists contributes to 
compromised independence as well as the transparency of the process. The expenses of 
panelists, according to paragraph 11 are covered from the WTO budget.  
 
Similar provisions apply to the Appellate Body. Since it is a standing body, the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding provides that “[t]he Appellate Body membership shall be 
broadly representative of membership in the WTO.” The Appellate Body has its own 
administrative infrastructure, the Appellate Body Secretariat. Former members of the 
Appellate Body have oftentimes been very vocal in describing the process and culture of 
decision-making. As a result, we know much about the process on appeal, although the 
information relies solely on personal accounts from former members. 34  Moreover, 
Appellate Body members have been vocal towards the political WTO organs and the 
need for more explicit and robust decisions.35 It appears that since the WTO decision-
making process is very intricate, the Appellate Body experiences some pressure to cover 
voids in the Agreements.36 This has been hailed as forward looking, and the Appellate 
Body is seen as transitioning “from legalistic reasoning to public reason and deliberative 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 James Bacchus, Table Talk: Around the Table of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 
35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1021 (2002), Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO Appellate 
Body 38 TEX. INT’L L. J. 469 (2003. 
35 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experiences from the WTO Appellate Body 38 TEX. INT’L L. J. 469 (2003)  “At 
least among lawyers there should be no doubt that one of these legal channels has to be used by WTO 
Members if they want to guide the Appellate Body in its future attitude towards the amicus curiae issue or 
any other contested problem of interpretation” confirming what Ginsburg says (infra) Tom Ginsburg, 
Political Constraints on International Courts in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION  483-502 at 492 (C. Romano ed. 2013). 
“I’m afraid that the results achieved during the Uruguay Round with respect to dispute settlement can only 
be sustained in the long run, if political decision-making becomes easier and a true complement to judicial 
decision-making”  
36 Tom Ginsburg, Political Constraints on International Courts in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION  483-502 at 492 (C. Romano ed. 2013) “Multiple parties typically do not 
build easy amendment procedures in to the treaty design and the more parties involved the more difficult 
any amendments will be to conclude. The WTO treaty is amended as a package in multinational 
negotiations that last years. The transaction costs are intentionally high; in order to make commitments 
effective, they must be difficult to escape. This makes the potential scope of law making capacity greater in 
multilateral settings and is a source of concern about the courts becoming runaway lawmakers. […] the 
bundling of international courts with broader regimes insulates the tribunals from certain forms of 
pressure.” 
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reasoning, from retrospective compliance with the law to a prospective modeling of 
consequences.”37 
 
Additionally, with respect to transparency, according to Article 14 of the DSU, much of 
the formal and informal part of the dispute settlement process is confidential, such as the 
submissions of the parties, the first draft of the Panel Report, and the consultations 
leading to the circulation of the Report. The first oral hearing is usually taped.38 The 
submissions of the parties are published in the “descriptive part” 39 of the report, and 
parties are free to disclose their own submissions to the public at any time.40 Several 
members publish their submissions in their websites.41 Once circulated to the WTO 
member states, the report is immediately made public and uploaded at the WTO website. 
In this sense, the procedure is quite transparent. As we noted previously, some of the 
meetings of the Panels can be publicly viewed in the WTO building if the parties agree to 
do so. Overall, the process is not different from many tribunals, and it could be improved.  
D. Selection of experts for the Dispute Settlement Process 
 
Lastly, the selection of experts is based on the right of the Panel to seek information 
according to Article 13 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. Many agreements have 
similar provisions and discuss the advisory role of experts with professional experience. 
As with Panelists, citizens of parties cannot participate as experts unless parties consent 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 HELMUT WILLKE, SMART GOVERNANCE: GOVERNING THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 85(2007) 
discussing the space for procedural rationality “from legalistic reasoning to public reason and deliberative 
reasoning. Looking closely at the world of the Appellate Body of the WTO, Garrett and Smith 
conclude“that the members of the Appellate Body are forward-looking and strategic” (Geoffrey Garrett & 
James McCall Smith, The Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement LEITNER PROGRAM WORKING PAPERS ISSUE 
5 <http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/30237/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/a5fd2fd0-
a3e4-4d2c-b475-cb807e39797d/en/1999-05.pdf>)  (1999) This change of normative perspective is 
prompted by the need to strengthen the authority and legitimacy of the norms of the WTO when the 
organization itself has no power of enforcing its rulings or of setting binding standards of its own.  
38 WTO SECRETARIAT, LEGAL AFFAIRS DIVISION & THE APPELLATE BODY, A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 26 (2004). 
39 Id. 55. 
40 Article 18.2 of the DSU and para 3 of working procedures in Appendix 3 to DSU. 
41  See for example http://mkaccdb.eu.int/miti/dsu for the European Union, 
http://www.acwl.ch/cases/SubmenuCase.htm for developing countries who are represented by the ACWL, 
http://www/dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/dispute-e.asp for Canada, http://ustr.gov/enforcement/briefs.shtml for 
the US.  
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to it. To date only individuals have been invited as experts, instead of expert review 
groups although the Dispute Settlement Understanding allows both.42 The Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures Agreement43 and the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement44 
establish permanent groups of experts in order to assist and consult the Panels and 
Appellate Body or provide the relevant committee with advisory opinions.  
 
The choice of expertise in the WTO carries important consequences. Many of the issues 
discussed are highly technical and expertise is necessary especially for the Panels but also 
for the Appellate Body in order to deliberate. The reliance upon the Secretariat and 
experts, both of which lack democratic legitimacy shifts our examination in this chapter 
towards the choice of these “expert” groups. First of all, expertise alone is not a 
legitimizing factor.45 In numerous disciplines exist multiple discourses and different 
results. The lack of transparency in choice of the experts together with the obscurity 
during the hiring process of WTO secretariat employees needs to somehow be countered. 
A very important way is the introduction of alternative views through amicus curiae 
briefs as was discussed in the chapter for external transparency. Even though the main 
premise of this thesis is a holistic approach on transparency and the idea that each of the 
issues related to transparency should be examined separately and the WTO should 
perform adequately in all of these areas, this is an exception. In particular, experts can be 
invited by the Panels and Appellate Body following any selection process, as long as 
alternative view points are introduced by the civil society through briefs. Such a balance 
would add to the legitimacy of the process before the Dispute Settlement Body. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Article 13.2 and Appendix 4 DSU.  
43 Article 24 paragraphs 2 and 3. 
44 Article 14 paragraph 3 and Annex 2.  
45 Anne Peters, Dual Democracy in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  292 ( J. 
Klabbers et al eds. 2009). 
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VI. Legal Transparency 
 
The previous chapters discussed various forms of transparency affecting the WTO, its 
member states and civil society at an institutional level. The last chapter will discuss a 
different form of transparency, namely the obligation of WTO member states to publish 
their trade-related legislation and the rule of law obligations to maintain adequate 
recourse mechanisms for traders and consumers in order to resolve issues that may arise 
in transnational trade matters, both at the border upon the entry of products, and at the 
domestic market context. 
 
The lack of transparency in the legal orders of WTO member states is considered to be a 
non-tariff barrier to trade and WTO member states are obligated from the GATT to 
refrain from allowing, enabling or imposing such a barrier. Even though this obligation 
existed from 1947, it has acquired attention only after the mid-eighties, to become “the 
best insurance policy against protectionism.”1 When explored, both the content and the 
recipients of benefits from transparency are the same in the WTO context, for all the 
types of transparencies, including the legal transparency of Article X. Disclosure of 
information, recourse mechanisms, platforms for stakeholders and shareholders to raise 
their concerns and voice their opinions is the content of both transparency as a legal 
principle in the WTO at the institutional level and the GATT for member states. The 
beneficiaries of transparency are other states, their citizens, the citizens of the host state, 
consumers and traders at large. Similarly, the different forms of WTO transparencies 
explored in the previous chapters have in one way or the other the same recipients.  
 
As such, transparency within the WTO’s institutional culture and administration needs to 
be examined together with legal transparency, since attitudinal changes with respect to 
openness tend to cross-fertilize the different forms of transparency. This holistic approach 
to transparency has prompted the inclusion of this chapter, and in particular, the elaborate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Lamy hails transparency as the best insurance policy against protectionism  
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/trdev_19jul13_e.htm 
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analysis on the different aspects of legal transparency, the monitoring mechanisms, which 
are in place to maintain updated information on trade legislation of WTO member states 
and their trade policies, and finally, the impressively large amount of disputes brought 
before the Panels and the Appellate Body, with transparency as a main or a secondary 
issue. Essentially, monitoring mechanisms and dispute settlement are the two tiers of the 
implementation of the letter and the spirit of Article X of the GATT.  
 
Additionally, legal transparency refers to the knowledge of the rules of trade “on the 
ground” at the site of their application, the borders and the markets of WTO member 
states. It is in many ways a prerequisite for other forms of transparency, and the first 
“contact” point between the importer, the exporter and the consumer with the WTO rules 
of trade. Article X does not establish a right of the above actors towards the WTO, but 
under certain conditions it creates (or reiterates- if they already exist) rights in the 
domestic legal order. It certainly creates a right to challenge tariffs other border measures 
before an administrative or adjudicatory mechanism.  
 
Finally, this chapter adds to the discussion on the value of the WTO as a game-changing 
organization in international trade by reducing the cost of information and ensuring that it 
is made available to all interested parties. This contribution is achieved because of the 
focus on transparency. This chapter will examine the law of transparency in the first 
section, the monitoring mechanisms in the second and the GATT and WTO case law in 
the third. Last, it will discuss the connection between legal transparency and the other 
forms, as it is one that needs further explanation.  
A. The law of the transparency obligations 
 
Surprisingly, Article X did not come to the forefront of adjudication and general attention 
until the nineties. On one hand, On the other hand, transparency as a legal rule has 
received significant attention. In particular, it will examine the history and evolution of 
transparency as a legal rule, its position in the accession process and the trade policy 
review mechanism and most importantly, its interpretation by the Dispute Settlement 
Body. In the WTO Agreements there are several provisions that impose transparency 
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obligations on WTO Member States. Member States are required to publish information 
with respect to legislation on any trade related issues that are regulated by the WTO 
Agreements that they are parties to and notify other members with respect to any changes 
in such legislation (publication and notification requirement). Additionally, WTO 
Members are required to establish enquiry points to provide information. Finally, several 
committees and mechanisms are put forward, including the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism, in order to produce reports with respect to trade policies of Member States 
(trade policy review process). 2 A list of articles related to transparency will be mapped 
here. 
 
In general, lack of transparency is viewed as a Non-Tariff Barrier to international trade.3 
Transparency provisions in the WTO have been viewed in a positive manner. As 
Bhagwati has stated:  
 
The mere exposure of a country’s policies in a coherent and impartial 
fashion can bring moral pressure to bear for change in the desired 
direction. I call it the Dracula Effect: expose evil to sunlight and it begins 
to shrivel and then die. 4 
 
The incorporation of transparency obligations and other provisions in the WTO 
Agreements first stresses the significance of openness and information sharing with 
respect to tariffs and trade regulation in the conduct of international trade. Second, it 
promotes a culture of peer-to-peer knowledge communication on measures affecting 
trade, and it creates a noteworthy platform of continuous cooperation for the smoother 
and more legitimate conduct of trade. Presumably transparency provisions will help draw 
at least some political support from civil society towards the WTO and from national !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS at 461-466 (2008). Van Den Bossche mentions four kinds of transparency requirements in 
the WTO: the publication requirement, the notification requirement, the requirement to establish enquiry 
points and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. He examines them in the context of mitigating the issue of 
non-tariff barriers to trade in goods.  
3 Id.  
4 Jagdish Bhagwati , Free Trade: What Now?, Keynote Address, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, on 
25th May 1998, International Management Symposium 1998 Freedom Prize, Max Schmidheiny 
Foundation p. 17, available at time.dufe.edu.cn/wencong/bhagwati/freedom_speech.pdf  accessed on 
November 17, 2012.  
 
246 
constituencies towards their governments. Thirdly, transparency potentially facilitates the 
settlement of disputes between countries outside the Dispute Settlement Body, which is 
also encouraged by the organization.5 Finally, it provides access to valuable information 
to investors, traders, individuals and corporate entities, thereby facilitating their 
participation in trade.  
 
Article X, the main provision of transparency in the GATT, was included during the 
negotiations for the International Trade Organization (ITO) after 1944, and was 
incorporated in the GATT. 6 According to the ITO negotiation history, Article X was 
loosely formed in accordance to Articles 4 and 6 of the 1923 International Convention 
Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities7. It was included as Article 15 of the 
US’ Department of Trade Suggested Charter for the ITO of the UN8 and then became 
Article 38 of the Havana Charter. Finally, it was integrated into the GATT, as Article X. 
 
Article X, entitled “Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations”, in its first 
paragraph requires WTO Member States to publish any laws, regulations, judicial 
decisions, administrative rulings of general application and international agreements 
which are related to trade. Such publication should occur promptly and in a manner that 
enables governments and traders to become familiar with them. Confidential information 
and information whose publication would either be detrimental to the public interest or to 
the interests of enterprises are not required to be published.  
 
Paragraph 2 adds a temporal character to the obligation of Paragraph 1; in particular, it 
provides that measures with respect to trade can be enforced only after they are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM, (3rd ed. 2009). According to Hoekman and Kostecki, transparency facilitates communication, 
allows the exchange of information (at 43). Transparency also reduces the pressure on the dispute 
settlement system and channels the discussion of certain measures towards the appropriate WTO body ( at 
45). 
6 Paragraph 8 of section A Chapter III of the Proposals 13 Department of State Bulletin 913 (December 9 
1945 No 337) at 920. Washington DC US Department of State Publication 3117 Commercial Policy Series 
113 released April 1947. See also Padideh Ala’I, From the Periphery to the Center? The Evolving WTO 
Jurisprudence on Transparency and Good Governance, 11:4 J. INT’L ECON. L.  779-802 at 782 (2008). 
7 DOUGLAS IRWIN ET AL, THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 147-148 (2008). 
8 Id. 
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published, reflecting the legal maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege praevia (no 
crime, no penalty without a law that precedes the act).  
 
Paragraph 3 (a) requires the administration of laws in a “uniform, impartial and 
reasonable manner.” Paragraph 3 (b) outlines the obligation of WTO member states to 
maintain judicial review mechanisms and procedures, which should be prompt and 
independent, thus guaranteeing impartiality and minimum Rule of Law safeguards. The 
last part (c) of paragraph 3 discusses the existence of agencies that are not formally or 
fully independent at the date of entry into force of the GATT.  
 
There are equivalents of Article X, with some differentiation depending on subject 
matter, in many other WTO Agreements. Here we will examine briefly some of the most 
important articles within the WTO Agreements. 9  
 
Article III of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contains a provision 
on transparency, again imposing obligations for publication of legislation and notification 
of changes in laws that affect trade in services and prompt response to requests by other 
members on any of the regulations affecting trade in services. 10 
 
In the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Part 
V, under the title “Dispute Prevention and Settlement”, contains Article 63 on 
Transparency, effectively extending the obligations of publication, notification and 
establishment of review mechanisms to the subject matter of this Agreement. 
 
Articles 5 and 6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) contain provisions 
that address issues relevant to anti-dumping investigations. In particular, they describe !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 There are over 200 notification requirements embodied in the various WTO agreements and mandated by 
ministerial and General Council decisions. See BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 71 (3rd ed. 2009). 
10 See Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20:3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 575-
614 (2009)  and Richard H. Steinberg, The Hidden World of WTO Governance: A Reply to Andrew Lang 
and Joanne Scott  20:4 EUR. J. INT’L L.1063-1071 (2009) discussing administrative issues with respect to 
WTO Committees and WTO governance involving the GATS and SPS Agreements. 
 
248 
the kinds of information that need to be included in an application for an investigation 
and how authorities will respond to requests for information. For example, Article 6.4 
provides that authorities will provide “timely opportunities for all interested parties” to 
have access to all information relevant to their claims. Article 6.9 requires authorities to 
inform all interested parties of all the essential facts under consideration before reaching 
a final decision. Article 12 outlines the content required in public notices of the initiation 
of an investigation and the explanation of the determinations on the anti-dumping 
investigation. Finally, Article 13, under the title “Judicial Review”, provides for the 
establishment of tribunals or procedures for the “prompt review of administrative actions 
relating to final determination.” Such tribunals must be independent of the authority that 
made the original decision. 
 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in Article 11 regulates the 
initiation and conduct of an investigation on existence, degree and effect of subsidies. 
Article 12 discusses information on evidence, and finally Articles 22 and 23 set out 
detailed requirements for public notice and judicial review. 
 
Article 1.3 of the Import Licensing Agreement provides that all licensing procedures will 
be administered in a “fair and equitable manner.” Article 1.4 provides for publication of 
rules that enables “governments and traders to become acquainted with them.” Paragraph 
5 of the same article discusses application forms and procedures.  
 
The first paragraph of Article 3 of the Agreement on Safeguards also contains publication 
requirements during the investigation phase by national authorities. The second 
paragraph describes the appropriate treatment of confidential information during the 
investigation. Also, Article 12 provides for notification obligations to Committee on 
Safeguards. The Agreement on Safeguards explicitly refers in Article 3 to Article X of 
the GATT. Similarly, Article 2(g) of the Agreement on Rules of Origin and Article 12 of 
the Valuation Agreement make reference to Article X.  
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Finally, the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement also contains provisions 
to ensure transparency in laws, regulations, procedures and practices with respect to 
government procurement, in Article V which provides for the establishment of 
information centers, Article VII paragraph 2, on not providing information in a manner 
that would have an effect of precluding competition, Article VIII on the qualification 
procedures for suppliers, Articles IX to XVII describing various procedural aspects 
during the tendering process, with Article XVII explicitly focusing on transparency. 11 
 
In addition to the above articles, several other decisions and Councils are related to 
transparency, publication, notification, judicial review and exchange of information. The 
most important one is the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which will be examined in 
detail later. It is based on the Understanding on Notification, Consultation, Dispute 
Settlement and Surveillance where the GATT contracting parties agreed in 1979 to 
establish a periodic trade review process of laws and practices of parties to the GATT 
that affect trade. Besides the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, other bodies and 
procedures in the WTO that perform functions related to transparency are, inter alia, the 
Working Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures (established in 1995 by the 
Council for Trade in Goods, it focuses on import licensing procedures), the Council for 
Trade in Services, the Committee on Trade and Development (established in 1965), the 
Committee on Balance of Payments Restrictions, the Committee on Safeguards and the 
Textiles Monitoring Body. 
 
Ensuring compliance with Article X comes at a high cost for many countries. Some of the 
WTO members already have, and possible have had for quite some time mechanisms in 
place to publish their trade laws, inquiry points and administrative and adjudicatory 
processes. For others, the cost of Article X has been proven to be high. 12  The 
proliferation of such requirements during the Uruguay Round, because of the covered !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS at 474 (2008).  
12 Finger, J. Michael, & Philip Schuler. Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The 
Development Challenge 23:4 THE WORLD ECONOMY 511-525 (2000). See also on the ideological 
foundations of such reforms, Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridicial Touchdown: The Regulatory 
Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209, esp. 
224-225 (2001).  
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Agreements placed an undue burden to many WTO member states and in particular 
developing and least developed countries whose resources are more limited. Not only did 
many states have to change their legislation in order to conform with technical aspects of 
the new Agreements, they also had to ensure there is appropriate information and 
recourse processes for traders. The value of Article X is great, but there needed to be 
additional consideration for a phase-in process. Some technical assistance was provided 
but only to least developed and some developing countries.13 It would have been optimal 
if similar support was provided for middle income countries as well as any country whose 
domestic legal system had to undergo a serious adaptation in order to comply with the 
abundance of transparency rules.  
B. Transparency monitoring bodies 
 
Trade monitoring and surveillance began in the late 1970’s and the 1980’s.14 It is yet 
another very important mechanism fostering the culture of transparency in the WTO is 
monitoring of countries’ trade policies and practices. Trade monitoring first occurs on an 
ad hoc daily basis at various WTO committees. Second, the member states have 
established two permanent monitoring bodies, one general and one specific, the Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) and the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). 
 
The various councils and the committees in the WTO act as ad hoc monitoring 
mechanisms, since, among other things, they are responsible for observing members’ 
activities related to the GATT and other agreements.15 The three specialized councils 
working under the General Council are: the Council for Trade in Goods; the Council for 
Trade in Services; and the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13  Id. 
14 Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert Wolfe, From Sunshine to a Common Agent. The Evolving Understanding 
of Transparency in the WTO ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER  
RSCAS 2-3(2015).  
15 See for example, Articles 17 and 18 of Agreement on Agriculture, establishing the Committee on 
Agriculture, Article 3 paragraphs 4 and 5 and Article 12 paragraphs 1-4 of the SPS Agreement establishing 
the SPS Committee and the collaboration of WTO members with international organizations whose 
mandate is to develop and harmonize standards on Sanitary and Phytosanitary products, Article 18 of the 
Customs Valuation Agreement, Article 7 of the TRIMS, Article 4 of the Import Licensing Agreement, 
Article 13 of the Agreement on Safeguards etc. Each Agreement regulates to a lesser or a larger extent the 
relevant committee.  
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Rights. The specialized committees issue reports and updates on countries’ notifications 
and compliance with WTO obligations. They then report to the General Council or the 
three specialized councils, which further report to the General Council. They also issue 
annual reports to the General Council. The WTO Secretariat assists this process since 
monitoring developments in trade is one of its duties. Some of the notification, 
information-sharing and monitoring procedures at the committees’ level are directly 
linked to transparency,16 especially when the documents produced are de-classified and 
published. But even prior to publication, the internal information monitoring and sharing 
promotes a culture of transparency within the organization.17 
 
Organized trade monitoring happens at the TPRM. The TPRM conducts periodic reviews 
of the trade policies and practices of all WTO members. In effect the TPRM embodies a 
consolidated effort towards the systematic implementation of all the different provisions 
in various WTO agreements which provide for the obligation of member states to publish 
their legislation and inform the organization on any changes in their trade policies or the 
adoption of new ones.18 
 
The TPRM was established during the Uruguay Round negotiations and was included in 
the Marrakesh Agreement of 1995 as Annex 3. It is therefore part of the Agreement 
Establishing the WTO.19 OECD and IMF review practices likely influenced its creation.20 
The TPRM was officially established in April 198921. Originally the TPRM focused on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Members’ transparency toolkit http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_toolkit_e.htm  
17 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS at 138 (2008). 
18 Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement (WTO 1995) Under A (i) objectives: “…contribute to improved 
adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments made under the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements […] and hence to the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving 
greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of Members.” 
19 The origins of the TPRM can be traced in the 1985 Leutwiler Report Recommendation 8, as well as the 
1986 Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este, which officially launched the Uruguay Round or trade 
negotiations. see Asif Qureshi, The New GATT Trade Policy Review Mechanism: An Exercise in 
Transparency or “Enforcement”? 24 J. WORLD TRADE 147, 148 (1990). Member States to the GATT 
decided to provisionally approve the TPRM in 1988 during the Montreal Ministerial Mid-Term Review 
Conference. 
20 Id. 
21 PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS at 82 footnote 20 (2008). Also Asif Qureshi, The New GATT Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism: An Exercise in Transparency or “Enforcement”? 24 J. WORLD TRADE 147, 149 (1990). 
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trade in goods, but after the birth of the WTO it extended its works in the areas of 
services and intellectual property.  
 
Trade Policy Reviews consist of two reports, one by the member state undergoing review 
and one by the WTO Secretariat, and it includes the minutes of meeting of the Trade 
Policy Review Body and the concluding remarks of its Chairperson. There reviews are 
then published in the WTO website. To date, the Trade Policy Review Body has 
conducted 291 Trade Reviews.22  The periodicity of the reviews depends on each 
member’s share of world trade. Thus, the United States, the European Communities, 
China, Canada and Japan are reviewed bi-annually.23 The next sixteen largest trading 
members are reviewed every four years and the rest every six years.24 Review of Least-
Developed countries can occur less frequently.25 The General Council of the WTO, 
acting as the Trade Policy Review Body26, meets on a monthly basis and under its Rules 
of Procedure appoints a Chairman, who has to be different than the Chairman of the 
General Council or the Dispute Settlement Body.27  
 
The TPRM focuses on national trade policy openness as part of the overall agenda of 
supporting the effectiveness of the world trading system and achieving coherence in 
global policy making28.  The TPRM is a mechanism that is directed to the benefit of both 
individuals and companies involved in trade, and it has as its objective to inform them as 
much as possible on all different aspects and conditions of trade. 29 According to Part B 
of Annex 3, entitled “Domestic Transparency”  
 
Members recognize the inherent value of domestic transparency of 
government decision-making on trade policy matters for both Members' 
economies and the multilateral trading system, and agree to encourage and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#chronologically Accessed on April 8, 2014. 
23 Trade Policy Review Mechanism Paragraph C (ii) Annex 3  
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Article III  4. 
27 Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Trade Policy Review Body. 
28 See Annex 3 in light of the Punta del Este Declaration. 
29According to the WTO website under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, “Individuals and companies 
involved in trade have to know as much as possible about the conditions of trade.” 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm11_e.htm  
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promote greater transparency within their own systems, acknowledging 
that the implementation of domestic transparency must be on a voluntary 
basis and take account of each Member's legal and political systems.30 
 
The TPRM is not to be used as a corrective mechanism and is not established to assist 
with actionable violations of WTO law.31 This means that the TPRM is not to be used as 
an information platform for launching disputes among member states.32 Rather, the focus 
of the TPRM on transparency and the empowerment of private market actors through 
information. Additionally, the TPRM is to a very large extent complimentary to the 
concrete obligations of Article X. As the GATT was reaching its fourth decade of 
existence, the spirit of Article X was supported by the TPRM as a new institutional form 
that does not have as a primary goal to enforce, but to inform all actors in international 
trade rather than just the members to the Agreements. Thus, the WTO focuses on 
transparency and the systematic review of trade policies as part of providing trade-related 
information not only to governments but also to private parties.  
 
It is interesting to take a look at an example of the Trade Policy Review of a country. 
China is an interesting case, since it is a recent WTO member, has requested developing 
country status and its economy is very substantial for the global economy.33 For that 
reason, China is reviewed every four years and here we will look at the last four reports. 
 
In the 2006 the TPRM acknowledged that the Chinese government has taken significant 
steps to improve transparency. Standardization of the behavior of administrative 
departments, public participation at various phases of the legislative process, 
establishment of enquiry points and websites are some of the measures mentioned in the 
Trade Policy Report. Two years later the TPRM revisited Chinese legislation and found 
that it had taken further steps to improve transparency. “Nonetheless,” the TPRM notes !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement (WTO 1995) Under B. 
31 Asif Qureshi, The New GATT Trade Policy Review Mechanism: An Exercise in Transparency or 
“Enforcement”? 24 J. WORLD TRADE 147-160 at 148 (1990). 
32 According to Paragraph A of the Annex on the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, the TPRM:“is not 
intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific obligations under the Agreements, or for dispute 
settlement purposes or to impose new policy commitments on Members.” 
33 Ljiljiana Biukovic, Selective Adaptation of WTO Transparency Norms and Local Practices in China and 
Japan, 11:4 J. INT’L ECON. L.  803-825 (2008). 
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“some aspects of China's trade policy regime remain complex and opaque.” The Chinese 
government has focused on publication of laws and the prevention and reduction of 
corruption but is still not publishing the economic evaluation of policies and measures, 
including tax and non-tax incentives, “to the detriment of public accountability, and thus 
governance.” In 2010 China had not improved significantly in terms of transparency. The 
Report of the TPRM mentions that China ranked 38th among 48 countries in the 2009 
Opacity Index. Complexity and opacity are seen as leading to corruption. The Report also 
mentions the Corruption Perceptions Index, where China ranked 72nd, with a score of 3.6 
out of 10 in 2008.  Finally, in 2012, the TPRM focused again extensively on transparency 
and noted the same deficits in publication of laws and information disclosure. The TPRM 
noted that there is still room for discretion and thus for corruption. The Report cites the 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index again, in which in 2011 China 
ranked 75th, with a score 3.6 out of 10, almost identical to its ranking in 2009. Then the 
report looks at information dissemination, still noting the lack of publication for tax and 
non-tax incentives. It also explores consultations with the private sector, including notice 
and comment procedures.34  
 
A continuous scrutiny on the issue of transparency is obvious from these Reports. Even 
though the TPRM has little to no enforcement power, still, the exposure of inadequacies 
in the reform of the Chinese legal system according to WTO obligations is noteworthy. 
The lack of transparency in China has become both pervasive and costly.35 There is 
intense criticism for China’s judicial process and lack of transparency36, which further 
causes a number of credibility problems for the country.37 The WTO has helped to shed 
light to the country’s previously corrupt practices. Prior to the accession of China to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 “Although, according to the authorities, all draft administrative regulations have been published on the 
China Legislative Information Network for public comments since 2008, it would appear that not all 
departmental rules have been published for public comment.  […] It was not clear to the Secretariat to what 
extent affected foreign investors were involved in the consultations, or whether proceedings or minutes of 
the hearings were available to the public.”   
35 Lawrence Trautman, American Enterpreneur in China: Potholes and Roadblocks on the Silk Road to 
Prosperity 12 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 427-446 (2012). 
36 John Capowski, China’s Evidentiary and Procedural Reforms, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the 
Harmonization of Civil and Common Law, 47 TEX. INT’L L. J. 42(2012), WIDENER LAW SCHOOL LEGAL 
STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER No. 12-02  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1979502. 
37 David Gantz, World Trade Law After Doha: Multilateral, Regional and National Approaches, ARIZONA 
LEGAL STUDIES DISCUSSION PAPER No 12-01 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984777 23 (January 2012). 
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WTO such a thorough inspection process, which most importantly occurs with the 
participation of China, was nonexistent.  
 
The second permanent monitoring body is the Textiles Monitoring Body or TMB 
established by article 8 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.38 The Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing, singed in 1995, established a 10-year transitional program in order 
to eliminate previous quotas in textiles and integrate the sector into GATT rules. Thus, 
the Textiles Agreement is a transitional instrument. According to the Agreement, the 
TMB supervises the implementation of the Agreement and ensures that the rules are 
faithfully followed. It is a quasi-judicial, standing body39 with unique characteristics in 
the organization. It consists of a Chairman and ten members, appointed by WTO Member 
governments and rotating at “appropriate intervals”40. The TMB issues annual reports to 
the Council for Trade in Goods.41  
 
Another new mechanism is the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, which in 
theory aspires to mitigate he negative consequences from RTAs and PTAs to global trade 
and the WTO Agreements.42 Finally, Mavroidis and Wolfe discuss the “specific trade 
concerns” procedure, as 
 
“the most elaborate monitoring and surveillance mechanism[…] not 
mentioned in the text of any WTO agreement, although many agreements 
encourage a process where members may engage in ad hoc 
“consultations””43 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Swapneshwar Goutam, The Role of Textiles Monitoring Body in the Agreement on textile and clothing 
and its Significance in International Trade, 5:1 J. INT’L COMMERCIAL L. & TECHNOLOGY 41 (2010).  
39 Article 8 paras 2 and 3, and 6-10. 
40 Article 8 para 1. 
41 Textiles http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/texti_e/texti_e.htm 
42 Petros C. Mavroidis, Always look at the bright side of non-delivery: WTO and Preferential Trade 
Agreements, yesterday and today, 10:3 WORLD TRADE REV 375-387 (2011). 
43 Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert Wolfe, From Sunshine to a Common Agent. The Evolving Understanding 
of Transparency in the WTO ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER  
RSCAS 3 (2015). 
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In its most elaborate form the specific trade concerns procedure has consolidated in the 
SPS and TPT Committees.44 
C. Case law (GATT/WTO) 
1. GATT 
 
This part will provide an overview of the key Panel reports in the GATT era. As the 
analysis progresses through time, we can see how the reports become more prolific and 
examine the issue. However, it is not until the establishment of the WTO that 
transparency moves to the forefront of disputes and is examined in depth. 
 
The examination of transparency started with the case of EEC-Apples from Chile in 
198045 where transparency is only mentioned briefly. The Panel examined the EEC 
suspensions applied to imports from Chile compared to voluntary restraint agreements 
negotiated with the other southern hemisphere suppliers, Argentina, Australia, New 
Zealand and South Africa. The EEC tried to negotiate similar voluntary restraints with 
Chile, but without success, and proceeded to adopt quantitative restrictions on Chilean 
apples. The suspensions were found to differ from the voluntary restraints because the 
Panel, inter alia found differences in transparency between the two types of action.  
 
The next report examining transparency was EEC- Wheat Flour in 1983, which was not 
adopted.46 The Panel, examining calculation of wheat prices observed that “certain 
problems might be reduced by improved transparency and possibly other forms of 
multilateral co-operation in either the International Wheat Council or the GATT.” 47 
Further, in Annex B, it moved to make a more substantive statement when it observed 
that “there are a number of problems in establishing price levels on the international !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 See Henrik Horn et. al., In the Shadow of the DSU: Addressing Specific Trade Concerns in the WTO SPS 
and TBT Committees, LEIBNIZ INFORMATION CENTRE FOR ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER IFN WORKING 
PAPER, No. 960. 
45  GATT Panel Report, EEC Restrictions on Imports of Apples from Chile, L/5047, adopted 
10 November 1980, BISD 27S/98 Para 4.11. 
46 GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Subsidies on Export of Wheat Flour, SCM/42, 
21 March 1983, unadopted. 
47 Id. Para. 5.9. 
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wheat flour market since there is no recognized world price” and “there is lack of 
transparency in international wheat flour sales generally.”48 
 
In 1984, the Panel issued a report on Japan- Leather II (US)49, a case concerning import 
restrictions by Japan on leather. The United States asked that the Japanese government, in 
addition to the elimination of the quota, eliminate the “administrative obstacles 
intertwined with the quota” since Japan’s administration of quota was inconsistent with 
the reasonableness requirement of Article X:3. Moreover, according to the United States, 
Japan failed to publish information with respect to the regulation of quotas, thus violating 
Article X:1.50 The Panel noted that it was not necessary for it to make findings on the 
matter of Article X. 51 
 
The Panel examined Article X again in 1987, in Japan-Agricultural Products I. The case, 
concerning import restrictions through an import monopoly, discussed more extensively 
than in the two previous cases the obligation under article X. According to the 
complainant, the United States, the operation of the Miscellaneous Import Quota was 
non-transparent, and Japan failed to publish a complete list of the quota amounts to be 
allocated to individual items within the MIQ. Japan maintained it was complying with 
Article X.52 The Panel for the first time elaborated on the Japanese practices and the 
requirement for transparency in administration of quotas. In particular, the Panel noted 
that:  
 
As regards the method used to enforce these measures the Panel found that 
the practice of "administrative guidance" played an important role. 
Considering that this practice is a traditional tool of Japanese Government 
policy based on consensus and peer pressure, the Panel decided to base its 
judgments on the effectiveness of the measures in spite of the initial lack 
of transparency. In view of the special characteristics of Japanese society 
the Panel wishes, however, to stress that its approach in this particular case !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Id. Annex B 
49 GATT Panel Report, Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, L/4789, adopted 6 November 1979, 
BISD 26S/320. 
50 Id. Paras 26-29. 
51 Id. Para 57. 
52 Id. Paras 3.5.1.- 3.5.5.  
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should not be interpreted as a precedent in other cases where societies are 
not adapted to this form of enforcing government policies.53 
 
The same year in US- Customs User Fee 54 New Zealand claimed that an ad valorem tax 
imposed by the US may be “particularly non-transparent.” A year later, Canada- 
Alcoholic Drinks very briefly mention the notion of transparency in combination with 
Article II of the GATT. 55 
 
In Japan-Semiconductors (1988)56, the Panel examined Article XI and concluded that any 
measures, regardless of their legal status in the domestic legal order violate Article XI if 
they restrict imports. Thus, the measures imposed by Japan restricting the export of 
certain semi-conductors at a price below the cost were considered to be restrictive 
regardless of their non-mandatory nature.57 With respect to transparency, the EEC 
claimed that the measures applied to export of semiconductors to third countries and the 
measures to improve access to the Japanese market lacked transparency, and thus 
violated Article X. 58 The Panel felt it was not required to decide on the violation of 
Article X and was further unable to identify any measure required to be published under 
Article X.59 
 
The Panels were requested to examine transparency in a series of cases in the next few 
years, but refused to explore the matter extensively. The panels this first decade of 
jurisprudence on transparency are sometimes engaging with the issue and sometimes not. 
Some examples follow. In Canada-Alcoholic Drinks II (1991) 60, the Panel: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Id. paras. 5.4.1.4- 5.4.1.5. 
54  GATT Panel Report, United States – Customs User Fee, L/6264, adopted 2 February 1988, 
BISD 35S/245) para. 65. 
55  GATT Panel Report, Canada – Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian 
Provincial Marketing Agencies, L/6304, adopted 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/37. 
56 GATT Panel Report, Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, L/6309, adopted 4 May 1988, BISD 35S/116. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. paras. 64-68, 81-83 
59 Id. paras. 128-129 
60 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial 
Marketing Agencies, DS17/R, adopted 18 February 1992, BISD 39S/27. 
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“considered it important that, if fiscal elements were to be considered as 
internal taxes, mark-ups would also have to be administered in conformity 
with other provisions of the General Agreement, in particular Article X 
dealing with the Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations”.61  
 
In EEC- Dessert Apples (Chile) (1989) the Panel said that  
 
“the EEC had observed the requirement of Article X:1 to publish the 
measures under examination ‘promptly in such a manner as to enable 
governments and traders to become acquainted with them’ through their 
publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.  It noted 
that no time limit or delay between publication and entry into force was 
specified by this provision.”62 
 
It repeated the same reasoning in EEC- Dessert Apples (US) (1989) 63 where the United 
States claimed that The European Communities violated the obligations of Article X 
paragraph 1 because it did not give adequate public notice of the import quotas on 
apples.64 The Panel, further said that Article X paragraph 2 prohibits backdated quotas 
and concluded the European Communities had acted inconsistently with Article X 
paragraph 2 since it gave public notice of the quotas only about two months after the 
quota period had begun.  
 
In Korea-Beef cases 65  (United States, Australia, New Zealand) the Panel examined 
transparency as a subsidiary claim. According to the complainants, Korea had not met its 
obligations under Article X by not providing proper public notice of the import restrictions.  
The Panel found that: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61Id. para. 4.20. 
 62 GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples – 
Complaint by Chile, L/6491, adopted 22 June 1989, BISD 36S/93; arguments 36S/115-116, paras. 6.1-6.2, 
findings 36S/133, paras. 12.1, 12.29. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. para. 5.21. 
65 GATT Panel Report, Republic of Korea – Restrictions on Imports of Beef – Complaint by Australia, 
L/6504, adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/202; GATT Panel Report, Republic of Korea – Restrictions 
on Imports of Beef – Complaint by New Zealand, L/6505, adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/234; 
GATT Panel Report, Republic of Korea – Restrictions on Imports of Beef – Complaint by the United 
States, L/6503, adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/268. 
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“[Australia/New Zealand/the United States] had, as a subsidiary matter, 
claimed that Korea had not met its obligations under Articles X and XIII by 
not providing proper public notice of the import restrictions.  It also noted 
that Korea had stated that the withdrawal of the measures imposed in 
1984/85 and the import levels in 1988 had been widely publicized.  In view 
of the Panel’s determinations as concerned the consistency of the Korean 
measures with Articles II and XI, the Panel did not find it necessary to 
address these subsidiary issues.  The Panel noted, however, the requirement 
in Article X:1 that ‘laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative 
rulings of general application, made effective by any contracting party, 
pertaining to ... rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, 
restrictions or prohibitions on imports ..., shall be published promptly in 
such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted 
with them’.  It also noted the provision in Article XIII:3(b) that ‘[i]n the 
case of import restrictions involving the fixing of quotas, the contracting 
party applying the restrictions shall give public notice of the total quantity 
or value of the product or products which will be permitted to be imported 
during a specified future period and of any change in such quantity or 
value’”.66 
 
Other cases under the GATT that touched very briefly upon transparency but did not 
consider it, either because no other violation was established or because it was seen as a 
secondary issue were: US-Sugar Waiver (1990)67; EEC-Oilseeds I (1990)68; EEC-
Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components (1990) 69; Canada-Grain Corn (1992)70; 
US-Malt Beverages (1992)71; US-Cement (1992) 72; US-Softwood Lumber II (1993)73; 
Korea- Polyacetal Resins (1993) 74 ; EEC-Bananas I (1993) 75 ; US-Salmon (AD) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66Same three panel reports referred to above, at 36S/230, 267, 306, paras. 108, 124, 130 respectively. 
67 GATT Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar-Containing 
Products Applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Headnote to the Schedule of Tariff Concessions, 
L/6631, adopted 7 November 1990, BISD 37S/228. 
68 GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and 
Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, L/6627, adopted 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86 
69GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, 
L/6657, adopted 16 May 1990, BISD 37S/132, para. 5.27. 
70 GATT Panel Report, Panel on Canadian Countervailing Duties on Grain Corn from the United States, 
SCM/140 and Corr.1, adopted 26 March 1992, BISD 39S/411. 
71 GATT Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, DS23/R, 
adopted 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/206. 
72 GATT Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Duties on Gray Portland Cement and Cement 
Clinker from Mexico, ADP/82, 7 September 1992, unadopted. 
73 GATT Panel Report, Panel on United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from 
Canada, SCM/162, adopted 27 October 1993, BISD 40S/358. 
74 GATT Panel Report, Panel on Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Polyacetal Resins from the 
United States, ADP/92 and Corr.1, adopted 27 April 1993, BISD 40S/205. 
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(1994)76;US-Salmon (CVD) (1994)77; Brazil-Milk (1994)78; EEC-Bananas II (1994)79; US-
Stainless Steel Plate (1994)80; US-Auto Taxes (1994)81; and, US- Lead and Bismuth Carbon 
Steel (1994). 82 Some of these reports were not adopted. 
2. WTO 
 
After the establishment of the WTO, the Panels and Appellate Body constructed a more 
systematic interpretation of Article X. As of 2013, fifty four legal claims were brought 
before the WTO Dispute Settlement relating to transparency in article X. 83 Here I will 
outline the reports that set the most important aspects of this jurisprudence.  
 
One of the first cases to examine measures of general application of Article X was the 
case of US-Underwear84 in 1997 brought before the WTO by Costa Rica against the 
United States. It involved a complaint on the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and an 
alleged quantitative import restriction by the US under Article 6 of the Agreement. The 
Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s findings that certain country-specific measures may 
constitute “measures of general application” under paragraph 2 of Article X, while a 
measure related to a company or a shipment may not. In the case the Appellate Body !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 GATT Panel Report, EEC – Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas, DS32/R, 3 June 1993, 
unadopted. 
76 GATT Panel Report, Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic 
Salmon from Norway, ADP/87, adopted 27 April 1994, BISD 41S/229. 
77 GATT Panel Report, Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic 
Salmon from Norway, SCM/153, adopted 28 April 1994, BISD 41S/576. 
78 GATT Panel Report, Imposition of Provisional and Definitive Countervailing Duties on Milk Powder 
and Certain Types of Milk from the European Economic Community, SCM/179, adopted 28 April 1994, 
BISD 41S/467. 
79 GATT Panel Report, EEC – Import Regime for Bananas, DS38/R, 11 February 1994, unadopted. 
80 GATT Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Stainless Steel Plate from 
Sweden, ADP/117 and Corr. 1, 24 February 1994, unadopted. 
81 GATT Panel Report, United States – Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R,  11 October 1994, unadopted 
82 GATT Panel Report, United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead 
and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, SCM/185, 
15 November 1994, unadopted 
83 BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM  98 (3rd ed. 2009) Table 3.5 Distribution of legal claims across WTO provisions. For GATT 
Article X, examining Transparency there are 46 claims in 2009. 
84 Appellate Body Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man‑made Fibre 
Underwear, WT/DS24/AB/R, adopted 25 February 1997, DSR 1997:I, 11, Panel Report, United States – 
Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man‑made Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/R, adopted 25 February 
1997, as modified by Appellate Body ReportWT/DS24/AB/R, DSR 1997:I, 31 
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noted that Article X and paragraph 2 more specifically embodies “a principle of 
fundamental importance– that of promoting full disclosure of governmental acts affecting 
Members and private persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality” 
which can be seen as a reflection of “the principle of transparency” with “due process 
dimensions.” The due process value has further been cited in many other WTO reports 
dealing with transparency. It concluded that: 
 
 “members and other persons affected, or likely to be affected, by 
governmental measures imposing restraints, requirements and other 
burdens, should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic 
information about such measures and accordingly to protect and adjust 
their activities or alternatively to seek modification of such measures.” 85  
 
The same year, in EC-Bananas III86 and with respect to Article X paragraph 3 (a), the 
panel ruled that Article 1.3 of the Import Licensing Agreement and Article X paragraph 3 
(a) have “identical coverage.”87 Also it said that the provisions apply to the administrative 
procedures for rules only, not the rules themselves.  
 
In 1998, three more disputes involved transparency issues under Article X. First, EC-
Poultry88, a complaint by Brazil against the European Communities, concerned the tariff 
rate quota system in the EC Schedule LXXX and the licensing requirements imposed by 
the European Communities with respect to frozen poultry originating from Brazil. Brazil !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 US-Underwear, Appellate Body, Para. 29. 
86  Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, 591; Panel Report, European 
Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by Ecuador, 
WT/DS27/R/ECU, adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, 
DSR 1997:III, 1085; Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by Guatemala and Honduras, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, 
adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, 695; 
Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
Complaint by Mexico, WT/DS27/R/MEX, adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, 803; Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by the United States, WT/DS27/R/USA, adopted 
25 September 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, 943 
87 EC-Bananas III para.203. 
88 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain 
Poultry Products, WT/DS69/AB/R, adopted 23 July 1998, DSR 1998:V, 2031; Panel Report, European 
Communities – Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/R, adopted 23 
July 1998, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS69/AB/R, DSR 1998:V, 2089 
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argued that the frequency of changes in licensing rules of poultry were not allowing 
WTO members to familiarize themselves with the rules as Article 1.4 of the Import 
Licensing Agreement provides. The Panel rejected this complaint, noting that  
 
“the transparency requirement under the cited provisions is limited to 
publication of rules and other information. While we have sympathy for 
Brazil regarding the difficulties caused by the frequent changes to the 
rules, we find that changes in rules per se do not constitute a violation of 
Articles 1.4, 3.3, 3.5 (b), 3.5 (c) or 3.5 (d).”89  
 
The Appellate Body upheld the ruling that Article X applies only to measures of general 
application since Brazil’s claims involved specific transactions such as individual poultry 
shipments and thus were outside the scope of Article X. 
 
The second report with respect to transparency that year was Japan-Film90, in which the 
Panel examined the publication requirement of Article X paragraph 1. A complaint was 
filed by the United States against measures taken by the Japanese government concerning 
the distribution, restrictions on sales and promotion of photographic film and paper. 
According to the Panel, the publication requirement of Article X paragraph 1 extends to 
administrative rulings of “general application” and administrative rulings addressed to 
“specific individuals or entities.” The Panel found that Japan had not violated its 
obligations under Article X paragraph 1 because the United States failed to demonstrate 
that Japan’s administrative rulings belonged to either of the above categories, which 
would result in the application of Article X. 
 
The Appellate Body briefly looked at Article X paragraph 3 the same year in the US-
Shrimp case where it noted as follows: 
 
“It is also clear to us that Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 establishes certain 
minimum standards for transparency and procedural fairness in the 
administration of trade regulations which in our view are not met here. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 EC Poultry para. 246. 
90 Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R, 
adopted 22 April 1998, DSR 1998:IV, 1179 
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The non transparent and ex parte nature of internal government procedures 
applied by the competent officials in the Office of Marine conservation, 
the Department of State and the US National Marine Fisheries Service 
throughout the certification processes under Section 609 as well as the fact 
that countries whose applications are denied do not receive formal notice 
of such denial nor of the reasons for the denial and the fact too that there is 
no formal legal procedure for review of or appeal from a denial of an 
application are all contrary to the spirit of Article X:3 of the GATT.91 
 
The next case examining transparency was Argentina-Hides and Leather in 2001.92It 
focused on Article X paragraph 3 (a), which concerns the administration of trade 
regulations.  The case involved an Argentinian regulation on the participation of 
representatives of the domestic tanners association in the customs inspection procedures 
for leather destined for export. The role of the representatives was to “assist” the customs 
authorities in their application of rules on customs classification and export duties. 
According to the European Communities, the participation of the representatives, who 
had a clear interest in the trade of hides, violated the principles of impartiality and 
reasonableness under Article X paragraph 3 (a). This form of transparency can be seen as 
assisting traders.93 
 
In the report of US-Stainless Steel94, also adopted in 2001 Korea complained that the 
United States acted inconsistently with Article X Paragraph 3 (a) by not following its 
own established policy in its antidumping investigation. The Panel rejected this claim of 
inconsistency. The panel held that Article X Paragraph 3 (a) is  
 
“not intended to function as a mechanism to test the consistency of a 
Member’s particular decisions or rulings with the Member’s own domestic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 Japan-Film para.183 
92 Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and Import of Finished 
Leather, WT/DS155/R and Corr.1, adopted 16 February 2001, DSR 2001:V, 1779. 
93 Panagiotis Delimatsis, Transparency in the WTO Decision-Making. TILEC DISCUSSION PAPER No. 2012-
006 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2001919 at 11(February 9, 2012). 
94 Panel Report, United States – Anti‑Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless 
Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea, WT/DS179/R, adopted 1 February 2001, DSR 2001:IV, 1295; Appellate 
Body Report, United States – Final Anti‑Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, 
WT/DS344/AB/R, adopted 20 May 2008, DSR 2008:II, 513; Panel Report, United States – Final 
Anti‑Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/R, adopted 20 May 2008, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS344/AB/R, DSR 2008:II, 599 . 
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law and practice; that is a function reserved for each Member’s domestic 
judicial system.”95  
 
It is very interesting that the Panel here clarifies that regulation with respect to 
transparency occurs at the level of the member states. With regard to the requirements of 
‘uniform administration’ and ‘reasonable administration’ the Panel said that:  
 
“The requirement of uniform administration of laws and regulations must 
be understood to mean uniformity of treatment in respect of persons 
similarly situated; it cannot be understood to require identical results 
where relevant facts differ. Nor do we consider that the requirement of 
reasonable administration of laws and regulations is violated merely 
because in the administration of those laws and regulations, different 
conclusions were reached based upon differences in relevant facts.”96 
 
The Panel looked at the “real effect” that these administrative measures might have on 
traders. The focus of the Panel on traders is very important since it looks at the protection 
of interests of private actors in the WTO context. 97The harmed party would not need to 
establish the existence of damage; it would only need to show potential impact on 
competitiveness due to partiality on behalf of the administrative body. The Panel here 
established that for the third paragraph of Article X to be applicable, it is not necessary to 
establish that a member discriminates between other members in the administration of its 
trade regulation. This means that Article X paragraph 3 can be examined regardless of 
any claims on discriminatory treatment. In particular, the Panel ruled that “the focus is on 
the treatment accorded by government authorities to the traders in question.” It also found 
that under paragraph 3 (a) members can challenge the substance of an administrative 
regulation.  
 
The Panel did not find a violation of the “uniform administration” obligation but did find 
a violation of the “reasonable administration” requirement in Article X paragraph 3 (a).  
With respect to partiality, the Panel found that “there is an inherent danger that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 US –Stainless Steel para. 6.50. 
96 Id. para. 6.51. 
97 Padideh Ala'i, From the Periphery to the Center? The Evolving WTO Jurisprudence on Transparency 
and Good Governance 11:4 J. INT’L ECON. L.  779 at 795 (2008). 
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Customs laws, regulations and rules will be applied in a partial manner so as to permit 
persons with adverse commercial interests to obtain confidential information to which 
they have no right”98. Should adequate safeguards had been in place, this could have 
remedied the situation, but the Panel did not find that such measures were in place. Thus, 
Argentina acted inconsistently with Article X, paragraph 3 (a). 
 
In 2001 the Panel decided another case involving Article X, US-Hot-Rolled Steel99. The 
case brought by Japan against the United States involved antidumping duties imposed by 
the US on hot-rolled steel products originating from Japan. The Appellate Body later did 
not review the Article X claims. The Panel examined the notion of “general application” 
of Article X paragraph 1 and found that, even though a single instance of a member 
state’s actions might be “evidence of lack of uniform, impartial and reasonable 
administration” of its legislation, a significant impact on the overall administration of the 
law is required. 100 
 
In 2003, Japan filled a complaint against the United States again, this time for a measure 
of sunset review of antidumping duties on corrosion resistant carbon steel flat products 
originating from Japan. In US-Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review101 the Panel 
examined Japan’s complaint under Article X paragraph 3(a). Japan claimed that the self-
initiation of sunset review laws was not uniform. The Panel said that the claims from 
Japan did not fall under the administration of laws and regulations and thus were not 
within the scope of Article X paragraph 3(a). The Panel said that: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 Panel Report, United States – Anti‑Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless 
Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea, WT/DS179/R, adopted 1 February 2001, DSR 2001:IV, 1295; Para 
11.100. 
99 Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti‑Dumping Measures on Certain Hot‑Rolled Steel Products 
from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August 2001, DSR 2001:X, 4697; Panel Report, United States – 
Anti‑Dumping Measures on Certain Hot‑Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/R, adopted 23 
August 2001 modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS184/AB/R, DSR 2001:X, 4769. 
100 US- Hot Rolled Steel Panel Report para. 7.268. 
101 Panel Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti Dumping Duties on Corrosion Resistant Carbon 
Steel Flat Products from Japan, WT/DS244/R, adopted 9 January 2004, as modified by Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS244/AB/R, DSR 2004:I, p. 85. 
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“[W]e find that this aspect of US law cannot be challenged under Article 
X:3(a_ of GATT 1994 because it relates to the substance rather than the 
administration of US law”102 
 
In 2004 the Appellate Body in US-Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews103  
addressed the issue of bringing an Article X case before the Dispute Settlement Body.  
 
“We observe first that allegations that the conduct of a WTO Member is 
biased or unreasonable are serious under any circumstances. Such 
allegations should not be lightly or in a subsidiary fashion. A claim under 
Article X:3 (a) of the GATT 1994 must be supported by solid evidence; 
the nature and the scope of the claim and the evidence adduced by the 
complainant in support of it should reflect the gravity of the accusations 
inherent in claims under Article X:3 (a) of the GATT 1994.104  
 
Another very important case on Article X jurisprudence was decided on 2005. Dominican 
Republic- Import and Sale of Cigarettes105 was a complaint brought before in the WTO 
dispute settlement process by Honduras, regarding charges, fees and other measures by 
the Dominican Republic on sale of cigarettes. The Panel examined both the publication 
requirement of Paragraph 1 and the administration of trade regulations of paragraph 3 (a) 
of Article X. First it looked whether the surveys needed to make the tax determination for 
cigarettes were “administrative rulings of general application.” These surveys had not 
been published, and they would provide the basis for administrative determination on 
taxes on cigarettes. Thus, the Dominican Republic was found in violation of Article X 
paragraph 1. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 Id. Para 7.293. 
103 Appellate Body Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti‑Dumping Measures on Oil Country 
Tubular Goods from Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2004, DSR 2004:VII, 3257 
Panel Report, United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti‑Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods 
from Argentina, WT/DS268/R and Corr.1, adopted 17 December 2004, as modified by Appellate Body 
Report W/DS/268/AB/R, DSR 2004:VIII, 3421. 
104 US-Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews Appellate Body Report Para. 217. 
105 Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of 
Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 19 May 2005, DSR 2005:XV, 7367; Panel Report, Dominican 
Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/R, adopted 19 
May 2005, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS302/AB/R, DSR 2005:XV, 7425 
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With respect to Article X, paragraph 3 (a) the Panel found that the Dominican Republic 
had applied the provisions under examination in an unreasonable manner. Specifically, 
the Panel said: 
 
“The fact that the Dominican Republic authorities did not support its 
decisions regarding the determination of the tax base for imported 
cigarettes by resorting to the rules in force at the time and that they 
decided to disregard retail selling prices of imported cigarettes is not ‘in 
accordance with reason’, ‘having sound judgment’, ‘sensible’, ‘within the 
limits of reason’ nor ‘articulate’.”106 
 
The next case on Article X was EC-Selected Customs Matters, a case dealing exclusively 
with article X.107 The United States challenged European Community’s administration of 
several laws and regulations on the valuation and classification of products for customs 
purposes because the procedures for review were different from one EU Member State to 
another. The Panel here examined Paragraph 3 (a), administration of trade regulations, 
and (b) obligation of prompt review and correction of the violation by an adjudicative 
body. The Panel said that the requirements of Article X Paragraph 3 (a) do not apply to 
laws, regulations and rulings but rather to their administration, reaffirming the ruling in 
Argentina-Hides and Leather in the sense that a separate examination of these rules 
would establish whether there is a violation of the Most Favored Nation treatment or the 
National Treatment rules of Articles I and III of the GATT. 
 
However, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding that “without exception”, 
Article X:3 (a) of the GATT 1994 always relates to the application of laws and 
regulations but not to laws and regulations as such.” It upheld the Panel’s conclusion that 
“substantive differences in penalty laws and audit procedures among the member States 
of the European Communities alone do not constitute a violation of Article X:3 (a) of the 
GATT 1994.”108 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes Panel Report Para. 7.388 
107 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Selected Customs Matters, WT/DS315/AB/R, 
adopted 11 December 2006, DSR 2006:IX, 3791; Panel Report, European Communities – Selected 
Customs Matters, WT/DS315/R, adopted 11 December 2006, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS315/AB/R, DSR 2006:IX‑X, 3915. 
108 EC-Selected Customs Matters Appellate Body Report Para. 309. 
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With respect to Article X Paragraph 3 (b) the United States claimed that it was not 
possible to get a review of a customs decision unless the importer had exhausted local 
(national) remedies. The Panel said that it is not reasonable that first instance national 
review tribunals, with limited jurisdiction, bind with their decisions all agencies within an 
EU Member. 109 So, the requirement to exhaust local review possibilities is reasonable. 
 
One of the most recent cases examining Article X is EC-IT Products. 110   The 
complainants were the US, Japan and Taiwan against measures of the European 
Communities on tariff classification and treatment of information technology products. 
The Panel found that the European Communities had violated both paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
Article X. In particular, the Panel in examining the EC measures said that: 
 
"Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings" can 
encompass more than those instruments formally characterized as such by 
a WTO Member. Otherwise, WTO Members themselves could determine 
which provisions would be subject to WTO obligations under Article X:1 
of the GATT 1994 merely by the labelling of those instruments.”111 
 
This is a rather expansive interpretation on what could fall under Article X Paragraph 1. 
Examining the notion of “made effective” the Panel adopted a rather expansive 
interpretation: 
 
“In our view, "made effective" also covers measures brought into effect in 
practice. In other words, it may include measures that have not yet been 
formally adopted in accordance with municipal law.” 112 
 
Another recent case is Thailand- Cigarettes.113 Philippines filed a complaint against 
Thailand on a number of measures affecting cigarettes from Philippines. The Philippines !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 EC-Selected Customs Matters Panel Report para. 7.538. 
110 Panel Reports, European Communities and its member States – Tariff Treatment of Certain Information 
Technology Products, WT/DS375/R / WT/DS376/R / WT/DS377/R, adopted 21 September 2010, DSR 
2010:III, p. 933. 
111 Id. para 7.1024. 
112 Id. para 7.1046. 
113 Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, 
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challenged the system under which Thai government officials served on the board of a 
state-owned domestic cigarette manufacturer. According to the Philippines, Thailand 
administered the measures under examination in a partial and unreasonable manner and 
there were delays in the administrative review process. Thus Thailand acted 
inconsistently with its obligations under Article X Paragraph 3 (a). Additionally the 
Philippines claims that Thailand’s ad valorem tax, health tax, and TV tax are inconsistent 
with Article X paragraph 1 because violates the publication requirement. Finally, the 
Philippines claimed that Thailand did not maintain an independent review process with 
respect to customs, and thus is in violation of Article X Paragraph 3 (b).  
 
The Panel did not find that Thailand was in violation of the impartiality and 
reasonableness requirement, however it found that there were delays in the review 
process and thus Thailand violated its obligations under Article X paragraph 3 (a). It 
found that Thailand violated Article X paragraph 1 because it did not publish laws that 
determine the VAT for cigarettes and the release of a guarantee in the customs valuation 
process. With respect to the Excice, Health and TV taxes, the Panel said that the claim 
was improperly brought under Article X paragraph 1. Finally with respect to the 
Paragraph 3 (b) claim the Panel found that Thailand had acted inconsistently since it did 
not maintain an independent review process. The Panel also agreed with the Philippines 
that Thailand violated Article X:1 by failing to publish laws and regulations pertaining to 
the determination of a VAT for cigarettes and the release of a guarantee imposed in the 
customs valuation process.   
 
Thailand appealed the case with respect to Article X:3 (b) and the Appellate Body upheld 
the Panel's finding that Thailand acts inconsistently with Article X:3(b) of the GATT 
1994 by failing to maintain or institute independent tribunals or procedures for the 
prompt review of customs guarantee decisions. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 15 July 2011 Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on 
Cigarettes from the Philippines, WT/DS371/R, adopted 15 July 2011, as modified by Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS371/AB/R. 
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In the case of China-Raw Materials114, the United States, Mexico and the European 
Communities claimed that China's restraints on the export from China of raw materials 
such as bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal, 
yellow phosphorus and zinc violated among other provisions, Article X in general and 
paragraphs 1 and 3 more specifically.  The Panel after a very extensive analysis found 
that China acted inconsistently with Articles X paragraphs 1 and 3(a) as well as 
paragraphs 1.2, 5.1 and 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol and Paragraphs 83 and 84 of 
China's Working Party Report. 
 
Article X was mainly examined in the Panel report in the case of US-COOL.  In this case 
Canada complained that the United States were violating their Article X paragraph 3 
obligations by implementing the 1946 Agricultural Marketing Act as amended by the 
2008 Farm Bill.  The Act imposed mandatory country of origin labelling (COOL) 
including the obligation to inform consumers on the country of origin of commodities 
such as beef and pork. In order for products to be considered of US origin the animal had 
to be born, raised and slaughtered in the United States. Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack 
wrote in 2009 a letter urging industry representatives to voluntarily adopt suggested 
labeling changes in order to provide more useful information to consumers. The Panel 
after examining Vilsack’s “suggestions for voluntary action” ruled that it constitutes 
unreasonable administration of the COOL measure in violation of Article X paragraph 
3(a) of the GATT. 
 
Finally, in the case of China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and Molybdenum, the United States, Japan and the European Union have 
requested consultations with China involving the Chinese Customs Commodity Codes 
and other published and unpublished measures, which impose export restrictions on rare 
earths. Among other provisions, the US, Japan and the EU claim that such measures are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114 Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 
WT/DS394/AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012; Panel Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation 
of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/R and Corr.1/WT/DS395/R and Corr.1/WT/DS398/R and Corr.1, 
circulated to WTO Members 5 July 2011 as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS394/AB/R. 
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inconsistent with Article X of the GATT. The Panel did not examine Article X in detail, 
even though it briefly looked at Chinese obligations to publish certain related legislation. 
3. Other agreements 
 
Currently there is no jurisprudence on Article III of the GATS, Article 63 of the TRIPS 
and Articles V, VII, and IX to XVII of the Government Procurement Agreement. With 
respect to the Antidumping Agreement, the cases on Articles 5, 6 and 12 are Guatemala 
Cement I and II, Mexico-Corn Syrup, Thailand H-Beams, US-Offset Act (Byrd 
Amendment), Argentina-Poultry Antidumping Duties, US-Lumber 5, US-DRAMS, 
Argentina Ceramic Tiles, Egypt- Steel Rebar, US- Hot-Rolled Steel, US- Corrosion 
Resistant Steel Reviews, US-Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, US Stainless 
Steel (Mexico). There is no jurisprudence on Article 13. On the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, the cases on Articles 11, 12 and 22 are US-Offset Act (Byrd 
Amendment), China-GOES, US Carbon Steel, US-Antidumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China). With respect to the Import Licensing Agreement, there are two cases on 
articles 1.3, 1.4 and 5, EC-Poultry and Turkey –Rice. Finally, on the Agreement on 
Safeguards, Article 3, the cases in the Dispute Settlement Body are US-Lamb, US-Line 
Pipe, Chile-Price Band System, Argentina-Preserved Peaches, US-Steel Safeguards and 
Dominican Republic-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Polypropylene Bags and 
Tubular Fabric.115  
 
D. The link between legal transparency with the other three forms 
 
Legal transparency establishes the core contact point between the trader and the 
government of the importing or exporting country. It involves tariffs and other trade 
regulations directly, so at first, it is not clear how it relates to the other three forms of 
transparency, and whether there is any mutual effect at all. Besides the argument that was 
made earlier that all four are linked through their relationship to different composite 
democracy facets, there is one more layer of connections. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115 Full case citations omitted. 
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External transparency, mostly the amicus curiae briefs but also its other aspects give 
consumers, business associations, trade unions and others who are affected by the 
outcomes of WTO decisions and national trade policies to take their case directly before 
the Panels and the Appellate Body. Without Article X and information dissemination and 
the experience of the application of national trade rules (including administrative and 
judicial recourse mechanisms), external transparency would be less effective. External 
transparency, if it becomes procedurally specific and institutionalized, it can add an 
additional layer of review beyond the national legal systems. The amicus form moreover 
works very well within the intergovernmental organization paradigm: it does not create a 
right to file a case and pursue essentially a course tantamount to that of the European 
Court of Human Rights. Instead, when a case has been filed by one member state against 
another, if citizens, consumers, interested parties at large feel they have not had the 
opportunity to be heard or did not think the national processes gave adequate weight to 
their voice, the WTO Panels might. Similarly, NGOs and industry representatives can 
participate, in a limited way during Ministerial conferences. In one sense, Article X and 
external transparency are not two sides of a coin but two sides of the same dice. As in a 
dice each side has a different value, the legal standing of interested parties varies 
depending on the type of transparency at hand. 
 
Internal transparency also represents one side of the same dice. Article X allows for 
WTO rules to be scrutinized in national debates and within domestic legal systems. The 
political outcomes from this process, whether they come in the form of lobbying, dissent, 
legal proceedings, or even voting for another government need to be re-directed towards 
the international forum. Internal transparency ensures that national governments can 
adequately represent the interests of their constituents at the multilateral stage. For 
developing countries this has now become a condition for participation in the 
international trading regime. Further liberalization does not appeal any more to their 
nationals. The WTO rules have been tested over the last twenty years, and the 
dissatisfaction at the domestic level has been filtered upwards towards the WTO through 
protests and through the national governments. Such critique needs a proper exit voice 
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especially at the WTO level, where all these decisions were made in the first place. 
Article X provides the formal mechanism for rules to be published and administered, and 
therefore tested at the domestic level. Internal and external transparency ensure that the 
outcomes of the domestic political debates regarding these rules will be communicated to 
all other WTO members and the representatives of each government will fully participate 
in reviewing the rules further. 
 
Finally, administrative transparency is mostly the background against which all the other 
three operate. It would be a stretch to argue it also represents a side of the dice. It ensures 
however that the WTO’s institutional structure functions as well as it can for trade 
ministers, diplomats, consumers, NGOs and everyone with internet access to remain 
informed and involved in the process.  
 
275 
VII. Evaluation 
 
After having examined the four aspects of transparency in the WTO, I would like to offer 
an evaluation of the WTO’s performance with respect to transparency. In the first part 
this chapter will discuss the outcome of each of the four previous chapters, on internal, 
external, administrative and legal transparency and the WTO’s scorecard on benefiting 
from the normative and discourse space available to its members and stakeholders. 
Second, I will revisit the constitutionalist paradigm and reiterate that democratization and 
the flexibility it offers with respect to the expansion of discourse and the meaningful 
inclusion of voices from all stakeholders is more appropriate, especially in view of the 
many transnational processes that are already in place in global trade governance. The 
WTO’s focus on transparency as a principle and a legal rule contributes to the 
transnationalization of the organization. This alters, as I will argue, the current content of 
state sovereignty. Finally, I will discuss the links between each form of democratic 
legitimation and the forms of legitimacy in global governance. As holding global 
elections may be a scenario that exists only in the distant future, different forms of 
legitimation explored in this thesis can be improved and temporarily fulfill input and 
output legitimacy roles. Moreover, there exist process and goal-specific legitimacy types, 
such as throughput and mission legitimacy that can also be linked to transparency forms 
in the WTO.  
 
The WTO has engaged in a rudimentary attempt to remedy its lack of democratic 
legitimacy. However, this attempt is insufficient and there is still a long way to go from 
here. For the evolution of hybrid forms of global democracy, the WTO needs to review 
its transparency approach in a holistic manner, address some extant issues (such as the 
amicus curiae problem) and develop a more coherent mid-term and long-term agenda for 
the future. The transnational fragments within the WTO have multiplied to the extent that 
the organization and its member states can no longer “hide” behind the intergovernmental 
nature of their commitments, especially in view of individuals being the direct 
beneficiaries from some of these commitments. Moreover, the structure of the 
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organization and the emphasis on transparency can significantly contribute to the 
transition of the WTO to a more democratic global governance regime.  
A. The WTO’s transparency profile  
 
Chapters III, IV, V and VI explored the different forms of transparency in the WTO. 
Transparency has gained a considerable amount of attention in the last two decades in the 
WTO. The organization’s performance oscillates between glimpses of exemplary 
openness, as in the case of publication of decisions in the WTO’s website and complete 
lack thereof, as evidenced in the problems associated with the Green Room. In some 
cases, transparent practices are more meaningful, in others they are positive but not 
useful in addressing the extant legitimacy concerns and in some cases, the transparency 
actions are inconsistent.  
 
More specifically, the best performance of the WTO with respect to transparency occurs 
in the area of external transparency. As we saw, the WTO has been systematically 
publishing all the documents, and following a very short declassification timeline. This 
practice is not based on custom, but a General Council decision. The Sutherland Report 
emphasized this form of transparency, most likely because the drafters of the Report were 
aware that this may be the WTO’s strongest legitimacy rating. Indeed, the WTO website 
appears to be very user friendly. However several heated issues in the WTO are absent 
from the website. Despite the enormous number of documents published, the WTO 
website does not allude to the paradoxes in international trade regulation. It remains 
entirely unclear how the pursuit of competitiveness and fairness for less developed 
countries can be compatible within the same organization. This paradox is exacerbated 
considering that most assistance to developing countries occurs at a voluntary basis, 
while the rules that promote competitiveness are obligatory.  
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Trying to eliminate nontransparent practices of member states and considering 
transparency “the best insurance policy against protectionism”1 cannot coincide with 
complaints from developing countries on access problems during Green Room talks, the 
rejection of amicus curiae briefs without any justification and secrecy in PTA and RTA 
negotiations.2 Hailing a fast-paced liberal market paradigm cannot be done in the same 
setting as the commitment to assist countries that suffer from extreme poverty conditions 
and no context-specific exit strategy. This lack of consistent narrative renders the large 
amount of information less meaningful.  
 
The second form of transparency that functions well is legal transparency. The numerous 
transparency provisions in the WTO Agreements described in the chapter on Legal 
Transparency introduce the largest body of mandatory transparency-related supranational 
legislation. However, as the GATT history of Article X indicates, these provisions would 
not be as important without the robust case law, starting from the 1980s. The numerous 
panel and Appellate Body reports gave transparency its current content. Similarly, the 
Appellate Body actively opened up towards external transparency, despite the opposite 
desire of the Member States.  
 
Article X was neglected for most of GATT’s history. In comparison the current attention 
to Article X is disproportionate to its early years. The evolution of WTO law includes 
attention to non-tariff barriers and one of the greatest obstacles for cross-border trade is 
the lack of clarity in border processes. This was not as obvious in the early GATT years 
when elimination of tariffs mattered the most. Possibly, WTO member states found it 
more difficult to violate the tariff elimination rules, but non-tariff barriers to trade, where 
lack transparency belongs, are murkier and easier to introduce and sustain, at least for a 
while, at a national level. Information is an invaluable element for traders knowing how 
to navigate border procedures. Article X also imposes infrastructural costs to smaller !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  Lamy hails transparency as the best insurance policy against protectionism  
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/trdev_19jul13_e.htm 
2 A recent example is that of the CETA, agreed between the EU and Canada. Both parties are vocal on their 
commitment to transparency, yet they have not published the bilateral trade agreement. See Robert 
Howse’s comments at http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2013/11/has-canada-violated-its-nafta-
transparency-obligations-by-keeping-the-ceta-text-secret.html 
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countries, which are further exacerbated by internal transparency deficits and the inability 
to adequately engage at the multilateral level on how to mitigate these costs. 
 
The GATT and the WTO to some extent exist in order to level the playing field as much 
as that is possible. It was inevitable for the attention to Article X to rise over the years. 
However, WTO members have made numerous efforts to distinguish this obligation from 
any other transparency elements, especially ones of administrative and external 
transparency. This is inconsistent, if not ironic: if information is important to traders, its 
importance not limited to tariff schedules, it extends to the entire WTO system and the 
way it functions. WTO members are nowadays very keen on pursuing Article X disputes, 
to the point that almost half of the disputes filed before the Dispute Settlement Body are 
transparency related, and more specifically, related to Article X. Yet, a common 
understanding exists that transparency quests end at a state-to-state level. Holding each 
other accountable with respect to trade-related policies is the limit of transparency, as 
member states see it. Going beyond that, and being transparent as an organization is a 
secondary priority, one of little to no legal validity, limited to the publication of 
documents ex post facto.  
 
In the case of external transparency and the participation of NGOs, the non-decisive role 
of transparency and participation are even more evident. NGOs have a hybrid observer 
status in Ministerial Conferences. It would not be a stretch to say that their contribution 
does not extend to any of the negotiations. Their presence became essential not for the 
multiplication of voices in international trade discourse but because the Seattle events and 
the dissatisfaction of civil society was so strong that the WTO needed to do something in 
order for the high-profile Ministerials to stop being opportunities for protests on the 
streets. They complemented NGO participation with meetings done with high police 
presence, and in some extreme cases, offered life insurance to WTO administrators.3 This 
is only a temporary measure, not only because civil society will demand a more 
important role in the organization, but also because in the next few decades the 
multiplicity of voices in the WTO will become necessary for the organization to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVORED NATIONS 2 (2009). 
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effectively monitor and regulate international trade – otherwise it will become irrelevant. 
Citizen-consumers have always been at the center of cross-border trade as they are the 
recipients of trade benefits. For years governments have been hiding behind the 
sovereignty veil and it is time that they move the citizen consumer to the center of the 
international trading system. 
 
The WTO has a very clear institutional path for the integration of civil society in a 
decisive manner. This path, created by the WTO Appellate Body is through amicus 
curiae briefs. However, this path is currently not functioning. The progress made in terms 
of external transparency is meaningless if NGOs still remain clueless as to what type of 
brief, with what content and in which cases could be truly useful to the members of the 
Panel and Appellate Body. First, amicus briefs are either simply dismissed, admitted in 
order to be dismissed as unnecessary or considered only inasmuch as the arguments they 
advance coincide with those of parties’ submissions. This approach negates meaningful 
participation of NGOs in the dispute settlement process and thus exacerbates the 
participation deficit in the area of external transparency. Second, the laconic responses 
published in the reports do not explain the reasons behind the amici rejections, adding to 
the lack information with respect to the process. NGOs who wish to submit briefs in 
future cases are faced with ambiguous dicta. In future cases, if they coincide with the 
members’ submissions, they might be rejected as redundant. If they deviate a lot, they 
might be rejected as non-relevant.4 Either way, they have no guidance on how to 
proceed.5 
 
The lack of information on reasons for overlooking amicus briefs points towards a deficit 
on two forms of transparency. The organization’s commitment to external transparency is 
compromised, on both its informational and participatory aspects. At the same time, the 
DSB is part of an international administration. The absence of case-specific justification 
for the decision to reject a brief points towards gaps in institutional transparency. If we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Lise Johnson and Elisabeth Tuerk, CIEL's Experience in WTO Dispute Settlement: Challenges and 
Complexities from a Practical Point of View, in CIVIL SOCIETY, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND COMPLIANCE 
BODIES 243 (Tullio Treves ed. 2005). See more specifically pages 254-255, 257. 
5 Gabrielle Marceau & Mikella Hurley, Transparency and Public Participation in the WTO: A Report Card 
on WTO Transparency Mechanisms, 4 TRADE, L. & DEV. V.1 19-44 at 34 (2012).  
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approach the issue of NGO participation as distinct from reasoned decision-making in 
international trade administration, then there is no flaw in all the short responses by the 
Panels and the Appellate Body: the issue of degree of NGO involvement is unrelated to 
the lack of justifications. In fact, only member states have a legal right to request answers 
to their questions. NGOs are not parties to the disputes, and they can be dismissed 
without further explanation. When treating the two transparencies separately, the WTO 
can report progress with respect to external transparency just by allowing the submission 
of briefs. 
 
A viable alternative for a participation platform in the WTO dispute settlement can be 
found in the likeness test of Articles I and III of the GATT. Reports have cited consumer 
tastes and preferences as one of the criteria for the determination of likeness of products. 
Consumer organizations could weigh in during this process. The testimony of consumers’ 
organizations regarding their tastes and preferences would be essential in determining 
likeness. An organized process, whereby unsolicited briefs can be submitted in order to 
argue on consumer’s views on whether two products are like or not can first, signal to the 
consumers that their opinions matter in trade disputes; second, it can assist Panels in the 
fact-finding process; third, it can create a small but significant gateway for submissions. 
 
Interested parties would be allowed to indicate their preferences directly to the DSB. The 
WTO would then accumulate some experience on amicus briefs and their management 
within this narrow legal window. Possibly, member states could end up trusting this 
process more than one allowing for blanket submissions. The submission option could be 
limited through time and length constraints, and it could be restricted only to include 
NGOs registered with the WTO. Considering that the largest number of briefs submitted 
to the WTO in a single dispute was 17, and if the permissible length of briefs is 5 or 10 
pages, the response tasks for the parties and the dispute settlement panel would not be as 
burdensome. This proposal is a positive step towards addressing concerns regarding 
legitimacy and stakeholder participation in the WTO since it aspires to demonstrate a 
permanent opportunity for consumer association involvement in the Dispute Settlement 
Process. By introducing the consumer society as a potential friend of the court, the Panels 
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would further rationalize and democratize Article I and III likeness tests, thus paving the 
road for possible future participation of additional non-directly-trade related stakeholders 
once amicus curiae briefs are consistently introduced and advised. 
 
An even more imminent problem is the position of developing countries. The internal 
transparency concerns as we examined them in the chapter on transparency and 
development have become critical for the future of the Doha Development Round. This is 
the biggest challenge facing the WTO. The lack of a coherent development approach and 
the persistence on a neoliberal trade liberalization paradigm, compatible with the 
Washington Consensus has stopped being a viable trade rhetoric almost since as early as 
1995. Developing countries have stood up to their developed counterparts during the 
most recent conferences. Not only this is a recent phenomenon, after years of falling 
through the cracks during such meetings, but also developed countries responded with 
resort to PTAs and RTAs amongst themselves. Moreover, the solutions we proposed may 
mitigate some of the issues but they will be difficult (or better, impossible) to be agreed 
on under the current consensus rule. 
 
For acceding countries the internal transparency issues appear more limited. The number 
of countries outside the WTO system is very few at this point. The issue is more one of 
principle rather than substance: if the WTO wants to maintain a platform of trust for 
future negotiations, this culture of trust must be present from the beginning of the 
accession process for candidate members. Moreover, many of the candidate members and 
the UN countries that have not applied for membership yet are developing and least-
developed countries. This renders the relevance of trust much more prevalent. Examples 
such as the accession of Vanuatu, which was pressured by the United States as part of its 
accession to sign the Aviation Agreement (a plurilateral agreement) even though the 
country does not have a civil aviation system, should not occur in the WTO. The United 
States had a clear interest to “multilateralize” the Aviation Agreement by pushing 
towards the addition of signatory member states, to the point that this agenda became 
unreasonable, as the case of Vanuatu indicates. Products entirely absent from a national 
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market, either as imports or exports should at least be off the table during accession 
negotiations and should not be allowed to produce deadlocks. 
 
The space for improvement in the WTO with respect to transparency and legitimacy is 
not only present, but easy to locate, and to regulate. Improving and expanding discourse 
by introducing, filtering and taking account of different voices is neither impractical nor 
requires a normative stretch, such as a new agreement, or even new decisions from the 
General Council. The aim of the four chapters on each transparency was to examine the 
problems, seek normative space and propose immediate solutions, without the 
requirement of painstaking multilateral negotiations.  
B. Transnationalism, Constitutionalism and Democratization 
 
The content of transparency as a rule and as a legal principle has been conducive to the 
transnationalization of the WTO. Information acts as the link between global civil 
society, citizens around the world either organized as NGOs or as consumers, traders, 
multinational corporations and voters facing the results of Articles I and III of the GATT 
and other cardinal rules from the Agreements. They also face the effects of subsidization 
of key sectors, violations of WTO rules and hand-twisting into further liberalization. The 
first level of transnationalization occurs at the level of national markets, as the WTO 
through the lowering of tariffs changes the competition balance in the domestic context. 
The relationship of domestic industries and their representatives as well as importers and 
exporters occurs through Article X, which obliges the importing state to publish its laws 
related to trade and to maintain adjudication mechanisms for challenges of administrative 
measures. Legal transparency is the most prevalent transnationalizing factor. 
Additionally, some WTO members maintain inquiry points on the WTO domestically and 
have established mechanisms for their citizens to report violations of the WTO 
Agreements that they experience as they engage in international trade. 
 
External transparency also contributes to the transnationalization of the WTO. Non-state 
actors have a formal status in the organization and the Secretariat connects with them by 
maintaining a list of NGOs that can participate in events open to them. Moreover, the 
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controversial amicus curiae practice links non-state actors directly to the Dispute 
Settlement Process. If institutionalized, the submission of amicus briefs can become a 
major gateway for the representation of civil society interests at the international level 
and with time it will allow for the filtering of global citizenry interests in the WTO 
adjudicatory process, thus moving the WTO citizens, consumers and traders to the center 
of the world trading system. 6  
 
At a theoretical level, treating the four transparencies separately obscures the 
phenomenon of transnationalization resulting from increasing integration in the WTO 
context. The evolution of the GATT from diplomacy to law, the move towards 
transparency7 and the creation of the WTO set in motion processes for the pursuit of non-
state interests at the WTO level. Corporations and individuals participate indirectly in the 
WTO processes through national mechanisms that allow for them to notify their 
governments on WTO law violations, file complaints and generally exercise pressure on 
their governments to further pursue cases of violations of WTO law. Some examples of 
such practices are the United States Representative Open Government,8 the Civil Society 
Dialogue initiated by the European Commission9 and Canada’s consultation venue in the 
Department of International Affairs and International Trade.10 As we saw, in some cases, 
companies will even participate in the dispute settlement process. 11  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6  Similarly in the EU, see A. Brink and Flora Goudappel, Processes of Transnationalization of 
Administrative Values: Administrative Regulation and Transparency in the EU, in VALUES IN GLOBAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (G. Anthony et al eds. 2010). 
7 See for the emphasis in transparency in the WTO case law, segment on Legal Transparency. See also 
JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
116-118 (2006). 
8  Office of the United States Trade Representative Open Government 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/around/eop/ustr , Freedom of Information Act and Open Government 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/reading-room/freedom-information-act-foia/foia-and-open-government  
9 Dialogues, Civil Society http://trade.ec.europa.eu/civilsoc/index.cfm, EU and the WTO 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/eu-and-wto/working-with-the-wto/  
10Canada and the World Trade Organization (WTO) http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/wto-omc/index.aspx?view=d  
11 The Appellate Body in EC-Bananas has affirmed that this practice is legal. See Appellate Body Report, 
EC — Bananas III, para. 10. See also on the issue: Marco Bronckers & John Jackson, Editorial Comment: 
Outside Counsel in WTO Dispute Processes, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L.  1 155-158 (1999). P.D. Ehrenhaft, Right 
to Counsel' in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings: A 1998 Resolution of the American Bar Association, 
2 J. INT’L ECON. L.  1 159-162 (1999). Finally, on the Fuji-Kodak industry participation in Japan-Film see 
Jeffrey Dunoff, The Misguided Debate over NGO Participation at the WTO, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L.  437 
(1998). 
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All the above elements demonstrate that state sovereignty of the 1947 GATT has changed 
drastically. Countries still hold an important role in international trade regulation while a 
large number of actors are now demanding to be heard during WTO processes. Civil 
society and traders are not satisfied with having an observer status, even if that is an 
institutionalized one (such as the Ministerial Conference). Multinational corporations 
have been present through their legal representatives in major disputes 12 , NGOs 
consistently submit amicus curiae briefs and protestors are so vocal that Ministerial 
Conferences are brought to a complete halt. The “old world” center- periphery balance of 
western-state international law does not describe the contemporary international trading 
system. 
 
Transnationalization renders constitutionalist arguments less convincing. 
Constitutionalism involves less flexible normative forms, and hierarchically superior 
principles that allow for reliable answers during conflict resolution. In this polynormative 
world, and in this polynormative regime that the WTO has evolved to, legal analysis 
should be able to account for all the phenomena we described without meaning that they 
necessarily need to be incorporated in a pyramid-like scheme, or prioritized over one 
another. However, this is not to say that domestic analogies are entirely unwarranted. The 
WTO as many international organizations exhibits institutional structures that are 
reminiscent, even modeled after the national separation of powers paradigm.  The 
following tables outline the possible links to the traditional constitutional paradigm. The 
different “hats” of the General Council, as a legislative, an executive and a judicial 
branch, as well as the Ministerial Conference, with full powers to make any number of 
drastic changes to the Agreements (as it happened in the Uruguay Round), might look 
like a supranational version of the nation-state governance. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 See Jeffrey Dunoff, The Misguided Debate over NGO Participation at the WTO 1 J. INT’L ECON. L.  437 
(1998). 
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Figure 5 Separation of Powers in the WTO 
 
However, everything else in the WTO and its most pressing issues today are not solved 
by resorting to this separation of powers scheme. To extend constitutionalist analogies 
beyond the tables above would be creating problems with incorporating into a single, 
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WTO-specific narrative transnational phenomena. Additionally, the ultra-normativity13, 
the ability of international institutions to develop beyond the agreed legislation that 
created them is not necessarily a reason for the blank cheque skepticism that Peters 
cautions against. Peters argues that: 
 
“Another undemocratic feature of global governance is the blank cheque 
phenomenon. This problem in theory not only concerns the purely 
transitive democratic foundation of international law and global 
governance via the democratic nation states, but in practice arises here. 
States lack control over international law and global governance because 
many international treaties are not precise and static but general and 
dynamic. This is most obvious for treaties establishing international 
regimes or organizations with bodies which monitor behaviour, interpret 
imprecise and incomplete texts, and which develop new norms 
(adjudicatory and/or quasi-legislative activity), especially if such 
secondary law directly addresses individuals, and thus to some extent 
replaces domestic legislation and administrative acts (global governance 
properly speaking).”14 
 
The other side of the blank cheque problem is the ultranormative ability of international 
organizations. It is a form of progressive adaptability to pressing problems. An 
illustrative example is that of amicus briefs in the WTO. Not only are they not explicitly 
covered by the WTO Agreements, but the members of the General Council in a meeting 
openly condemned the Appellate Body’s practice. Yet, amicus briefs are still accepted in 
the WTO, not through some form of judicial activism, but through legal interpretation of 
existing clauses in the DSU that indeed allow for innovative fact-finding. When faced 
with the option of controversial discourse space, such as this, which clearly carries the 
potential of inclusion of many more voices, resorting to constitutionalism will lead to the 
end of such initiatives.  
 
Madison and Montesquieu, when they described the structures that became the 
foundations of modern constitutionalism, they did so in the context of newborn 
democracies. Their analysis was coupled not only with the constitutional legal space that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters 1:2 
GLOBAL POLICY 127-136 (2010). 
14 Anne Peters, Dual Democracy in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  329 et seq., 
293( J. Klabbers et al eds. 2009). 
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emerged, the French and American constitutions, but also the political space that brought 
these to life. WTO analysis before discussing the possibility of constitutional principles 
or global norms should first explore the same political space and what it can include in 
order to expand its reach and inclusiveness. The blank cheque problem may be the 
WTO’s saving grace to solve its legitimacy problems. A blank cheque to lock in place 
constitutional norms does carry the problems that Peters described. However, a blank 
cheque to enable more participants to put forward their concerns during decision making 
and a new mandate that moves away from the rigid neoliberalism of Articles I and III to 
the exploration of development-specific norms is the type of democratization that Cass 
and Nicolaides and Howse argued for.  
  
C. Forms of legitimacy in the WTO 
 
The least contested form of legitimacy is input legitimacy, through elections and direct 
participation of stakeholders in decision making. The nation state possesses the 
enforcement mechanisms, which are infamously absent in international law and draws 
legitimacy through clearly defined hierarchies or democratic participation. However, the 
direct participation of citizens in the operations of the organization is still not possible for 
two reasons mainly. First, states, which are still the main units of participation in the 
international community would be very reluctant to allow any involvement of 
individuals, and consensus to that effect is almost impossible to obtain at least in the near 
future. Second, even though participation platforms (elections) have been successfully 
established in few cases in regional organizations (such as the EU), the elected organs 
themselves are limited in their capacity. Equivalent forms at a global level are currently 
seen as utopian.  
 
References to the WTO demos exist in the preambles of the Agreement Establishing the 
WTO, and the GATT which mention raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and real income, the preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture which refers 
to food security, the preamble of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
and Article XX of the GATT referring to human health. The numerous protests against 
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the WTO can also be seen as tokens of the existence of a demos, in a reverse fashion. 
Citizens of different countries voice jointly their opposition to the policies of the 
organization. Moreover, citizens of member states are the WTO demos both in terms of 
their government’s membership in the organization but also as “citizens-consumers.”15 
The fundamental participant units in trade are the vendor and the buyer.   
 
In order to be a “citizen-consumer” any kind of participation in the national economy of a 
WTO member state can be sufficient to delineate the WTO demos as inclusive of all 
“citizens-consumers.” Furthermore, it is in the interest of the consumers to find the 
cheapest product in the market and the progressive elimination of tariffs is a crucial 
mechanism to that effect.16  Transparency thus can empower actors towards norm 
compliance and promote discourse.17 Consumers in WTO member states ultimately enjoy 
the benefits from tariff reduction and elimination. A case for the immediacy of 
distributional effects of WTO measures to consumers is more than reasonable.18 The 
strong civil society opposition during the Seattle Ministerial and other WTO high profile 
meetings indicates that citizens also understand themselves as direct recipients of 
measures adopted in the WTO context. 
 
At first glance, it seems that the lack of direct participation or global elections could pose 
a legitimacy deadlock for the global demos, or the global civil society. Helmut Willke in 
his book “Smart Governance” addresses the input legitimacy dead-end and seeks 
methods to “compensate for the lack of formal legitimacy and formal democratic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 ULRICH BECK, WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION 70 (2000). 
16 Under this description with respect to demos the WTO falls most likely between the model of 
intergovernmentalism and global governance, although one could argue that the existence of protests could 
also bring WTO to the model of global polity. See Raffaele Marchetti, Models of Global Democracy in 
Defence of Cosmofederalism, in GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 22-47, 
23-27, 32 (R. Marchetti ed. 2008). 
17 Thomas Hale, Transparency, Accountability, and Global Governance 14:1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 73-94, 
85 (2008). 
18See recently Benjamin Faber, Trade liberalization, the price of quality, and inequality: Evidence from 
Mexican store prices, (2012) available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/rese_12sep13_paper2_e.htm.pdf and David Tarr, Russian 
WTO accession: Achievements, impacts, challenges, WORLD BANK & OECD 5-9 (2010) on impact of 
Russia’s accession to the WTO on Russian households. See also T. Rutherford and D. Tarr, Poverty Effects 
of Russia‟s WTO Accession: modeling “real households” and endogenous productivity effects, 75:1 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 131 – 150 (2008). 
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structures.”19 According to Willke, the main source of the legitimacy complains is that 
there is no global government corresponding to the global political system. In the lack of 
“normative authority” (majority vote), it should be replaced with forms of “cognitive 
authority[…], a complex interplay of minimizing doubts and maximizing revisions in the 
framework of “organized skepticism.” 20  Formal democratic legitimacy should be 
replaced by “derivatives of (formal) legitimacy” providing also some form of 
accountability of the organization or the regime.21 He identifies the WTO as an example 
of an institution, which develops this rationale.22 
 
He explains that: 
 
“ In more general terms, the input-legitimacy of formal democratic law 
becomes but one side of a polycentric architecture of sources of 
legitimacy, including in particular an output-legitimacy as a major form of 
derivative legitimacy.”23  
 
Willke concludes that: “…transparency, efficiency, expertise, accountability, and 
popularity are as much foundations of legitimacy as are nationality and democratic 
process.”24 Facing legitimacy problems that structurally cannot be addressed through 
democratic means and input legitimacy the WTO’s institutional response can be to excel 
in other legitimacy forms. 25 The most obvious legitimacy form would be output 
legitimacy. Currently one of the main output legitimacy processes in international law is 
transparency, and considering the prominent Article X transparency obligation in the 
GATT it is not outside the WTO’s institutional ethos to extend such principles to its own 
function. Transparency can contribute to the WTO’s output legitimacy (and marginally, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 HELMUT WILLKE, SMART GOVERNANCE: GOVERNING THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 8(2007). 
20 Id. 45. 
21 Id. 46 emphasis in the original. 
22 Id. 76.  
23 Id. 94.  
24 Id. 
25 By analogy the argument in the EU has been discussed by FRITZ W SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: 
EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? (1999) as well as Andrew Glencross, Democratic Inputs versus Output-
Oriented Governance: The ECB’s Evolving Role and the New Architecture of Legitimacy in the EU 
<www.researchgate.net/profile/Andrew_Glencross/publication/270338057_Democratic_Inputs_versus_Out
put-
_Oriented_Governance_The_ECB%27s_Evolving_Role_and_the_New_Architecture_of_Legitimacy_in_th
e_EU/links/54a7c0030cf257a6360ad46d.pdf> p.24 
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with amicus briefs to its input legitimacy). In the legitimacy debate within the WTO, 
transparency in its different forms serves as an output legitimacy component (through 
Article X, the constant updating of the WTO website, and the public broadcasting of 
meetings of various WTO bodies). It simultaneously serves as an expression of input 
legitimacy, through the submission of amicus curiae briefs. The costs of publication are 
continuously reduced because of information technology developments. Also, countries 
that publish their rules and administrative procedures related to trade become potentially 
more investor-friendly26. However, costs remain high for developing and least developed 
countries who still suffer from huge infrastructural deficits and need assistance to 
overcome them.  
 
Overall, input and output legitimacy forms imply that independent of the WTO member 
states and whether the government representatives in the WTO are elected through 
democratic processes or not, the WTO, in absence of a global democracy has developed a 
proto-form of substitutes to its lack of democratic legitimacy. Transparency is currently 
the most significant of these substitutes, possibly the only one that is as prevalent.  
 
Transparency can produce two other forms of legitimacy. First, process, or throughput 
legitimacy, which echoes the domestic rule of law in decision-making processes. Kjaer’s 
analysis approximates a definition of such process legitimacy: 
 
 “The question of legitimacy is therefore reduced to an evaluation of the 
ability of the relevant legal infrastructure to ensure that the perspectives 
emerging from different societal spheres are in concordance or to put it 
another way: that the legal infrastructure can achieve convergence 
between the different perspectives of science, environment, health, 
economics and politics. Taking the complexity of the issues and the 
multitude of perspectives into consideration, constant convergence is an 
unlikely outcome. […] Hence the classic distinction between input and 
output legitimation is replaced by an understanding of the process itself as 
the central source of legitimacy.” 27 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Ljiljiana Biukovic, Selective Adaptation of WTO Transparency Norms and Local Practices in China and 
Japan, 11:4 J. INT’L ECON. L.  803-825 (2008). 
27 POUL F. KJAER, BETWEEN GOVERNING AND GOVERNANCE: ON THE EMERGENCE, FUNCTION AND FORM 
OF EUROPE'S POST-NATIONAL CONSTELLATION 137(2010). 
 
291 
However, Vivien Schmidt cautions against this substitution. As this is the most 
incomplete legitimacy form, it cannot replace neither input or output legitimacy 
deficits.28 As such the WTO cannot rely, and this is evident from its current legitimacy 
deadlocks, in mere publication of documents or following established procedures in order 
to solve its legitimacy problems. 
 
Finally, to the extent that transparency is part and parcel of WTO official rhetoric and a 
general institutional commitment, transparency becomes an integral element of the 
organization’s mission legitimacy.29 In the WTO context, the link between transparency 
and mission legitimacy does not signal towards the organization’s “destiny” nor does it 
point to a “promised land.”30 Rather, it reaffirms trust and openness as the foundations of 
the international trading system. Historical periods that preceded both the GATT and the 
WTO, namely the Second World War and the Cold War, were characterized by historians 
as “dark times.” Consequently, the two international trade structures that emerged after 
the end of obscurity have an inherent disposition towards openness, participation and 
transparency.  
 
 
Form of 
legitimation 
Expression  WTO form Legitimacy 
Classification 
Vertical 
legitimation 
Incomplete secondary 
vertical legitimation 
National legitimacy 
processes of WTO member 
states’ governments 
Input 
Executive 
representation 
General Council, 
Ministerial 
Conferences 
Internal transparency, 
consensus and meaningful 
decision-making  
Input, 
Throughput, 
Mission 
Horizontal 
mutual control 
Permanent in trade 
review bodies and 
mechanisms, 
exceptional during the 
Legal and administrative 
transparency 
Output, 
Throughput 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Vivien A. Schmidt, Forgotten Democratic Legitimacy: “Governing by the Rules” and “Ruling by the 
Numbers" in the Euro Crisis in THE FUTURE OF THE EURO” (M. Blyth & M. Matthijs eds. forthcoming, 
2015 Final Draft for Chapter on file with the author) 
29 J.H.H. Weiler 60 Years since the First European Community: Reflections on Messianism” 22 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 303-311 (2011), and Gráinne de Búrca, Europe's Raison D'Etre NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PUBLIC 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPERS Paper 385. http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/385 (2013) 
30 J.H.H. Weiler 60 Years since the First European Community: Reflections on Messianism” 22 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 303-306 (2011). 
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DSU process 
Associative 
and expert 
representation  
Amicus curiae briefs, 
expert testimonies, 
NGO participation in 
Ministerials etc. 
External and administrative 
transparency 
Input, 
Throughput 
Individual- 
Rights’ based 
legitimacy  
Publication of WTO 
documents, national 
inquiry points, Article 
X and equivalents 
national administrative 
and adjudicatory 
recourse mechanisms 
External and legal 
transparency 
Output, 
Throughput, 
Mission 
 
Table 11 Legitimacy classifications of different transparency forms 
All forms of legitimacy that are mentioned in table 11 are currently deficient and 
incomplete in the WTO. Their existence however demonstrates that there is potential to 
fix many extant problems in the organization. Transparency cannot be an ad hoc or de 
facto substitute for direct democracy deficits in the WTO. Rather, only a coordinated and 
committed change of direction in all transparency forms has the potential to act as an 
efficient legitimacy substitute and remedy the deficits outlined in the introduction. The 
WTO’s performance on transparency is far from optimal. Consequently, such 
improvements would improve the legitimacy status of the organization. Most important is 
for the WTO officials to be aware of inconsistencies with respect to transparency. The 
same applies for the Appellate Body, as it chose to engage with external transparency: 
insisting that civil society should be heard means that its voice should be considered 
seriously and answered in case law. As we saw, such briefs have only been meaningfully 
integrated in WTO case law very few times. However, the overall approach of the Panels 
and the Appellate Body creates the necessary conditions for such input legitimacy. 
Allowing for a narrow and undisputedly open window for submission of briefs based on a 
practical standpoint – the determination of likeness in products – aspires to harvest the 
opportunity that the Panels and Appellate Body have chosen to leave open. 
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Conclusion 
 
This doctoral dissertation has attempted to collect and discuss all the transparency 
elements that appear in the context of the WTO. As an academic project it aspires to act 
as a foundation for a systematic review of the WTO’s performance on transparency and 
the improvement of all the problematic areas. In view of the Doha deadlock the WTO’s 
role as a negotiation forum for multilateral agreements will subside in the next decade. 
However, its monitoring function will continue, and perhaps will redirect the mandate of 
the organization from trying to promote trade liberalization to maintaining a forum of 
information, which can be mainly useful to the WTO’s global citizenry.  
 
First, transparency has received a lot of attention recently in Public International Law, 
International Relations and International Economic Law. I expect that there will be a 
proliferation of systematic attempts to assess the position of transparency in other 
transnational regimes as the field grows bigger and extends beyond the more limited 
international/global administrative law analysis.  
 
Second, as international organizations (and international financial institutions more 
specifically) have suffered from legitimacy crises at a more structural level in the last 
three decades, works geared towards tracing and evaluating democratic elements in 
multifaceted principles of these organizations will multiply. By exploring transparency in 
all its manifestations, this thesis aspires to provide a model of analysis of composite 
democracy at a transnational level, and a case for comparison with other international 
organizations, which also lack direct electoral legitimacy. 
 
Lastly, this analysis can be useful for other international organizations in the context of 
global governance. The WTO exhibits many of the elements of a global governance 
system or regime and transparency contributes an important aspect, that of legitimacy 
substitution. Moreover, it is indicative of the dynamic process that David Kennedy 
describes when he discusses global governance. According to Kennedy: 
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“We will need to think of our work on global governance not only as 
description, but also as program for a world in transition. At the same 
time, of course, any such program will be but one among many, and will 
find itself pushed and pulled by the projects and priorities of all the other 
actors on the field. We will need to think about global governance as a 
dynamic process, in which legal, political and economic arrangements 
unleash interests, change the balance of forces, and lead to further 
reinvention of the governance scheme itself.”1 
 
Willke in the same spirit notes that: 
 
Global governance consists in large parts in creating governance regimes 
for global contexts by establishing organizations (institutions), structures, 
processes and rule systems that have the capabilities to provide intelligent 
decisions for highly complex and concatenated problems.2 
 
The transnationalization of legal relationships in the WTO context enables the emergence 
of a number of hybrid, public-private forms of participation in the global trade order. As 
such, a global governance regime describes the current state of the WTO. It differs from 
the international regimes because of a number of additional elements present in the WTO 
and evident through the transparency analysis. Considering the transnationalization of 
legal relationships, participation to the WTO is not static, but to some extent includes 
civil society stakeholders and other transnational actors. This element is very crucial for a 
global governance regime. Exclusion of civil society actors is reminiscent of the old 
Westphalian international organization instead of a global governance regime. To this 
day, direct and indirect participation of non-state actors lato sensu in the WTO has taken 
all the different forms that the transparency analysis shows. 
 
It remains a fact, however, that the WTO is a member-driven organization. With this 
analysis, I do not negate the relevance of Westphalian state and the results of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, 34 OHIO NORTHERN U. L. REV. 827-860, 832 
(2008). 
2 HELMUT WILLKE, SMART GOVERNANCE: GOVERNING THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 42 (2007). 
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multilateralism. 3 It is important at the same time to internalize levels of governance that 
extend beyond the nation state. NGOs and the amorphous maze of the global civil 
society, either in the form of consumers or in the form of protestors, are relevant to the 
WTO. 4 This analysis points towards ways by which the nation state has bound itself 
contractually that result in creating rights and information processes for individuals, 
corporations and NGOs (and other actors). Such state- non-state interactions at the 
international level make relationships incontestably transnational. The WTO is also 
responsive to global civil society, aware of the criticism and making efforts to address it 
at some level.5 The WTO consists of member states whose constituencies are aware of 
the WTO and the way it works. Current technology and the WTO practice of publication 
online allows for information on international trade regulation to travel instantly and for a 
nominal cost. This flow of information increases the requests for transparency.6 Thus 
transparency, which allows for information and the development of knowledge networks 
at a national and a global level matters a lot for the characterization of a organization as a 
global governance regime. Moreover, WTO has developed over the years many 
transnational properties and secondary participation mechanisms for civil society actors 
and industry representatives, also contributing to its transparency commitment. The 
dynamic process of global governance regime formation, as well as the evolution of 
transparency can be useful for other international regimes to embrace hybrid democratic 
forms through output legitimacy.  
 
This thesis focused on a socio-legal assessment of democratic elements or traces that 
were achieved in the WTO context through consensus and can be expanded through the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See AM- Slaughter, the emergence of a global rule of law coupled with the nation state structures where 
the “bearers” of sovereignty will be “disaggregated government institutions.” That may be the near future 
of international trade regulation. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 261 (2005). 
4 Achilles Skordas, Self-determination of peoples and transnational regimes: a foundational principle of 
global governance, in TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN MODELS 
207-268, 253 (N. Tsagourias ed. 2007). 
5 See also here HELMUT WILLKE, SMART GOVERNANCE: GOVERNING THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 
168 (2007) on political inclusion of intelligent governance regimes.  
6 See Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT’L & FOREIGN AFF. 1-21, 
1 (1998-1999). 
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WTO processes.7 Through this analysis I hope to shed light onto patterns of development 
of principles into legal norms. Further, I propose that efforts for reform of the WTO can 
concentrate in already functioning processes. Thus future proposals for reform can 
explore regulatory spaces where different elements of input and output legitimacy can 
exist, potentially adding to the democratization of international law. The challenge, of 
course, remains: to find practical ways to improve the WTO’s transparency track record. 
This can help create permanent links between output legitimacy and hybrid forms of 
global democracy. This may be the future of global democratic structures, at least in the 
short term.  
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  Susan Rose-Ackerman & Rory Truex, Corruption and Policy Reform YALE LAW & ECONOMICS 
RESEARCH PAPER No. 444.  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2007152 on the mutual impact of how non-
democracies benefit from public accountability and transparency.  
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ACWL  Advisory Centre on WTO Law 
ATC Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
DSB  Dispute Settlement Body 
DSU  Dispute Settlement Understanding 
EU  European Union 
GAL  Global Administrative Law 
GATS  General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947 as amended) 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product  
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
IOs International Organizations 
IPA International Public Authority 
IPL International Public Law 
LDCs  Least Developed Countries 
MFN  Most Favored Nation 
NGOs  Non Governmental Organizations 
PTAs  Preferential Trade Agreements 
RTAs  Regional Trade Agreements 
SPS  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
TBT Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade 
TRIPS  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
UN    United Nations 
UNCTAD  United Nations Commission on Trade and Development 
US  United States of America 
WTO  World Trade organization 
 
  
